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Abstract 
 Singapore was the stronghold of British intelligence in the Far East during 
the Cold War. The small city-colony played host to a diverse range of British 
intelligence organisations including regional outposts of MI5 and the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS), specialist technical intelligence centres, open source 
reporting centres and the police Special Branch. These intelligence outfits 
operated across three levels: the local, the regional and the national. This thesis 
investigates the British intelligence milieu in Singapore, focusing upon its 
organisation and status; its working culture and operations; and its impact or 
influence. In so doing, the thesis interrogates to what extent we can speak of a 
definable British intelligence ‘community’ in Singapore during the early Cold 
War. It concludes that there were instead two distinct communities: a local 
intelligence community, and a regional-national one. Nevertheless, there were two 
core similarities. Security intelligence was at the forefront of both communities as 
the most appropriate response to the nature of the Cold War both within 
Singapore and the Southeast Asian region. Secondly, both intelligence 
communities played a significant role not just in shaping official perceptions but 
as avenues for covert policy implementation. At the regional level, intelligence 
activities enabled Britain to fight the Cold War through clandestine measures, 
fulfilling the key policy goal of providing containment without (extensive) 
commitments. Locally, security intelligence was a major driving force in the 
engagement between the Singapore government, communist ‘terrorists’ and anti-
colonial nationalists. This thesis is not just about British intelligence in the Cold 
War. It also provides original insight into Singapore’s transition to self-
government between 1946 and 1959 by focusing on the crucial role played by 
Special Branch. Intelligence services were vital in ensuring that Singapore was 
rendered ‘safe’ for decolonisation, and their activities indicate continuity between 
colonial and post-colonial government in Singapore. 
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1. Introduction. A ‘unique window’? 
 As centres of real-life intrigue and fictional espionage drama, Berlin and 
Vienna attained iconic status as Cold War spy cities. To a lesser extent, Hong 
Kong enjoyed a reputation as ‘the Berlin of the East’.1 Far less attention has been 
given to Singapore, despite the city-colony being, as noted Richard Aldrich, ‘the 
nerve centre of British defence forces east of Suez’.2 Although Hong Kong was a 
significant base for ‘China watching’, Singapore was the hub of British 
intelligence in the Far East.3  
 This thesis examines the organisation, operation and influence of the 
British intelligence apparatus in Singapore during the early Cold War. It 
emphasises the creation of two distinct British intelligence communities in 
Singapore: a local community focused on internal developments within the city-
colony, and a regional community with an external outlook often (but not always) 
aligned with Britain’s national intelligence agenda. Contemporary commentators 
expressed two contradictory views of this system. On the one hand, some of the 
user departments receiving their reports saw the ‘regional’ level of intelligence as 
a waste of effort and expense. It is true that intelligence managers in Singapore 
struggled to secure a reliable intake of raw information from their outposts in 
Southeast Asia, and that their analyses sometimes admitted to being largely 
speculative. However, another viewpoint predominated: that this system provided 
a ‘unique window’ and unique opportunity to deal with the intelligence challenges 
posed by Singapore and Southeast Asia. These challenges included violence 
orchestrated by national communist parties such as the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP), Viet Minh and others; concerns about the influence of communist China 
over Chinese diasporas; anxieties about the anti-colonial activities of Indonesia; 
and fears about the possibility of direct Soviet meddling. Meanwhile, Britain was 
reluctant to enter into overt and encompassing Cold War commitments in 
Southeast Asia. As this thesis demonstrates, the Singapore intelligence apparatus 
                                                            
1 Mark Chi-kwan, Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations, 1949-1957 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 43; Johannes Richard Lombardo, ‘United States Foreign Policy towards 
the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong during the Early Cold War Period, 1945-1964’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1997) p. 51. 
2 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘“The Value of Residual Empire”: Anglo-American Intelligence Cooperation 
in Asia after 1945’, in Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World, 
ed. by Richard J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 226-258 (p. 236). 
3 Aldrich, ‘The Value of Residual Empire’, p. 248. 
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provided an ideal solution. It became a framework to covertly fight the Cold War 
in Southeast Asia through propaganda, security assistance and intelligence 
diplomacy. This is why the Singapore intelligence machine continued to be 
regarded as an important tool in Britain’s Cold War arsenal.  
 Meanwhile, the thesis also provides an original contribution to our 
understanding of Singapore’s transition towards eventual independence during the 
critical period of 1946-59. Intelligence and security services were at the forefront 
of this process, and understanding their role casts light on the priorities, 
vulnerabilities and strengths of the colonial state during its latter stages. The 
importance of intelligence and the security operations it guided emphasises 
continuity between colonial and post-colonial Singapore. 
 The significance of Singapore to Britain’s Cold War was encapsulated by 
the commentary of Joseph Burkholder Smith, an American Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) official posted to Singapore in 1954: 
Singapore, however, presented a set of special circumstances […] It was 
the site of the headquarters of all British defence forces east of Suez – 
army, navy and air – as well as the location of the office of the High 
Commissioner for Southeast Asia,4 to which were attached an office of 
MI-5,5 Britain’s intelligence service charged with the ‘security of the 
realm’, MI-6,6 the British secret service for foreign intelligence operations, 
an office for collating intelligence from all British and Commonwealth 
intelligence-collection organisations in the Far East,7 and the Information 
Research Department, IRD,8 Britain’s Cold War propaganda and 
psychological warfare service. The CIA Singapore station, hence, was 
located in the centre of British intelligence and Cold War activities 
involving all of Asia.9 
This list is incomplete. Singapore also played host to the regional headquarters of 
Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the three service intelligence 
directorates (army, navy and air force), a significant signals intelligence site, a 
specialised image intelligence centre, and various open source intelligence 
initiatives. These agencies all had an outwards-facing ‘regional’ outlook. They 
                                                            
4 The Commissioner General for Southeast Asia. 
5 MI5, whose motto is actually Regnum Defende: defence of the realm. 
6 MI6, more properly known as the Secret Intelligence Service. 
7 The Joint Intelligence Bureau. 
8 Represented in Singapore through its offshoot, the Regional Information Office. 
9 Joseph B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Putnam’s, 1976), pp. 145-146. 
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were joined by more inwards-looking, ‘local’ intelligence services such as the 
police Special Branch.  
 In addition, as Smith’s statement implied, the importance of Singapore to 
Britain’s imperial outlook made it a centre for international intelligence 
interactions. Cold War allies including the United States, Australia, France and 
the Netherlands all maintained a presence in Singapore to participate in the often 
unrewarding game of intelligence liaison. Less friendly nations also contributed to 
the Singapore intelligence game. British security services were concerned about 
the potential activities of Soviet and Chinese spies, although there was little 
evidence of their presence. In the early 1950s, Indonesia’s intelligence services 
were useful allies. However, by the time of Indonesia’s Outer Islands rebellion in 
1958, supported covertly by Britain and the United States, relations had 
deteriorated. Indonesian rebels used Singapore to gather information on the 
outside world and try to garner sympathy, whilst the security services of the 
Indonesian state recruited local agents to frustrate their efforts.10 With such a 
plethora of friendly and hostile clandestine operatives, it is no surprise that Wies 
Platje, a former Dutch cryptanalyst, recalled that ‘Singapore became an ideal 
fishing ground for a professional intelligence officer’.11 
 The rise of Singapore as a Cold War intelligence city created enticing 
opportunities for Britain. Not only was it the hub of their own intelligence efforts, 
but Singapore’s status helped bolster their dwindling power and influence through 
interactions with long-standing allies and new post-colonial nations. This process 
could also be a cause for friction and jealousy between the authorities in 
Singapore and the imperial metropole.  
 In January 1955, Sir Dick White, the Director-General of Britain’s 
Security Service, faced an uphill struggle in convincing the Foreign Office of the 
importance of Singapore intelligence work. The Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir 
Ivone Kirkpatrick, was considering cost-saving by reducing overseas intelligence 
establishments. Comparing Singapore with Germany, the Permanent Under-
                                                            
10 Matthew Jones, ‘Maximum Disavowable Aid: Britain, the United States and the Indonesian 
Rebellion, 1957-1958’, English Historical Review, 114(459) (1999), 1179-1216 (p. 1188). 
11 Wies Platje, ‘Dutch Sigint and the Conflict with Indonesia’, in Secrets of Signals Intelligence 
during the Cold War and Beyond (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 285-312 (p. 301). 
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Secretary seemed to think that ‘Singapore also was full of intelligence officers 
[…] a slough of despond in South East Asia’. Kirkpatrick disregarded the value of 
intelligence collation and analysis on the spot. He criticised the Far Eastern 
intelligence hub in Singapore and its Middle Eastern counterpart in Cyprus. As 
White recalled, Kirkpatrick questioned whether ‘by working on the island of 
Cyprus, one was any more realistically partaking in the atmosphere of the Middle 
East than by working in London. Indeed, he thought that the tendency of a small 
island would be towards parochialism’.12  
 In contrast, Cold War intelligence managers preferred the argument that an 
intelligence community in Singapore could provide more informed analyses of 
developments based on proximity and cultural immersion than any analysis that 
could be produced in London. This view was not unique to British intelligence. 
During his first visit to Singapore, the CIA’s Russell Jack Smith, observed that: 
The professional bonanza came in the realisation of Singapore’s 
significance in the mid-1950s as a strategic centre in Southeast Asia. 
Singapore was far more than an entrepôt. For the British it was both a 
bastion of commercial-financial interest and a regional defence centre […] 
For the Americans, Singapore had mostly commercial value, but its 
importance in long-term strategic terms was evident in Washington. For 
both, it was a unique window on the swirling post-World War II scene of 
Southeast Asia where every country from Burma to Indonesia was 
struggling to reach a new accommodation with changed realities. It 
seemed to me that an observer with a broad substantive background, 
situated in Singapore, could provide perspectives and insights of value. 
Through his immersion in the local scene and his normal contacts with 
merchants, shipping men, military officers, and diplomats he could gain an 
understanding of the interplay of economic, political, and strategic forces 
as seen from within the region, not from distant and paperbound 
Washington.13 
This thesis explores the tension between these two interpretations: the ‘slough of 
despond’ and ‘unique window’. Looking purely at the production of intelligence 
and its processing from raw information into useful reports, it is easy to see why 
                                                            
12 Kew, The National Archives [TNA], KV 4/426, Note of discussion between White and 
Kirkpatrick, 13 January 1955. 
13 Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Washington: 
Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), p. 90. 
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Singapore could be regarded as a ‘slough of despond’. Yet this view failed to 
gather traction. Instead, the ‘unique window’ view came to dominate. 
 This ‘unique window’ (or ‘slough of despond’) was part of an even larger 
organisation: the office of the Commissioner General for Southeast Asia. This was 
a semi-proconsular appointment created in May 1948 to coordinate foreign, 
colonial, defence and intelligence policy in Southeast Asia. During the period 
covered by this thesis, the office had two incumbents. Its first holder (from 1948-
55) was Malcolm MacDonald. An unconventional diplomat and avid collector of 
Asian art, MacDonald once proclaimed that ‘I like Beauty, I love Beauty, I 
worship Beauty in all its earthly forms’.14 His relationship with the intelligence 
community, however, was not always so amorous. At first a thorn in the side of 
the intelligence services, by the 1950s MacDonald became an enthusiastic 
champion of secret intelligence and covert propaganda. A believer in ‘domino 
theory’, he appreciated the utility of clandestine methods in achieving Britain’s 
Cold War goals on the sly.15 In 1955, MacDonald was replaced by the more 
conventional Robert Heatlie Scott. The latter already had an intimate knowledge 
of the intelligence apparatus in the Far East. In the course of his Foreign Office 
career, Scott had served as the first chair of the JIC in Singapore. 
 In 1952, The Times explained to its readers the activities of this regional 
bureaucracy, by then housed in a purpose-built complex at Phoenix Park. This 
former golf club was converted to house the 450 civil servants working under 
Malcolm MacDonald in Singapore. Its name was derived from the emblem of 
wartime Southeast Asia Command. The Times wrote that: 
The office of the Commissioner General in Southeast Asia has been 
described as a tropical duplication of Whitehall, and it certainly represents 
an intelligent approach to the new Asia. In its prefabricated offices in 
                                                            
14 Malcolm J. MacDonald, The Pleasures and Pains of Collecting, ed. by Alexander Nicholas 
Shaw (Durham: Friends of the Oriental Museum, 2018), p. 154. 
15 ‘Domino theory’ refers to the idea that the ‘fall’ of one nation to communism could cause 
communism to spread to neighbouring states ad infinitum – like falling dominoes. The term was 
popularised by President Eisenhower in 1954 with regard to Indochina. Wen-Qing Ngoei 
suggested that MacDonald’s views, transmitted to the Americans and borne out by the rapid 
collapse of Southeast Asia to Japan in 1941-42, may have influenced Eisenhower’s developing 
views. See: Wen-Qing Ngoei, ‘World War II, Race and the Southeast Asian Origins of the 
Domino Theory’, Sources and Methods (Wilson Centre, 2017) 
<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/world-war-ii-race-and-the-southeast-asian-origins-the-
domino-theory> [accessed 8 March 2019]. 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
6 
 
Phoenix Park are diplomatic and colonial sections, economic, technical 
and labour, and intelligence departments and the Defence Coordination 
Committee, and if at times the complexity of its scope would seem 
confusing it is no more so than the region with which it is concerned. One 
of its main tasks is the collection and coordination of information of all 
kinds from British territories and neighbouring countries.16 
Information was at the heart of this large and nebulously-defined bureaucracy. 
This thesis considers how intelligence agencies not only helped to shape the 
opinions of user departments in Phoenix Park (and Singapore’s Government 
House), but also how they provided opportunities to enact policies. This is 
particularly evident in the role of Special Branch as a police enforcement actor as 
well as intelligence collector. It is equally clear with regard to the international 
intelligence activities which supported Britain’s foreign policy objectives. The 
ability to contribute to policy implementation was a major factor in explaining 
why the effectiveness and desirability of the Singapore intelligence centre was not 
subjected to greater scrutiny. 
 Within Singapore, there were many British intelligence agencies. At the 
apex of the status pyramid sat the Joint Intelligence Committee, Far East – the 
JIC(FE). This was a body primarily concerned with multiple-source evaluations 
with a strategic focus. It was modelled upon the national JIC which sat under the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee in Whitehall and acted as ‘the interface between 
intelligence and policy’.17 Underneath the JIC(FE), a number of independent 
agencies conducted different intelligence activities. Two of the most prominent 
were Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE) and the Far East Controller. SIFE was 
an offshoot of the Security Service (MI5) concerned with security intelligence. 
The Far East Controller, also known as SIS(FE), was the regional representative 
of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6). The Controller coordinated SIS 
field stations across the region. A Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) prepared reports 
for the armed services about defence economics, topography and scientific 
matters. There were also intelligence departments affiliated with the three armed 
services, as well as other joint initiatives. These intelligence organisations sat 
across three bureaucratic levels. The JIC(FE), SIFE and SIS(FE) all sat at the 
                                                            
16 ‘Troubles of S.-East Asian Region’, The Times, 5 December 1952, p. 6. 
17 Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World 
(London: John Murray, 2002), p. 1. 
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‘regional’ level, using Singapore as a base (and conceptual focal point) for 
activities across Southeast Asia. This was closely tied with the ‘national’ priorities 
of British intelligence, and ‘national’ bodies like MI5 Head Office sometimes 
interfered with processes occurring in Singapore. Meanwhile, the ‘local’ level of 
intelligence, concerned with Singapore itself, was dominated by the police Special 
Branch. Defining the boundaries between national security intelligence (a concept 
examined later in this chapter), colonial information production and police-work 
persistently created problems across these levels of intelligence. 
 There are three core concepts to this thesis. Firstly, it examines the 
organisation, working culture and impact of the three levels of British intelligence 
working in or through Singapore. From this, it concludes that there were strong 
distinctions between the local intelligence community and a ‘regional-national’ 
one. Secondly, two interpretations of this system are evaluated: the ‘unique 
window’ versus the ‘slough of despond’. Britain struggled to improve information 
collection, implying that – in terms of fulfilling its most basic intelligence 
functions – regional intelligence was a ‘slough of despond’. Nevertheless, this 
view did not persist, and regional intelligence was seen as effective for a number 
of reasons. Most notably, it provided an opportunity to exert influence in the 
clandestine Cold War and preserve British influence. Thirdly, this thesis 
highlights the significance of intelligence to understanding Singapore’s post-war 
transitions from colony to self-government. 
 
Singapore in transition 
 Whilst this discussion is concerned primarily with the role of a particular 
British intelligence community in the Cold War, it also provides a new 
perspective on the history of Singapore. The period of 1946-59 was one of great 
change within Singapore. It was also a period of political diversity, when the 
triumph of the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has governed the city-state 
continuously from the first elections under self-government in 1959, was not yet 
certain. During the 1940s and 1950s, colonial administrators had to deal with the 
sometimes violent opposition of the MCP, various hues of what they regarded as 
more ‘legitimate’ nationalists, and growing concerns about the pull factor of 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
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communist China. They were equally concerned about the potential for Soviet or 
Indonesian meddling, and the uncertainties generated by the national 
government’s move towards decolonisation. In this period of Singapore’s 
transition, intelligence was at the forefront of Britain’s response. Its vital role has 
not previously been explored. 
 In April 1946, the temporary British Military Administration handed over 
authority to a new civilian government. Before the Second World War, Singapore 
was administered as part of the ‘Straits Settlements’ consisting of Malacca, 
Penang and Singapore. The other Malay States were under indirect rule. After the 
war, this form of colonial government seemed anachronistic, and British rule was 
modernised to better facilitate progress towards self-government. Singapore 
became a separate Crown Colony and mainland Malaya was unified into a 
Malayan Union (1946-48) and subsequently the Federation of Malaya (1948-57). 
The first Governor of Singapore (see table 1.1) was Franklin Gimson. An 
experienced Colonial Office Asia hand, Gimson’s career had taken him from 
Ceylon to Hong Kong just in time to be interned by the invading Japanese. After 
four months as Governor of Singapore, Gimson was awarded a knighthood. Some 
of his early priorities were social welfare provision and minor political reforms. 
However, the increasing violence of the ‘Emergency’ provoked by the MCP and 
the government’s incompetence during a period of riots in December 1950 
dominated Gimson’s governorship.18 
Table 1.1. Governors of Singapore, 1946-59 
Franklin Gimson 1946-52 
John Fearns Nicoll 1952-55 
Robert Brown Black 1955-57 
William A. C. Goode  1957-59 
 
 Singapore’s status as a ‘new’ colony had a bearing upon intelligence 
activities, which at times seemed experimental. Equally importantly, its ethnic 
make-up was a crucial factor in how intelligence practitioners and their 
                                                            
18 A. J. Stockwell, ‘A Colonial Progress: Franklin Gimson in Ceylon, Hong Kong and Singapore’, 
in Studying Singapore’s Past: C. M. Turnbull and the History of Modern Singapore, ed. by 
Nicholas Tarling (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), pp. 171-206. 
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governmental consumers understood Singapore. In 1947, Singapore underwent its 
first post-war census. Before results were published, the government estimated 
that 90% of the population were ethnically Chinese. The actual results showed 
that, of a total population of 980,000, 77.7% were Chinese (see table 1.2).19 By 
the time of the next census in 1957, the population had grown by almost 50% to 
over 1.4 million. This rapid growth entailed an additional concern for intelligence 
practitioners, particularly with regard to immigration from China or Hong Kong.20  
Table 1.2. Singapore population in 1947. 
Chinese 77.7% 
Malay 12.2% 
Indian 7.2% 
European 1.1% 
Eurasian 1.0% 
Other ethnic background 0.8% 
 
 The most pressing problem facing Singapore was the Malayan Emergency. 
Beginning in June 1948, communist-inspired violence in the Federation of Malaya 
led to a government crackdown and a prolonged insurgency aimed at 
overthrowing colonial rule. As well as fighting a jungle war in the Federation, the 
MCP also conducted underground activities in Singapore. Sometimes their 
campaign entailed more open, violent activities characterised by the colonial 
government as terrorism. The Gimson government followed the direction of 
Malcolm MacDonald and the Federation in declaring a State of Emergency.  
 Membership of the MCP was strongest amongst the Chinese population. 
This alludes to a key point of distinction between the Emergencies in the 
Federation and Singapore. In the Federation, the Chinese were a minority and 
more easily subjected to population control methods. Conversely, they 
represented the overwhelming majority in Singapore. Security operations assumed 
a very different, more clandestine and less preventative, character.  
                                                            
19 TNA, FCO 141/14359, Minute by E. C. S. Adkins, 11 June 1947; TNA, CO 537/7247, The 
Leach Report, 17 May 1951, p. 2. 
20 Warwick Neville, ‘Singapore: Ethnic Diversity and its Implications’, Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers, 56(2) (1966), 236-253 (pp. 237-238). 
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 Colonial officials tried to understand their subject population with 
reference to ideas about race and loyalty. The Singapore government 
differentiated between the ‘King’s Chinese’, who had being settled in Singapore 
for generations and, although supportive of self-government, would remain loyal 
to the British Commonwealth, and ‘China born’ Chinese who were more likely to 
be influenced by political developments within China.21 Age was another 
demographic issue with security implications. In 1958, almost half of Singapore’s 
population was characterised as being ‘youths’.22 Specifically, 43% of the 
population were under the age of fifteen.23 This was perceived to be a particular 
problem because this generation grew up in the shadow of communist victory in 
the Chinese Civil War. From an imperialist perspective, these youths saw 
communism not as something which failed to impact upon Malayan politics in the 
1930s, but which was successfully elevating China from a degraded state to a 
great power.24 Communism was particularly strong in schools, and dealing with 
young people created problems for the police in a period of increasing public 
scrutiny. Heavy-handed policing became increasingly untenable.25 
 Moreover, the police force was dependent for recruitment upon the 
populations it was policing. In 1949, 88% of gazetted officers were Europeans. 
Although this was an overwhelming majority, it was smaller than in most 
colonies. In Hong Kong, there was not a single non-European police officer. 
There were only three colonies in the whole British Empire (Mauritius, Cyprus 
and Jamaica) which had a greater number of non-European officers.26 The 
intelligence arm of the police, the Special Branch, offered greater opportunities 
for non-Europeans and appointed its first locally-born Director in 1957.  
 However, for the police rank-and-file, the colonial government relied upon 
locally-recruited staff. The majority of the police were Malay. In 1952, less than 
9% of the total police force was Chinese.27 In 1956, when the ‘Malayanisation’ of 
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the police was a hot political topic, 75% of the total police force remained Malay. 
Their officers, however, mostly comprised of Chinese or Indians at the lower 
ranks and Europeans in top positions. This garnered the attention of the JIC in 
London which saw the ethnic make-up of the police as problematic. Foremost, it 
appeared to favour the Malays overall, running the risk of the majority Chinese 
population seeing the police as a mechanism of Malay domination. Conversely, 
the majority Malay police force could perceive a contradictory bias and resent 
taking orders from Chinese or Indian officers. Periodic recruitment drives 
amongst the Chinese population had failed to redress the imbalance.28 
 The ethnic demographics of Singapore therefore created a security 
challenge for the British-dominated, imperialist-minded intelligence community. 
Geography provided another complex issue. Whilst the colony accounted for a 
total of 217 square miles, 75% of its population inhabited a 31 square mile urban 
area.29 This created difficulties for security agencies in dealing with communist 
underground activities amongst the densely-packed urban masses, as well as 
communist hideouts in rural areas which posed their own difficulties. The open 
geography of rural Singapore was a particular problem in mounting surveillance 
operations.30  
 Urban geography had further implications for the security situation. 
According to a 1947 government survey, 58% of the municipal population lived 
in overcrowded or acutely overcrowded conditions. Health was a constant 
challenge (Singapore suffered a smallpox scare in 1959), and, fearing the financial 
implications, the colonial government refused to accept responsibility for housing. 
As noted by the revisionist Singapore historian Michael Barr, it is little surprise 
that Singapore became fertile ground for radical politics. On the one hand, 
Singapore appeared to be a prosperous city reaping the benefits of Western 
‘modernity’ whilst remaining distinctly ‘Asian’. It seemed to symbolise 
something equivalent to the American Dream for immigrant Chinese families. But 
it was also a place of squalor, neglect and inequality. The latter was typified by 
                                                            
28 TNA, CO 1035/8, JIC(56)36th meeting, 12 April 1956. 
29 CO 537/7247, The Leach Report, 17 May 1951, p. 2. 
30 FCO 141/14485, Memorandum by Alan Blades, 12 July 1951. 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
12 
 
the racism endemic to colonialism, as well as seething inter-communal tensions 
between Chinese, Malay and Indian populations.31 
 Singapore was therefore more than just a strategic headquarters for British 
intelligence. It was also presented a set of challenging intelligence problems. This 
thesis offers an original approach to understanding Singapore’s post-war history 
through the prism of intelligence and counter-subversion. 
 Within the historiography of Singapore, the dominant narrative is that of 
transition from colonial rule to independence. This nationalist and often linear 
history is sometimes dubbed ‘the Singapore Story’. Lee Kuan Yew, one of the 
founders of the PAP, rapidly rose from being a potential dissident watched by the 
security services to being the Prime Minister who guided Singapore to 
independence: often by making good use of those same security services to quash 
his opposition. According to this narrative, Singapore’s ‘story’ was a triumph of 
the wisdom of its architects (principally Lee) against a backdrop of vulnerability, 
isolation and smallness.32 In explaining this ‘story’, imperial historians assessed 
the decolonisation of Singapore with reference to metropolitan weakness. 
Nationalist histories placed Britain’s withdrawal not within a narrative of British 
decline but rather Singapore’s concurrent emergence.33 
 The emergence of Singapore went through a number of distinct stages. In 
1946-48, the focal point of Britain’s interest in colonial restructuring was 
mainland Malaya. Singapore was sidelined. In the immediately following years, 
the outbreak of the communist ‘Emergency’ created a further barrier to engaging 
with reform. Very little constitutional development occurred until security forces 
had managed to suppress organised MCP resistance by the mid-1950s. Likewise, 
in the Federation of Malaya, constitutional progress did not gather meaningful 
momentum until after General Gerald Templer succeeded in breaking the back of 
the communist insurgency during 1952-54. 
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 In 1953, the conservative-leaning Progressive Party declared a ten-year 
target for self-government. Singapore’s new Governor, John Fearns Nicoll, 
appointed a commission under the chairmanship of Sir George Rendel to instigate 
a comprehensive review of the constitution. This led to a new ‘Rendel 
Constitution’ which replaced the old Executive Council with a cabinet-style 
Council of Ministers. The Council was split between members appointed by the 
Governor and elected representatives. Singapore gained an elected Chief Minister, 
although power for defence and security, as well as overall authority, remained 
concentrated in the British Governor and his staff. 
 The Labour Front party won the elections of 1955, bringing the lawyer 
David Marshall to the office of Chief Minister. This was just the first stage 
towards independence. Britain was not willing to give more concessions to 
Singaporean nationalists until they were convinced that Singapore was ‘safe’ for 
decolonisation. They needed to believe that a successor government would 
prevent Singapore from falling to communism and ensure it remained pro-British 
and continue to play host to the British armed forces. As Chief Minister, Marshall 
staked his reputation on persuading Britain to accept a more rapid timetable for 
self-government. He resigned following the failure of his negotiations. Crucially, 
Marshall had repealed some of the Emergency Regulations, only to be faced with 
an upsurge of communist agitation. He was thus forced to create a new 
Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, effectively reversing his previous 
decision. As such, Marshall lost face locally and looked weak and indecisive to 
the British. London would not compromise with such a candidate. Marshall’s 
successor, Lim Yew Hock, was more conservative and worked closely with the 
British security apparatus to combat communist activities from 1956-59. 
Consequently, Lim succeeded where Marshall had failed in negotiating with 
Britain for self-government. 
 At first a comparatively minor political force, the PAP was founded in 
October 1954. Its leader was Lee Kuan Yew, a young and ambitious Singaporean 
Chinese lawyer who became a person of great interest to British intelligence. The 
PAP flirted openly with known communists and certainly adopted a left-of-centre 
stance. This posed the question of whether Lee was tactically manipulating 
communist supporters for his own ends or whether he was a secret fellow 
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traveller. British intelligence agencies enjoyed frank contacts with Lee, and 
became securely convinced that he was not a communist. They soon became more 
concerned with whether Lee was strong enough to retain power within the hands 
of his party’s moderates. In the end, action by Special Branch helped him to do so. 
Meanwhile, Lim Yew Hock agreed a timetable for self-government with London. 
The elections of May 1959 brought this to fulfilment, with a landslide victory for 
Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP. 
 This progress represents the nationalist narrative of Singaporean history 
during the period 1946-59. There have been a number of attempts to construct 
revisionist counter-narratives with a mixed record of success. Some of these 
attempts at providing a critical discourse, particularly in exploring the continuity 
in Singapore’s ‘culture of control’ from pre-colonial to colonial and post-colonial 
times, have floundered in the political arena by focusing too much upon the 
PAP.34 Although victorious in every general election from 1959, the PAP was not 
the sole driver of the emergence of modern Singapore. The MCP, which colonial 
authorities treated as a dissident, subversive and illegal entity, provided an 
alternative anti-colonial vision. Meanwhile, the colonial state had its own agency 
in driving Singapore’s political development, and the police and intelligence 
services were a crucial part of this. Studying intelligence casts new light on the 
relationship between the British colonial authorities, the PAP and the MCP. It has 
implications for explaining why the PAP moved from a markedly left-wing 
agenda to being a more conservative political force.35  
 The MCP itself has been the subject of a few significant studies. Richard 
Clutterbuck’s 1973 book provided an introduction to the MCP challenge which 
emphasised the transition from a violent campaign to an underground struggle and 
then to an open united front.36 Alternatively, a more recent work by Singapore 
scholar Bilveer Singh adopted a thematic study of the MCP campaign. This is an 
appropriate tool for examining communist activities. Strategies such as terrorism, 
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united fronts, penetration of political parties, and industrial or educational 
subversion cannot be broken down into exclusive periods. The MCP pursued most 
of these strategies at any one time, as Singh effectively demonstrated. 
Unfortunately, Singh’s book drew predominantly on secondary sources or 
published memoirs and document collections rather than archival material.37 
Looking through the archives of British intelligence, the picture that emerges is a 
hybrid between Clutterbuck’s chronological and Singh’s thematic models. 
Although intelligence actors were aware of the multi-pronged challenge presented 
by the MCP, they countered that challenge by focusing on what they perceived to 
be the biggest threat (where the MCP was seemingly placing most resources). 
This corresponds to Clutterbuck’s three stages, producing in this thesis a narrative 
of counter-terrorism (chapter four), counter-subversion (chapter six) and counter-
united front work (chapter seven). The adoption of a counter-subversion strategy 
by Special Branch did not mean that terrorist activities had halted. It simply meant 
that police action had reduced the frequency of such overt acts that they could 
focus on longer-term underground activities. 
 The final stage of this campaign, countering the communist united front, 
was examined by another Singapore historian, Lee Ting Hui. Lee made excellent 
use of sources including the testimony of ex-detainees and the internal security 
archives of post-1959 Singapore to explain how the MCP tried to use united front 
tactics to influence Singaporean politics.38 By using British archival sources, the 
current thesis complements Lee’s study. This thesis evaluates how British 
intelligence organisations perceived the changing communist threat and how they 
evolved strategies to counter it. These previous studies of the Singapore 
Emergency have all focused upon the MCP rather than the security forces which 
confronted it. The MCP ultimately failed to determine the outcome of the 
‘Singapore story’. Understanding how the intelligence services and the police 
made sure of this outcome is an important and overlooked aspect of Singapore’s 
post-war history. Previously, research about Singapore Special Branch operations 
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terminated with the fall of Singapore to Japan in 1942.39 Because of the release of 
new documentary material in the UK National Archives in 2012-13, we can 
finally appreciate the important role of Special Branch during Singapore’s post-
war transitions. 
 Even in studies of the MCP challenge, the dominant scope is a strictly 
national one. Clutterbuck and Lee Ting Hui sought to explain the position of the 
MCP within Singapore’s road to decolonisation, just as nationalist (and 
revisionist) discourses sought to explain the triumph of the PAP. Any connections 
between the ‘Singapore story’ and wider Cold War are largely implicit. However, 
a small body of scholarship has begun examining the international element of 
Singapore’s post-war history. In an edited collection of 2011, Syed Aljunied and 
Derek Heng argued that Singapore was both ‘metropole’ and ‘periphery’. 
Singapore was a location where global processes such as the Cold War and 
decolonisation impacted upon local development. It was equally a place from 
which transformative processes could emanate beyond Singapore’s borders.40 
Their agenda is pertinent for the current thesis. The consolidation of a regional 
intelligence community transformed Singapore into something in-between a 
metropole and a ‘traditional’ colony. British intelligence agencies in Singapore 
construed a particular view of the Cold War. In turn, they coordinated clandestine 
activities from Singapore to pursue Cold War policies across the region. 
 A new history of Singapore by Michael Barr is representative of the 
emerging revisionist discourse. Barr noted that the most basic feature of 
Singapore’s history is the continuity in Singapore’s centrality to regional societal 
and commercial networks. In this regard, although Barr’s work remained focused 
on Singapore itself, his revisionist discourse has helped to bridge the gap between 
parochial and international approaches to Singapore’s history.41 The history of 
Singapore from 1946-59 is also the history of the Cold War, Britain’s 
uncomfortable readjustment to decline, and of the Malayan Emergency. By 
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focusing on one facet – intelligence – the current thesis helps to highlight the links 
between these national and international discourses. 
 The international aspect in new Singapore histories remains ripe for 
development. Both Albert Lau and Tan Tai Yong argued that the British approach 
to constitutional talks with Singaporean delegations was governed by security 
concerns in the context of the global Cold War.42 Nevertheless, the voices of the 
actual intelligence and security services remain absent from these diplomatic 
perspectives. In a study of United States policy towards Singapore, S. R. Joey 
Long demonstrated how Washington’s fear that Britain would be unable to 
prevent the fall of Singapore to communism determined American policies 
towards the island. Long also showed how the Americans unsuccessfully used 
covert operations to bolster pro-American sentiment and to gauge the stability of 
Lee Kuan Yew’s regime.43 The agency of British intelligence, meanwhile, is lost 
within his study. Nevertheless, the British had most to lose in Singapore’s Cold 
War and greatest opportunity to influence events. The appreciations of British 
intelligence were an important means of reassuring policy-makers that Singapore 
was ‘safe’ for decolonisation.  
 By looking at intelligence, this thesis therefore contributes to the 
developing historiography of Singapore through linking local developments with 
the broader international context. Singapore was the centre of all British 
intelligence activity in the Far East. It was also an important hub of local 
intelligence activities, where security concerns about the tenability of a non-
communist Southeast Asia were mirrored at the internal level. Understanding 
these interactions not only tells us something about British intelligence during the 
Cold War, but also helps explain why Singapore developed along a particular path 
during the final stages of colonial rule. 
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Understanding intelligence: definitions, concepts and processes 
 The literature on intelligence studies is perhaps as broad (and at times 
nebulously defined) as the responsibilities of the Commissioner General’s 
organisation. Before beginning to explore the British intelligence communities in 
Singapore, it is prudent to examine some of the core definitions and concepts 
upon which this analysis rests. This section considers what is meant by 
‘intelligence’. It then interrogates the concept of an ‘intelligence cycle’, 
particularly focusing on ideas about intelligence processes and assessment. From 
this analysis, we come to an understanding of intelligence which is applicable to 
the particular intelligence milieu under scrutiny. 
 Perhaps the most problematic concept in intelligence history is defining 
‘intelligence’ itself. Former JIC secretary Michael Herman explained that there 
can be narrow, middle and broad views of what constitutes ‘intelligence’.44 In its 
most narrow sense, intelligence is information about a potential adversary which 
that adversary does not wish to be known.45 Clandestine collection services are 
required to acquire this intelligence. As Herman observed, ‘intelligence collection 
is directed against targets that do not consent to it and usually take measures to 
frustrate it’.46  
 At the broadest end of the spectrum, intelligence is the sum of available 
knowledge on a particular subject. This definition incorporates covert material, 
confidential information and publicly-accessible data. However, it has been well 
noted by Philip Davies that this broad definition is little different from the basic 
functions of the civil service.47 Such collation was the work of agencies including 
the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD), not the secret services. Neither 
the producers of intelligence nor its consumers (or users) in government would 
equate the work of FORD with the work of SIS or MI5. Indeed, the need to 
maintain a distinction (and deniability) between the ordinary work of government 
and the world of intelligence is arguably one of the reasons that secret services 
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came into being. A narrower definition of intelligence would appear more in 
accordance with the self-defined functions of the British intelligence community, 
particularly the ‘secret’ services.48 Intelligence could thus be said to be the 
activity undertaken by covert information agencies.  
 However, too narrow a definition appears equally out of sync with the way 
producers and consumers of intelligence understood the concept during the Cold 
War. Secretive bureaucracies were created to deal with non-secretive sources, 
incorporating ‘open source’ information and ‘grey’ intelligence. The latter 
referred to material that was not widely diffused but which was not regarded as a 
matter of national security, such as confidential economic reports or trade 
literature.49 Examples of grey and open intelligence abound in this thesis, 
including the JIB, ‘China Bureau’ and the Regional Information Office (RIO).  
 Even when adopting a more middle-ground approach, the emphasis 
remains on the agency producing this material, and the uses to which it was 
applied. Intelligence thus can be described as what covert or semi-covert agencies 
‘do’, even if the raw material they use is sometimes less than secret. Michael 
Herman suggested that ‘intelligence is somehow rooted in concealment […] its 
techniques derive their special character from dealing with this deliberately 
created obscurity’. This does not imply a narrow focus on covert sources. 
Intelligence assessment should be holistic and all-source.50 But the subjects 
targeted usually involve some degree of secrecy even if open sources are used to 
penetrate them. This understanding would fit with the way that British intelligence 
approached the creation of communist China (as discussed in chapter five). 
 Consequently, we have moved away from one of the three approaches of 
intelligence outlined by the American practitioner and theorist Sherman Kent. In a 
well-known triptych, Kent defined intelligence as knowledge, organisation, and 
activity.51 If defining intelligence as a particular type of knowledge remains 
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problematic, then perhaps the answer lies in defining that knowledge with 
reference to the organisations and activities that produce it.  
 Major Robert Harry Mathams, an Australian scientific intelligence 
specialist, carefully distinguished between ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’. As 
Mathams explained, ‘information is the raw material from which intelligence is 
produced’. Information can come from a variety of sources but becomes 
intelligence through being processed in a specific manner by a specific 
bureaucracy.52 Likewise, CIA analyst and in-house historian Thomas F. Troy 
wrote that ‘intelligence per se is subjective. Like beauty, it is in the eye of the 
beholder’.53 Troy’s observation is a useful reminder that intelligence (defined as 
knowledge) needs to have some purpose or relevance, conferred through being 
part of a particular organisation or activity. Similarly, Herman noted that 
intelligence usually has a more restricted de facto meaning than just ‘information’. 
It has associations with international relations, defence, national security and state 
secrecy.54 Perhaps the solution is to understand intelligence in terms of the way it 
is handled and used: who creates it, how they create it, the form in which it is 
presented, who receives it, and what they do with it.  
 Of course, no conceptualisation or definition of intelligence is perfect or 
universal. Personal, departmental and national predilections all have an effect. 
This thesis is not about the construction of an understanding of intelligence, and 
this opening discussion is purely intended to outline some of the potential 
problems – and opportunities – in different approaches to what constitutes 
intelligence. Such definitions became a bone of contention between some of the 
key agencies discussed in this thesis. For the sake of clarity, it is possible to 
construct a basic definition which adequately fits the varying perceptions and 
priorities of the individuals and organisations dealt with hereon. Such a definition 
could be approximated by the following statement: 
Intelligence is information pertinent to pursuing the strategic, foreign 
policy and national security objectives of a state or organisation. It is 
collected and processed by a self-defined intelligence community, the 
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status of which is generally accepted by its consumers. Whilst the 
definition of what material constitutes intelligence can be broad, what 
makes this 'intelligence' is the special way it is treated by a special 
bureaucracy. 
It is accepted that such a definition is as imperfect as any other yet proposed, and 
is only offered for the sake of guiding this specific discussion. It asserts the 
importance of the use of intelligence (within the foreign policy or national 
security process), the self-awareness of the community which produces and uses 
it, and the way in which it is put together. 
 Discussing concepts such as the ‘collection’, ‘processing’ or 
‘consumption’ of intelligence, brings to mind another controversial topic: the 
intelligence cycle. The bedrock of teaching on intelligence, the cycle is normally 
constructed of five distinct stages: planning or direction, collection (sometimes 
referred to as raw production), processing, analysis, and dissemination. Perhaps 
the most important stages are those of processing and assessment, by which raw 
information is transformed into ‘intelligence’.55 
 However, the intelligence cycle has come under increasing criticism. In 
particular, it seems to miss out important elements of the intelligence process such 
as covert action, counterintelligence and political oversight. Moreover, the 
standard, linear cycle distorts the reality that collection (the intake of raw 
information) and assessment (the transformation of this into ‘finished’ 
intelligence) are often interactive and occur concurrently.56 It also does not 
account for the reality that users of intelligence are sometimes delivered raw 
information. A ready example of this is Winston Churchill’s hearty appetite for 
raw ‘Ultra’ decrypts during the Second World War.57  
 Furthermore, the cycle does not account for what happens following 
dissemination. Intelligence is just one dimension of the policy-making process, 
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and we must be careful to avoid attributing undue influence.58 Intelligence reports 
compete for influence with political interests, the personalities and preconceptions 
of policy-makers, and contradictory intelligence summaries. Indeed, intelligence 
does not contain separable elements of facts and interpretation. Most of its value 
comes from the application of interpretation of some kind. Even with all-source 
assessment, subjectivity can never be truly eliminated.59 Therefore, there is no 
guarantee that policy-makers will accept the interpretations of intelligence 
agencies over their own interpretative preferences. Even if intelligence is 
influential upon policy-makers, this does not guarantee an intended outcome. 
Despite rigorous evaluation, intelligence can get things wrong. Factors wholly 
exogenous to the typical intelligence cycle, such as the relative openness of a 
target regime, or that regime’s capacity for successful disinformation, can be just 
as influential on intelligence outcomes.60 This critique suggests that the 
intelligence cycle is a distortion of reality. It can equally be indicted as a 
simplification of those processes which it otherwise accurately describes. This is 
most clear with regard to the direction and assessments stages. 
 A useful framework for understanding intelligence direction is that of 
‘push and pull’ business architectures as described by the historian Philip Davies. 
Push organisations are self-tasking, presenting their results to convince users of 
their priorities and choices. In contrast, in pull architectures, consumers select 
targets and direct collection agencies to fulfil them. In the Anglo-American 
intelligence communities, pull architectures are predominant.61 This concept of 
pull is most compatible with the traditional intelligence cycle, in which collection 
agencies are set tasks in the direction phase. In the Cold War British system, users 
such as the Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff Committee either articulated 
requirements directly to the collection agencies, or via the national intelligence 
requirements set by the JIC (subordinate to the Chiefs of Staff until 1957).  
 However, this is an incomplete picture. Collection agencies also can be 
self-tasking, and lines of authority are often far from simple, particularly with 
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regard to the post-1945 British intelligence community in Singapore.62 Many of 
the agencies discussed in this thesis were subject to direction from their own 
chiefs, parent organisations in London, user departments based in Singapore, and 
the national intelligence effort. A more useful version of the intelligence cycle 
should acknowledge the complexity inherent in intelligence direction. 
 In a similar vein, intelligence assessment is a more complex, multi-stage 
process than accounted for by the simple intelligence cycle. Expanding on 
Michael Herman’s theorisations, a more nuanced assessments cycle could be seen 
as comprising: 
1. Collation: bringing together information from various outlets (including 
different departments or field stations within the same agency). This 
activity was a primary function of Singapore-based agencies including 
SIFE, the JIB and SIS(FE). 
2. Evaluation: making judgements about the reliability or credibility of 
information based on its source history, cross-referencing and other 
factors. The Singapore Special Branch used the ‘Admiralty system’ for 
grading reliability and credibility (see table 4.2). 
3. Analysis: identifying significant facts and comparing them to existing 
knowledge. The agencies involved in the collation of intelligence in 
Singapore were equally involved in its evaluation and analysis, before 
passing on to other agencies. 
4. Integration: bringing together analysed information from various sources 
and looking for patterns or points of discord. This equates to what is 
usually referred to as all-source analysis, and was carried out in Singapore 
by the Joint Intelligence Staff which was subsidiary to the JIC(FE). 
5. Interpretation: using the integrated intelligence to try to determine what it 
means for the future. This function was particularly evident in JIC(FE) 
assessments.63 
Although this appears a linear list, these stages can just as easily be concurrent – 
as shown by the involvement of SIFE in collation, evaluation and analysis – and 
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can sometimes be skipped entirely. The intelligence cycle, which usually equates 
this multi-faceted process to one or two stages, is a gross simplification. 
 The perfect intelligence cycle is as chimerical as the perfect definition of 
intelligence. Indeed, one can wonder whether it is helpful to reduce the 
intelligence process to a diagram smacking of universalism. One could argue that 
a precise definition or diagrammatic description of intelligence is as unknowable 
and incomprehensible as the eldritch gods of the horror writer H. P. Lovecraft.  
 Yet producing such definitions and diagrams remains a useful means of 
communicating ideas about intelligence. To that end, a modified intelligence cycle 
is here proposed which meets most of the critiques outlined above and has the 
virtue of explaining the core stages and key relationships entailed in this thesis 
(see figure 1.1). This is not intended to be a universal model but one which 
broadly fits the British intelligence system in Singapore during the Cold War. The 
term ‘assessment’ is used to avoid confusion with the more specific terminology 
discussed above. At least one of the stages of collation, analysis, evaluation, 
integration and interpretation are involved at each level of assessment outlined 
below. The collection stage is merged with the concept of ‘action’, 
acknowledging that intelligence collection agencies are sometimes involved in 
covert action or clandestine propaganda. This is not to say that these processes are 
the same thing. Covert action is not intelligence collection, although the same 
agencies can be involved in both – and operations designed to implement one can 
lead to the other. This duality is particularly important at the local level, as Special 
Branch operations (typically including raids on suspect addresses and the 
detention of suspects) were at the same time ‘action’ operations informed by 
previous intelligence and ‘collection’ operations designed to gather new data for 
analysis.  
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Figure 1.1. An 'intelligence cycle' for Cold War Singapore. 
 
 Having proposed a working definition of intelligence and something akin 
to a cycle or process, it is opportune to examine some more practical concepts 
implicit within this intelligence cycle. Namely, these are the idea of the 
intelligence report, the notion of an intelligence community, and the concept of 
national intelligence. 
 Both Sherman Kent and Michael Herman (who were intelligence 
practitioners before they were intelligence theorists) proposed three different 
classes of finished intelligence report.64 The documentation consulted for this 
thesis supports this distinction. Firstly, there are ‘basic descriptive’ reports such as 
military orders-of-battle, economic fact-files or encyclopaedic country studies 
which provided strategic planners with background knowledge about a country of 
interest.65 The reportage of the JIB network, particularly the 1953 report on Sino-
Soviet cooperation by the Australian JIB discussed in chapter five, were examples 
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of this type of report. Secondly, there are ‘current reportorial’ reports which deal 
with very recent events. These keep track of the modalities of change.66 The SIFE 
monthly reviews of communism which are discussed throughout chapter three fell 
into this category, as did many of the local political intelligence reports and 
monthly or fortnightly Special Branch reports found in chapters four and six. 
Finally, perhaps the most important but least voluminous type of intelligence 
report is the ‘speculative-evaluative’ which have a mid to long-range forecasting 
function. Examples of this type included JIC(FE) predictions of likely 
developments in neighbouring states, which typically offered forecasts over a 
three year period.67  
 This thesis is concerned with the output of intelligence in the form of such 
reports, their influence on policy-makers (where this is possible to trace), and the 
role of intelligence agencies in promulgating action. It is equally concerned with 
the activities or processes inherent in intelligence production and the complexities 
of intelligence organisation. In order to approach intelligence organisation in 
Singapore, the concepts of intelligence communities and national intelligence are 
paramount. 
 The concept of an ‘intelligence community’ is, broadly speaking, an 
Anglophilic one. It refers to the recognition that intelligence forms part of an 
orderly system organised at the national level.68 More specifically, Philip Davies 
has suggested that it is a particularly American conception of intelligence 
organisation, which is approximated in the United Kingdom by the so-called 
national intelligence system. Because the JIC, the centre of Britain’s national 
intelligence effort, is more concerned with organising activities than coordinating 
agencies, the membership of this community is more fluid than its American 
counterpart.69 This can be seen with the British intelligence ‘community’ in 
Singapore, where certain agencies including the Malayan Security Service were 
temporarily co-opted into the regional JIC, and observers from allied (Australian 
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and American) intelligence agencies were sometimes allowed into its notional 
community.  
 For Davies, the key features of the British national intelligence system (or 
community) can be described as: 
1. A corpus of intelligence collection agencies and departments. Examples 
from Singapore included SIS(FE) and its field stations. 
2. A complex of joint bodies which integrate intelligence at the operational 
level. Pertinent examples included the JIB and the Joint Air Photographic 
Intelligence Centre, Far East – JAPIC(FE). 
3. The Joint Intelligence Committee, which coordinates at the executive 
level. Singapore housed the JIC(FE), subordinate to the national JIC in 
London. 
4. Working-level interagency committees and teams operating under the JIC. 
This description would include the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence 
Board, Far East, which set requirements for the JAPIC(FE). 
5. A network of Cabinet Office committees and staffs that function alongside 
and above the joint intelligence organisation.70 In Cold War Singapore, 
this was approximated by the British Defence Coordination Committee, 
Far East. 
This brief exposition could appear to suggest that there was a British intelligence 
community in Singapore bearing a direct resemblance to the national intelligence 
community in the imperial metropole. However, the reality is more nuanced.  
 Singapore was the focal point of all British intelligence activities in 
Southeast Asia and most activities in the Far East. The Far East, as understood by 
British intelligence and their consumers at the time, was synonymous with today’s 
concepts of East plus Southeast Asia. These activities took place on three levels: 
the local (concerned with just one state), the regional (concerned with 
developments across the region) and the national (the United Kingdom’s national 
intelligence effort).  
                                                            
70 Davies, Evolution of the UK Intelligence Community, p. 15. 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
28 
 
 The regional and national levels were usually closely coordinated, as most 
of the regional-level collection and assessment agencies were offshoots of 
national organisations such as MI5, SIS and the JIC. In contrast, greater disparity 
was present between the local and the regional-national. Although the JIC(FE), 
SIFE and MI5 weighed in with advice on local intelligence activities within 
Singapore, they were rarely directly concerned with, or overly interested in, the 
local intelligence output. Greater interest in local developments became apparent 
from the mid-1950s, and accelerated in the period of 1959-1963, when the future 
of the Singapore base became an issue for national policy.71  
 Nevertheless, there are certain traits in common between the local, 
regional and national levels of intelligence which corresponded to a particularly 
British intelligence model. Prominent examples included the depoliticisation and 
demilitarisation of security intelligence by placing it within the police (Special 
Branch) or a civilian security service (MI5). During the withdrawal from Empire, 
Britain enjoyed some (but not complete) success in exporting a British 
intelligence model to the Commonwealth successor states. In both the old ‘white’ 
Dominions like Australia and new nations across Asia and Africa, British officials 
helped build intelligence services based upon their national model.72 This thesis 
considers how Britain sought to spread this model outside the Empire-
Commonwealth by offering advice and training to nations such as Laos and 
Thailand, as well as how the local intelligence services in Singapore were 
prepared for self-government. 
 Intelligence communities comprise a number of differently-focused 
agencies conducting different ‘types’ of intelligence. These are varyingly defined 
with reference to the source material they use, the sort of target they gather 
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information upon, who they gather information for, or who makes up their internal 
organisation. For example, the agency SIFE, an offshoot of MI5, specialised in 
security intelligence. This can be defined as intelligence pertinent to the national 
security of the state, including information about opposition intelligence activities 
(counter-espionage), subversive movements (counter-subversion) and the physical 
safeguarding of information (protective security). Defining what constituted 
national security intelligence in the colonial context created divisive power 
rivalries between the national, regional and local levels of intelligence. 
Meanwhile, SIS collected foreign intelligence: intelligence about the intentions, 
capabilities and society of foreign states. Their main source of information was 
what is generally known as human intelligence, or espionage. 
 Aside from human intelligence, there were three major types of 
intelligence collection undertaken by the British intelligence apparatus in 
Singapore. These were signals intelligence, image intelligence and open source 
intelligence. Signals intelligence is conventionally divided between electronic 
intelligence (such as radar patterns) and communications intelligence (based on 
the interception of communications). In turn, communications intelligence can 
include cryptography (the breaking of codes and ciphers to read communications), 
traffic analysis (analysing patterns in undeciphered messages) and direction 
finding.73 The latter was particularly useful to signals intelligence agencies in 
Singapore before the Japanese invasion of Malaya in December 1941 as a way of 
keeping track of Japanese naval movements.74  
 Image intelligence today incorporates a wider variety of technologies and 
techniques. During the early Cold War, it was essentially the use of aerial 
photography taken by specialised or modified aircraft. The British Far Eastern Air 
Force included various aircraft modified for this purpose, including Meteor jet 
fighters and Pembroke or Valetta light transports, and eventually the more 
specialised Canberra Photographic Reconnaissance mark 3 ‘spyplane’. 
 In addition to these more secretive types of intelligence collection, open 
source intelligence was a significant field. Users of intelligence at the national and 
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regional levels saw potential in applying open source information to provide 
background insight into closed societies such as communist China or North 
Vietnam which were proving difficult targets for the clandestine collection 
methods of SIS. These were not only very security-conscious societies, but also 
ones in which European intelligence officers – given the restrictions on travel – 
would clearly stand out. 
 Alternatively, some agencies are more defined by their organisational 
character and hierarchies. All three armed services maintained intelligence 
departments at the national and regional levels. These service intelligence 
directorates are sometimes referred to as collecting ‘military’ or ‘defence’ 
intelligence. The term ‘service’ is preferable to ‘military’ as the latter only 
properly includes the army. Likewise, the term ‘defence’ has too many 
connotations with the Ministry of Defence, whereas the service directorates were 
responsible to separate ministries. They relied heavily upon open source 
intelligence along with some lower-level human intelligence including 
interviewing refugees fleeing China. 
  
A ‘missing dimension’? 
 Since it was first used by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks in 1984, 
the phrase ‘missing dimension’ has become a familiar concept in intelligence 
history. For Andrew and Dilks, international historians had overlooked the crucial 
role of intelligence in modern history. Since this time, intelligence history has 
proliferated rapidly. In Britain this was partly facilitated by greater public 
acknowledgement ushered in by the 1989 Security Service Act, followed by 
limited but academically significant releases by various intelligence services to 
the UK National Archives.75 This was a transformation from the previous official 
attitude. As noted by two intelligence historians, ‘for most of the twentieth 
century, the culture within Whitehall towards intelligence was broadly the same as 
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the Victorian attitude towards sex: although it obviously took place, it was 
improper to discuss it’.76 
 Nevertheless, the idea of a ‘missing dimension’ persists. In 2001, Richard 
Aldrich drew attention to the specific problems of researching Cold War 
intelligence. Whilst secret intelligence had become fully integrated into the 
history of the Second World War, Cold War clandestine activities remained less 
understood. As Aldrich acknowledged, this was due to the majority of records 
remaining closed: ‘viewing the subject as being like a distant iceberg, with the 
immense bulk of its matter still dangerously submerged, some commentators have 
decided to steer well clear’.77 Of course, as Aldrich’s own research showed, the 
lack of records directly produced by the intelligence services should not prevent 
historians from discovering their activities in records affiliated with their user or 
consumer departments. Whilst the available picture of Cold War intelligence may 
be imperfect and often fragmented, it does exist.78 Following Aldrich’s lead, 
numerous scholars have done much to dispel the ‘missing dimension’ in Cold War 
history. 
 Perhaps a more pervasive application of the ‘missing dimension’ is that of 
the role of intelligence during the end of empire. In 2010, Calder Walton and 
Christopher Andrew observed that, despite plenty of studies of colonial policing 
and political intelligence, the role of the national intelligence community in 
decolonisation was a ‘missing dimension’.79 Their observation was shared by 
historians including Martin Thomas and Philip Murphy.80 The current author 
contends that Walton and Andrew underestimate the role of what they dismiss as 
‘political’ or ‘police’ intelligence to national security. Nevertheless, their 
observation regarding a disparity between studies of national intelligence and 
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studies of colonial intelligence is apt. More recent historians have helped 
ameliorate this discrepancy by reflecting on the involvement of national or 
regional intelligence agencies in local problems.81 However, more work remains 
to be done to integrate national agendas with local realities, particularly in the 
British approach to Southeast Asia. This is a ‘missing dimension’ which this 
thesis helps to fill. 
 The release of the so-called ‘Migrated Archives’ of the former Colonial 
Office  in 2012-13 makes it possible to integrate national, regional and local (or 
colonial) intelligence agendas to a greater extent than hitherto. These consist of 
records returned and concealed rather than be handed over to post-colonial states. 
Originally four criteria were applied in selecting documents for ‘migration’: 
1. Those which might embarrass the UK or local government. 
2. Those which might embarrass members of the police, military forces, 
public servants or others, e.g. police informers. 
3. Those which might compromise sources of intelligence information. 
4. Those which might be used unethically by ministers in a successive 
government.82 
Much attention has been devoted to those files relating to the embarrassing issue 
of complicity in torture and brutality in counterinsurgency campaigns such as the 
Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya and the Cyprus Emergency. Thus far, the files 
from Singapore (totalling around 2800 individual files) have garnered less 
attention than those from neighbouring territories in Southeast Asia.83 However, 
whilst lacking the allure of scandal and embarrassment, they contain significant 
tracts of intelligence data. 
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 It could be argued that the lack of a detailed history of British intelligence 
in Singapore is itself a ‘missing dimension’.84 This thesis casts light on the history 
of a number of marginalised intelligence agencies, ranging from far-reaching 
organisations with metropolitan links to highly specialised and more localised 
units. However, to borrow a phrase from Rory Cormac, as interesting as this may 
be, ‘the so what question remains’.85 
 As well as filling several institutional gaps, this thesis aims to shed new 
light on two broader ‘missing dimensions’ within the existing historiography. 
Firstly, it aims to provide analysis of the organisation, working culture and impact 
of a specific intelligence milieu during the Cold War. More broadly, this benefits 
our understanding of wider issues surrounding late-imperial intelligence 
organisation and the significance of clandestine activities to Britain’s Cold War 
and decolonisation policies in the Far East.  In particular, the thesis focuses on 
security intelligence and its relative status within the intelligence hierarchy 
centred upon Singapore. Security intelligence attained a position at the heart of 
the intelligence system. On the local level, Special Branch led the fight against 
communist elements within Singapore. Regionally, SIFE became one of the 
preferred forums for intelligence advice to the Commissioner General. Nationally, 
the MI5 worked to ensure the retention of British influence following the 
withdrawal from empire. This position of prominence was not inevitable. Rather, 
it was at odds with the initial decisions taken by policy-makers in constructing a 
three-tier intelligence system for the Far East. The following chapters explain why 
and how security intelligence became so integral.  
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 A second ‘missing dimension’ is the ‘intelligence gap’ in our 
understanding of Singapore’s post-war history. This also has implications for the 
concurrent ‘Malayan Emergency’ from 1948-60. The period under question, 
beginning with the resumption of civilian rule in 1946 and ending with the 
attainment of internal self-government in 1959, was one of immense change for 
Singapore and has attracted a range of historical methodologies. However, 
comparatively little has been written about Singapore’s place in Britain’s Cold 
War, despite being the centre of the Far Eastern regional administration and an 
anti-communist battleground in its own right. Even less has been said about the 
role of intelligence during this period of international tension and local transition. 
 As a thesis primarily about British intelligence, this discussion draws upon 
an increasing corpus of literature about Britain’s secret services during the Cold 
War. The historiography of British intelligence in the twentieth century is 
fortunate to encompass a variety of methodologies and conceptual or geographical 
focuses. 
 Official histories are one of the noteworthy features of this landscape. 
Although their reliance on sources unavailable for cross-checking can be 
frustrating, these histories are useful for providing a detailed inside view of the 
organisation, priorities and sometimes practices of several key agencies. As well 
as the seminal official histories of MI5 and SIS, there are now authorised histories 
of British defence economic intelligence (principally the JIB and its successor, the 
Defence Intelligence Staff) and an initial volume of the national JIC ending in 
1957.86 From an international perspective, the first of the three volumes of the 
official history of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 
contains a detailed exposition of the involvement of MI5 officers in its creation, as 
well as hinting at some of the liaison between ASIO and SIFE.87 
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 As well as authorised histories, there are equally insightful unofficial 
histories of specific agencies based on publically available declassified 
documents. These include organisational histories of GCHQ by Richard Aldrich 
and the Foreign Office Information Research Department (IRD) by Andrew 
Defty.88 Aldrich’s earlier work, The Hidden Hand, remains the most 
encompassing survey of British and American intelligence activity during the first 
two decades of the Cold War.89 Although the official history of SIS terminated in 
1949, insight into subsequent SIS activities can be found in Philip Davies’ 
organisation-heavy account or the more sensationalist treatments by Gordon 
Corera and Stephen Dorril.90 Joining the official history of the JIC, Rory 
Cormac’s 2013 monograph provided a more detailed examination of the 
involvement of the JIC in post-war colonial counterinsurgency.91 Cormac’s more 
recent book gave the most complete account of covert action in British policy to 
date, building on a previous article exploring the Whitehall mechanism for 
coordinating covert action.92 This relationship between policy-makers and the 
national intelligence community is also undergoing increasing scrutiny, typified 
by two recent studies of the relationship between Prime Ministers and 
intelligence.93 In a similar vein, the current study considers the evolving 
relationship between the Commissioner General for Southeast Asia and his 
intelligence apparatus. By proving their indispensability to the Cold War priorities 
of the Commissioner General, intelligence agencies such as SIFE successfully 
deflected metropolitan pressures to reform and economise. 
 This corpus of work provides an improving picture of Britain’s national 
intelligence community during the Cold War. In studying the intelligence 
apparatus in Singapore, some more specific debates are important. Foremost is 
that highlighted by Andrew and Walton when referring to the role of national 
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intelligence agencies in decolonisation as a ‘missing dimension’. Their argument 
implies an essential difference between the work of colonial Special Branches, 
and the security intelligence remit of MI5 or SIFE.94 Such a distinction was 
debated by intelligence practitioners and users during the Cold War and implicitly 
linked with power relationships. However, the Singapore Special Branch was as 
much a security intelligence agency as MI5, as it was responsible for producing 
intelligence about subversive or espionage threats vital to the maintenance of 
national security. It did, however, have a different working culture to MI5 due to 
its position within the police, giving Special Branch powers of arrest and 
detention. Walton and Andrew’s argument can be criticised for overly defining 
the situation of the 1950s by more modern distinctions in intelligence. Intelligence 
during the early Cold War should be studied in relation to the specific situation of 
those times, in which a range of actors contributed to security intelligence in 
response to a diverse array of international and colonial threats. 
 A number of historians have grappled with this relationship between 
colonial policing and security intelligence. Georgina Sinclair noted that the 
increasing globalisation of the Cold War led to a major expansion in the 
intelligence requirements of colonial police forces.95 Likewise, in a study of 
political intelligence in the Gold Coast (Ghana), Richard Rathbone suggested that 
the 1948 crisis, interpreted with reference to imperial security concerns about 
communism, signified a change in the nature of the colonial state. This change 
resulted in an upsurge of local intelligence activity driven by a schizophrenic 
approach to communism. Whilst reporting that there was very little evidence of 
communist activity, colonial officials obsessively searched for it.96 Comparisons 
are easy to draw with some of the early regional intelligence assessments from 
Singapore. 
 The importance of security intelligence for colonial stability is 
acknowledged by a diverse range of scholarly theories. Christopher Bayly’s ideas 
about colonial knowledge and intelligence in India emphasised the limitations of 
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colonial intelligence. Where colonial knowledge failed to mesh with indigenous 
society, racial stereotypes distorted understandings and ‘information panics’ 
sometimes ensued. The British community in India, for instance, typically isolated 
itself, losing the possibility for acquiring tactile cultural knowledge which could 
have guided more accurate intelligence.97 Similarly to India, Singapore was a 
complex multi-ethnic state. One can argue that the British community were much 
better integrated than in India. Moreover, Special Branch recruited local Malay 
and Chinese as well as international Chinese and Indian officers. Even though 
colonial officials still applied racialist categorisations to understanding their 
subject populations, the front lines of British intelligence were much more in 
touch with the local situation than their forebears in colonial India.  
 Whilst Bayly emphasised the vulnerability of colonial intelligence, Martin 
Thomas’ theory of ‘intelligence states’ (also applied by Edmund Clipson) alluded 
to the opportunities created by intelligence for ameliorating broader 
vulnerabilities. Intelligence was central to the colonial project because imperial 
powers recognised the limits of coercive power. Intelligence activities provided 
not only a system of information assessment, but also facilitated interaction 
between the coloniser and the colonised. Local informants, by aiding the security 
services to further their own agendas, participated in their own colonisation.98 
This conception is implicit of the ability of intelligence activities to contribute to 
the implementation as well as the formulation of policy: one of the key reasons 
why the Singapore intelligence milieu was seen as effective. 
 Moving away from a localised approach, there appears growing interest 
about regionalism in late-imperial British intelligence organisation. Specifically, 
Philip Murphy has assessed the significance of the Federal Intelligence and 
Security Bureau of the Central African Federation. This was a more executive 
regional authority than the coordinating machinery of the Commissioner General 
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for Southeast Asia.99 Nevertheless, many of the difficulties faced in the 
relationship between local, regional and national intelligence in Singapore were 
not unique to Southeast Asia but part of broader issues in providing intelligence 
and security for the federal approach to empire.100 With more direct parallels to 
the Singapore situation, SIFE’s sister agency Security Intelligence Middle East 
(SIME) – based initially in Cairo and later Cyprus – has been the focus of articles 
by Roger Arditti and Chikara Hashimoto. SIME was wound down in 1958 as 
Britain faced the reality of rapidly dwindling influence in the Middle East. The 
South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) commitment, intensity of the 
regional Cold War and threat from Indonesia ensured that SIFE remained a vital 
adjunct of the Commissioner General’s establishment until the early 1960s.101 
 Regional organisation was not purely an intelligence structure. The 
Commissioner General’s offices contained diplomatic, defence, colonial, 
economic, research and public relations sections as well as intelligence agencies. 
By focusing on intelligence, this thesis highlights the significance of this broader 
regional structure for understanding Britain’s Cold War in the Far East. The 
regional level of Far Eastern policy has been the focus of very few previous 
studies. 
 Perhaps most notable in this regard is Karl Hack’s 2001 book. Hack, 
primarily a historian of the Malayan Emergency, looked at British defence posture 
in relation to metropolitan, international and local influences. He suggested that 
Britain’s regionalist policy showed continuity with pre-existing imperial aims, and 
that the Cold War only added greater emphasis to longer-term defence concerns. 
Overall, Hack emphasised Britain’s limited engagement with the Cold War. 
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Although policy-makers wanted a buffer zone of non-communist states between 
the British territories of Malaya and Singapore and the communist states of North 
Vietnam and China, they were not prepared to back this up with hard 
commitments. Such an undertaking would have contradicted defence policies 
formulated on the basis of reducing and devolving defence responsibilities.102 
Hack’s work is praiseworthy for its sustained focus on the regional level of 
defence and also for incorporating national policy. However, he can be criticised 
for paying little attention to the intelligence dimension. The BDCC(FE) was 
served by the JIC(FE), and as well as guiding defence policies, intelligence 
agencies were able to contribute to the execution of policy. Hack is correct in 
asserting that Britain was unwilling to entertain major overt commitments to the 
‘upper arc’ of Southeast Asia. However, they instead used covert means such as 
intelligence training and propaganda interventions to play a proactive clandestine 
role in shoring up this buffer zone. 
 Other historians have attempted to cover British policy across Southeast 
Asia, including Peter Lowe and Nicholas Tarling.103 In contrast to Hack’s study, 
their works are essentially treatments of a series of local issues with reference to 
particular states, rather than offering analysis about region-wide trends. Both 
acknowledge the position of Commissioner General, but downplay its significance 
on providing a new approach to policy-making. Lowe notes that ‘the 
appointments of Killearn [Foreign Office Special Commissioner] and MacDonald 
were significant in the sense of reinforcing awareness of the common problems of 
the region but there was no intention of ceding real power to a viceroy based in 
Singapore’.104 Through the prism of intelligence, this assertion can be questioned. 
Certainly the metropole had no intention of ceding power to the Commissioner 
General’s establishment. As Tilman Remme’s study of Britain’s pursuit of 
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has shown, London came to prefer 
cooperation through inter-governmental arrangements rather than devolving 
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power to Singapore.105 However, this did not prevent MacDonald and Scott from 
trying to pursue an independent (although usually complementary) policy, or from 
attempting to usurp policy-making functions from the local or national levels. 
Moreover, whilst the diplomatic and colonial elements of the Commissioner 
General’s offices had no real power, the intelligence agencies attached to Phoenix 
Park – reinforced by their local and national links – did have power to enact a 
more assertive regionalist policy.  
 Some metropolitan officials held the view that ‘the value of the 
Commissioner General’s organisation depended entirely upon the personality of 
Malcolm MacDonald’.106 Whilst MacDonald’s unique personality and personal 
friendships with Asian leaders were a significant part of the value of the 
Commissioner General, the ability to conduct theatre-level intelligence operations 
was another.107 As noted by Spencer Mawby with regard to the Caribbean (but 
equally applicable to Southeast Asia), the need to reach accommodation with 
moderate nationalists during the era of decolonisation created a more low-key 
approach to the Cold War, reliant on covert activities.108 
 In analysing this bureaucracy and the personalities within it, the thesis 
interacts with ideas from New Diplomatic History. New Diplomatic History is a 
holistic approach to the study of diplomacy which responds to social and cultural 
studies by shifting focus towards the processes rather than the results of 
diplomatic activity. Studies responding to this agenda have varyingly focused on 
gendered concepts of diplomacy, the conceptual links between modern and pre-
modern diplomacy, diplomatic performance or ritual, and broader considerations 
of who we understand to be a ‘diplomat’.109 Whilst contributing to the tradition of 
intelligence history, the thesis also draws inspiration from these ideas. Most 
explicitly, later chapters consider the diplomatic potential of intelligence agencies. 
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Building on the work done by Chikara Hashimoto with regard to intelligence 
diplomacy in the Middle East, the thesis thereby contributes to the agenda of New 
Diplomatic History by reframing the intelligence practitioner as a potential 
diplomat.110 Moreover, just as New Diplomatic Historians seek to investigate the 
processes behind diplomatic results, the thesis aims to investigate the culture of 
intelligence in Singapore, its interaction with society (particularly in the work of 
Special Branch), and its relationships with its principal users. 
 As well as growing interest in the regional level, national intelligence 
networks are increasingly understood to have played an important role in colonial 
crises. In Confronting the Colonies, Cormac explored how the JIC approached 
colonial insurgencies. He argued that the Cold War provided a ‘cognitive prism’ 
through which the JIC viewed colonial crises, which could sometimes have 
damaging ramifications for accurate assessment. International explanations were 
favoured over purely internal ones and ‘simplistically conflated imperial 
developments with Cold War developments’.111 Although his study is 
metropolitan-focused, Cormac’s analysis is equally applicable to the regional 
JICs. As this study explores, the JIC(FE) – and broader regional intelligence 
community – tended towards Cold War explanations. This did not always mean 
that they ignored local factors, but that these local factors were often seen as 
products of Cold War influences.  
 Also focusing on colonial flashpoints, Tony Craig instead considered the 
role of MI5 in specific crises. He suggested two models to explain their 
involvement. In counter-subversion scenarios, with relatively stable conditions, 
MI5 used pre-emptive tactics, helping to define and investigate potential threats. 
In this they were acting more as security consultants than directly-concerned 
actors. In contrast, during counterinsurgency scenarios, MI5 was drawn into 
closer relationships with the local intelligence community. For Craig, the nature 
of the operating environment determined the way MI5 responded. Although there 
is some utility in these models, there are also problems with them.112 It is 
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questionable whether there is such a clear distinction. The situation in Singapore 
was one of counter-subversion, albeit with a great deal of overlap with the 
counterinsurgency in Malaya. But MI5 oscillated between a hands-off approach, 
providing advice and reports to government whilst letting the local intelligence 
collectors get on with their tasks, and a more active role through planting officers 
within Special Branch. This had more to do with MI5’s medium-term aims for 
building a post-colonial intelligence legacy, as well as a perennial problem in 
long-term intelligence collection, than the nature of the Singapore situation.  
 Furthermore, Craig’s analysis is of less help in understanding the 
involvement of MI5 outside its traditional imperial remit. In October 1948, the 
Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, adjudicated that SIS should withdraw its presence 
from post-colonial India. This precedent established the so-called ‘Attlee 
Doctrine’, by which the Empire and Commonwealth were seen as MI5’s spheres 
of influence, and the rest of the world assigned to SIS.113 A more functional 
division of labour evolved under the auspices of the Commissioner General’s 
establishment in Singapore. As the security intelligence authority, SIFE was 
primarily responsible for liaison with the SEATO powers and providing security 
training to foreign intelligence services. This involved MI5 outside the imperial 
sphere, provoking opportunities for more meaningful collaboration with SIS than 
was present in other theatres. 
 This thesis also contributes to a body of studies looking specifically at the 
role of intelligence in Cold War conflicts and crises in Southeast Asia. In addition 
to studies of Britain’s involvement in clandestine affairs, recent works have 
highlighted the significance of other powers, particularly the French regime in 
Indochina and Dutch authorities in Indonesia. Meanwhile, other historians have 
elucidated upon the part played by non-colonial powers including Canada and 
Australia. Australia played an important role in regional affairs through 
membership of SEATO and collaborated closely with Britain in SEATO 
intelligence forums.114 
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 From a British perspective, the role of MI5 and SIFE was discussed by 
Calder Walton’s Empire of Secrets.115 This populist narrative lacked a central 
thesis and broadly repeated other accounts of intelligence in Malaya. Walton fell 
into the trap of seeing SIFE largely through the prism of the Malayan Emergency, 
whereas SIFE’s responsibilities were more concerned with the region as whole. 
Fewer historians have chosen to look at the role of SIS(FE) than MI5. Philip 
Davies’ 1999 article remains the only focused study of the topic.116 However, his 
article is largely confined to theoretical models and exploring the position of the 
Far East Controller within the overall SIS hierarchy. The lack of archival sources 
prevents a deeper study into the work of SIS(FE).117 Indeed, the only operational 
details discovered by the current author relate to a failed propaganda adventure, 
Operation Debenture. Debenture was also discussed by Thomas Maguire, whose 
thesis on intelligence and propaganda explored some of the relationships between 
RIO, SIS and SIFE in pursuing counter-subversion in Southeast Asia.118 
Maguire’s thesis demonstrated a rigorous application of British and American 
sources in examining the policies pursued by both powers. The principal 
differences between his work and the current study are threefold. Firstly, this 
study takes security intelligence as its keystone, whereas Maguire focused on 
propaganda intelligence. Secondly, the current thesis is more concerned with 
intelligence organisation, methods and analysis, whereas Maguire was more 
interested in the practical outputs of the intelligence process through propaganda. 
Finally, Maguire’s study was not an investigation into the British intelligence 
milieu based in Singapore. Instead it was an analysis of British and American 
attempts to affect counter-subversion. 
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 In contrast to a dearth of information on agencies such as the JIC(FE) and 
SIFE in published histories, another unpublished thesis by Roger Arditti provided 
greater insight into their interaction with the Malayan Emergency. Indeed, the 
Malayan Emergency of 1948-60 has attracted more interest from intelligence 
scholarship than any other aspect of British intelligence in the Far East.119 Whilst 
most of this literature focuses on the purely local intelligence machinery, Arditti 
considered how the JIC(FE), SIFE and JAPIC(FE) interacted with local 
intelligence collectors. Nevertheless, his conclusions were greatly different from 
those expounded by this thesis. Arditti argued that the JIC(FE) and SIFE meddled 
with a reasonably well-performing local intelligence machine, the Malayan 
Security Service (MSS) and hindered intelligence efforts in combatting the 
insurgency. He posited that service intelligence mechanisms were far superior to 
civilian ones in adapting to the local environment and encouraging joint 
operations. However, whilst Arditti acknowledged that SIFE’s regional remit ‘was 
bisected by local and metropolitan responsibilities’, his scope did not allow for 
investigating their activities at the regional or national level.120  
 Looking beyond Malaya, a clear trend developed, showing the reduction in 
status and relevance of service intelligence organisations over time. Meanwhile, 
SIFE became increasingly central to the work of the Commissioner General. 
Whilst most of the literature about Malaya agrees that the Special Branch created 
in 1948 took at least 2-3 years and possibly longer to become a really effective 
intelligence producer, the performance of its fraternal organisation in Singapore 
remains a ‘missing dimension’. Therefore, acknowledging the corpus of existing 
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work on British intelligence in Malaya, this thesis does not propose to directly add 
to this. Instead, it provides a countervailing view which combines the regional and 
national bigger picture with a localised focus on developments within Singapore 
itself. This provides not only an original insight into the Malayan and Singaporean 
Emergency, but also challenges previous assertions about Britain’s hands-off 
policy in Southeast Asia, and demonstrates the importance of the three-tier 
intelligence structure in maintaining Britain’s great power ambitions. 
 
Overview 
 The core themes of this thesis are the relationship between local, regional 
and national intelligence; the importance of intelligence in driving Singapore’s 
post-war transitions; and the position of Singapore as a ‘unique window’ or 
‘slough of despond’. In order to understand the significance of these themes, the 
thesis looks at three main areas of analysis: intelligence organisation, intelligence 
culture and intelligence outcomes. 
 With regard to organisation, status and hierarchy, this thesis looks at the 
interplay between the three levels of intelligence. This is an issue with 
significance beyond Singapore, as similar systems were adopted in late-imperial 
Africa and the Middle East. Also, within each level, the thesis considers how the 
organisation of intelligence systems can indicate the relative status of activities or 
agencies. Specifically, it investigates why security intelligence attained a position 
of significance.  
 To fully understand British intelligence in Singapore, we must move 
beyond organisation and consider the workings or operational culture of 
intelligence. In so doing, the thesis considers whether a unified intelligence 
culture developed. It is apparent that it did not. Although security intelligence was 
at the heart of both a regional-national and a local intelligence community, the 
former consistently sought to enhance its own status by downplaying the 
intelligence culture of the latter. With regard to intelligence assessment, the thesis 
looks at how far analysis was dominated by Cold War paradigms. From the mid-
1940s, intelligence analysts consistently applied Cold War logic to the situation in 
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Singapore and Southeast Asia more broadly. However, this was not always 
insensitive to local complexities.  
 Finally, in seeking to understand the impact and influence of British 
intelligence in Singapore, we must evaluate the influence of intelligence upon 
policy-makers. This is far from straightforward, as available policy documents or 
discussions rarely make direct reference to intelligence material. Intelligence 
officials briefed decision-makers, and decision-makers then created policy which 
often accorded with the analysis of their intelligence advisors. Yet it is difficult to 
determine how far this was directly the result of intelligence dissemination, or 
whether it was a coincidence of views. Other ways of thinking about the impact of 
intelligence are to interrogate the significance of intelligence activities as a means 
of engaging with the Cold War in Southeast Asia, and how these clandestine 
endeavours contributed to achieving national goals. In this regard, both the local 
and regional-national intelligence communities were of considerable importance 
in supporting overt policy. This explains why the ‘slough of despond’ view failed 
to undermine support for the retention of a large and diverse intelligence milieu in 
Singapore. Moreover, impact can also be understood in bureaucratic as well as 
organisational terms. Some intelligence agencies thrived and appeared to win the 
confidence of their users, whereas others were assigned to the scrapheap of 
intelligence history. Even if it is not always possible to trace the impact of 
intelligence reportage, the overall impact of an intelligence agency (or broader 
community) can be evaluated through the status and influence that agency 
developed. 
 To examine these issues, the thesis employs a range of sources. Most 
numerous are the official state papers of the UK National Archives. As well as the 
records produced by government departments at the receiving end of intelligence, 
these include a growing corpus of data directly produced by intelligence agencies. 
Such records are far from perfect, and it can be dangerous to adopt an overly 
deterministic attitude. Just because one agency recommended something, it did 
not automatically become policy. Moreover, the nature of the British intelligence 
system, geared towards departmentalism rather than centralisation, could produce 
competing voices. The British intelligence architecture was greatly infused with 
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‘Whitehall’s genetic code’.121 However, for any given period of time, only a 
fraction of these voices are represented in the archives. 
 Nevertheless, there is a significant quantity of sources regarding the 
organisation and activities of British intelligence in Singapore. One of the most 
valuable are the MI5 ‘KV’ series in the UK National Archives. These include 
records created by its Singapore offshoot, SIFE. However, the abrupt termination 
of these records in 1956 has created confusion. A recent journal article 
erroneously suggested that SIFE was wound down in 1956.122 SIFE actually 
continued to operate 1963, but the scanty files from the post-1956 period are to be 
found in the records of other departments. The ‘KV’ files shed light on the 
relationship between SIFE and MI5 Head Office, the position of SIFE within the 
Commissioner General’s establishment, and the internal organisation of SIFE. 
Conversely, they are weak on details of what SIFE officers actually did. Much 
information concerning the operation of a joint sub-section with SIS(FE) is 
redacted. Although containing some interesting internal reviews, they do not 
contain much evidence of the products SIFE was disseminating to its consumers. 
Finished SIFE reports abound in the Colonial Office records for the period of 
1948-50, but dry up thereafter. As an alternative source of MI5 insider 
information, the diaries of its Deputy Director-General, Guy Liddell, contain a 
number of personal insights into SIFE-SIS relations, the direction of SIFE efforts, 
and the dissemination of intelligence through the JIC. Comparable problems of 
limited chronology abound with many of the other agencies discussed. However, 
taking a bigger view of the Singapore intelligence community enables the precise 
histories of different agencies to be co-opted at different times, enabling a more 
substantive discussion than is possible for any single agency.   
 The release in 2012-13 of the Migrated Archives (the ‘FCO 141’ series at 
the National Archives) made this thesis possible. The intelligence records from 
Singapore are a previously untapped trove of information about the activities of 
various agencies. They are, of course, far from perfect. Although containing a 
number of folders relevant to regional agencies such as the JIC(FE), these are 
chronologically sporadic and concentrated upon the earlier years of this thesis. 
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The greatest strength of the Migrated Archives lies in reports produced by local 
intelligence bodies.  
 By knitting together various different reports produced by Special Branch 
and a succession of local intelligence committees, an unbroken run of intelligence 
reports can be created from ‘FCO 141’ records. These almost exclusively 
contained disseminated reports produced for consumer departments. They 
summarised the state of intelligence at the time, and triumphantly paraded Special 
Branch successes in obtaining important intelligence or taking effective action 
against the communists. They rarely gave details about the methods used by 
Special Branch to gain this information, except when such methods are almost 
accidental. As such, these records are best supplemented with the digitised oral 
histories of Special Branch officers held by the National Archives of Singapore. 
These provide valuable insight into the operational culture and methods of Special 
Branch, but little about the assessments process or impact of their activities. Oral 
histories form a useful counterpoint to the ‘FCO 141’ local intelligence sources, 
as the weaknesses of the one are the strengths of the other. Nevertheless, these 
oral histories can have reliability issues due to the time lapse between the events 
described and the actual recording. In this thesis, they have therefore been used 
with caution to illustrate the personal reflections of former intelligence officers 
about the intelligence culture they operated in, rather than as evidence of specific 
operations. 
 Similar problems and opportunities can be found in the memoirs consulted 
for this thesis. Some of the most interesting are the memoirs of a Singaporean 
communist leader;123 a Japanese diplomat and spy who collaborated with British 
intelligence immediately after the Second World War;124 and Australian or 
American intelligence officers who frequently liaised with the British.125 As well 
as these memoirs, digitised intelligence files from Australia and the United States 
have been consulted for an allied perspective upon British intelligence in 
Southeast Asia. 
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 In addition to state records, oral histories and memoirs, this thesis 
incorporates the private papers of both intelligence producers and users. These 
frequently contain official documentation as well as more personal reflections. 
The admittedly few private papers of John Dalley (Director of the Malayan 
Security Service, 1946-48) include various reports pertinent to the organisation of 
his agency, whilst an adjacent series in Oxford’s Bodleian Library comprises its 
finished reports. The papers of Singapore-based colonial officials such as H. 
Ralph Hone (Oxford) and W. L. Blythe (SOAS) also give insight into the early 
organisation of local intelligence. The most useful personal repository is that of 
Commissioner General Malcolm MacDonald. The extensive Malcolm MacDonald 
papers held by Durham University contain reams of personal letters, unpublished 
book manuscripts, and occasional insights into the relationship between 
MacDonald and the intelligence community. MacDonald was a colourful and 
personable character and, as the primary authority to whom regional intelligence 
was responsible, a key figure in this thesis. 
 Nevertheless, although it is possible to reconstruct the history of the 
British intelligence milieu in Singapore, we must remember that this is an 
imperfect reconstruction. As aforementioned, at the regional-national level, there 
are far more organisational records available than those relating to operational or 
analytical processes of intelligence. To refer to the intelligence cycle, it is far 
harder to draw conclusions about intelligence collection than direction. The 
records available strongly indicate that intelligence managers and users were 
consistently dissatisfied with intelligence collection during this period (but 
generally supportive of the agencies charged with collecting it). However, without 
access to more of the reports they were receiving (particularly post-1950), it is 
difficult to interrogate the validity of their views.  
 In the international dimension, very few records have been declassified to 
shed light on Britain’s intelligence liaison and intelligence diplomacy. Intelligence 
liaison can be defined as the development of relationships between intelligence 
agencies for purposes of sharing information or otherwise benefitting the 
intelligence agencies directly. Intelligence diplomacy refers to the actions of 
intelligence agencies in building relationships to fulfil broader political goals. 
From the available records – particularly the comments of intelligence managers 
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in the JIC system and diary entries of Guy Liddell – it would appear that 
intelligence liaison was less effective than intelligence diplomacy. 
 Few records are therefore available which give operational detail about 
intelligence collection, intelligence sharing or processes of covert action. Equally, 
from 1950 onwards, it becomes more difficult to see what sort of processed 
intelligence was reaching consumers. This has implications for evaluating the 
impact of intelligence. However, this obstacle is not insurmountable. The 
strengths of the available sources lie in details regarding the relationships between 
intelligence agencies and the way they were managed. Consequently, we can trace 
impact in bureaucratic if not in operational terms. In other words, intelligence 
agencies may not have enjoyed success in their operational activities, or we may 
not be able to judge if they were successful. Instead, it is possible to trace their 
bureaucratic success: which agencies thrived and why their principal users 
supported them. That agencies such as SIFE were able to do this despite 
indications that they were less operationally effective is testament to the overall 
status of intelligence within Whitehall (and its tropical offshoot in Singapore) 
during the Cold War. 
 Although there is a much greater quantity of intelligence summaries 
available for the local intelligence picture than the regional-national level, 
interpreting the Singapore Special Branch creates its own problems. The sources 
of the Migrated Archives are strongest with regard to processed intelligence 
reports distributed by Special Branch. Far less is said about the legal context in 
which Special Branch operated. In analysing the allegations of physical torture 
discussed in chapter seven, we are forced to rely upon records created by Special 
Branch themselves and declassified by the British state. The fact that these 
records seem to vindicate Special Branch is perhaps unsurprising. This does not, 
however, mean that they are not correct (in this specific instance). Consequently, 
the thesis does not intend to intervene in debates surrounding the (mis)use of force 
in counterinsurgency or colonial ‘rebellions’ because it would be dangerous to 
draw blanket conclusions based on such scanty evidence. 
 The thesis proceeds in three chronological sections. Part one deals with the 
period from the end of the British Military Administration in April 1946 until the 
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Singapore riots of December 1950. The three chapters within this section explore 
how intelligence communities were constructed and then adapted to the changing 
environment during the transition from a ‘post-war’ to a ‘Cold War’ world.  
 Chapter two shows how priorities and expectations were determined by 
national actors expecting the core work of the new intelligence system to be 
strategic. The system created from 1946 was a Second World War construct. 
However, the emergence of insurgency and subversion as the key threats to 
British interests resulted in a re-evaluation of the influence and status of different 
activities. Chapter three moves beyond organisation to consider the content of 
intelligence assessments and their impact upon policy-makers’ perceptions of a 
Cold War. It considers the problems in intelligence production which potentially 
made these assessments unreliable, and the influence of Cold War paradigms and 
the anti-communist agenda of Malcolm MacDonald. The fourth chapter focuses 
on the implications of the Malayan Emergency for local security in Singapore. 
This chapter shows how the Singapore Special Branch became an effective 
instrument of counter-terrorism and examines the role of regional and national 
networks in contributing to the local intelligence machine. 
 Part two considers a period of both consolidation and change beginning 
with Malcolm MacDonald’s ‘Cold War’ conference in August 1950 and ending 
with his replacement by Robert Scott in 1955. Whilst the British intelligence 
machine sought to build upon its strengths and devise new approaches to 
ameliorate its weaknesses, the Cold War was expanding and changing. The 
intervention of communist China in the Korean War brought different intelligence 
agencies to prominence. Meanwhile, the creation of SEATO and developments in 
Vietnam meant that Britain was increasingly involved in intelligence coordination 
at the international level. 
 Chapter five embodies these changes by examining how the regional 
intelligence community expanded its remit and influence. This chapter expands 
upon the growing synergy between MI5 and SIS, the increasing prominence of 
propaganda and covert action, and the use of intelligence diplomacy as a solution 
to Cold War concerns. This chapter also considers how Britain responded to the 
rise of communist China. Meanwhile, chapter six returns to the situation within 
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the island of Singapore. As Special Branch became a victim of its own success, 
having dealt a decisive blow to the MCP but sacrificed inside sources, the three 
levels of intelligence became increasingly interpenetrated. This revised 
intelligence machine continued to devote its efforts to improving security within 
Singapore.  
 The final part, and seventh chapter, deals with the road to Singapore’s 
landmark elections in 1959. This chapter evaluates how Britain responded to 
increasing uncertainty regarding the future of its intelligence base in Singapore, 
and how political considerations had an increasing impact upon the nature of 
intelligence operations. It also assesses the impact of attempts to ‘Malayanise’ the 
local intelligence machine, and the significance of intelligence agencies in how 
policy-makers came to terms with the rising power of the PAP. 
 Overall, the thesis concludes that the two intelligence communities were 
distinguished by different organisational models, working practices and priorities. 
The local intelligence community demonstrated a moderately successful capacity 
for intelligence production. Conversely, the major recurring weakness of the 
regional-national community was an inability to improve the collection of raw 
intelligence outside Singapore. Nonetheless, all levels of intelligence had a 
significant impact upon Britain’s pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. In the 
first instance, intelligence communities reinforced a Cold War awareness within 
their consumer departments and provided assessments regarding the nature and 
level of threat. Yet intelligence communities were more than just passive, 
reporting bodies. The regional-national community offered opportunities to 
covertly implement Cold War policies through helping to cement alliances, 
providing a mechanism for building up a buffer zone in the ‘northern tier’ of 
Southeast Asia via propaganda, covert action and security assistance, and 
facilitating the continuation of British influence despite dwindling overt resources. 
This is one of the prime reasons why the regional-national intelligence community 
continued to be regarded as a ‘unique window’ upon the intelligence challenges of 
Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the local intelligence community guided police action 
and shaped opinions to make sure that Singapore was safe for decolonisation. 
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2. Creating a post-war intelligence machine 
 The aftermath of the Second World War witnessed an important milestone 
in the political development of Malaya and Singapore. Whilst many expected a 
return to pre-war colonial normality, Britain did not revert to business as usual. 
Instead, during the period of the British Military Administration from September 
1945-April 1946, the Colonial Office prepared for a radical reorganisation of its 
possessions in Southeast Asia. A centralised Malayan Union and separate 
Singapore were created against the warnings of experienced colonial officials. 
The Malayan Union failed to win popular support, and was replaced with the 
Federation of Malaya in February 1948. Singapore remained a separate crown 
colony. However, newly arrived officials including Malcolm MacDonald foresaw 
that the future of these nations lay in independence as part of a single federal state. 
Such an approach mirrored the pan-Malayan outlook of MacDonald’s first office 
as Governor General (1946-48). With such a preoccupation on restructuring 
mainland Malaya, the British reoccupied with fewer plans for developing the city-
colony.1 
 The administration’s immediate concern was the restoration of law and 
order. Doing so was rendered problematic by reliance on friendly local elites who 
had proved equally amenable to the Japanese. Moreover, British colonial officials 
treated lawlessness and corruption as endemic to Singapore due to the presence of 
both Chinese and Malay secret societies.2 Meanwhile, the communists were hailed 
as heroes for their role in resisting the Japanese occupation. Their leader Chin 
Peng received the OBE. The Supreme Allied Commander for Southeast Asia, 
Louis Mountbatten, recognised the MCP as a legal entity, arguably undoing the 
counter-subversion efforts of Special Branch in the 1930s and the Japanese 
Kempeitai in the 1940s. As well as maintaining legal premises on Queen Street in 
Singapore’s administrative centre, the Party set up an underground Singapore 
Town Committee. The latter operated through front organisations including the 
Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU) and its local subsidiary, the 
Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU). The communists quickly began to 
capitalise on socioeconomic discontent and organise strikes which increasingly 
                                                            
1 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, pp. 225-228. 
2 René Onraet, Singapore: A Police Background (London: Dorothy Crisp, 1946), p. 105. 
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pushed the British authorities towards a more confrontational attitude.3 In June 
1947, Malcolm MacDonald told his intelligence advisors that: 
The field of Singapore was very fruitful for them [the communists]. He 
pointed out that Singapore had a large Asiatic population who were very 
gullible and who could be easily played upon in regard to the anti-
European complex, anti-Imperialism complex, &c. [sic] in all sorts of 
ways.4 
Even before the outbreak of violence in Malaya in June 1948, colonial officials 
were therefore expressing concern about potential communist subversion. In this 
particular extract, the focus is on communism as a threat to imperial security, but 
this was increasingly framed with reference to the international Cold War.  
 MacDonald’s comment also indicates how imperialist racial 
preconceptions influenced the way that Britain conceptualised Singapore. In 1946, 
a former Inspector-General of Police noted how: 
For a long time to come, the many different peoples of this as yet 
undeveloped country will be better served by British officers brought up in 
and interested in the country than by idealists or theorists interested in 
their ideals or theories; or even by better class men of their own race who 
are as yet too close to and too attracted by the old nepotic [sic] tradition of 
native rule.5 
In this comment, the imperialist world-view is clear, as is the conceptual line 
drawn between ideologues (i.e. communists) and anti-colonial nationalists. 
 Against this background of colonial restructuring and revived concerns 
about communism and imperial security, Britain created a new intelligence 
network for Singapore and the Far East. This chapter examines how the shaping 
of the post-war intelligence community. At both the local and regional levels, 
there was a clear preference for non-executive, theatre-wide and joint agencies. 
The core intelligence concerns which dominated this system were strategic, 
ensuring that service intelligence directorates enjoyed high status. However, the 
eruption of insurgencies across the region shifted concerns towards security and 
                                                            
3 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, pp. 232-233. 
4 Bodleian Library, Mss Ind Ocn s. 254, Papers of John Douglas Dalley, Minutes of Governor 
General’s special conference, 26 June 1947. 
5 Onraet, Singapore, p. 15. 
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foreign intelligence. As counter-subversion became the key policy goal in the 
Cold War (both within Singapore and across the region), civilian security services 
such as SIFE and the Singapore Special Branch began dominating the intelligence 
agenda. The outbreak of the Malayan Emergency proved to be a catalyst for 
important changes in the shape and status of the British intelligence apparatus in 
Singapore. 
  
Rebuilding local intelligence 
 The origins of Singapore’s local intelligence community can be traced 
back to the First World War. An organised communist movement existed in 
Singapore from 1925. The MCP in its recognisable form was created only in 
1930. However, the main catalyst in the creation of a police intelligence branch 
was not the communist threat but the 1915 Indian Army mutiny in Singapore. It 
was by no accident that the intelligence machinery continued to rely upon old 
India policemen well into the 1940s. In 1918, following advice from the Delhi 
Intelligence Bureau, the Singapore police set up both a Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) and an Intelligence Department. This latter organisation was a 
counter-espionage and counter-subversion agency which soon became known as 
the Special Branch.6 
 By the 1930s, the preoccupation with revolutionary Indian nationalism 
(only claiming to represent a small minority of Singapore’s population) was 
replaced by both communist subversion and Japanese espionage. By 1935, Special 
Branch had penetrated the MCP at the highest levels. Nigel Morris, a future 
Director of Special Branch, was appointed the head of the Anti-Communist 
Section in 1935. Morris believed that the key to their success was recruiting local 
Chinese detectives. Some of these had even been members of the MCP before 
defecting, and thus had the knowledge and contacts needed to run double agents 
within the communist party.7 
                                                            
6 Ban Kah Choon, Absent History, pp. 66-74. 
7 NAS 001745, Interview with Nigel Morris, reel 2. 
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 Their most famous success was in running Lai Tek as a penetration agent. 
Lai Tek had previously worked for French colonial intelligence in Indochina, and 
was passed to Singapore in 1934. From 1939-47, the British succeeded in planting 
him as the Secretary-General of the MCP by using Special Branch intelligence to 
pick off his rivals.8 With a British agent as head of the MCP, the communist 
movement was little threat in this period. 
 Special Branch also turned its attention to Japanese espionage in the later 
1930s. In 1937, another future Director, Alan Blades, set up a Security Sub-
Branch responsible for checking the 3000 Japanese citizens residing in Singapore 
at that time. In 1940, Blades arrested Mamoru Shinozaki, a diplomatic clerk 
believed by Special Branch to be a naval intelligence officer. According to 
Special Branch, Shinozaki had been creating a spy ring in Singapore unaware that 
his every move was being watched over a two year operation.9 The relationship 
between Blades and Shinozaki played a crucial role in the post-war reconstruction 
of an effective local intelligence machine. 
 In February 1942, Singapore surrendered to the Japanese and the senior 
Special Branch staff evacuated the island. Following victory over Japan, 
Singapore was governed by the British Military Administration from September 
1945-March 1946. During this time, there were two main local intelligence 
agencies, both concerned solely with security intelligence. On the military side, 
Field Security was commanded by Major Isaac. Their responsibilities included the 
administration of Japanese prisoners prior to repatriation. These included Japanese 
intelligence officers of the Kempeitai (the Japanese ‘Gestapo’). Meanwhile, a 
civilian Malayan Security was established in September 1945 to reemploy former 
Special Branch officers in a security role. Briefly headed by a Major J. C. Barry, 
from November 1945 it was commanded by Alan Blades.10 During this period, 
these temporary security intelligence organs proved effective in resurrecting a 
working intelligence machine. They began moving towards a policy of 
                                                            
8 Leon Comber, ‘“Traitor of all Traitors” – Secret Agent Extraordinaire: Lai Teck, Secretary 
General, Communist Party of Malaya (1939-1947)’, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 83(2) (2010), 1-25. 
9 NAS 000150, Interview with Ahmad Khan, reel 1. 
10 Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, p. 31. 
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confrontation with communism at a time when the colonial authorities were 
preoccupied with political concerns. 
 The Japanese prisoners in the custody of Field Security included pre-war 
‘spy’ and wartime civil administrator Mamoru Shinozaki. Shinozaki was 
pleasantly surprised to find that British intelligence was aware of his wartime 
record – he had saved many Singaporean Chinese families from persecution and 
death – and Blades greeted him ‘like a long-lost friend’. From 1945-47 Shinozaki 
served as an interpreter for Field Security, where he was involved in translating 
the oral testimony of Kempeitai counter-intelligence officers. This provided 
important information on the position of the MCP at the end of the war.11 
Japanese intelligence officers proved only too pleased to cooperate with their 
former enemies. According to their British minders, this was because they hated 
the communists even more than they hated British imperialists.12 
 Although a few pre-war Special Branch records were successfully 
evacuated to India in 1942, most of their secret records were destroyed. Field 
Security interrogations of Kempeitai officers therefore proved a vital stopgap in 
rebuilding a security intelligence archive. In addition, immediate security efforts 
focused on re-establishing contact with former agents such as Lai Tek.13 
 As early as January 1946, Alan Blades wrote to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Lord Mountbatten, to warn of the communist threat. During the war, 
the MCP had been uneasy allies, operating guerrilla forces under the direction of 
Force 136 of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). But within a few 
months of victory, old tensions had resurfaced and the alliance collapsed. Blades 
warned that ‘the communist party has had enough rope. If it is not pulled up with 
a jerk very soon there may be very serious consequences’. His advice fell on deaf 
ears. The Military Administration suffered from a tendency towards debate and 
consultation rather than taking decisive action.14 For an interim administration 
                                                            
11 Shinozaki, Syonan, pp. 144-146. 
12 NAS 001745, Interview with Nigel Morris, reel 5. 
13 Bodleian Library, Mss Ind Ocn s. 271, Papers of H. Ralph Hone, Report on the British Military 
Administration of Malaya, p. 67, 87-89; CO 537/4814, SIFE report, ‘Communism in Hong Kong’, 
2 February 1949. 
14 Bodleian Library, Mss Ind Ocn s. 262, Papers of Harold Fairburn, Blades to Mountbatten, 29 
January 1946. 
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worried about the repercussions of the Whitehall decision to impose a new form 
of colonial rule, this was hardly surprising. 
 Blades was not alone in identifying the MCP as the principal threat to 
colonial security. Chinese Affairs advisor Victor Purcell noted that: 
The problem, however, is to keep the subversive activities of the 
Communist Party in check and at the same time not to interfere with 
legitimate association and expression of opinion… What we are 
confronted with at present is the threat of small but resolute attempts to 
terrorise the entire community with the undermining of the administration 
as their sole end.15 
The British were not willing to turn Malaya into a police state, but some voices 
were clearly aware of the communist menace on the horizon. This anti-communist 
concern was framed solely in terms of the viability of colonial rule and 
emphasised the local agency of the MCP. This is not the same as the Cold War 
narratives which started to emerge from 1947. 
 The end of military rule and the beginning of the new civil administration 
in spring 1946 necessitated the creation of new intelligence bodies. Despite the 
change in colonial administration in favour of two separate colonies, a new 
Malayan Security Service (MSS) was created which was more expansive than the 
temporary organisation commanded by Blades.16 This was pan-Malayan: 
encompassing both the colonies of the Malayan Union (which became the 
Federation of Malaya in 1948) and Singapore. In other words, the new MSS 
created in April 1946 occupied a poorly defined position somewhere between the 
local and regional levels and conflicted with the reality of colonial separation. 
 The director of the new organisation was Colonel John Dalley. Colonel 
Dalley was an experienced police officer and guerrilla organiser from the early 
stages of the war, but not a career intelligence officer. His pan-Malayan 
headquarters was in Singapore ‘since Singapore is the centre for all Chinese 
subversive activities, which will always constitute the main security danger’.17 
                                                            
15 Bodleian Library, Mss Ind Ocn s. 116, Papers of W. L. Blythe, Report on Chinese Affairs by 
Victor Purcell (Principal Advisor, Chinese Affairs), 18 February 1946. 
16 A previous incarnation had existed from 1939, but the post-1946 MSS was very much a ‘new’ 
structure. 
17 FCO 141/14360, Minutes of a meeting between Malayan Police and SIFE, 2 September 1946. 
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Just like the intelligence outfits of the Military Administration, MSS was keenly 
aware that communism amongst the Chinese population would be the most 
serious threat to colonial security. 
 The existence of MSS as a security intelligence collation centre provided 
the kernel of rivalry with MI5. This was complicated by instructions to the MI5 
representative in the Malayan Union, who was mandated not just to collate but 
also to ‘collect security intelligence by all practicable means’.18 MSS officer L. F. 
Knight viewed MI5’s penetration into local intelligence collection with much 
consternation, writing that ‘a first reading… gave me the impression of a sort of 
Gestapo organisation’. This first clash was defused through an agreement that 
MI5 officers would not run agents within Malaya and Singapore without MSS’ 
knowledge.19 
 MSS had no executive powers to arrest or detain, and was therefore reliant 
on cooperation with the police to act upon its intelligence. This was not, however, 
forthcoming and Dalley felt isolated from ‘the bigger framework of Empire 
security’.20  Unlike the pre-war Special Branch, MSS was not part of the police 
and not integrated into the Colonial Office. Nor was it affiliated with the regional 
or national intelligence hierarchy. Temporarily a full-time observer, from late 
1947 Dalley was removed from the membership of the JIC(FE), despite strong 
objections from Malcolm MacDonald. The committee’s chairman explained that 
Dalley could still be invited to any relevant discussions, but because the JIC(FE) 
had a regional outlook, the director of a local intelligence service could not be a 
standing member. Whilst it could be debated whether MSS had more of a micro-
regional remit, a second objection raised by the JIC(FE) to Dalley’s continued 
presence was more decisive. The committee was mainly concerned with strategic 
questions and intelligence from foreign territories. The proper reporting agency 
for Dalley’s intelligence was the colonial governments in question, and not the 
JIC, which fed into the national intelligence effort.21  
                                                            
18 FCO 141/14360, Directive for DSO Malayan Union, 1 August 1946. 
19 FCO 141/14360, Memorandum by L. F. Knight, ‘Commentary on Instructions to DSO Malayan 
Union’, 27 August 1946. 
20 FCO 141/17012, Memorandum by Dalley, ‘Staffing MSS’, 21 March 1947. 
21 FCO 141/15432, Minutes of a meeting held in Singapore, 28-29 November 1947. 
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 The resuscitation of local security intelligence was thus a problematic 
process. On the one hand, MSS won the confidence of Governor General 
Malcolm MacDonald. But its nebulous foundations and lack of integration at any 
level of the intelligence hierarchy left it fundamentally vulnerable. Although 
security intelligence was paramount at the local level, both the police and MI5 felt 
they could do a better job than MSS. Most of the successes enjoyed by MSS from 
1946-48 were the result of prior operations such as the pre-war recruitment of 
double agent Lai Tek. This was particularly apparent in Singapore, where MSS 
inherited a solid track record of achievement, as well as experienced officers such 
as Nigel Morris and Alan Blades. In contrast, the MSS Malayan branch struggled 
to achieve any meaningful successes.22 
 
The concept of regional intelligence 
 The decision to create a ‘regional’ level of intelligence was a product of 
the specific circumstances of the time. According to a SIFE report of 1947, prior 
to the Second World War, intelligence production and evaluation were conducted 
on a compartmentalised local level. The surprise of the Japanese invasion of 
Malaya discredited this approach.23 In addition, the war saw increasing attention 
to coordinated and joint intelligence endeavours, or – to put it another way – 
intelligence by committee. These wartime ‘lessons’ inspired a network of regional 
agencies created from 1946-49 along with their sometimes confusing acronyms. 
To paraphrase George Orwell, ‘it looked at first sight as though [Singapore] were 
suffering from a plague of initials’.24 
 This new intelligence system contained elements of innovation as well as 
throwbacks and reactions to wartime ‘lessons’. SIFE’s dismissal of the previous 
intelligence regime as overly compartmentalised is a questionable interpretation 
of history. Moreover, the disparity between the local and regional intelligence 
                                                            
22 NAS 001745, Interview with Nigel Morris, reel 5; Bodleian Library, Mss Ind Ocn s. 254, Papers 
of John Douglas Dalley, Minute by Dalley, 1 July 1948. 
23 KV 4/422, SIFE Report, ‘Assessment of the Value of SIFE and DSO Positions in the Far East’, 
c. December 1947. 
24 Orwell was referring to Spain: George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (London: Penguin, 2000), 
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communities which was present from 1946-48 would appear to suggest that this 
‘lesson’ was not learned.  
 Before 1941, the British intelligence system in the Far East was primarily 
an imperial security service. However, successes in dealing with subversive 
threats such as the MCP in Malaya and Singapore contributed to an atmosphere of 
complacency in which counter-espionage and strategic foreign intelligence 
suffered. As well as separate imperial security services, a broader, theatre-level 
intelligence bureaucracy emerged during the 1930s. Initially based in Hong Kong, 
the three armed services pooled resources into a Far Eastern Combined Bureau 
(FECB). The level of cooperation between different intelligence organisations was 
reasonably good, but the individual sources of intelligence upon which they relied 
were poor. This observation also consistently describes the post-war period.25 
 In August 1939, defence planners reconciled themselves to the realisation 
that Hong Kong was indefensible against a large-scale attack. The FECB moved 
to the Singapore naval base (which had been completed in 1938) and a subsidiary 
Far East Security Service was formed to pool security information. This move 
was a landmark moment in Singapore’s development as an intelligence centre. 
The centre of gravity in Britain’s Far Eastern Empire was gradually shifting from 
Hong Kong to Singapore.26 Historians have disagreed over the extent to which 
this embryonic regional intelligence community failed with regard to the threat 
from Japan. Aldrich argued that the intelligence community was providing 
accurate forecasts of Japanese intentions, but user departments refused to accept 
that Southeast Asia represented a soft and attractive target to Japan. On the other 
hand, Antony Best suggested that Aldrich overestimates the foresight of 
intelligence reports which tempered their appraisal of Japanese capabilities with 
the caveat that Japan had previously only been tested against enemies far inferior 
to the British Empire.27 As the 1947 SIFE report indicates, intelligence managers 
in the immediate post-war period instead chose to blame the ‘surprise’ of the 
Japanese attack on failings in local intelligence and the lack of sufficient avenues 
                                                            
25 Aldrich, British Intelligence and the War against Japan, pp. 20-21, 30-31. 
26 Antony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge, p. 155; Peter Elphick, Far 
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for integrating local reports into a regional bigger picture. The JIC also blamed a 
lack of resources and status.28 This interpretation had a significant impact on the 
creation of a much larger and more influential regional intelligence apparatus 
from 1946. 
 The hierarchy of intelligence which evolved after the Second World War 
was created within the context of a broader administrative structure. From 1946-
48, this was split in half between the Colonial and Foreign Offices. On 22 May 
1946, Malcolm MacDonald was sworn in as Governor General of the British 
territories in Southeast Asia. This was a non-executive position intended to 
coordinate the administration of Britain’s colonies, although lacking formal 
powers to coerce individual governments. MacDonald was a former Secretary of 
State for the Colonies who believed strongly in decolonisation and the 
Commonwealth. He possessed substantial informal influence, used by MacDonald 
to have Malayan High Commissioner Edward Gent removed from office in 
1948.29 Within Malaya, he was fully committed to removing the more unsavoury 
features of colonialism such as ‘white-only’ clubs. Off-duty, MacDonald was 
enraptured by beauty: in birds, scenery and the Chinese ceramics he devotedly 
collected. Even on duty, MacDonald was eccentric, referred to by the British press 
as the ‘shirt-sleeve diplomat’ on account of his disdain for wearing formal dress.30  
 Two months before MacDonald was sworn in as Governor General, the 
Foreign Office implanted its own man in Singapore. This was Miles Lampson, 
Lord Killearn, who became the Special Commissioner for Southeast Asia. 
Killearn was a more experienced diplomatist. He cut his teeth in Tokyo and 
Beijing before rising to serve as Ambassador to Egypt. His office was similarly 
nebulous to MacDonald’s, providing non-executive coordination of Foreign 
Office posts and monitoring the rice shortages plaguing the area.31  
 These two figureheads of the Singapore regional bureaucracy forged an 
effective working partnership. The historian A. J. Stockwell has noted that this 
                                                            
28 CO 537/2653, JIC(FE)(48)7(Final), JIC(FE) report, ‘Lessons on the Organisation of Intelligence 
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was a surprising partnership as Killearn and MacDonald were the very antithesis 
of one another. Whereas Killearn ‘revelled in the pomp and oriental trappings of 
his office’ and was an old Etonian, MacDonald was the grandson of a ploughman 
and styled himself as a man of the people. Killearn was ‘a relic of a previous era’ 
whilst MacDonald was a ‘pioneer of the new Commonwealth’.32 Yet the harmony 
between them is less surprising than Stockwell suggests. As well as sharing a 
passion for collecting Chinese ceramics, they had, in fact, a friendly prior 
acquaintance. In 1929, a much younger MacDonald had visited Beijing for the 
first time where he had been entertained by Killearn and his family who enjoyed 
showing him around China’s historic sights.33  
 From 1946-47, a regional defence and intelligence structure evolved to 
serve these harmonious masters. On the defence side, a British Defence 
Coordination Committee, Far East – BDCC(FE) – was created, bringing together 
the three commanders-in-chief of the Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force 
(RAF) under the chairmanship of MacDonald. Conversely, the Joint Intelligence 
Committee in London – JIC(London) – spawned an offshoot in Singapore: the 
Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East). This JIC(FE) was part of the Special 
Commissioner’s Foreign Office structure. This separation is indicative of the 
British government’s intentions for the intelligence community. Whilst defence 
was centred upon the colonial obligations of the Governor General, intelligence 
was at first linked with the Foreign Office and centred upon foreign threats. This 
would appear a dramatic reversal from the pre-1941 situation, when intelligence 
was predominantly an imperial security endeavour. The shaping of the regional 
intelligence and defence architecture from 1946 was an attempt to correct the 
perceived inadequacies and complacencies of its previous incarnation. 
 Defining the remit of this new intelligence machine was linked to the 
growing significance of Singapore in British policy. The concept of ‘Southeast 
Asia’, as understood by the British, began with reference to Burma, Thailand, 
Indochina, Malaya (including Singapore and Borneo) and Indonesia. However, 
following the expansion of influence of Southeast Asia Command during the 
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Second World War, Britain found itself dealing with a larger area. The 
decolonisation of India in 1947 also shifted the centre of gravity of Britain’s ‘East 
of Suez’ interests to Singapore. The definition of Southeast Asia came to include 
parts of South Asia like Ceylon, and to stretch towards Hong Kong and the 
Philippines. The regional intelligence community based in Singapore also 
established hegemony over the oversight of intelligence in East Asia. This 
represented the ascendancy of Singapore as what a 1947 Foreign Office paper 
called the ‘centre for the radiation of British influence’ in Asia.34 
 The regional intelligence community quickly grew into a network of 
civilian, armed service and joint intelligence structures. Under the auspices of the 
JIC(FE), joint intelligence organisations were at the top of the hierarchy. The 
committee was responsible for all-source intelligence evaluation and prepared 
papers for the national intelligence effort whilst also guiding the regional defence 
community. This represents the crucial difference between the pre-1941 and post-
1945 regional intelligence machines. Although joint service institutions were at 
the heart of both incarnations, after the Second World War, the enhanced status of 
the JIC(London) ensured that the new regional system mirrored the Whitehall 
intelligence make-up. The JIC(FE) provided a crucial link between the regional 
and national intelligence communities that had been missing in the build-up to 
war. During the immediate post-war years, the Far East did not bulk large in the 
concerns of Britain’s national intelligence effort. Largely this was because of a 
strategic focus on Europe and the Middle East, but it also reflected the emerging 
reality that agencies like the JIC could devolve their Far Eastern responsibilities to 
Singapore.35 
 The national intelligence machine also underwent reshaping during this 
period. Two of the most noteworthy features were the importance attached to 
integration of intelligence at the very top via the JIC and the increasing 
importance of a national intelligence effort in response to the strategic Soviet 
threat.36 In Singapore, the growing centrality of the JIC(London) was transposed 
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through the creation of the JIC(FE) in early 1947 to replace the Central 
Intelligence Staff leftover from wartime Southeast Asia Command. It was jointly 
responsible to the JIC(London) and BDCC(FE), although chaired by the Special 
Commissioner’s representative.37 Reflecting the imprecise geographical 
responsibilities of the entire regional structure, the primary responsibility of this 
early JIC(FE) was Southeast Asia (as per the Special Commissioner and Governor 
General). However, it also had an important secondary responsibility for a broader 
Far East incorporating China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia and even India.38 
 Its initial composition was split between three grades. The permanent 
signing members were the Special Commissioner’s representative (Robert Scott) 
– who acted as chairman – and the three heads of the armed services intelligence 
staffs. Shortly afterwards a representative of the Governor General was added.  
This distinction followed the contemporary structure of the parent JIC(London), 
where only the Foreign Office and three service representatives signed papers. In 
both London and Singapore, civilian intelligence chiefs from SIS and MI5 were 
restricted to a lower status as permanent but not signing members.39 Actual papers 
were first drafted by a Joint Intelligence Staff (Far East) – JIS(FE) – which shared 
the signing membership of the JIC(FE).40 
 The early organisation of regional intelligence strongly reflected armed 
service involvement. Indeed, the subject matter upon which the early JIC(FE) 
reported was heavily weighted in favour of foreign, particularly strategic, 
intelligence subjects. MacDonald’s deputy, Sir Ralph Hone, noted that there was a 
tendency to regard information from British territories as not, in the strictest 
sense, ‘intelligence’.41 The emerging regional intelligence system was, as with the 
administrative structure it served, a tropical duplication of Whitehall. Like the 
national intelligence community, its ‘genetic code’ was built around 
departmentalism over centralisation. Committees and joint bodies existed to 
provide integration and consensus.42 However, just as the JIC(London) was 
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subordinate to the Chiefs of Staff Committee until 1957, the JIC(FE) was a 
subsidiary of the BDCC(FE). In practical terms, therefore, it tended towards being 
a clearing house for defence intelligence rather than a broader all-source and all-
types evaluation centre. 
 The JIC(London) keenly encouraged its Singapore outpost to provide 
appreciations conforming to strategic or defence-related subjects. In June 1948, 
the same month as the Malayan insurgency erupted, London requested reports on 
Soviet interests in the Far East; Soviet capabilities and likelihood of attacking 
Anglo-American interests; the military situation in China; and the military 
implications of Japan’s surplus population.43 As well as reflecting the primacy of 
Cold War concerns about general war with the Soviet Union, this also 
demonstrates the retention of fears about a resurgent Japan.  
 The post-war intelligence machine was thus a product of particular 
interpretations of pre-war intelligence failures, the factors which appeared to have 
produced intelligence success during the conflict, and the reshaping of the 
national intelligence effort. In July 1948, the JIC(FE) provided a study of the 
lessons of war against Japan, condemning the wartime system of intelligence 
organisation. Insufficient importance had been attached to intelligence despite the 
fact that ‘the Far East provides great opportunity for secret intelligence and 
clandestine operations of all kinds, both to us and an enemy’. One specific 
problem was the lack of topographical intelligence in advance, necessitating 
dangerous photographic overflights during the offensive campaigns of 1945 and 
hindering forward-planning. In the new Cold War, Britain was determined not to 
be taken off-guard, actively seeking to learn from the past. Subsequent 
developments in the Singapore intelligence organisation were important steps in 
learning from earlier mistakes. As the JIC(FE) noted, ‘a democratic country, 
which cannot afford to maintain armed forces at war strength in peacetime, must 
take out an insurance policy in the form of a strong and efficient intelligence 
organisation’. This comment further encapsulates their focus on strategic 
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planning.44 From the very outset it appears possible to speak of a fairly unified 
regional-national intelligence community. The regional apparatus created in the 
early post-war years was structurally and conceptually tied to its parentage in the 
metropole. Nevertheless, by trying to make up for the pre-war focus on imperial 
security to the detriment of strategic concerns, the new system ran the risk of 
being unsuitably chartered to deal with the rising imperial security concerns of the 
late 1940s. 
 From summer 1948, in response to the outbreak of communist insurgency 
in Malaya and growing likelihood of a communist victory in mainland China, the 
JIC(FE) prompted the British colonies of Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong to 
create Local Intelligence Committees (LICs). These would replicate on a local 
level the composition of the JIC, incorporating civilian and service experts to 
analyse locally produced intelligence. Their introduction fully integrated the JIC 
system at the national, regional and local levels. However, whilst the Singapore 
government agreed that such a measure was ‘not only desirable but essential’, 
Hong Kong proved more troublesome.45 The Governor of Hong Kong refused to 
comply until MI5 Director-General Sir Percy Sillitoe intervened on behalf of the 
national intelligence effort in August 1949.46 Arguably the creation of the LICs 
was an entirely superfluous and inappropriate development outside of the jungle 
war in the Federation of Malaya. As future chapters make clear, counter-
subversion efforts in Singapore were dominated by Special Branch, and the ability 
to disseminate their reports to variously constituted LICs patronised by service 
chiefs had little impact on their successful operations (although LIC reports are a 
boon for the historian). At the local level, security intelligence was paramount, 
and replicating the strategically-focused regional-national intelligence community 
did little to assist security services. 
 Two further joint intelligence structures emerged in Singapore during the 
late 1940s. Their creation reinforced the defence-dominated intelligence 
hierarchy. The first was a representative of the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). 
The JIB was created in response to wartime ‘lessons’ that military planners 
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required up-to-date information in areas such as operational topography, scientific 
intelligence, war economies and background research into potential future 
enemies.47 The JIB was both an inter-service and Commonwealth endeavour with 
the Far East falling into the responsibility of the Australian JIB(Melbourne) or 
JIB(M). In practical terms, most of the intelligence the JIB used was open source 
information.48 At its core was the belief that high-level espionage and signals 
intelligence operations needed a background of lower grade research. It also 
represented a rationalisation of various wartime bodies for producing this sort of 
joint intelligence.49  
 In addition to the JIC(FE), JIS(FE) and JIB representative, a fourth joint 
intelligence centre was established in June 1948. This was equally a product of the 
post-war reshuffling of the national intelligence community. Back in Britain, the 
wartime Central Interpretation Unit for analysing air photographic intelligence 
was renamed the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Centre. On 1 June 1948, this 
organisation replicated itself in Singapore with the Joint Air Photographic 
Intelligence Centre, Far East: JAPIC(FE).50 
 The JAPIC(FE) was primarily responsible for the collation and analysis of 
air photographic (also known as ‘image’) intelligence. Actual direction of 
photographic production was provided by the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence 
Board, Far East: JAPIB(FE). This was a sub-committee of the JIC(FE) chaired by 
the Chief Intelligence Officer, Far East Air Force (FEAF). JAPIC(FE) had local 
detachments in Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong. These were commanded by 
whichever service had greatest commitment in the area. By 1952, exactly half of 
JAPIC(FE)’s total strength of 76 personnel were assigned to local detachments: 7 
at Butterworth (Malaya), 16 at Kuala Lumpur (Malaya), 8 at Tengah (Singapore) 
and 7 at Kai Tak (Hong Kong). This distribution shows the priority given to 
Southeast Asia over the China area, and in particular the insurgency in Malaya.51  
  The composition of these joint intelligence structures indicates how 
service intelligence outfits enjoyed high status during the early post-war period. 
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All three fighting services had intelligence collation centres in Singapore. Military 
intelligence has left the biggest archival footprint. At the national level, MI2 was 
the section of the Directorate of Military Intelligence responsible for the Middle 
and Far East during the early Cold War. MI2 reports naturally prioritised military 
subjects, such as the operational situation in countries beset by communist 
insurgencies or the progress of the communist advance in China.52 
 As well as benefitting from a system inspired by perceived ‘lessons’ of the 
recent war against Japan, service intelligence directorates helped to perpetuate 
such a system. MI2 argued a similar view to the JIC(FE), that too little attention 
was given to Southeast Asia before the Second World War due to complacency in 
the belief of Singapore’s impregnability. To meet the Cold War threat, they 
needed to regard the theatre as a single strategic unit, as ‘enemy occupation of any 
one country would provide jumping-off point for invasion of the whole of SEA 
[sic]’.53 Their conception of regional intelligence was geared towards meeting a 
future strategic threat along similar lines to the rapid Japanese advance through 
Southeast Asia. With the JIC(FE) signing membership dominated by the armed 
services, it is littler surprise that the committee focused on strategic evaluations. 
 Under MI2’s authority, a regional military intelligence headquarters was 
established to serve the Commander-in-Chief of Far East Land Forces (FARELF) 
in Singapore (see figure 2.1). This was the General Staff Intelligence (GSI) 
branch. GSI branch collated and analysed intelligence provided from military 
attachés, Field Security sections and through liaison with civilian agencies 
including SIS. Their primary responsibilities were to prepare handbooks, order of 
battle data and personality records relevant to the Far East. MI2 was in turn 
responsible for summarising and evaluating these reports back in London. This 
hierarchy ensured that Far Eastern product was integrated into military 
intelligence appreciations alongside the greater strategic priority of Europe, and 
thus became part of the national intelligence effort.54 
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Figure 2.1. Organisation of military intelligence in the Far East, 1948. 
 
 Further evidence of the high status accorded to service or defence 
intelligence can be seen in the control of signals intelligence. Arguably the 
success of signals intelligence in the European theatre was vital to Allied victory 
in the Second World War. This was therefore a significant intelligence activity. In 
wartime Europe, signals intelligence had been controlled by the Government 
Code and Cypher School, subordinate to SIS. This matured into an independent, 
civilian Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) during the early 
Cold War. However, in the Far East, signals intelligence remained the 
responsibility of the three armed services, particularly the RAF. Only in 1951 
were plans enacted to create a GCHQ-administered signals centre alongside the 
existing RAF Chia Keng intercept station in Singapore.55 
 Civilian intelligence agencies were initially at the bottom of the Singapore 
regional hierarchy. The two agencies in question were the regional outposts of 
what would become Britain’s most influential intelligence services: SIS and MI5. 
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 Traditional espionage or foreign intelligence was conducted by SIS, which 
established a Far East Controllerate, sometimes abbreviated to SIS(FE), in 
Singapore. After the Second World War, SIS simply moved its theatre 
headquarters over from Ceylon, from where it had directed wartime operations.56 
The remit of the Far East Controller was to give direction to individual SIS field 
stations as well as to channel their production back to headquarters and liaise with 
foreign partners. By 1947, SIS had field stations in Hong Kong, China (Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Nanking, Urumqi), Japan (Tokyo), Indochina (Hanoi) and Indonesia 
(Batavia). They shortly enacted plans to open new stations in Thailand (Bangkok), 
Burma (Rangoon) and Korea (Seoul).57 
 Meanwhile, security intelligence was the responsibility of MI5’s regional 
outpost, SIFE. According to a SIFE internal report, the metropolitan government 
regarded Singapore as the most significant British base in the Far East. This was a 
turnaround to the situation a decade previous when, until 1939, Hong Kong had 
been Britain’s key defence and intelligence interest in the area. The creation of the 
naval base, realisation of the vulnerability of Hong Kong, and multiplicity of 
problems facing Southeast Asia in the late 1940s all contributed to the new status 
of Singapore. This importance made the defence of Singapore against subversion 
or espionage a priority of direct concern to MI5 under guidance issued by the 
Prime Minister.58 Consequently, whilst SIFE’s remit was to conduct regional-
level assessment, its approach in doing so was focused on providing security for 
the British territories of Malaya and Singapore. As such, SIFE became 
increasingly concerned with the state of local intelligence in those colonies. This 
created tensions with the local intelligence machine.  
 On 6 August 1946, the Director-General of MI5, Sir Percy Sillitoe, 
appointed Colonel Cyril Egerton Dixon as the first Head of Security Intelligence 
Far East (H/SIFE). Dixon was to command a SIFE headquarters section in 
Singapore, and as ‘theatre head’ of MI5 in the Far East, would help coordinate the 
network of Defence Security Officers (DSOs). These were MI5 liaison officers 
attached to colonial or Commonwealth territories to offer security intelligence 
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advice. They also channelled raw intelligence back from local producers to SIFE 
headquarters in the old Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank building in Singapore. 
 SIFE’s charter described the new agency as ‘an inter-services organisation 
responsible for the collection, collation and dissemination to interested and 
appropriate Service and Civil departments of all Security Intelligence affecting 
British territories in the Far East’. Although described as ‘inter-services’, in 
reality it was a regional outpost of MI5, albeit with a few of its initial staff 
members drawn from service intelligence. H/SIFE had two masters: the Director-
General of MI5 and the defence structure which would shortly evolve into the 
BDCC(FE).59 SIFE was therefore envisaged as part of the regional administrative 
system under the Governor General (and subsequently the Commissioner 
General). Already there was an underlying anachronism, as the defence and 
intelligence side of this structure covered the entire Far East, whereas MacDonald 
and Killearn’s briefs only covered Southeast Asia. 
 The SIFE charter is somewhat vague in defining what was meant by 
‘security intelligence’. In addition, assigning responsibility for collection as well 
as collation (the former interpretable as the production of raw intelligence whilst 
the latter implied channelling intelligence produced by other agencies) contained 
the kernel of future rivalries. 
 Sillitoe’s personal instructions to Dixon contained greater clarity. These 
directed H/SIFE to fulfil five specific requirements: 
1. Collation of intelligence relating to foreign intelligence services whose 
activities are inimical to British interests. 
2. Collation of intelligence relating to any political or subversive movement, 
indigenous or foreign, which is a potential danger to British security. 
3. Detection of clandestine means of communication. 
4. Coordination of protective security policy. 
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5. Supply of information from SIFE records to assist DSOs or other officials 
in background checks of doubtful aliens, residents or visitors to British 
territories.60 
This memorandum demonstrates more explicitly the purpose of SIFE as lying in 
intelligence collation rather than collection. Whilst covering the entire Far East, 
the focus was evidently on threats to the British territories in Southeast Asia and 
Hong Kong. This collation activity, according to the SIFE charter, would 
necessitate close liaison with local intelligence agencies such as colonial Special 
Branches, SIS field posts in foreign territories, and the intelligence services of 
friendly foreign powers.61  
 Dixon only lasted a few months in office, being replaced by a Malcolm 
Johnson at the end of 1946. Johnson had nearly two decades experiences in what 
was then referred to as ‘oriental intelligence work’, having previously served in 
the Delhi Intelligence Bureau in British India. However, Johnson was killed in an 
air crash shortly after taking up his appointment, and was replaced by an MI5 
Head Office appointee, T. ‘Hugh’ Winterborn (see table 2.1), who struggled to 
forge good relations with the principal consumers of his intelligence.62 
Table 2.1. Heads of SIFE, 1946-59 
Cyril Egerton Dixon 1946 
Malcolm Johnson 1946-47 
Hugh Winterborn 1947-48 
Alex Kellar 1948-49 
Jack Morton 1949-52 
Courtenay Young 1952-55 
Richard Thistlethwaite 1955-59 
 
 Sillitoe’s instructions also clarified what MI5 understood by ‘security 
intelligence’. The first task assigned to Dixon was a clear reference to counter-
espionage, whilst the subsequent instructions related to counter-subversion and 
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protective security. Therefore, the MI5 view of security intelligence can be 
defined as counter-espionage plus counter-subversion plus protective security: a 
definition which closely approximates that given in the previous chapter. These 
instructions ensured that SIFE’s functions were not dissimilar to those of MI5 in 
Britain. There was one key difference. SIFE officers were not actually producing 
raw intelligence. Although MI5 operated across the British Empire, it rarely 
engaged in direct collection outside of Britain, instead operating on a collation 
and advisory basis. 
 As a result, some SIFE officers feared that their organisation would 
become ‘merely a post-box’ between the DSOs, Governor General’s organisation 
and MI5 Head Office. SIFE officer Courtenay Young noted that MSS already 
collated information across Malaya and Singapore. Therefore, for SIFE to add 
something useful for their regional masters, they would need to develop links with 
SIS in order to create a bigger picture.63 Thus seeking to avoid duplicating the 
work of MSS entailed the risk that SIFE would become a rival to the JIC(FE) as a 
clearing house for multiple-source intelligence. In practice, the strategic focus of 
the JIC(FE), contrary to the security functions of SIFE, ensured that relations ran 
smoothly. 
 Counter-subversion became SIFE’s main focus. Even in their first month 
of operations, Young foresaw that most subversion would be communist-inspired. 
SIFE saw communist movements as essentially transnational. This helped justify 
their own existence, as collating security intelligence across territorial boundaries 
would be essential to meeting this threat.64 This elevated SIFE from a purely 
imperial intelligence organisation to part of a regional and national intelligence 
picture. In this regard, the creation of SIFE addressed some of the failings of the 
pre-war intelligence system, which was too focused on indigenous problems at the 
expense of externally-originating security threats such as Japanese espionage. 
 In the context of the emerging Cold War, counter-espionage concerns 
were centred upon the Soviet Union (and later China). In late 1946, reports 
surfaced of a Soviet proposal to establish a new legation at Bangkok housing 200 
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‘diplomatic’ officials. SIFE and its DSOs were under no illusions that a great 
many of these officials would be intelligence officers. This could leave the British 
territories encircled by a Soviet-penetrated Thailand to the north and revolutionary 
anti-colonial Indonesia to the south.65 In addition to these paranoid-sounding 
concerns, SIFE entertained further suspicions that the SOVEXPORTFILM 
network for distribution of propaganda films was a front for the suspected 
espionage activities of its Shanghai director.66 Nonetheless, counter-espionage 
was a lesser concern than counter-subversion. SIFE theorised that the Soviets 
would prefer to work through local communist parties than take direct measures to 
destabilise the European colonies. This view was further evidence of an emerging 
Cold War attitude which broadened out the remit of imperial security.67 
 Within only a short time, SIFE grew in confidence as a collation centre 
capable of providing useful appreciations of the regional security picture. 
Singapore was not only its home but also its conceptual focal point. As 
aforementioned, the defence of Singapore was a key interest covered by MI5’s 
imperial responsibilities. Other major concerns included the Anglo-Australian 
long-range weapons programme which they feared was vulnerable to communist 
penetration utilising lines of communication via Southeast Asia. This was partly 
the result of signals intelligence. ‘Venona’ decrypts of Soviet intelligence 
communications showed that the Australian Department of External Affairs was 
penetrated by Soviet spies. This prompted Britain to withhold classified 
information from the joint guided weapons programme and led to MI5 and SIFE 
officers playing a critical role in the development of an Australian counterpart: the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).68   
 The creation of SIFE mirrored the appointments of Killearn and 
MacDonald to guide and coordinate intelligence across the region. The regional 
intelligence community reflected a desire to avoid one of the perceived key 
weaknesses of the pre-war intelligence system: disparity between local, regional 
and national intelligence efforts. SIFE was a particularly important link between 
the three levels of the new system. Through DSOs, they could incite local 
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governments into more efficient counter-measures against espionage or 
subversive activity. Early examples included persuading the Hong Kong 
government to institute more rigorous censorship and its Singapore counterpart to 
tighten up immigration controls.69 Meanwhile, SIFE provided regional-level 
collation and assessment, and through MI5 was tied into the national intelligence 
effort. 
 Therefore, a number of trends are apparent in the conception of regional 
intelligence adopted from 1946. The influence of the Second World War was 
paramount in shaping the regional intelligence system. Perceived ‘lessons’ from 
the recent conflict convinced policy-makers of the need for a growing regional 
bureaucracy which – rather than producing original raw intelligence – served as a 
collation, analysis and evaluation centre. This is very much the ‘unique window’ 
view espoused by CIA officer Jack Smith: the belief that, firstly, intelligence 
analysis conducted in-theatre was better than that done in London, and secondly, 
that Singapore was the ideal location for such work. Not only was it closer to field 
stations and thus easier to influence local collection, but Singapore itself was seen 
as representative of the problems faced by the region as a whole. In addition, the 
influence of the war can also be seen in the precise shape of regional intelligence. 
Copying the system of national intelligence in London, service intelligence 
agencies were accorded most influence through a hierarchy which privileged joint 
intelligence structures. Comparably, strategic intelligence subjects were 
prioritised over colonial intelligence. The shape of regional intelligence was a 
reaction to past failings in the theatre (albeit based on questionable 
interpretations). It was also a metropolitan imposition shaped by national 
intelligence concerns such as the perceived Soviet threat. In contrast, local 
intelligence grew organically out of immediate post-war developments and 
previous legacies, but struggled to find correlation between the anomalous 
position of MSS, post-war colonial restructuring, and the increasingly coherent 
regional-national intelligence community. Already there appeared to be two 
intelligence communities developing in Singapore which were at odds with one 
another. Despite intelligence collection being concentrated at the local level, the 
power imbalance clearly benefitted the regional-national agenda. 
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 This post-war intelligence architecture did not remain unaltered. By 1948, 
SIFE was growing in confidence and influence because of the realisation that the 
primary threat to the area was not strategic but one of security: insurgency. The 
outbreak of the Malayan Emergency was a catalyst for the revision and expansion 
of the regional intelligence community, defined more as an instrument of counter-
subversion than of strategic defence. 
 
Crisis and catalyst 
 As the next two chapters demonstrate, the outbreak of the Malayan 
Emergency in June 1948 had significant repercussions for intelligence operations 
at all three levels. But no less seismic were its repercussions for the more prosaic 
world of intelligence organisation. Whilst traditional explanations posit that MSS 
was disbanded in August 1948 as a result of its failure to predict the outbreak of 
communist insurgency, in a recent article, Philip Davies and Roger Arditti argued 
that MSS was dissolved because the MI5 Director-General orchestrated a 
campaign to undermine it.70 But although Sillitoe’s campaigning played some 
role, more fundamentally, MSS reporting was hardly satisfactory. Just two days 
before the outbreak of violence, MSS Director John Dalley recorded that ‘there is 
no immediate threat to internal security’. Indeed, Dalley’s Political Intelligence 
Journals were dense and waffling, containing little evidence that a confrontation 
was imminent.71 In March 1947, double agent Lai Tek disappeared with MCP 
funds, dealing a major blow to intelligence production from which MSS struggled 
to recover.72  
 Turf wars within the intelligence community coincided with an important 
change in the regional administration. In May 1948, the posts of Special 
Commissioner and Governor General were combined into one Commissioner 
General for Southeast Asia holding directives from both the Foreign and Colonial 
Offices. This decision was made entirely over the heads of the two incumbents 
and resulted in MacDonald continuing under this combined office.73 The British 
                                                            
70 Arditti and Davies, ‘Rethinking the Rise and Fall’, p. 304. 
71 CO 537/6006, Dalley’s report on internal security, 14 June 1948. 
72 Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, pp. 40-41. 
73 MAC 17/2/20-21, Bevin to Killearn, 6 June 1947. 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
79 
 
Government’s decision shocked both Killearn and MacDonald who agreed that 
combining the two offices could be a risky dilution of MacDonald’s attentions. As 
Killearn argued, ‘as for the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office have bowled them 
a fast one and got the middle stump’.74 Nevertheless, London over-ruled its 
Singapore representatives and proceeded to combine the two posts. Although 
contributing to problems in 1948, the new structure soon demonstrated its merits 
by enabling greater centralisation of the regional intelligence system and better 
coordination between intelligence producers, assessors and their consumers. 
 The jurisdictional conflict between SIFE and MSS also came to a head in 
1948. For MI5, defining the boundaries of security intelligence (their 
responsibility) and political intelligence (what they felt MSS or Special Branches 
should be doing) was all about power. In December 1948, after emerging 
triumphant from their battle with MSS, H/SIFE Alex Kellar clarified their 
interpretation of security intelligence as ‘information on all subversive or 
clandestine activities which threaten British interests in the Far East’.75 In one 
sense, this broad directive was an attempt to establish SIFE hegemony over 
security intelligence: a hegemony which MSS had challenged. This was treated as 
distinct from colonial political intelligence, or information required for the 
effective administration of a territory by the imperial power. However, in the 
context of colonial insurgencies, the line between political and security 
intelligence was blurring. In 1953, the new H/SIFE Courtenay Young maintained 
that ‘in the political scene of South East Asia today, it would, under any 
circumstances, be impossible to draw a hard and fast line between the two’.76 
Arguably a less divisive definition then suited SIFE interests, with growing 
attention being given to assisting Special Branches in building up their security 
intelligence potential.  
 When producing his landmark report on colonial security in 1955, General 
Gerald Templer agreed that, since communist threats to the political status of a 
colony were also a threat to its national security, there was little difference 
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between political and security intelligence material.77 However, he maintained a 
distinction between political and security intelligence assessment. Templer 
criticised the Colonial Office for focusing too much on the former. Templer 
himself had worked alongside a former H/SIFE Jack Morton who served as his 
Director of Intelligence in Malaya. One of the primary goals of Templer’s report 
was to increase security intelligence assistance from MI5 to the Colonial Office. 
Therefore, his definition of security intelligence, just like that of Courtenay 
Young, supported this MI5 intrusion by emphasising the connection between 
political and security intelligence collection, whilst safeguarding MI5 and SIFE’s 
status through reinforcing the distinction between political and security 
intelligence assessment.78  
 This process of defining responsibilities for security intelligence was 
inherently linked with power relations. This was evident in December 1947, when 
MI5 Director-General Sir Percy Sillitoe complained to the Colonial Office that 
MSS was beginning to over-step its charter. Sillitoe complained that Dalley was 
boasting to be running agents into Thailand and liaising directly with the Dutch 
and Americans in Singapore. If accurate, this was an incursion upon the remits of 
SIFE and SIS(FE).79 The following month, an MI5 triumvirate of Sillitoe, Guy 
Liddell (Deputy Director-General) and Courtenay Young (then a SIFE officer) 
privately agreed to lobby for MSS to be split up into separate Special Branches, 
enabling SIFE to establish hegemony over security intelligence.80 
 Dalley constituted not only a jurisdictional challenge but also a perceived 
hindrance to MI5 operations. According to MI5 sources, the reliability of which is 
difficult to judge, the MSS Director was – ‘in the crudest fashion’ – destroying 
mail intercepted in Malaya on its way to suspect addresses in Hong Kong. This 
compromised the long-term investigations of the Hong Kong DSO. The 
communists in Hong Kong realised that their mail was being intercepted and their 
addresses were blown. This had wider ramifications as Hong Kong was believed 
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to be used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a ‘communist liaison 
centre’ for contacting communist parties across Southeast Asia. The DSO was 
trying to help the local Special Branch monitor these contacts discreetly.81 
Whether or not these allegations were true is less important than how MI5 officers 
appeared to believe that MSS was a threat to their work, and were prepared to 
lobby the national intelligence hierarchy and its consumers. 
 The dispute with MSS assumed a more personal character when Sillitoe 
met Dalley face-to-face in March 1948. This meeting was dominated by animosity 
resulting from Dalley having previously derided Sillitoe as ‘only a policeman 
from Glasgow without any security experience’. Conversely, SIFE officer Alec 
MacDonald was accused with having boasted that MI5 possessed enough 
influence to get Dalley exiled from Malaya.82 Perhaps Dalley had some point as 
Sillitoe, a former Chief Constable, was ‘a burly no-nonsense policeman who had 
cut his teeth suppressing hooliganism in Sheffield and fighting gangs on the mean 
streets of Glasgow’.83 Sillitoe struggled to win the support of his own department, 
but in the case of Dalley’s effrontery, MI5 rallied round their Director-General. 
 Very little was achieved by this meeting in March 1948. One proposition 
to engender better cooperation was for both MSS and SIFE to report in a monthly 
meeting to the Singapore Governor. This would have been a severe plummet 
down the bureaucratic hierarchy for SIFE, as their proper contact was not with 
local governments but Malcolm MacDonald’s regional apparatus. Deputy 
Director-General Guy Liddell aptly surmised that ‘I am afraid that nothing can 
result from all this except a general stink’.84 
 Liddell’s diaries provide interesting insight into MI5 Head Office 
perspectives during this tumultuous period. In particular, Liddell despaired over 
what he saw as the naivety of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur 
Creech Jones. Creech Jones placed great faith in colonial economic development 
as the best antidote to communism – not dissimilar to the ideas behind the 
Marshall Plan – but was less keen to turn the British Empire into a security state. 
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Liddell was exasperated by the £100,000 being spent on a Malayan University 
when there were not enough policemen or spies to keep law and order. Of the 
Secretary of State, Liddell wrote that ‘his policy really is to teach the colonial 
children to run before they can walk, without giving them any nurses to see that 
they do not get into mischief’.85 As well as displaying an imperialistic attitude 
which appears endemic in Britain’s Far Eastern intelligence milieu, Liddell 
appears to have missed the point that, with the ‘nurses’ in such disarray amongst 
themselves, perhaps the intelligence community was as much the problem as the 
solution. 
 Meanwhile, H/SIFE Hugh Winterborn was not immune from criticism. 
Liddell blamed him for not paying more frequent visits to his consumers. Even 
though Dalley’s intelligence product was suspect – as Liddell wrote, ‘it is better 
that the Government should have no information than inaccurate information’ – 
Dalley was simply more visible than Winterborn.86 As a result, MSS seemed to 
enjoy a stronger dissemination relationship with their consumers. MacDonald had 
only recently being upgraded to Commissioner General, and still retained a 
Colonial Office mentality in his parochial, Malaya-first priorities, which was to 
the benefit of MSS. 
 The Malayan Emergency broke out following a spate of murders on rubber 
estates on 16 June 1948. Due to growing criticism of Winterborn from both local 
consumers and MI5 Head Office, the incumbent H/SIFE was reduced to deputy 
and Sillitoe’s favourite overseas trouble-shooter was brought in as temporary 
Director. The new H/SIFE was the sharkskin-jacketed Alex Kellar, who was 
previously instructed to sort out SIME’s teething troubles.87 
 Traditionally, historians of the Malayan Emergency maintained that MSS 
was disbanded and replaced by separate Special Branches in Malaya and 
Singapore because its intelligence product was woefully inadequate. In short, it 
failed to predict the communist insurgency. This has been challenged by Davies 
and Arditti, who argued that it was MI5’s campaign to undermine MSS which was 
                                                            
85 KV 4/470, Liddell diary, 28 July 1948. 
86 KV 4/470, Liddell diary, 13 April 1948; KV 4/470, Liddell diary, 23 April 1948. 
87 MAC 16/2/14, Creech Jones to MacDonald, 1 September 1948. See also: Walton, Empire of 
Secrets, 172-173, 244.  
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
83 
 
principally responsible.88 However, their revisionist argument is not watertight, 
placing too much emphasis on MI5’s political capital and under-estimating MSS’ 
own structural and cognitive failings.  
 Whilst Dalley did warn of the increasing likelihood of an open clash with 
communism throughout 1947 and 1948, this was lost within the waffle and 
irrelevance which constituted MSS Political Intelligence Journals. It is little 
surprise that his supposed warnings (a term which stretches credibility) went 
unheeded. For example, in May 1948, Dalley’s reports discussed signs of 
potential MCP mobilisation, the opening up of old arms dumps and tightening of 
security amongst the wartime communist guerrilla’s Ex-Comrades Association. 
However, there was no real attempt at analysing these trends, and certainly no 
evaluation giving the impression that a revolt was imminent. This was a major 
difference between MSS and SIFE reports, as the latter placed more emphasis on 
analysis of trends.89 To return to the ideas discussed in the introduction, MSS 
reports were of the basic descriptive type, whereas those of SIFE were more 
current reportorial.  
 The outbreak of violence in June 1948 took the colonial government by 
surprise. In Singapore, MSS worked much closer with the police than in the 
Federation. Following the events in rural Malaya of 16 June, they quickly began 
rounding up suspected communists who had been identified on the MSS card 
index. However, they soon ran out of arrest books for logging detentions and 
releases, and were forced to improvise by adapting deposit and withdrawal books 
given to them by one of Singapore’s banks. These artefacts – preserved in the 
Internal Security Department Heritage Centre in Singapore – are implicit of the 
panic which ensued in summer 1948 and the lack of preparations made for it.90 
Such a situation could be indicative of a lack of adequate intelligence leading up 
to the outbreak of Emergency. It could also represent the colonial government’s 
possibly over-zealous reaction to the initially isolated acts of violence. 
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 Apportioning MSS with the sole blame for this perceived intelligence 
failure suited the interests of more than just MI5. The Chiefs of Staff were 
dissatisfied with the national JIC for failing to foresee the rebellion. Blaming 
hapless local actors ensured the JIC(FE) was absolved of blame, and by 
implication cemented the position of the wider regional intelligence system. Both 
SIFE and the JIC(FE) were parented by the national intelligence apparatus, 
whereas MSS lacked similar support at the metropole.91 
 Likewise, MI2 posed awkward questions as to why GSI branch in 
Singapore failed to provide any forewarning. The regional head of military 
intelligence, Colonel Grazebook, followed the example of SIFE and the JIC(FE) 
by laying the blame squarely on the shoulders of MSS. Grazebook explained that 
he had wound down the intelligence collection activities of Field Security in 
February 1948 at the request of the civilian authorities, but MSS proved 
inadequate to fill the gap. Whilst Dalley boasted of possessing much information 
about the MCP, this was never passed on to either GSI or the JIC(FE). The only 
MSS reports they received were the Political Intelligence Journals, which 
Grazebrook felt were totally inadequate:  
The gravity of the situation was never sufficiently stressed in [the 
Journals] and their significance escaped us. I don’t want to hang out the 
dirty linen too much before your eyes, but frankly the organisation for 
evaluating and disseminating the available information was far from 
perfect.92 
 Perhaps more importantly, the writing was already on the wall before the 
Malayan Emergency began. The structure of MSS was entirely at odds with the 
reality that the Federation of Malaya and Singapore were two separate territories 
and would remain as such for the foreseeable future. In May 1948, Singapore 
Governor Franklin Gimson had tabled a proposal to replace MSS with two Special 
Branches, albeit with Dalley retaining control of a much-reduced collation and 
coordination centre. This would also produce greater conformity to the imperial 
norm for colonial intelligence agencies to be under police authority and therefore 
seen as professional, apolitical bodies. However, such a proposal would have 
constituted an even greater jurisdictional overlap between Dalley’s new collation 
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centre and SIFE.93 MSS was therefore at odds with established systems of 
governmental and intelligence organisation. It is unlikely that Gimson’s plan 
would have worked, especially given Dalley’s irascible personality. In the event, 
MSS was officially disbanded on 23 August 1948.94 However, whilst this 
appeared to signal the end of a significant challenge to SIFE’s hegemony, it was 
just the beginning of a sharp deterioration in their relations with one of their 
principal consumers: Malcolm MacDonald. 
 MacDonald disapproved of the way in which Dalley was discarded to the 
intelligence scrap-heap. The Commissioner General blamed MI5 for using 
metropolitan muscle to enforce changes within Southeast Asia. He complained 
that ‘Sillitoe’s effort to force on us proposals which he knows that we shall object 
to makes an extremely unpleasant impression on me’.95 MacDonald saw Sillitoe 
as an empire-builder, undermining MSS to safeguard SIFE’s hegemony. There is 
some merit to this assertion, as the MSS intelligence journals were replaced by a 
‘Pan-Malayan Review’ of intelligence in the Federation and Singapore: the sort of 
collation envisaged in Gimson’s plan of May 1948 albeit sans Dalley. These Pan-
Malayan Reviews were divided into two sections. The two Special Branches 
jointly authored a ‘political’ intelligence review, followed by a ‘security’ 
counterpart prepared by the MI5 DSO. This fulfilled MI5’s desire for a distinction 
between political and security intelligence which benefitted their own position in 
the intelligence hierarchy.96 On a practical level, it proved to be a more effective 
system of intelligence dissemination which facilitated greater coordination 
between local and regional intelligence. 
 Following the abolition of MSS, MacDonald lobbied for Dalley to be 
offered a position within SIFE. He placed great faith in Dalley’s local experience 
and abilities as an intelligence officer, stretching credibility by arguing that ‘he is 
the only man whose information has proved reliable’. To the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, MacDonald wrote that: 
We are in trouble today largely because Dalley’s information and advice 
about the Communist menace in the Federation was not accepted by the 
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police, who in turn apparently persuaded the late High Commissioner to 
reject Dalley’s information and advice.97 
MacDonald was correct in highlighting the poor relations between MSS and the 
Malayan Police. However, he was swimming against the tide in trying to argue 
that Dalley’s intelligence was essentially sound. 
 The Commissioner General escalated the dispute by proposing to eradicate 
the existing intelligence set-up. Supported by the Governors of Singapore, 
Sarawak and North Borneo, MacDonald argued that SIFE was inadequate because 
of its lack of local expertise.98 After a governors’ conference at his palace of Bukit 
Serene, MacDonald reported to the Colonial Office that: 
As you know we are far from satisfied with the service which we have 
received from SIFE… If we were free to do so, we would recommend a 
very different set-up… for there are grounds for thinking that the division 
of duties between SIFE and [SIS] which may be desirable in some other 
parts of the world is extremely unsuitable in South-East Asia and the Far 
East.99 
MacDonald’s intelligence heresy favoured one organisation for security and 
foreign intelligence under his own auspices. He envisaged combining SIFE and 
SIS(FE) into one organisation reporting directly to the Commissioner General. 
Ironically a partial MI5-SIS merger in Singapore was subsequently adopted at a 
later stage, but in 1948 this consumer revolt was abruptly quashed. 
 Unfortunately for MacDonald, his assault was leaked to both Sillitoe and 
the Chief of SIS. The Commissioner General was forced to backtrack that he was 
only ‘thinking aloud’. Liddell was not impressed. He believed that ‘there is no 
doubt that MacDonald has lost his head about Dalley, as he now has nobody who 
comes and whispers things into his ear’.100 
 MacDonald’s challenge came to nothing. The regional Commanders-in-
Chief backed SIFE, for which they felt responsible owing to its reporting status to 
the BDCC(FE). Whilst in-theatre colonial officials sided with MacDonald, MI5 
performed better at garnering metropolitan Colonial Office support. Briefly 
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visiting London, Kellar persuaded the Southeast Asia Department that 
MacDonald’s critique stemmed from resentment that SIFE did not act as his 
‘personal intelligence staff’.101 However, MacDonald’s ‘thinking aloud’ proved a 
positive influence in another regard, as it highlighted the need for better 
integration of regional intelligence with its user departments. 
 Back in Singapore, Kellar went to considerable effort to repair relations. 
He patiently explained to MacDonald that SIFE was not a producer of raw 
intelligence, so could not be blamed for cognitive failure in Malaya. Kellar tried 
to make MacDonald realise that most of his criticisms should be targeted at the 
local intelligence producers.102 
 This patience paid off. Perhaps Kellar was assisted by circumstances as 
MacDonald grew into his enlarged role as Commissioner General: his first 
diplomatic appointment outside the colonial or Commonwealth sphere. By the 
time Kellar departed Singapore in May 1949, ‘it was clear that [MacDonald] no 
longer entertained his earlier ill-informed criticisms of SIFE’.103 During their final 
few weeks, MacDonald and Kellar were highly successful in helping to strengthen 
dissemination relationships across the regional intelligence system. When Kellar 
departed, MacDonald praised his constructive work, leaving ‘our organisation and 
preparedness […] much stronger for your few months’ work here’.104  
 MacDonald’s organisation moved into a new purpose-built complex at 
Phoenix Park, housing intelligence agencies such as the JIC(FE), SIS and SIFE 
alongside their consumers. This provided opportunity for unprecedented unity. At 
a governors’ conference in January 1949, MacDonald attacked the Singapore 
Special Branch for its unwillingness to cooperate with SIFE. He appeared to 
understand the purpose of SIFE and to appreciate that its utility rested on 
improving the intake of raw intelligence from local agencies. Conversely, Kellar’s 
relations with individual local governments were deteriorating. In particular, 
Singapore Governor Franklin Gimson did not discard his resentment over Dalley 
so easily as MacDonald, remaining in Kellar’s grossly politically incorrect words 
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‘the principal n***** in the woodpile’.105 Colonial governments appeared to 
resent any move to centralise authority under MacDonald.  
 The most important changes enacted in this period revolved around the 
JIC(FE). Kellar successfully used MI5 influence to lobby the JIC(London) into 
making the JIS(FE) a full-time secretariat in February 1949, rather than drawing 
ad hoc on officials from the JIC(FE) constituents.106 But this did not go far 
enough. Newly convinced of the value of the regional intelligence apparatus, 
MacDonald wanted a full-time Foreign Office chairman for the JIC(FE) (see table 
2.2).  
 
Table 2.2. JIC(FE) chairmen and their Foreign Office positions, 1946-59. 
Robert H. Scott 1947 Counsellor, Special Commissioner’s 
Office 
Herbert N. Brain 1947-48 Deputy Special Commissioner 
Patrick S. Scrivener 1948-49 Deputy Commissioner General for 
Foreign Affairs 
Michael J. Creswell 1949-51  
Counsellor, Commissioner General’s 
Office 
JIC(FE) Permanent Chairman 
Michael N. F. Stewart 1951-54 
Andrew G. Gilchrist 1954-56 
Denis A. Greenhill 1956-59 
 
 In 1948-49, the position was filled by the Deputy Commissioner General 
for Foreign Affairs, but MacDonald and the Commanders-in-Chief argued that a 
permanent, specialised official would be better equipped to oversee the extensive 
intelligence problems in the region. Conversely, the Foreign Office and 
JIC(London) were opposed to the scheme, worrying that a permanent chairman 
would lack the political capital to carry weight with the committee’s members. 
However, because of Colonial Office support and MacDonald’s growing 
influence in Whitehall, the Singapore view emerged triumphant. In May 1949, the 
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Foreign Office appointed its Counsellor in Tehran, Michael Creswell, as full-time 
JIC(FE) Chairman.107 
 In September 1949, the JIC(FE) charter was officially revised to take 
account of these changes. It now included H/SIFE, the JIB Representative and the 
SIS Far East Controller as signing members. In addition, the committee was 
assigned wider direct responsibilities for a region including China and Soviet 
satellite Outer Mongolia. The entire Soviet Union was included as an area of 
indirect interest.  This expansion of JIC(FE) responsibility is implicit of the 
concern for a developing Cold War in the Far East.108  
 The revised charter included reference to ‘security intelligence’, implying 
the newly entrenched position of SIFE as an indispensable organ of Phoenix Park 
and growing centrality of security intelligence to the regional bigger picture. The 
JIC(FE) could also direct the provision and control of intelligence sources except 
for those provided by SIFE and SIS(FE). This further highlights the growing 
status of SIFE, able to contribute fully to the JIC but not subject to operational 
oversight. It is also indicative of the growing centralisation of intelligence 
direction in the Far East in three main bodies: the JIC(FE), SIFE and SIS(FE).109 
 In addition, a new Security Sub-Committee of the BDCC(FE) was 
inaugurated to review and coordinate protective security. This new body advised 
on physical security of premises and documents, restrictive security (cyphers and 
classification grading) and personnel security (vetting). This activity occupied a 
dubious position under the influence of both SIFE and a Foreign Office Regional 
Security Officer attached to Phoenix Park. However, H/SIFE was chosen as the 
chairman of the new sub-committee, further entrenching SIFE’s position.110 The 
position of Regional Security Officer was dissolved in March 1955 because it was 
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essentially duplicating SIFE duties (recognising that the expertise of MI5 was far 
greater than the Foreign Office).111 
 These changes to the regional intelligence system in 1948-49 produced a 
more coordinated structure which significantly improved dissemination 
relationships. The rejuvenated consumer relations which burgeoned in the 
subsequent period were partly a result of these structural changes. They also 
reflected the importance of individual personalities committed to improving 
relationships. This process of consolidation was critical to the emergence of a 
regional-national intelligence community which matches the understanding of the 
concept of national intelligence discussed in the previous chapter. As 
aforementioned, in the British model, this definition was somewhat fluid and 
membership of such a community was not fixed. In Singapore, this is evident in 
the initial presence of MSS as a permanent observer to the JIC(FE) and its 
dismissal. The changes to the JIC(FE) in 1948-49 reinforced its position at the 
apex of the intelligence hierarchy, effectively enforcing a model of intelligence 
organisation which replicated the national intelligence system. Bringing SIS and 
MI5 fully into this community equally embraced the post-war national model. 
 One other development of 1949 is implicit of a changing direction for 
regional intelligence. This was the creation by the Foreign Office of a Regional 
Information Office (RIO) with a remit for collating ‘propaganda intelligence’. 
RIO was created in direct response to calls from Malcolm MacDonald to intensify 
propaganda efforts as part of counter-subversion policy in the wake of the 
Malayan Emergency. MacDonald argued that ‘in this war the most effective 
ammunition is ideas, the most potent weapon for firing them off are information 
and propaganda services’.112 The first director of RIO, John Rayner, defined 
‘propaganda intelligence’ as both material which could be adapted for use in 
propaganda or analysing trends in communist information policy.113 The latter 
function was of particular interest to the existing intelligence community, as RIO 
evaluations of communist (particularly Chinese) radio broadcasts could help other 
agencies better understand the opaque foreign policy of communist states as well 
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as the political aims of insurgent movements. RIO collated material including 
captured documents from insurgents in Malaya as well as radio monitoring reports 
on broadcasts from Moscow and Beijing. Much of this was passed on from other 
intelligence services such as SIFE. In return, RIO distributed its own analyses 
throughout the Phoenix Park intelligence community.114  
 
Summary 
 The decision to establish RIO is revealing of the changing shape of 
regional intelligence between the intentions of the British government in 1946 and 
the practicalities of 1949. Singapore’s initial post-war intelligence architecture 
was highly influenced by perceptions of intelligence failings in the run-up to the 
Second World War. Intelligence and defence planners believed that the previous 
regional system, the FECB, lacked clout and they needed to create a new 
community which would have broader remit, greater authority and better 
relationships with user departments. Equally, the success of the JIC during the war 
and the legacy of the Japanese attacks of December 1941 ensured that regional 
intelligence was heavily geared towards strategic defence concerns. Imperial 
security took second place and was initially less integrated into the overall 
intelligence product. The regional level of intelligence was greatly shaped by 
national agendas and agencies, and thus it is possible to speak of the emergence of 
a regional-national intelligence community during this period.  
 Conversely, local intelligence production easily adapted to the changing 
circumstances of the post-war world under the British Military Administration. 
However, the decision to adopt an anomalous system of local intelligence (MSS) 
which failed to correlate with constitutional developments and threatened the 
position of the regional-national community hindered developments from 1946-
48. The two most significant trends in Singapore’s local intelligence were the 
assumption by key officials such as Alan Blades that communism would be the 
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next great challenge, and the decision to revert to a Special Branch organisation 
following the discrediting of MSS by its regional rivals. 
 Overall, it is therefore apparent that intelligence organisation during the 
period 1946-49 was highly influenced by power relationships and differing 
assumptions about post-war intelligence priorities. There was already a 
discrepancy between a local intelligence community focused on countering 
potential communist subversion and a regional-national intelligence community 
which was more interested in the strategic threat from the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, the outbreak of insurgency in Malaya in June 1948 catalysed the 
revision and expansion of regional intelligence along lines more focused on 
counter-subversion and imperial security. Such a shift moved away from 
intelligence priorities determined by British national agendas and towards the 
recognition of local and regional concerns. This benefitted the status of SIFE, and 
had the potential to facilitate greater integration between the three levels of 
intelligence. The creation of RIO bolstered this shift in favour of both a defensive 
and proactive counter-subversion agenda. The next two chapters examine how, 
during the same period, intelligence analysis and dissemination was affected by 
the Malayan Emergency, and how the revived Singapore Special Branch 
contributed to active counter-subversion measures. Later chapters explore the 
extent to which the refocusing of regional intelligence in 1949 bridged the divide 
between the two intelligence communities at a practical level.   
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3. The onset of a Cold War in Asia 
 The outbreak of the Malayan Emergency was an important catalyst in the 
transition from a ‘post-war’ model of intelligence organisation to a ‘Cold War’ 
system which emphasised imperial security and counter-subversion. This chapter 
explores the importance of intelligence networks in guiding the response of 
policy-makers to the onset of a Cold War in Southeast Asia. Despite a dearth of 
raw intelligence being produced at the local level, the collation machinery in 
Singapore proved highly effective in influencing both Lord Killearn and Malcolm 
MacDonald. This generated opportunities to influence national policy. 
 Cold War interpretations quickly dominated intelligence assessment and 
dissemination. These were not, however, insensitive to local distinctions and did 
not necessarily imply a monolithic or Soviet-dominated view of communism. The 
regional level of intelligence, particularly the JIC(FE) and SIFE, linked fairly 
nuanced analysis of the situation in Southeast Asia with national intelligence 
assessments which emphasised the limited scope of Soviet activity. Security 
intelligence was particularly influential in shaping how policy-makers approached 
regional developments, even if only confirming previously held assumptions. This 
is not to say that intelligence agencies were influential over specific policy 
choices, particularly in Malaya. JIC assessments on Malaya often lacked tangible 
policy impact because they were more geared towards long-term defence planning 
for conventional wars.1 However, intelligence generated by the regional-national 
community helped influence the perceptive context of decision-making by 
providing users with a range of basic interpretative and current reportorial 
assessments on events as they unfolded. Nevertheless, raw information collection 
became conspicuous as the key weakness in the intelligence process.  
 By collating information from across Southeast Asia, SIFE and the 
JIC(FE) drew conclusions about trends in communist policy. Initially, they 
applied a Cold War paradigm emphasising Soviet and Chinese direction of local 
communism, sometimes insensitive to local distinctions. This was an issue across 
the British intelligence community. During the violence which began in 1948, the 
JIC(London) ‘viewed the [Malayan] conflict predominantly through a Cold War 
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prism and simplistically conflated imperial developments with Cold War 
developments’.2 Comparably, SIFE showed some tendency to subordinate local 
developments to the global conflict. In December 1947 they concluded that the 
Soviets preferred to work through local communists because it was easier and 
cheaper than direct destabilising action against the European empires.3 However, 
they soon began to make more nuanced distinctions of the relationship between 
local communists and Moscow. 
 The historian Geoff Wade argued that, in the years 1946-47, British 
officials were watchful but sanguine about communist prospects in Southeast 
Asia. He proposed that the violence of 1948 and victory of the CCP in the Chinese 
Civil War in 1949 provided for the start of a proper Cold War by giving substance 
to previously vague anxieties.4 Wade’s argument was shared by Tilman Remme, 
who posited that the Malayan Emergency was a watershed marking the extension 
of the Cold War to the Far East and the start of a British approach in dealing with 
communism on a regional basis.5 By evaluating the intelligence background to 
official positions, this chapter indicates that pre-1948 Cold War perceptions and 
regional solutions were more advanced and significant than Wade or Remme 
acknowledged. As shown in the previous chapter, security intelligence 
representatives of the British Military Administration were already advocating a 
less complacent attitude towards local communists in 1946. SIFE became the 
most significant agency in influencing these perceptions at the regional and 
national level, because its remit for security intelligence was most applicable to 
the main threats of insurgency and subversion in Southeast Asia. 
 
Guiding policy through intelligence assessment 
 Intelligence is not produced in a vacuum but can be a vital part of an 
effective policy-making machine. Moving away from the organisation of 
intelligence activities in Singapore, we must also consider the impact of processed 
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intelligence on policy-making. Analysing the assessment and dissemination 
process indicates that there was growing cohesion between the regional and 
national levels of intelligence which supported the transition of policy-making 
bodies towards a more proactive Cold War awareness.  
 From spring 1947, SIFE produced a monthly round-up of communist 
activities. These were disseminated to MI5 Head Office, SIS, the Colonial and 
Foreign Offices and armed service departments.6 As well as being distributed to 
the metropole, these also gave guidance to regional policy-makers. These reports 
keenly influenced the developing anti-communist perceptions of Special 
Commissioner Lord Killearn and Governor General Malcolm MacDonald.  
 Although primarily focused on rice shortages, Killearn first reported upon 
Cold War regional tensions in December 1946. Killearn then agreed with the 
British Minister in Moscow, Frank Roberts, that, although Southeast Asia was 
outside the scope of Soviet expansionist designs, it offered excellent opportunities 
for disruptive activities against the West. Roberts and Killearn expected Moscow 
to cause trouble in Southeast Asia to shift the global balance of power and favour 
their position in Europe. For Killearn, Britain’s best defence was to promote 
healthy political and economic conditions which would stifle opportunities for 
communist agitation.7 Roberts was a key figure in the development of a Cold War 
consensus within the Foreign Office, authoring a series of despatches in March 
1946 with marked similarity to George Kennan’s ‘long telegram’.8 Killearn’s 
explicit agreement with and reference to Roberts’ conclusions is significant in 
showing the influence of ideas from one region to another within the British 
Foreign Office. 
 Over the course of the following year, the Special Commissioner’s reports 
demonstrated growing concern with communist subversion. In July 1947, Killearn 
acted as a conduit to disseminate to the Foreign Office the recent SIFE 
conclusions that: 
                                                            
6 WO 208/4830, Distribution list for SIFE review of communism, 30 November 1948. 
7 FCO 141/14370, Killearn to Attlee, 4 December 1946. 
8 Sean Greenwood, ‘Frank Roberts and the ‘Other’ Long Telegram: The View from the British 
Embassy in Moscow, March 1946’, Journal of Contemporary History, 25(1) (1990), 103-122. 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
96 
 
a) International communist communications had not yet been fully re-
established following wartime disruption. 
b) Communist parties were growing in strength, aided by economic 
difficulties and labour unrest. 
c) Communists were fomenting nationalism as the first step towards their 
ultimate goal. 
d) They presently lacked overall direction. 
e) Communist parties presented a direct menace to security in the Far East. 
They were bound to be directly or indirectly controlled by Moscow, albeit 
temporarily out of touch.9 
 The Special Commissioner further predicted that the new Soviet legation 
in Thailand could provide the direction which was currently absent. This 
appreciation by SIFE and its intake by Killearn implied a monolithic view of local 
communism as being under Soviet control and part of a broader international 
movement. Inspired by SIFE’s warning, Killearn renewed his call for measures to 
promote regional stability, adding that the best antidote may well be ‘the speedy 
development of self-government on truly democratic lines’.10 As Killearn later 
explained, ‘if you suppress a nationalist severely enough you will find him 
tending towards communism because it is the communists who have consistently 
supported nationalist movements in dependent territories’.11 These statements 
indicate how the process of decolonisation could be subordinated to a Cold War 
paradigm by decision-makers. Killearn’s reaction typifies the prevailing view in 
intelligence assessment in 1947, which was still focused on external control and 
influence of local communist movements. 
 Concurrently, Governor General Malcolm MacDonald responded more 
proactively to SIFE’s new monthly reports. His actions suggest that decision-
makers were less sanguine and watchful before 1948 than Geoff Wade implied, 
but were instead seeking out possible counter-measures and involving the 
intelligence community in the policy-making process. On 26 June 1947, 
MacDonald convened a special conference with SIFE, MSS and local colonial 
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officials. Summarising concerns over growing communist influence over labour in 
Malaya and Singapore, MacDonald said: 
That Communism was Enemy No. 1 in these territories and in South-East 
Asia. It was already a very serious one and was capable of becoming quite 
a formidable one, and without falling into the error of exaggeration or 
excitement it had to be realised that Communism would have to be dealt 
with in a pretty big and effective way.12 
 Following the special conference, H/SIFE Hugh Winterborn prepared a 
paper examining methods for countering communist underground activities. The 
SIFE chief agreed with Killearn that communism could not be countered merely 
through suppression. Britain needed to offer an alternative positive model, 
demonstrating that nineteenth century imperialism was dead.13 SIFE was united 
with its principal consumers in holding up colonial reform not as an end in itself 
but a solution to Cold War security dilemmas. Throughout SIFE’s operation, the 
contexts of the Cold War and decolonisation were treated as largely inseparable. 
Within the Singapore intelligence communities more broadly, imperial security 
was consistently conflated with Cold War imperatives. 
 Shortly before leaving Singapore in spring 1948, Killearn reported that, on 
the basis of SIFE information, it was unlikely that recently received reports of the 
founding of a Far Eastern Cominform were true.14 This marks a subtle 
transformation in the substance of analysis reaching policy-makers.  SIFE was 
moving away from explanations which involved direct Soviet involvement. 
 The scare over a Far Eastern Cominform was an important step in the 
development of more nuanced Cold War perceptions. Although ultimately proved 
false, the seriousness with which such reports were treated is indicative of the lack 
of any firm information on Soviet intentions and the influence of growing Cold 
War paranoia in the metropole. The formation of the actual Cominform in 
September 1947 and Andrei Zhdanov’s ‘two camp’ speech marked a new 
departure in analysis of the global Cold War, leading to an intensified intelligence 
effort in Southeast Asia. Zhdanov was Chairman of the lower chamber of the 
Supreme Soviet and in charge of the Cominform: the Communist Information 
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Bureau. Zhdanov used the Cominform, designed to coordinate between 
communist parties across the world, to propagate the idea that the world had 
descended into two camps and that it would be impossible to remain aloof. 
Ultimately, SIFE was successful in weeding out the reliability of incoming 
reports, judging the so-called ‘Far Eastern Cominform’ to be a fabrication of the 
Nationalist Chinese propaganda machine (trying to frighten the Western powers 
into giving them greater support).15 This showed the beginning of a more 
balanced view. 
 The situation in East Asia proved more susceptible to paranoia and rumour 
than Southeast Asia. MI2 chief Charles Tarver arrived in Okinawa in late 1947 to 
be told by an American that the Soviets had withdrawn from the United Nations 
and that war was inevitable. Worrying that such a development had indeed 
occurred during his flight, Tarver was relieved to ascertain that this was nonsense. 
Nevertheless, the implications were telling: ‘there are a large number of 
warmongers about in the East, many of whom believe that this war will start as a 
result of an incident in Korea’.16 
 In early 1948, the UK Military Advisor in Tokyo passed on information 
from the Americans that supported rumours of the formation of a Far Eastern 
Cominform.17 MI2 openly disagreed with SIFE, arguing that SIFE’s dismissal of 
these rumours as Nationalist Chinese fabrications went contrary to several reports 
received by military intelligence from Tokyo and Saigon. Tarver accepted that 
there may not be a separate Cominform but opined that there was certainly more 
organised communist coordination than SIFE credited. With the benefit of 
hindsight, SIFE’s view appears correct, which perhaps indicates that MI2 was 
overly optimistic in its reliability assessments.18 The reliance of British 
intelligence on American or Nationalist Chinese sources for information about 
East Asia was a major problem in providing reliable analysis for the entire Far 
East. Another dubious source of information was the military intelligence agent 
Captain Vendeniapin: a Hong Kong-based White Russian who provided sub-
agents inside China. Although MI2 suspected Vendeniapin of CCP sympathies, 
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this did not prevent them from sharing his information with MI5 who apparently 
much appreciated this intelligence.19 Reliance on such sources was not good for 
the intelligence process in East Asia. 
 Having internalised such reporting from intelligence assessors, supported 
by Killearn and MacDonald, the head of the Foreign Office Southeast Asia 
Department issued a stark assessment of the Cold War situation: 
Reports from a variety of sources make it clear that an important change in 
Communist policy in South East Asia has taken place during the past few 
months. The new line […] is for Communist parties in South East Asia to 
adopt the same general tactics as they have been employing since 1946 in 
Western Europe of doing everything possible to undermine and hamper 
the reconstruction and economic development of the whole area.20 
This message is significant not only for noting the shift in communist policy 
towards greater confrontation, but also for adapting the lessons of the Cold War in 
Europe to Southeast Asia. The idea of a ‘new line’ became increasingly central to 
SIFE reporting following the foundation of the Cominform in September 1947. 
This idea also began to imply a balanced distinction between international 
inspiration and local impetuses in explaining communist behaviour. 
 Throughout 1947-48, SIFE were particularly concerned by the activities of 
international communist cultural organisations and other international contacts. In 
February 1948, these fears culminated in the Calcutta Youth Conference in India. 
Although ultimately a damp squib, the communist-inspired conference heightened 
SIFE’s fears of a coordinated anti-colonial thrust.21  
 These activities appeared to constitute a ‘new line’ shared by communist 
parties across the region. SIFE summarised the implications of the first stage 
shortly after a meeting of international communist representatives at Harbin, 
China, in November 1947: 
The events of recent months have provided evidence that Asia is fast 
reproducing the salient features of the political division in Europe […] 
moderates and their ‘liberal’ ideas are fast disappearing and compromise is 
at a discount. As in war the neutrals are moving into alignment or are 
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divided by internecine political warfare. Communism is striving to make 
capital out of a resurgent Asian nationalism.22 
In this report, SIFE commented that Southeast Asia was succumbing to a situation 
similar to the Civil War in China. Politics were polarised as communist parties 
sought to create ‘new democratic’ coalitions with other anti-colonial movements. 
These united fronts were expanding communist political influence and enabling 
communists to hijack or side-line anti-colonial nationalism. However, this was 
only the beginning of the emergence of the ‘new line’, which culminated in a 
rejection of political struggle in favour of violent revolution. 
 The beginning of the Malayan Emergency in June 1948 was a watermark 
for both intelligence organisation and intelligence assessment. The start of the 
communist insurgency emphasised the weakness of local intelligence production, 
led to greater emphasis on the distinction between internal and international 
communist influences, and ensured national policy-makers were increasingly 
engaged with Southeast Asia. The Emergency also led to growing discrepancies 
between the local and regional-national intelligence communities. In the context 
of the onset of Britain’s Cold War in Southeast Asia, this was most apparent in the 
different emphasis given to Soviet involvement.  
 SIFE assessed the outbreak of violence in Malaya within the context of 
international inspiration. In June 1948, SIFE concluded that ‘the present outbreak 
of industrial unrest, intimidation, assassination and arson in Malaya is not an 
isolated phenomenon but part of a coordinated communist offensive which is 
spreading eastward from India’.23 Their assessment explicitly referenced the 
Calcutta Youth Conference as the seminal moment in inspiring revolutionary 
violence. SIFE cited Zhdanov and the Cominform as the key influence in a 
reorientation of Asian communist parties from constitutional to revolutionary 
struggle. This was directly linked to European developments. As SIFE phrased it, 
‘the communist campaign in South-East Asia continues to grow in intensity as the 
gulf between Russia and the Western Powers widens’.24 
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 Communist violence in the Federation of Malaya posed two linked 
questions to British intelligence. Firstly, whether this was a deliberate planned 
revolt by the MCP, and if so, whether it was driven by local policies or 
international direction. Although failing to foretell the violence, immediately after 
the event, MSS was confident that it was a centrally planned revolt. They 
postulated a four-phase scheme beginning with industrial unrest (Singapore in 
April 1948) and rural terrorism (Malaya in June) followed by attacks on 
government officials and the seizure of strategic areas. Both of the latter only 
materialised after the government declared a State of Emergency, which would 
appear to contradict MSS’ assertions of a planned revolt.25 Their interpretation 
was nonetheless corroborated by GSI branch, where Colonel Grazebrook prepared 
an interim appreciation on insurgent intentions just three weeks after the first 
violence. Reliant on information from MSS as well as early interrogations 
conducted by field units, Grazebrook concluded that the Central Committee of the 
MCP had planned out an insurgent campaign and undertaken preparations such as 
dispersing its cells amongst local populations.26 However, the raw intelligence 
underpinning these assumptions of central culpability is questionable. There are 
no such justifications found within MSS reports leading up to the revolt. Indeed, 
as the historian Calder Walton asserted, ‘before the outbreak of the insurgency, 
Malaya’s intelligence machinery was hardly worthy of the name’.27  
 SIFE could not respond to the events of June 1948 with any authority 
because MSS denied them access to original documents. The local MI5 DSO in 
Malaya provided a summary which directly contradicted MSS: ‘so far as I have 
been able to ascertain, there is no positive evidence, as apart from logical 
deductions and reasonable conclusions from events, of the formulation of any 
detailed plan of offensive by the MCP’.28 Reports from the DSO were more 
analytical and incisive than the ‘current reportorial’ style of SIFE monthly 
summaries.   
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 Referring to this problem – deducing the extent to which the communist 
violence was centrally planned – the imperial historian A. J. Stockwell argued that 
the MCP may not have intended such rapid escalation. British responses to what 
could have been purely localised violence contributed to solidifying the insurgent 
campaign.29 As Stockwell acknowledged, it is, however, difficult to prove or 
disprove whether the outbreak of violence was the result of MCP central planning 
or their lack of discipline over-zealous local branches.30 For understanding the 
intelligence community, what matters is how these uncertainties were presented to 
consumers of intelligence. 
 There was even less evidence of explicit Soviet direction in Malaya. 
Rather than actual direction, SIFE postulated considerable ideological influence 
upon MCP policy reorientation through Zhdanov’s ‘two camp’ theory. This 
distinction was appreciated by the DSO : 
These facts do not give an impression of a powerful, well-prepared Party 
poised for an all-out attack to seize power and establish a Communist State 
and I personally doubt whether this is the objective. To my mind a more 
reasonable explanation is that MCP leaders have been reminded pointedly 
of their mild and lagging programme by comparison with those of other 
Communist Parties in South-East Asia [...] the plan is basically 
international rather than national.31 
In contrast, MSS was more credulous of an international communist conspiracy. 
The Deputy Director wrote that ‘there is no reason to suppose that the activities of 
the Party cannot be part of a world-wide plan as opposed to a local tactical plan’.32 
Dalley suggested that MCP contacts with other communist parties as well as their 
imitation of Soviet methods implied at least some degree of external direction (not 
merely ideological influence).33 The outbreak of the insurgency thus provided for 
a widening gap between the local and regional intelligence communities. The 
latter was more effective in disseminating its ideas at the national level, although 
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policy-makers chose to publicly adopt an interpretation of Soviet instigation for 
political reasons. 
 The more balanced interpretation by MI5 representatives is fairly nuanced. 
The DSO implied that the MCP made a deliberate decision to escalate 
confrontation of their own volition. They were not explicitly instructed by the 
forces of international communism but definitely influenced by the regional and 
global context, prompting them to act precipitately. Such insight is vindicated by 
more recent historiography, such as Larisa Efimova’s use of the Russian archives 
to demonstrate that the Soviet Union had no clear Asia policy and was instead 
focused on watching the situation. It appears that the Kremlin gave local 
communists only limited rhetorical inspiration rather than any practical 
instructions.34 New evidence obtained after the outbreak of the Emergency 
provided further corroboration. An MCP Central Executive Committee resolution 
entitled ‘The Present Aspect of the International Situation’ showed how, in March 
1948, the MCP concluded that – in light of international developments – a new 
approach was needed in the struggle against colonialism and that armed conflict 
was inevitable.35 
 Back at headquarters, SIFE disseminated this understanding to decision-
makers in Singapore and London. SIFE provided government consumers of their 
intelligence with a succinct timeline showing how local communist parties 
internalised and acted on Zhdanov’s ‘two camp’ line at different rates, adapting 
the international angle to local environments. This was based on ‘evidence’ drawn 
from their DSOs, MSS and other local allies such as the Burmese police and 
Indian security services. Most of these raw intelligence producers were 
predominantly reliant on open sources such as public speeches by communist 
leaders. These were hardly reliable for evaluating true communist intentions, and 
the fact that they all conformed to a shared ideological awakening was perhaps 
not as incisive as was felt at the time.36 The poverty of sources was a significant 
concern not just confined to the Far East. It was also a recurring JIC theme in 
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assessing the threat posed by the Soviet Union during the formative years of the 
Cold War.37 
 Reflecting this poor quality of sources, JIC(FE) Chairman Patrick 
Scrivener revealed that there was little direct evidence for the inferences made by 
the likes of MSS: 
No single document has come to light disclosing any coordinated plans for 
communist uprisings in the South-East Asia area. There is however no 
doubt of the source of inspiration for the reorientation of communist 
policy in South-East Asia: it is manifestly the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, acting through Zhdanov and the Cominform.38 
This statement corroborates SIFE analysis that Soviet ideological leadership 
inspired local uprisings but did not specifically instruct them. This is in accord 
with recent historiographical arguments about the Malayan Emergency. At the 
time, Cold War decision-makers portrayed the Emergency as the product of direct 
and explicit orders from Moscow (for very deliberate reasons) which skewed 
early scholarly analysis. More recently, Karl Hack and other historians have 
synthesised a post-revisionist argument emphasising the dynamic interaction 
between local and international factors which retrospectively supports SIFE and 
JIC(FE) analysis.39  
 The memoirs of the MCP leader, Chin Peng, largely corroborate the 
interpretation forwarded by SIFE. Chin Peng wrote that, in the final weeks of 
1947, the MCP came to regard armed struggle as inevitable but not imminent. 
However, their outlook was transformed in March 1948. The catalyst was a visit 
to Singapore of the Australian communist Laurence Sharkey. Meeting the top 
MCP leadership, Sharkey reported about the Calcutta Conference and current 
international trends. As Chin Peng noted, the MCP leadership of the late 1940s 
were all comparatively young and looked to more established communist 
movements and personalities for inspiration. They also reacted to the increasing 
crackdown on communist labour activities by the Federation and Singapore 
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governments. Balancing these local concerns and international inspiration, the 
MCP leaders agreed to embark on a policy of armed revolution and began 
preparations. However, the events of 16 June 1948 were not planned. Chin Peng 
claimed to be unaware in advance of the rural murders which were conducted by 
local MCP members. A lack of discipline and excess of zeal within the Party thus 
prompted the governments to declare an Emergency and forced the MCP to 
accelerate the timetable of its planned revolution.40  
 If Chin Peng’s testimony is truthful, then his account of events would 
imply that SIFE analysis of events was more incisive than that of MSS. Equally, it 
would suggest that June 1948 was not as decisive an intelligence failure as 
practitioners at the time. MSS could have provided better intelligence of the 
decisions taken in March 1948 and the subsequent communist preparations (which 
only became known to British intelligence in July 1948). However, they could not 
have predicted the way events would escalate in June because these were not 
directly controlled by the MCP central leadership. 
 However, government consumers of intelligence publicly favoured the 
conspiracy interpretation. Shortly before the outbreak of violence, Malcolm 
MacDonald warned listeners to Radio Malaya that ‘if the restless, impatient 
directors of international communism are checked in Europe […] they may plan a 
political offensive in the East. There is evidence that they have resolved on that 
policy already’.41 For historians such as Geoff Wade, these statements marked a 
turning point as Britain began publicly promoting the idea that Southeast Asia was 
a new front in the global Cold War.42 As this analysis has shown, this was a 
revelation which intelligence officials and their principal consumers had privately 
taken for granted some months prior. The application of this idea to the public 
sphere was an attempt to link imperial defence to the escalating international 
conflict. The inadequate provision of intelligence made it easier for decision-
makers to promote a conspiratorial explanation which fitted their colonial and 
Cold War world-views.43 
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 Within the corridors of power, SIFE appears to have had some influence in 
shaping official perceptions. At a meeting of the Foreign Office Russia 
Committee in October 1948, MacDonald explained that the MCP embarked upon 
revolution ‘in the first place [due] to the fact that the Communists generally felt 
that the “old reformist policy” was losing them ground and secondly, to the South-
East Asia Youth Conference in Calcutta’. This implies that MacDonald shared 
SIFE’s interpretation, balancing both local and international factors in 
understanding the decision to revolt. He also agreed with the DSO and JIC(FE) 
that the decision for revolution was inspired by international trends but ultimately 
made by the local communist leadership after receiving ideological guidance from 
Sharkey.44 MacDonald further explained how the MCP gradually moved towards 
violent measures because of the lack of progress in their earlier subversive 
efforts.45 This more balanced interpretation was not transmitted publicly because 
denouncing the MCP as an externally-directed force rallied public support for the 
government.46  However, in evaluating the influence of intelligence communities, 
it is difficult to judge how far MacDonald’s interpretation was directly led by 
SIFE or how far he used SIFE assessments to justify his private views. During the 
special conference which MacDonald called in June 1947, he had already 
appeared convinced that the MCP was working towards an eventual power-play 
by using united front tactics and other means of subversion to destabilise imperial 
control. MacDonald, therefore, may have independently come to similar 
conclusions to those which the regional intelligence community later expressed.47 
 This interpretation, which may be termed one of ‘Soviet inspiration 
without direction’, was not only the product of security intelligence. It was also 
shared by the military intelligence community in Singapore. GSI branch 
concluded that the MCP embarked on the revolt despite poor chances of seizing 
power in Malaya because they felt the need to conform to the prevailing Cold War 
ideology begun in Moscow and taken up by other Asian communist parties.48 
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These views were accepted by MI2 in London, who agreed that the MCP had 
voluntarily sacrificed its long-term interests in order to demonstrate their loyalty 
to international communist doctrine. MI2 analysis hypothesised that ‘the objective 
of the insurgents is to create as much chaos as possible in furtherance of a 
worldwide communist plan directed against the colonial system’.49 This national 
military intelligence analysis goes further than SIFE evaluations in attributing 
responsibility to Soviet central planners, showing the slippery slope of Cold War 
paranoia within the intelligence process. 
 The highest forum for national intelligence assessment was the 
JIC(London). Since 1946, the JIC had been advising policy-makers that 
communism constituted a serious menace across the world which would only 
increase unless countermeasures were adopted. This was largely speculative, 
however, as early JIC reports admitted that they lack informed sources on Soviet 
intentions.50 Events in Southeast Asia appeared to justify some of these 
conclusions. One month after the beginning of the Malayan conflict, the JIC 
produced a final report on Soviet interests, intentions and capabilities across the 
world. This report is interesting for emphasising caution in Soviet policy. 
Although the Kremlin was attributed with a long-term aim of creating a 
communist world order, they were not expected to take precipitate action. At the 
national level, British intelligence assessors saw the Soviet Union as seeking to 
revise the international order from a position of weakness. Southeast Asia was 
outside the immediate scope of perceived Soviet designs but offered the Kremlin 
excellent disruptive opportunities against Western empires (repeating the analysis 
shared by Roberts and Kennan in 1946). The Soviet Union was expected to play 
little role in Southeast Asian affairs beyond using propaganda and other forms of 
indirect pressure to encourage greater communist activism and coordination with 
other anti-colonial movements: two key features of the ‘new line’ and road 
towards revolution.51 
 This JIC report shows that, at the highest level of the national intelligence 
community, consensus emerged that the Soviet role in Southeast Asian affairs was 
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indirect and ideological. This demonstrates a growing unity of view between 
regional and national intelligence, further suggesting that they can be regarded as 
a cohesive intelligence community. Following the outbreak of violence in Malaya, 
Southeast Asian problems became conflated with issues surrounding the global 
Cold War in Britain’s national intelligence efforts. In contrast, at the local level, 
the intelligence process was beset by collection problems, and intelligence 
assessors struggled to provide a coherent definition of the communist threat to 
imperial security. 
 Reflecting the growing seriousness of the regional situation, from August 
1948 SIFE’s intelligence reviews were expanded from a Southeast Asia remit to 
cover the entire Far East. Drawing heavily on these SIFE reports and their 
annexed ‘country studies’, the JIC(FE) produced an important paper on 
‘Communism in the Far East’ on 7 October 1948. 
 As could be expected from what was still a strategically-focused, wartime-
influenced body, the JIC(FE) paper examined communism in light of the 
disruption caused by the war against Japan. It explained that the end of the Second 
World War left the Far East more vulnerable to communist influence than ever 
before. European prestige was shattered whereas communist parties could claim a 
significant part in guerrilla warfare. More materially, they had ferreted away 
formidable reserves of Allied arms. Asian nationalism was rising against a 
backdrop of political and economic instability, whilst the Chinese diaspora in 
Southeast Asia were increasingly impressed by CCP successes in China. The 
JIC(FE) concluded that coordination between local communist parties was ‘loose 
but effective’. In India, Malaya and Burma, communist parties decided to move 
towards violence. They began in similar fashion with self-critical theses which 
drew upon Zhdanov’s ideological concepts. These similarities led the JIC(FE) to 
the conclusion that these decisions, although independent, were prompted more by 
consideration of the international situation than purely internal factors.52  
 With regard to the chronology of the regional Cold War, the JIC(FE) also 
agreed with SIFE. They concluded that the turning point began with Zhdanov’s 
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foundation speech to the Cominform in September 1947. This speech, which 
declared that the world was split into two ideological camps and that third parties 
should choose sides, provided the ideological framework for a reorientation of 
communist strategy. This was reinforced by personal contacts in Calcutta in 
February 1948. These meetings allowed for greater ideological coordination. As a 
result, separate parties in Southeast Asia embarked on revolts in subsequent 
months: in Burma on 27 March 1948, Malaya on 16 June, and Indonesia on 18 
September. The latter, a three-month revolt in Madiun, was triggered by the return 
of communist leader Muso who had been in exile in the Soviet Union since the 
1920s.53 The JIC(FE) confidently grouped these events as part of a coordinated 
strategic plan. This was a more advanced Cold War view than that advocated by 
SIFE. SIFE emphasised the high level of ideological inspiration, but were less 
convinced that individual revolts were coordinated by Soviet strategists. The 
Soviets were only directly implicated in the Indonesian affair.54 
 Geoff Wade argued that the Cold War in Southeast Asia properly began in 
1949 because of the role of communist China in British calculations.55  Whilst he 
is correct that the China factor significantly increased the tempo of British 
reactions (especially in the metropole), from the perspective of British intelligence 
officers and policy-makers in Singapore, it would appear that a Cold War was in 
existence from at least winter 1947-48, based upon assessments of communist 
behaviour conducted as early as 1946.  
 The Cold War ideas expressed by SIFE and the JIC(FE) had a 
proselytising effect not only upon their regional consumers in Singapore but, 
through the medium of Killearn and MacDonald, also upon the decision-making 
establishment in London. As aforementioned, the head of the Foreign Office 
Southeast Asia Department, Paul Grey, took up the idea of a ‘new line’ whereby 
communist parties shifted tactics from united front political struggles to 
revolutionary violence. Grey used this theme to argue for more proactive 
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countermeasures. He suggested that the strategy of containment adopted in 
Europe proved the desirability of a firm attitude in preventing communist 
expansion. Given that Southeast Asia now appeared to be in the grip of a much 
more violent Cold War, similar action was increasingly desirable.56 Consequently, 
ideas about the need to deal more strongly with communism first expounded by 
local intelligence officials in the British Military Administration were 
subsequently taken up by regional intelligence assessors and their governmental 
consumers, and thus disseminated to national policy-makers. The result of this 
chain of influence was an increasingly proactive use of clandestine measures to 
confront communism in Southeast Asia during the 1950s. 
 Malcolm MacDonald was an important influence in transmitting these 
interlinked ideas about the emergence of a Cold War and desirability of 
containment. In 1949, he wrote to the Foreign Office with a ‘domino’ explanation 
of the regional position: ‘if Indo-China is lost, then Siam and Burma will probably 
go the same way shortly afterwards. That will bring the power of international 
communism to the border of Malaya’.57 The Commissioner General argued that ‘it 
was probably partly because of frustration in the West that the planners of 
international communist strategy have given more attention to the East’. This 
view, aired in March 1949, seems different from MacDonald’s earlier 
explanations to the Russia Committee, where he had emphasised the limited, 
ideological character of Soviet ‘direction’. As the regional situation deteriorated, 
more paranoid ideas of monolithic communism appear to have gathered currency. 
MacDonald’s preferred solution to the growing dilemma was to create Asian 
equivalents of the Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty to halt communism 
along the so-called ‘upper arc’ of Indochina, Burma, Pakistan and Tibet.58 
Eventually these ideas came to partial fruition through the Colombo Plan and 
SEATO, although these were greatly weaker than their European equivalents. The 
Colombo Plan was a loose mechanism for bilateral aid packages which began as a 
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Commonwealth initiative to inoculate against communism, whilst SEATO never 
became as united or strong as its European counterpart.59 
 For Foreign Office analysts, the genesis of the ‘new line’ was simply 
explained. Agreeing with MacDonald, they postulated that the Soviet Union 
sought to sabotage the economic recovery of Western Europe by disrupting their 
colonies in Southeast Asia.60 As attested by the new Information Research 
Department (IRD) – set up in 1948 to administer anti-communist propaganda – 
‘communist developments in S[outh]-E[ast] Asia are of concern to the Foreign 
Office not only because they present an immediate problem in the defence of our 
vital interests, but because they fit into the general strategy of the Kremlin in the 
Cold War against us’.61 SIFE commented upon IRD’s draft paper that they agreed 
that Moscow was using its ideological influence to spread unrest in the colonial 
world because they were worried about the balance of power in Europe. In other 
words, Zhdanov’s speech to the Cominform emphasising the ‘global nature of the 
Cold War in September 1947 was a reaction to George Marshall’s announcement 
of United States economic aid to Europe in June 1947.62  Likewise, military 
intelligence in Singapore noted how ‘there may be little yet to suggest that there is 
a central controlling influence on communist activities in this part of the world, 
but it is interesting to note how a general flare-up out here coincided with a check 
on Russian designs in Berlin’.63 
 Nevertheless, there remained little solid intelligence for the beliefs of 
certain Foreign Office officials that the Kremlin was materially to blame for the 
upsurge of revolution in Southeast Asia. In a memorandum of late-September 
1948, Paul Grey wrote that ‘circumstantial evidence strongly suggests Russian 
inspiration and guidance in the recent series of communist outbreaks in South-
East Asia’. But inspiration and guidance was different from actual direction. 
Therefore, the ideas generated by SIFE, and transmitted through MacDonald’s 
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visit in October 1948, had some influence on restraining tendencies towards 
conspiracy theorising. Grey admitted that there was only direct evidence of Soviet 
instigation in the Indonesian case.64 Similarly, his department later noted that 
‘though there is no concrete evidence of direction from Moscow, nevertheless the 
pattern suggests that communists in South-East Asia are following the Moscow 
line’.65 This shows the importance of regional intelligence evaluations in shaping 
the perceptions of decision-makers in Singapore and London. On the one hand 
they fostered greater Cold War awareness amongst their consumers; on the other, 
they helped reign in some of their consumers’ wilder assumptions by providing 
more nuanced understandings of the limited capabilities of the Kremlin. 
 MacDonald was somewhat ahead of the imperial metropole in assuming 
the existence of a Cold War in the region. Following the secret conference 
convened with SIFE and MSS in June 1947, MacDonald and Killearn’s deputies 
composed a scheme for a Special Planning Committee for innovating 
countermeasures against communist expansion. However, no action was taken 
because the metropole felt MacDonald’s position on the Cold War in Asia was in 
advance of official policy.66 By the early 1950s, MacDonald’s pressures for a 
more proactive clandestine approach to the Cold War through propaganda and 
counter-subversion would embody official policy. 
 Following the Calcutta Conference, approval was given to the Special 
Planning Committee. This was created under the chairmanship of MacDonald’s 
Colonial Office deputy, Sir Ralph Hone, and included representation from SIFE, 
MSS and the defence establishment. On 24 April 1948, the committee produced 
its sole report which emphasised the importance of counter-communist 
propaganda and political warfare. This would only become manifest in tangible 
outcomes from 1949 with the creation of RIO in Singapore as a result of 
MacDonald’s pressures and the global designs of IRD. This is implicit of the 
potential for intelligence agencies in not only providing assessments to help guide 
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decision-makers’ perceptions, but also in providing solutions to Cold War 
problems through covert methods.  
 The Special Planning Committee was noteworthy for one additional 
reason. It concluded that there was no direct evidence of contact between local 
communists and the Soviet Union. But equally, there was no evidence that such 
connections did not exist.67 This encapsulates the effect of Cold War paranoia in 
an intelligence system with endemic collection problems. Because there was no 
information to deny Soviet direction, it remained a conceptual possibility. Despite 
the success achieved in creating effective and influential networks of intelligence 
collation and assessment in Singapore, first-stage production remained the core 
weakness throughout the 1940s and 1950s. 
 The parallel evolution of the office of the Commissioner General and the 
regional intelligence system was highly important for Britain’s engagement with 
the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Although MacDonald lacked executive authority, 
and intelligence agencies such as SIFE relied upon other organisations for their 
intake, this new level of bureaucracy enabled intelligence evaluation and 
dissemination that was qualitatively different from pre-war networks. Firstly, 
intelligence of all types was now collated across the region, enabling greater 
analysis of separate events to inform general conclusions (sometimes 
exaggerated) about communist coordination. Within this system, the nature of the 
communist threat gave increasing precedence to security intelligence. The 
JIC(FE) produced biannual reviews of communist activity in the region which 
showed clear hallmarks of influence from SIFE’s more reportorial monthly 
reviews. These reports fitted both the ‘current reportorial’ and the ‘speculative 
evaluative’ categories. Such reports were the most widely distributed to users of 
intelligence, and reflected the ultimate distillation of multiple-source assessment 
in Singapore. Secondly, as became more apparent after 1949, intelligence 
dissemination was given a greater immediacy. Once SIFE became housed 
alongside MacDonald in Phoenix Park, the physical distance between intelligence 
reporters and decision-makers was negligible. In addition, by concentrating 
regional coordination in Singapore rather than London, Britain’s ‘tropical 
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Whitehall’ benefitted from the perceived advantages of on-the-spot policy 
evolution. Both intelligence practitioners and their Singapore consumers saw the 
island city as a ‘unique window’ on the Southeast Asian situation. This system 
evolved as a result of Cold War perceptions instilled by intelligence reporting: a 
system which perpetuated a continued focus on Cold War concerns in regional 
intelligence direction.  
 Cold War interpretations thus came to dominate intelligence assessment in 
Singapore. This did not always imply a monolithic or Soviet-dominated view of 
communism. SIFE proved effective in putting across a more balanced 
interpretation which emphasised the interaction between Soviet ideological 
inspiration and local communist parties’ own agendas. This intelligence 
assessment helped shape policy-makers responses, and, as later chapters elucidate, 
intelligence agencies could also offer the perfect clandestine solution. Equally, at 
the national level, the Malayan Emergency prompted a shift from treating 
problems in Southeast Asia as self-contained to viewing them in the context of the 
global Cold War.68 Such an approach is implicit in the inclusion of Southeast Asia 
in the July 1948 JIC(London) report on Soviet intentions and capabilities, despite 
the admittance that the region was outside the scope of direct Soviet activities. 
Ideological influence provided an explanation that enabled greater linkage of 
events in Europe with those in Southeast Asia, as became increasingly apparent in 
the minutes of the Foreign Office Southeast Asia Department.  
 
Intelligence collection and local analysis 
 Decision-makers were primarily guided by the analysis of an increasingly 
cohesive regional-national intelligence community. They were in turn reliant on 
sound intelligence collection at the local level. It was well noted by Martin 
Thomas that ‘with such a plethora of intelligence organisations, it was perhaps 
inevitable that the principal difficulty facing advisory bodies such as the JIC was 
to collate information quickly into intelligible threat assessments’.69 For SIFE and 
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the JIC(FE) to have any material to evaluate, they needed to liaise with local 
actors; but their ability to collate material was entirely dependent on raw material 
being collected in the first place. As aforementioned, their evaluations often relied 
on open sources as well as captured communist documentation from police raids. 
Material was collated from across foreign and Commonwealth territories in 
Southeast Asia, as well as by the Hong Kong Special Branch and MSS. As 
attested by the indecisive conclusions of intelligence users, initial collection 
became conspicuous as the key weakness in the intelligence process. 
 Whilst relations between MSS and the regional intelligence bureaucracy 
were essentially poor, Colonel Dalley enjoyed good access to certain government 
consumers, particularly Malcolm MacDonald and Singapore Governor Franklin 
Gimson. This did not include the Federation High Commissioner Edward Gent or 
his Commissioner of Police. When MSS came under criticism for not forewarning 
of the Emergency, Dalley complained that the Federation of Malaya government 
had refused to furnish administrative support and that the Malayan police did not 
pass on any intelligence that came into their hands. This left his officers isolated 
in attempting to recruit secret agents or use surveillance operations: the latter 
being difficult without assistance from the police infrastructure. Even Dalley 
believed integration with the police was essential, although unsurprisingly wished 
to preserve his own headquarters.70 More junior MSS officers agreed that the 
separation of intelligence and police was not working, leaving the police without 
any intelligence expertise to guide their operations, and MSS without any 
effective conduit for enforcement.71 
 Likewise, MacDonald came to blame the situation of summer 1948 upon 
the non-cooperation of the Malayan government towards MSS.72 The 
Commissioner General supported MSS during the tribulations of 1948 because he 
had found their reportage useful to his developing anti-communist agenda. When 
MacDonald convened the special conference on communism on 26 June 1947, 
Dalley was allowed an important role. Throughout the meeting, Dalley proved 
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much more vocal than H/SIFE Hugh Winterborn, although this was hardly 
surprising given that the conference was focused upon MSS’ jurisdictional area.  
 Dalley provided the other delegates with a diagram illustrating the 
different political movements in Malaya and Singapore. This chart explicitly 
showed Soviet influence playing a directing role over the MCP. Dalley expressed 
no doubt that the MCP had been in direct contact with Moscow before the Second 
World War, and that they now enjoyed mediated contact via the CCP. He 
postulated a chain of influence from the Soviet Union via Manchuria, Shanghai, 
Hong Kong and Bangkok to Malaya. His emphasis was greatly different from 
those espoused by SIFE and the JIC(FE) in 1948 which focused on ideological 
inspiration instead of a direct chain of contact. This marks another discrepancy 
between the local and regional-national intelligence communities in the field of 
perceptions and conclusions. It is unsurprising that certain consumers were 
confused over the state of knowledge possessed by British intelligence agencies.73  
 Although his conclusions were somewhat suspect, Dalley provided a more 
useful contribution through factual reporting on the current situation in Malaya 
and Singapore. In the Federation, the MCP controlled approximately 75% of 
organised labour. Meanwhile, in Singapore, they exercised authority via the 
Singapore Harbour Labour Union (SHLU). According to an MSS agent, the MCP 
had a total of 11,800 members across both territories. 11,000 of these members 
were Chinese, 760 were Indian and the remainder either Malay or Indonesian. The 
majority of MCP members were in the Federation, with only 925 in Singapore 
(less than 0.1% of the Singapore population).74 
 MacDonald and Dalley agreed that the first objective of the MCP was to 
get rid of the government. As in other countries, communists were using united 
front tactics to hide behind nationalist forces. Their ultimate objective was to set 
up a communist state. The Trade Union Adviser proclaimed to be friends with 
individual communists who made no secret of the fact that they waited for him to 
register unions before proceeding to take them over. Malayan High Commissioner 
Edward Gent also believed that the MCP fully intended to break down law and 
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order as a prelude to taking over. He appeared keen to explore the possibility of 
outlawing the communist party, but MacDonald was not confident they had 
enough evidence to justify this at that time (and preferred more clandestine 
countermeasures to public displays of imperialist repression). Instead, he argued 
they should copy the communists’ own tactics and harness non-communist unions 
and parties against them.75 If the opinions Gent was espousing at this meeting are 
truly indicative of his personal stance, it would seem surprising that he was not 
more cooperative in building an effective local intelligence machine. In such case, 
the lack of support given to MSS by the Federation government would appear to 
be less to do with intelligence priorities and more a result of power tensions 
caused by MSS’ anomalous remit and headquarters situated in Singapore. 
 Although the MSS Political Intelligence Journals lacked coherency and 
did not give decisive warning of the outbreak of violence which occurred in June 
1948, they did comment on escalating industrial unrest promulgated by the MCP 
in Singapore. This became an open confrontation during a labour dispute 
involving the SHLU in spring 1948.  
 The MCP began with the circulation of seditious pamphlets printed in 
March 1948 which accused the police of acting like ‘fascists’ by conducting 
summary executions. During the ensuing crisis, Dalley argued that the MCP made 
two tactical errors that had left them with ‘just about enough rope with which to 
hang themselves’. Their first mistake was in provoking government action 
through the seditious pamphlets. This justified the Singapore police in taking 
action to arrest leading agitators and thus discovering documents proving that the 
Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Union leader decided to call a strike unilaterally 
in advance of the union’s collective decision. This intelligence helped to publicly 
discredit the strike as a communist political instrument. The government was able 
to disclose the information provided by MSS which showed that the PMFTU had 
manipulated the strike without proper consultation.76 Although Dalley was 
disappointed that the Colonial Office refused to allow stronger action, this 
produced the MCP’s second tactical error. Their over-confidence prompted them 
to send the government an inflammatory letter following the banning of a 
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communist-organised May Day procession, thus justifying the banning of a 
planned assembly which the government was previously willing to tolerate. As 
such, the MCP appeared weak.77  
 By May 1948, effective cooperation between the police, MSS and 
government in Singapore (contrary to that in the Federation) was successful in 
deflecting MCP plans for industrial unrest. However, this encouraged Dalley 
towards some questionable intelligence analysis. For the first part, two days 
before the outbreak of rural violence in Malaya, Dalley recorded that ‘there is no 
immediate threat to internal security in Malaya although the position is constantly 
changing and is potentially dangerous’. He expected the MCP to continue to focus 
on consolidating control of industrial labour before making more decisive 
moves.78 Secondly, MSS interpreted the Emergency with greater reference to 
long-term MCP planning and Soviet direction than regional intelligence assessors.  
 Although under supervision of SIFE and ultimately responsible to MI5, 
DSOs were another source of local intelligence analysis. As well as passing 
information back to SIFE headquarters, they were responsible for guiding the 
appreciation of security intelligence by the local government in their territory. 
Their unique position enabled them to combine on-the-spot information obtained 
by the likes of MSS with MI5 views of the bigger picture. However, it must be 
remembered that DSOs were not involved directly in raw intelligence collection, 
and were therefore dependent on colonial agencies for their intake of local 
information. This is further reason why a rigid distinction between national 
security intelligence and colonial political intelligence made little sense in the 
context of the early Cold War outside of power relationships. 
 In addition to providing analysis of the unfolding Emergency in Malaya 
and Singapore, the DSO system also gave MI5 an input into local security in 
Hong Kong. Hong Kong was initially served by a single DSO with one assistant. 
By the mid-1950s, the MI5 contingent had swelled to four intelligence officers, 
nine registry staff, two translators and an additional liaison officer embedded 
within Special Branch.79 This gives some indication of the importance attached to 
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the colony as an intelligence window on communist Chinese intentions. During 
the late 1940s, the position of DSO was held by Alan Roger. Because of his links 
to SIFE and MI5, Roger began applying Cold War preconceptions before more 
localised intelligence assessors. 
 This became evident in 1948, when the outbreak of violence across 
Southeast Asia clearly contrasted with the peaceful situation in Hong Kong. By 
spring 1948, Roger advised Governor Alexander Grantham of the growing 
likelihood of a clash between the government and CCP in Hong Kong. The 
communists were turning the colony into a staging post for ‘international 
communist’ intrigue, involving propaganda distribution to Southeast Asia and 
suspicious visits from Soviet bloc spies. The latter included one Mr A. Pisarevsky 
believed to be the senior economic intelligence officer of the Shanghai station of 
the Czechoslovakian Information Bureau.80 
 Following the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency, Roger purported to 
possess: 
Increased knowledge of the Communist network linking Hong Kong with 
Europe and America as well as with the countries of South-East Asia, 
India and North China, penetrating into cultural, welfare and labour 
organisations and embracing persons of either sex and in every walk of life 
81  
Whilst this did not constitute active subversion, Roger believed that if Hong Kong 
ceased to be of value to the CCP as a point of international contact, they would 
use all methods possible to disrupt British rule. This was similar to the 
understanding of Soviet disruptive intentions towards the colonial sphere voiced 
by the JIC(London) and Foreign Office. However, this was not yet a direct threat 
to Grantham’s government. Instead, the DSO appeared to be guiding Hong Kong 
towards a tougher position because of concerns centred upon uprisings in 
Southeast Asia and the belief that the CCP in Hong Kong were a vessel for Soviet 
influence. 
 Given the nature of the DSO as a conduit for the SIFE regional picture, it 
is unsurprising that his reports favoured of international intrigue. What is 
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interesting is the extent to which this was distanced from the reality in Hong 
Kong, where the CCP remained cautious. Unlike the communist parties of 
Southeast Asia, they were careful to avoid provoking the British government. 
Nevertheless, the Governor agreed with the DSO in attributing communist 
quiescence not to genuine tolerance for his regime but an appreciation that Hong 
Kong was a useful opening to the world. Under the status quo, Hong Kong, like 
Berlin, was a two-way intelligence window. If the CCP provoked the government 
into suppressive measures, it would be to their own detriment.82 
 Therefore, although Roger’s evaluations were of questionable relevance to 
the local situation, they were not without significance. Insight from MI5 helped 
interpret the reasons for communist cooperation, shaping the Governor’s view that 
the CCP were acting pragmatically to maintain lines of communication with the 
outside world. In other words, by giving the communists a safe haven, Hong Kong 
was weakening the position of other colonies in Southeast Asia. The Governor, 
like his MI5 advisor, was under no illusions that the CCP would cease to be 
cautious as soon as the situation became more favourable. 
 A similar understanding was shared by Grantham’s second-in-command, 
Colonial Secretary David MacDougall. MacDougall was experienced in 
clandestine work, having spent the Second World War broadcasting grey and 
black propaganda from San Francisco to Japan.83 In April 1948, MacDougall 
summarised the situation: 
Superficially no threat to internal security exists: an atmosphere of 
complete calm reigns […] But this is never really the case in Hong Kong: 
inertia exists, but not stability […] The threat to internal security cannot 
therefore be said to be negligible. Similarly it would be a mistake to say 
that it was at the present time great: its potentialities are great, but when 
they will be realised no-one can predict.84 
 These early warnings appeared vindicated by a sudden increase in raw 
intelligence following the arrest of a communist courier on 6 September 1948. 
This was not the result of careful planning but a fortuitous accident. Police 
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officers conducting a routine street search happened upon a suspicious man in 
possession of CCP documents including secret internal records. However, these 
were predominantly local directives of very low grade, giving little insight into 
the CCP’s international intentions. The accidental nature of this useful, if limited, 
intelligence breakthrough is comparable to many of the successes of the 
Singapore Special Branch in the 1950s which also relied upon routine policing.85 
 The first practical outcome was a coordinated police raid on the home of 
Lin Kun, identified as Secretary of the CCP South China Bureau. Lin Kun’s 
residence was raided on 11 December 1948, yielding large quantities of new 
documents. Nevertheless, the majority of the intelligence gained was of little 
relevance to Hong Kong’s national security. Instead, it was more useful as 
political information for the Foreign Office. One particular diary provided firm 
corroboration for SIFE suspicions that Hong Kong was a regional directing centre 
used for liaison with Southeast Asia. It also seemed to imply the ideological 
orthodoxy of the CCP.86  
 The Foreign Office interpreted the translated material as proving that the 
CCP was not moderated by ‘Chinese’ nationalist factors as some had predicted.87  
Since August 1947, the Foreign and Colonial Offices participated in regular 
Whitehall meetings with the principal intelligence producers including MI5 and 
SIS. In March 1949, they discussed the Hong Kong Special Branch translations of 
Lin Kun documents. The Foreign Office appeared convinced that the CCP must 
be considered an entirely orthodox Marxist party. From assessments of the Lin 
Kun documents, they believed that in the best case there would be a brief 
honeymoon period once a Chinese communist government was formed due to its 
initial weakness. This would soon give way to an ‘entirely ruthless’ 
internationalist communist policy.88 
 Following the loss of all Special Branch records during the Japanese 
occupation, the Lin Kun documents enabled the re-establishment of an 
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intelligence registry in Hong Kong. Hong Kong was in a weaker position than 
Singapore, where the cooperation of former Japanese intelligence officers helped 
resurrect an intelligence archive in 1945-46.89 The Lin Kun raid was therefore 
both a product of earlier intelligence which had highlighted Lin’s role as an 
underground leader, and also an operation designed to collect further intelligence 
to guide future policy. This scramble for information explicitly highlights the dual 
role of a Special Branch as an intelligence producer and police enforcer. 
 In Hong Kong as well as Singapore and Malaya, MI5 networks played an 
important role in interpreting local security concerns. The DSOs were able to take 
local intelligence produced by the Special Branch or MSS and contextualise it 
with the regional picture provided by SIFE. In the case of Hong Kong, this meant 
the DSO was warning about communist subversion before direct evidence of 
subversive activity became apparent. The integrated local-regional-national 
hierarchy provided by MI5 ensured that their interpretation was effective at 
guiding policy-makers at all three levels. 
 
Summary 
 Security intelligence was of paramount importance to Britain’s adoption of 
a Cold War posture in Southeast Asia. Intelligence collation and evaluation from 
SIFE and the JIC(FE) compared the security situation across the region, providing 
policy-makers with direction on a ‘new line’ in communist policy. Previously, 
communist parties had appeared willing to work through political processes 
everywhere except Indochina. However, from 1947-48, a ‘new line’ emerged as 
they firstly attempted to squeeze out opposition and gain political dominance 
(seen in Singapore during the labour disputes in April-May 1948) before 
embarking on violent revolution. SIFE helped guide policy-makers in Singapore 
and London, interpreting these events in a way which emphasised the interaction 
of local conditions with ideological guidance from Moscow and China.  
 As a result, intelligence consumers such as Killearn and MacDonald 
actively adopted Cold War attitudes and policies. Directly referencing SIFE 
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guidance, Killearn postulated that decolonisation through transferring power to 
friendly, non-communist elites could be a way of containing communism. 
MacDonald agreed, but also emphasised solutions more akin to containment in 
Europe: ensuring political and economic stability whilst building a defensive 
perimeter with the cooperation of friendly states. In May 1949, shortly after the 
inauguration of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Commissioner General garnered the 
agreement of the Foreign Office Far East Department that ‘the object of regional 
cooperation should be the building of a common front against Russia’.90 However, 
little practical progress was made towards this end until the creation of SEATO in 
1954. Meanwhile, MacDonald continued to put his faith in intelligence and 
propaganda services as a means of pursuing more proactive counter-subversion. 
 MacDonald was ahead of the imperial metropole in assuming the existence 
of a Southeast Asian Cold War as a solid reality. This can be explained through 
his closer position to the intelligence cycle, as well as his presence on the ground 
of regional affairs. This was what British intelligence organisers, their allies and 
their consumers perceived to be the ‘unique window’ effect. By autumn 1948, the 
situation in Malaya ensured that intelligence analysis from Southeast Asia was 
increasingly important to the national intelligence agenda.  
 Because of the nature of the threat faced – either revolutionary warfare 
from communist insurgents or political and labour subversion through more 
protracted communist campaigns – security intelligence occupied the most crucial 
position. SIFE evaluations were the main driving force behind JIC(FE) regional 
summaries of communist activities, which in turn were approved by the 
JIC(London). This is not to say that local intelligence was not without importance. 
Although the regional angle was more influential in shaping overall British 
perceptions and policy, following the dissolution of the moribund MSS, the 
Singapore Special Branch became increasingly effective at intelligence collection 
and assessment. As the next chapter shows, this guided decisive action by the 
Singapore government in preventing the city colony from succumbing to terrorist 
violence. 
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 In guiding policy-makers through the origins of a Cold War in Southeast 
Asia, a number of themes are apparent across the various intelligence networks. 
Cold War interpretations of local events were dominant, but these were not 
always the same across all agencies or at all levels. Whilst MSS emphasised a 
more monolithic view of Soviet communism, regional agencies such as SIFE were 
more receptive to the balance between local and international factors. The 
outbreak of the Malayan Emergency prompted greater national interest in 
Southeast Asia affairs, and intelligence departments as well as their primary users 
in Singapore contributed to shaping national policy and perceptions. The events of 
June 1948 were a catalyst in growing divergence between the local and regional-
national intelligence communities over intelligence assessment, repeating the 
trend visible in the field of intelligence organisation. The next chapter considers 
the impact of the dissolution of MSS upon local intelligence. Although the 
creation of a new Singapore Special Branch led to improved tactical intelligence 
production, it also reinforced a distinction between the organisational cultures of 
the two intelligence communities. 
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4. Singapore security and communist violence 
 The spate of murders in rural Malaya on 16 June 1948 had seismic 
repercussions for the intelligence system in Singapore. For intelligence analysts, 
the communist insurgency in Malaya was seen as the most dramatic moment in a 
series of escalations across the region linked with Soviet ideological influence. 
The regional-national intelligence community guided foreign policy specialists’ 
understanding of this ‘new line’ and cemented the assumption of the existence of 
a Cold War in Southeast Asia. June 1948 was no less important for intelligence 
organisation. Locally, MSS was discredited and replaced with separate Federation 
of Malaya and Singapore Special Branches which were part of the police 
infrastructure. Regionally, the escalating spate of insurgencies in Southeast Asia 
culminated in greater influence for civilian intelligence agencies, particularly 
SIFE, and growing centralisation within the Commissioner General’s new offices 
at Phoenix Park. 
 This chapter evaluates the results of June 1948 on the new Singapore 
Special Branch. Following the disbandment of MSS, the new Federation Special 
Branch took until the early 1950s to become really effective.1 However, this was 
not the case in Singapore, as attested by the first post-war Special Branch director, 
Nigel Morris. Because of the successes enjoyed by the previous Singapore Special 
Branch in the 1930s, such as the management of double agent Lai Tek, the 
Singapore division of MSS inherited greater intelligence expertise than the 
Federation section. This enabled quicker government action to be taken to prevent 
an outbreak of mass violence such as occurred in Malaya. Consequently, after the 
division into two Special Branches in September 1948, the new Singapore 
intelligence service benefitted from MSS’s better record in the city colony.2 
During a period of what may be termed a ‘phony war’ from 1948-49, the 
Singapore Special Branch consistently maintained the upper hand. However, the 
communists regained the initiative with a dramatic wave of terrorist violence, 
including an assassination attempt on Governor Franklin Gimson in 1950. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the year, through a combination of good luck and 
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effective tactical intelligence, Special Branch rounded up the highest body of the 
MCP in the colony. This was not a complete triumph, as taking action against the 
communist underground necessitated the loss of valuable sources of information, 
leaving the police in the dark for the next two years. 
 The Emergency situation in Singapore and its links to the broader Cold 
War have received little historiographical attention.3 As well as expanding our 
understanding of Britain’s Cold War intelligence system, this thesis contributes to 
the body of work on the Malayan Emergency by casting light on British responses 
to insurgent activity in Singapore.  The Emergency dominated colonial 
governance in Singapore from 1948 until the early 1950s, overshadowing agendas 
for colonial reform and social development during this period. As attested by 
Singapore historian C. M. Turnbull, ‘the draconian suppression of perceived 
subversion jammed the lid dangerously tight on a seething cauldron of genuine 
grievances and injustices […] complicated further by the impact of events in the 
surrounding region and particularly in China’.4 Security factors were an important 
part of Singapore’s transitions in the wake of the Second World War. 
 This chapter evaluates why Singapore remained quieter than Malaya 
during 1948-49, and how effective the Singapore Special Branch proved in 
responding to the outbreak of communist violence. During this period, the 
Singapore government was headed by Governor Franklin Gimson (1946-52). 
Gimson was a long-standing colonial official who was more representative of the 
colonial old guard than Commissioner General Malcolm MacDonald. Gimson 
arguably lacked the initiative or innovation to take a more decisive stance on 
Singapore’s political and security problems. As a result, despite the growing 
capabilities of Special Branch, the dominant theme of this period – to refer back 
to Guy Liddell’s questionable analogy of nursing – was one of administering 
cures to outbreaks of communist subversion rather than inoculating against them.  
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Containing the Emergency 
 In the late 1940s, mainland Malaya and Borneo had to contend with 
nationalist challenges including the opposition to the Malayan Union and the 
‘anti-cession’ movement which opposed the transfer of Sarawak from the Brooke 
family to the British crown. Communism was not the only challenge to colonial 
role. In contrast, the MCP was the only significant internal security threat to 
Singapore. Whilst the communist organisation had been dealt a heavy blow by the 
Japanese security regime, it survived the Second World War and gained prestige 
by participating in resistance. Two Party members sat on the Advisory Committee 
to the British Military Administration from 1945-46, and the MCP operated as a 
legal political entity until summer 1948. However, the communists were aware 
that their open organisation was easy for the police to observe, so they also built 
up a parallel secret structure.5 
 The secret underground was headed by the Singapore Town Committee, in 
turn responsible through the South Malaya Bureau in Johore to the Central 
Executive Committee. Meanwhile, in addition to the underground Party structure, 
the legal MCP organisation was based at 218 Queen Street and nominally led by 
Cheong Meng Chin.6 By early 1948, the MCP’s visible activities in Singapore 
operated through a network of front organisations.  
 The most important front movement was the Singapore Federation of 
Trade Unions (SFTU): a subsidiary of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade 
Unions (PMFTU). The SFTU was an umbrella organisation which included 
influential unions either dominated or fully controlled by the communists, 
including the Singapore Harbour Labour Union (SHLU). Moreover, the SFTU 
also contained an illegal Workers Protection Corps. These dedicated activists used 
violence and intimidation to enforce discipline within the labour organisation.7 
This was first formed in November 1946, and – in a recurring theme amongst the 
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more violent arms of the Singapore MCP – incorporated its membership from 
criminal secret societies as well as ideologically-motivated communist cadres.8 
 Following a series of strikes in January-February 1946, the MCP Central 
Executive Committee focused on constitutional progress and peaceful agitation. 
This was likely due to the influence of Lai Tek, reasserted following initial post-
war dislocation, who had been a Special Branch agent before the war. However, 
after Lai Tek absconded in 1947, wartime guerrilla leader Chin Peng replaced him 
and urged greater militancy.9 In 1947 alone, MCP-inspired strikes in Malaya and 
Singapore cost the two governments 696,036 working days (70% of which were 
in Singapore). This programme of industrial subversion set the tone for greater 
confrontation in 1948.10 
 In April 1948, the MCP took advantage of a dispute in the Harbour Board 
to strengthen their control over organised labour. They controlled 91 out of 159 
unions through the SFTU, accounting for 72% of unionised workers. Beyond the 
numbers, the MI5 DSO was more worried by which unions were members of the 
SFTU alliance, including the majority of civil service, municipal, infrastructure 
and harbour unions. They all seemed very much ‘eager and able to play the Soviet 
game’.11 Such a conglomeration could deliver a crippling blow to the economic 
and administrative life of Singapore. 
 On 10 April 1948, Workers Protection Corps members distributed 
seditious pamphlets levelling false accusations of police brutality. This provided 
the government with justification to banish eight committee members of the 
SHLU implicated in conspiring with the militant body. Accurate intelligence 
received from MSS, according to Governor Franklin Gimson, enabled decisive 
action.12 The Singapore police raided the premises of both the SHLU and 
umbrella SFTU, netting further evidence of the illegal activities of the outlawed 
Workers Protection Corps. The two raids uncovered a list of Protection Corps 
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members, enabling their arrest and the curtailing one of the key MCP 
underground organisations in Singapore.13 A combination of effective intelligence 
and police work – absent in Malaya –was instrumental in undermining MCP 
capabilities from the outset. Unlike in the Federation, the Singapore offices of 
MSS were based inside the police building and drew upon police personnel. Co-
location helped facilitate rapid dissemination of their intelligence and its 
conversion into effective police action. 
 The SFTU retaliated through preparing to call a general strike of all its 
constituent unions on 23 April 1948. However, using information from the 
intelligence process to justify public policy, the government successfully 
discredited this as a politically-motivated strike and therefore illegal. Gimson 
wished to prohibit the SFTU outright, but a more cautious Colonial Office refused 
permission until after the start of the Emergency.14 The Singapore government 
publicised recent intelligence showing that the SFTU had ordered the general 
strike without consulting its constituent unions, acting at the instruction of its 
parent body, the PMFTU. The colonial regime argued that this exposed 
communist manipulation of the labour scene for political ends.15 Intelligence 
could therefore be used as a weapon to rally public support for the government, as 
well as a guide to counter-subversion action. A similar approach was employed by 
Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister of Singapore in 1961. Lee was faced with 
growing opposition to his support for merger between Singapore and the 
Federation of Malaya from his former colleague Lim Chin Siong. Lim, who 
Special Branch had proven to have communist connections, had formed a new 
party, the Barisan Sosialis, with other expelled members of Lee’s People’s Action 
Party. In order to rally public support behind merger, Lee gave a series of twelve 
radio talks (which he repeated in English, Malay and Mandarin). These were 
subsequently published under the title The Battle for Merger. In these talks and 
book, Lee disclosed Special Branch intelligence which indicted Lim Chin Siong 
with being a communist and discredited the Barisan Sosialis.16 The means by 
which Special Branch came by this intelligence during the British colonial period 
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are described in chapter seven. Lee Kuan Yew’s public disclosure of this 
intelligence, repeating the actions of the colonial state from spring 1948, is 
implicit of an inherited intelligence culture in post-war Singapore in which 
intelligence could be disclosed to achieve political goals. As seen in the 
intelligence cycle proposed in chapter one, the intelligence process does not end 
when assessed material is disseminated to consumers. Rather, those consumers 
then decide what – if anything – to do with it. In this case, action was taken in the 
form of public disclosure of intelligence.  
 In 1961, The Battle for Merger was the first logical step on the road to 
Lee’s decision to use Special Branch to arrest the leaders of Barisan Sosialis in a 
large-scale round-up of ‘leftist’ opponents in 1963. Throughout the Emergency, 
the colonial government similarly used the products of intelligence collection and 
assessment to depict the MCP as adhering to a ruthless revolutionary policy.17 As 
seen in the previous chapter with Malcolm MacDonald’s public speeches, this 
sometimes involved portraying a much modified picture to the actual intelligence 
available. In this regard, claiming to possess ‘intelligence’ became a useful act of 
political justification. This alludes to a different way of understanding the impact 
of intelligence. As well as the bureaucratic and policy impacts referred to in the 
introduction, intelligence could also have a public impact if public action was 
taken based upon it. In both 1948 and 1961-63, the selective disclosure of 
intelligence played a significant role in garnering public support for hard-line 
government policies. 
 A combination of MCP mistakes and British successes prevented the 
outbreak of more serious unrest. The MCP planned two major public events to 
coincide with May Day (an important communist holiday): a procession and a 
public assembly. These would be led by the SFTU. Through excessive use of 
intimidation, the MCP handed the government an excuse to forbid the procession. 
Then a ‘stupidly defiant’ letter of protest by the SFTU (to quote the DSO) 
provided justification to ban the assembly as well. The communists therefore 
provided an excuse for their own censure.18 
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 These early signs of a more confrontational MCP stance led to decisive 
British retaliation in the form of Operation Bulldog. This was a police operation 
supported by MSS intelligence to arrest and deport anyone connected with the 
Workers Protection Corps or other MCP underground leaders.19 Building on the 
successful partnership shown during the Harbour Board crisis, the intelligence and 
police services cooperated to clamp down on potential communist activities. 
 However, the underground sections of the MCP had potential to be more 
troublesome than its ineffective open front. In May 1948, MCP activists engaged 
in a campaign of arson, labour intimidation and armed assault in an attempt to 
cripple Singapore’s rubber and tin industry. The most dramatic episode was the 
burning down of the Bin Seng rubber factory on 10 May.20 MSS struggled to 
provide guidance on MCP strategic intentions to match the useful tactical 
intelligence provided on Workers Protection Corps membership and SFTU 
activities. Available sources of information did not indicate whether this was 
another short-term, high-impact campaign conceived as retaliation for the MCP’s 
recent setbacks, or whether it was the start of a more sustained programme of 
escalation.21 This pattern was repeated throughout the Emergency in Singapore. 
Whilst MSS and Special Branch enjoyed many successes in generating tactical 
intelligence, they often failed to provide a higher level view of MCP intentions 
and capabilities. As a result, security forces struggled to move beyond a reactive 
footing. 
 The first rural attacks in Malaya occurred on 16 June 1948. The Federation 
government declared a State of Emergency on 18 June. The Singapore 
government did not follow suit in declaring an Emergency until 24 June. This was 
potentially because – due to the weaker intelligence picture and lack of MSS-
police cooperation in Malaya – the Federation government panicked quicker, 
whereas the Singapore government was more confident in their ability to retain 
control. 
 Shortly after the outbreak of violence, the discredited MSS was replaced 
by a Special Branch within the Singapore Police. The new Singapore Special 
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Branch began operating under the leadership of experienced police intelligence 
and MSS veteran Nigel Morris (see table 4.1). In commencing operations, Morris’ 
Special Branch benefitted from the better legacy left behind by MSS in Singapore 
than the Federation. In the Federation half of MSS, relations with the police were 
extremely poor. The situation had been better in Singapore where MSS was 
housed in the CID building and utilised officers seconded by the police. As a 
result, a discrepancy developed between the effectiveness in intelligence 
production of the two halves of MSS. This was a problem which the creation of 
Special Branches only partially solved, as the Federation Special Branch took 
longer to establish itself than its Singapore counterpart, which inherited a more 
positive legacy from MSS.22 
  Shortly after the inauguration of the new Special Branch, the government 
created a Local Intelligence Committee (LIC) which began holding meetings in 
November 1948 under the chairmanship of a new Secretary for Internal Affairs. 
This took precedence over a previous intelligence committee chaired by the DSO. 
The latter body now became the Services Intelligence Liaison Committee (SILC) 
which met weekly to enable the DSO to apprise service representatives of the 
contents of the latest Special Branch reports. The retention of the SILC despite the 
creation of a new LIC shows the importance of MI5, in this case by providing a 
bridge between civilian and military officials. This was particularly important 
given the context of the insurgency conflict in Malaya, where growing civil-
military intelligence coordination was a vital ingredient to effective 
counterinsurgency.23  
 
Table 4.1. Directors of Singapore Special Branch, 1948-59. 
Nigel G. Morris 1948-50 
Alan E. G. Blades 1950-57 
Khaw Kai Boh 1957-59 
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 Concurrently, the discredited MSS Political Intelligence Journals were 
replaced by a fortnightly ‘Pan-Malayan Review’ which covered both territories. 
These contained a political section authored by the two Special Branch Directors, 
and one on security intelligence prepared by the DSOs. This latter section 
contained more detailed and interpretative analysis of MCP actions than the 
political section, even though most of the raw intelligence was produced by the 
Special Branches. These reports can be classified as a meshing together of the 
‘basic descriptive’ types of intelligence report (the political section) and the more 
analytical ‘current reportorial’ type (the security section). The role of the DSO in 
writing these journals further indicates the importance attached to MI5 and SIFE 
expertise, and a new commitment to making sure earlier turf wars were not 
repeated. MI5 hegemony over ‘security intelligence’ was assured. Whilst Special 
Branches were primarily responsible for intelligence collection, MI5 influence 
was firmly entrenched over analysis. 
 On 23 July 1948, the governments of both Singapore and the Federation 
outlawed the MCP along with some of its key front organisations. Malcolm 
MacDonald justified this action to the Colonial Office by citing a ‘mosaic’ of 
evidence from various intelligence sources which proved beyond doubt that the 
MCP was directly responsible for the violence in Malaya as well as industrial 
intimidation in Singapore.24 Such an interpretation was somewhat questionable 
and the subject of disagreement between local and regional intelligence 
organisations. In this case, a more decisive interpretation of intelligence suited the 
needs of the administration. The SFTU was forcibly de-registered in December 
1948. By year’s end, the total number of unions owing allegiance to the MCP had 
fallen from 92 to 56.25 The intelligence community had already discussed the 
option of making the MCP illegal once again (as it had been before the Second 
World War) during MacDonald’s special conference in June 1947. However, on 
that occasion, MacDonald had not felt there was sufficient evidence to publically 
justify this action. The decision to outlaw the MCP in July 1948 is implicit of the 
influence of intelligence agencies. The information digested by MacDonald from 
the likes of MSS and SIFE in June-July 1948 ensured he became confident that 
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action could be justified against the MCP. This is not to say that intelligence 
agencies determined his anti-communist policy. After all, MacDonald convened 
the special conference because he already wanted to curb communist activity and 
wished to engender discussion between intelligence services and colonial 
officials. However, a steady stream of intelligence was useful in making decision-
makers feel confident to act decisively and be able to carry public opinion behind 
them. 
 In response to what they perceived to be a coordinated revolutionary 
outbreak, the colonial governments in the Federation and Singapore implemented 
a series of Emergency Regulations. These gave the Governor of Singapore and 
High Commissioner of the Federation broad powers to introduce sweeping, 
punitive legislation to curb dissident political activity. The Emergency 
Regulations allowed the police (which, from September 1948, included the 
intelligence agency Special Branch) to arrest suspects and detain them indefinitely 
without trial. Initially there was no oversight beyond the executive branch (the 
Governor and his Chief Secretary) to curb the police in the implementation of 
these powers. Suspected communists could be held in detention centres, most 
notably on St John’s Island (previously a disease quarantine centre) without 
sentencing by jury or judge. The police could also implement targeted searches or 
large-scale cordon-and-search operations without a warrant.26 
 Although not equal to the insurgent violence in Malaya, the situation in 
Singapore could hardly be described as calm. Intelligence passed to the Governor 
suggested that the MCP aimed to expand the Workers Protection Corps and 
recover from their weakened position.27 Special Branch quickly identified new 
activists sent from the Federation. Effective security intelligence – derived from 
surveillance operations, captured documents and successful agent recruitment – 
helped keep the Singapore MCP in a state of dislocation for the remainder of 
1948.28 To cite one example, the detention of an insurgent in Johore on 11 
September 1948 and their subsequent interrogation enabled the Federation Special 
Branch to give information to their Singapore counterparts that led to the arrest of 
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four Workers Protection Corps members, an important MCP liaison officer, an 
insurgent fighter returning home to Singapore and a communist recruiter.29 
 In the first Pan-Malayan Review, DSO Eric Leighton commented that 
captured MCP documents bore the unmistakable imprint of Zhdanov’s ideological 
theories. He argued that ‘this fact provides additional evidence that the change in 
MCP policy from “rightist opportunism” to militant opposition forms part of a 
Soviet inspired plan for South-East Asia’.30 One MCP propaganda leaflet declared 
that ‘the revolutionary struggle of the people is not isolated. It is a link of the 
national liberation movement of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of the Far 
East. It is also a link in the world revolution’.31 Regional analysis discussed in the 
previous chapter therefore played an important role in understanding local 
intelligence. Whilst historians have debated whether the strong British reaction in 
June-July 1948 was responsible for solidifying a previously uncertain MCP into a 
protracted insurgency, it is hardly surprising that decision-makers reacted so 
strongly given the Cold War context emphasised by their intelligence experts. 
 New police powers were required. The Commissioner of Police, R. E. 
Foulger, attributed great importance to the mandatory national registration of all 
residents over twelve years of age. This provided a registry of everybody legally 
residing in Singapore which the police could use as the basis for investigations. 
This system was so effective that it became a key target of MCP disruption 
efforts.32 The early successes of arresting suspected communist activists and 
introducing national registration prompted the MCP to create a new front 
organisation. This was the Singapore People’s Anti-British League (ABL), 
inaugurated on 1 September 1948. The ABL functioned as a stepping-stone 
between communist sympathisers and full MCP membership.33 There was also a 
Students’ ABL managed by MCP youth organiser Guo Ren Huey. The primary 
duties of both adult and youth ABL representatives were to cultivate new 
members, solicit donations to support the armed struggle and to distribute 
propaganda. Once proven trustworthy, they were eligible for full MCP 
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membership. The creation of this new framework is indicative of the success of 
British security forces in driving the MCP underground, but also the difficulties 
this created in keeping tabs on the communist movement. Previously, the MCP 
had operated a legal office and cultivated members directly. Following 
suppression, the ABL was needed to maintain contact with the masses and vet 
new members, symptomatic of the MCP’s security dilemmas.34 
 Intelligence received from a reliable Special Branch agent in autumn 1948 
confirmed that MCP membership had not fallen greatly since 1947 despite a spate 
of arrests at the start of the Emergency. There remained approximately 700 full 
MCP members in Singapore, consisting of 500 Chinese and 200 Indians.35 Given 
that the majority of the Singapore population was ethnic Chinese, isolating and 
identifying communist sympathisers was more difficult than in the Federation, 
where the security forces relied on coercive population control to achieve success. 
Such tactics were not possible in Singapore, so timely intelligence and strong 
policing were of even greater importance.36 
 Nevertheless, intelligence analysis of captured documents was reassuring. 
The DSO drew attention to how the MCP saw itself as dislocated due to a 
combination of internal purges of moderate elements who opposed the new 
militant line compounded by effective police action. The MCP was not planning 
immediate revolution in Singapore, but focusing on mobilising support for the 
insurgency in Malaya. Meanwhile, they were reorganising around the Singapore 
Town Committee and its subsidiary District Committees.37 
 This was confirmed by highly secretive information obtained by Special 
Branch. This intelligence – an agent’s report graded A.2 on the Admiralty scale 
(see table 4.2) – amounted to a report of a clandestine meeting of the Singapore 
Town Committee in September 1948. As such documents were not widely 
distributed, it can be inferred that Special Branch had a well-placed informant. At 
this time, Special Branch believed that the Town Committee consisted of around 
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five or six members. Due to Special Branch successes in identifying and arresting 
leading MCP members, by November 1948 there appeared to be only two 
members of the Town Committee still active. The MCP shortly promoted a third 
member, but the continuing effectiveness of Special Branch in targeting 
experienced communist activists meant that the MCP struggled to augment its 
hierarchy in Singapore. The Town Committee never recovered its full strength.38 
This report provides the first link in a chain of evidence suggesting that the 
Special Branch enjoyed success in penetrating the MCP hierarchy. Although these 
Special Branch reports were primarily descriptive and contain little analysis, they 
were rigorous in their evaluation of the reliability of sources (a reminder that these 
are distinct stages of the assessments process). This rigour is helpful in attempting 
to understand what sort of human sources Special Branch had access to. 
Table 4.2. Admiralty system for intelligence grading, as used by the 
Federation and Singapore Special Branches.39 
Source reliability Information accuracy 
A – completely reliable 1 – confirmed 
B – usually reliable 2 – probably true 
C – fairly reliable 3 – possibly true 
D – not usually reliable 4 – doubtfully true 
E – unreliable 5 – improbable 
F – reliability cannot be judged 6 – accuracy cannot be judged 
  
 Another – or perhaps the same – A.2 graded ‘very secret source’  informed 
Special Branch that the MCP had no violent plans for Singapore because it needed 
to rebuild its front organisations. Special Branch Director Nigel Morris believed 
this agent to be completely reliable.40 Following government deregistration of the 
SFTU, the MCP introduced a new labour umbrella, the Singapore All-Races All-
Trades General Labour Union (GLU) in 1949. In addition, they intensified 
propaganda work to attract more sympathisers or ABL members. This campaign 
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centred upon a new publication, Freedom News, beginning in January 1949 and 
edited by Students’ ABL leader Guo Ren Huey: now promoted to the Singapore 
Town Committee.41 Previously Freedom News had been the internal propaganda 
organ of the MCP but from 1949 it became an openly distributed publication 
printed on a farm in eastern Singapore.42 Its initial monthly circulation was of 
1000 copies.43 
  Nigel Morris firmly believed that only the continued efforts of Special 
Branch and the police in picking off front leaders as soon as they became active 
prevented escalation into a more dangerous situation. Operation Bulldog led to a 
further psychological victory through the seizure of the official seal of the 
Workers Protection Corps in police raids of October 1948.44 The director of 
Special Branch was adamant that ‘chaos can only be avoided by firm government 
control’.45 In this regard, limited comparisons can be drawn with the situation in 
the Federation, where government responses during the period of 1948-50 were 
almost entirely repressive. Only from 1950 did the Federation security regime 
begin paying equal attention to ‘hearts and minds’.46 Equally in Singapore, 
policing and intelligence were at the forefront of government responses, and MCP 
activities were contained through strict Emergency Regulations. The key 
difference between the situations was that, due to the different nature of the two 
communist campaigns and the greater success enjoyed by intelligence producers, 
repressive measures in Singapore were more targeted and entailed less coercion 
against the population at large. 
 In the first six months, 304 individuals were detained under Emergency 
Regulations in Singapore. Only 202 resulted from Special Branch cases. There 
were 102 detentions resulting from Criminal Investigation Department (CID) 
cases of arms smugglers, labour agitators and saboteurs who were found to have 
links to the MCP.47 This provides further evidence of the importance of involving 
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the police in security intelligence. As well as enabling quick and effective action 
following Special Branch leads, the new system enabled other police departments 
to contribute to counter-subversion. The Emergency Regulations also proved to be 
an effective instrument for more assertive policing of long-standing problems 
such as criminal secret societies. 
 The escalating confrontation in spring 1948 set the tempo for the first six 
months of the Emergency in Singapore. The government maintained a lid on more 
violent MCP activities through effective coordination between the intelligence 
and police services. However, despite enjoying numerous small successes, the 
security forces were as much on the back-foot as they were in the jungle war 
raging in Malaya. Special Branch intelligence collection was good, but it was 
primarily tactical. As a result, targeted police enforcement operations tended to be 
reactive, supplemented by restrictions on political liberties via the Emergency 
Regulations. 
 
A phony war 
 By the end of 1948, Special Branch had established an effective system for 
intelligence production, with indications of successful agent recruitment within 
the MCP. The fruits of their intelligence were efficiently disseminated. Within the 
police force, intelligence enabled rapid enforcement action. Secondly, with the 
assistance of the DSO, it was used to maintain consensus amongst various 
government departments, defence officials and other intelligence agencies. The 
work of Special Branch could be classified as both police intelligence and security 
intelligence. If the latter is defined as information pertaining to the national 
security of the state, then clearly – despite MI5’s dismissals of colonial agencies 
as ‘political’ intelligence – this is what Special Branch was doing. The MCP in 
Singapore was a subversive force which was more than just a threat to the stability 
of colonial dominance. It sought to establish a communist-inspired regime. By 
supporting insurgency in the Federation, instigating social unrest in Singapore and 
preparing for a terrorist campaign, the MCP was a threat to national security and 
Special Branch was the primary producer of security intelligence to counter this 
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threat. A distinction between political and security intelligence has little meaning 
in this context. 
 The year 1949 was a period of phony war. In contrast to the deteriorating 
situation in the Federation, security forces retained control through sound tactical 
intelligence production, analysis and dissemination. The MCP struggled to 
reacquire the initiative and instead concentrated on rebuilding its underground 
structure ready for a more explosive campaign of action. A letter from the 
Governor to the Colonial Office in January 1949 confirmed the existence of an 
important, well-placed Special Branch agent within the MCP hierarchy. Governor 
Gimson – a man described by Malcolm MacDonald as politically wise but lacking 
‘real administrative ability and efficiency’ – was reticent about passing on 
intelligence from this source to his superiors in London.48  The Governor worried 
that any leakage could lead to the identification and neutralisation of the agent 
which would be severely to the detriment of the local intelligence picture.49 
 That relative calm prevailed was in large part testimony to the 
effectiveness of Special Branch. In addition, SIFE and MI5 contributed advice 
and access to their global security intelligence pool. This was often achieved 
through the DSO, whose title was revised to ‘Security Liaison Officer’ (SLO) in 
May 1949: seemingly more appropriate for a limited advisory role in the period of 
decolonisation. In summer 1949, SIFE and MI5 Head Office investigated 
international opium smuggling networks at the request of Special Branch. Nigel 
Morris worried that the MCP could be smuggling drugs to fund their activities. 
Reassuringly, MI5 concluded that there was no reliable evidence of this other than 
the recovery of $500,000 of opium on the body of an insurgent killed on the Thai 
border. This could just as easily be individual criminal activity as a communist 
conspiracy.50 Despite such help, the influence of the regional-national network on 
local security affairs was very limited. SIFE and MI5 provided advice when 
requested, and the SLO helped to disseminate Special Branch intelligence to the 
armed services, but they were not in the front line of the Emergency. This alludes 
to two crucial distinctions between the two British intelligence communities in 
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Singapore. In terms of priorities, the local community was heavily concentrated 
on the MCP subversive threat, whilst the regional-national community was more 
concerned with external influences. As a result, whilst security intelligence was 
growing in status as one of the most important activities at the regional-national 
level, local intelligence was security intelligence. Moreover, the two communities 
were distinguished in terms of working cultures. Whilst the regional-national 
intelligence community was predominantly non-executive (although sometimes 
used as an avenue for policy instrumentalisation), Special Branch was an integral 
part of the enforcement process. 
 The new post of Secretary of Internal Affairs was an important link in the 
policy-making chain. In May 1949, Major J. C. Barry was appointed to this 
position, chairing the Local Intelligence Committee. Barry had previously served 
as a security intelligence officer during the British Military Administration and 
then in MSS and the police CID.51 One of his duties was to collate the descriptive 
reports produced by Special Branch and the SLO for the varying committees and 
distil these into a more concise analytical report for the Governor. These were 
named ‘political reports’ despite discussing security intelligence. Barry’s 
worldviews appear to have been strongly influenced by anti-communism. He even 
denounced Jehovah’s Witnesses as ‘a sort of religified [sic] communism with all 
the worst forms of fanaticism and obscurantism (even discussing them makes one 
display a similar extravaganza of words)’.52 
 In June 1949, Special Branch obtained an MCP document outlining a 
three-month plan for Singapore. This entailed increased propaganda, the 
expansion of the new GLU, and attempts to destroy identity cards to derail 
national registration. Six persons were arrested for producing counterfeit identity 
cards which could be used by wanted communists, highlighting the overlap 
between criminal, political and security issues during the Emergency. 
Nevertheless, Barry was confident that Special Branch had control and would be 
able to provide adequate warning of any trouble. He was more concerned with the 
Immigration Department, which appeared to be the weak link in the security 
                                                            
51 The duties of the CID included surveillance of secret societies, gambling suppression, organised 
crime and anti-narcotics police work. 
52 FCO 141/15628, Singapore political report for August 1949. 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
142 
 
chain. In the budget for 1949, the Singapore police was allocated $8,300,000 
whilst Immigration received only $260,000. With around 3000 Chinese migrants 
or visitors flowing in and out of Malaya and Singapore every month, they lacked 
the resources to conduct more than a semblance of a security check.53 
 The immigration question related to a secondary security threat: the CCP. 
Barry was increasingly concerned with the potential for Chinese communist 
bodies to support the local insurgents. By summer 1949, the MCP in Singapore 
had been reduced to around 200 underground members and 500 sympathisers. Its 
Indian section was completely broken, leaving the MCP an entirely Chinese 
organisation. However, front groups loyal to the China-based CCP vied for 
dominance in the labour, education and cultural fields. Immigration from China 
had the potential to compound this already complex security situation.54  
 The main instrument of CCP influence was a cultural group called the 
Mayfair Dramatic and Musical Association. Run by the Shaw brothers, local 
Chinese cinema entrepreneurs described by Barry as ‘notorious Japanese 
collaborators’ and ‘shady businessmen’, the Mayfair Association conformed to 
the CCP trend for using theatre to disseminate propaganda.55 
 Barry’s report regarding the potential security threat of the CCP caused 
some confusion in the metropole. Foreign Office officials such as Robert Scott 
were of the impression that, because there was no formal CCP organisation 
outside China, the threat to Southeast Asia was purely from national communist 
parties like the MCP.56 MI5 Head Office clarified and supported Barry’s 
arguments. They postulated that the CCP wished to persuade overseas Chinese to 
return to China to support the mainland revolution and could not rely on local 
parties like the MCP which had conflicting nationalist goals. Therefore the CCP 
built up independent front organisations in places with a large Chinese diaspora. 
Their activities had the potential to eclipse the MCP as a future security threat due 
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to the establishment of the communist government in China.57 This shows how 
the SIFE regional picture, which emphasised the emergence of the CCP as a 
strong ideological influence on local communist parties, could be applied to the 
local level. 
 SIFE proved a useful ally to Special Branch in investigating international 
communist influence. In early 1950, an Indonesian Chinese man was arrested in 
Singapore for not possessing identification papers. His interrogation revealed that 
he belonged to a training centre in South China for infiltrating subversive agents 
throughout Southeast Asia. In February 1949, the Hong Kong government had 
closed down Tat Tak College in the New Territories for contributing to this 
recruitment process. This case involved local evidence seized from the communist 
courier arrested in September 1948 as well as international indictments from 
Indonesia and Indochina obtained through SIFE liaison.58 The Singapore case 
proved that this activity was not halted by action against Tat Tak. SIFE helped 
Special Branch reconstruct this international chain by using their SLOs to institute 
parallel investigations in Hong Kong and Malaya, as well as liaising with SIS and 
foreign allies to obtain information from Indonesia and China. On a more 
quotidian basis, by maintaining a card index of communists from across Southeast 
Asia, SIFE could quickly supply information to assist Special Branch.59 Such 
cooperation across shared intelligence activities (security intelligence) could 
bridge the gap between the local and regional-national intelligence communities. 
  Despite these distractions, Special Branch remained focused on the 
primary security threat – the MCP – and continued to lead decisive police action. 
On 7 September 1949, the police raided a clandestine meeting of the underground 
trade union movement. Documents seized during this raid were subjected to 
analysis by Special Branch and the SLO, appearing to indicate that the MCP was 
struggling to penetrate legitimate unions.60 Maintaining constant pressure via 
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Operation Bulldog and the Emergency Regulations prevented the new GLU from 
achieving the same level of dominance as the SFTU had enjoyed in early 1948.61 
 This was following by a more significant raid in November 1949 on a 
number of connected addresses linked with a property at 96 Duxton Road in 
Singapore’s Chinatown, where MCP propaganda had been discovered in a hidden 
wall cavity. Eleven young Chinese suspects were arrested, believed to be former 
members of the New Democratic Youth League who had graduated into the ABL. 
By the end of the month, connected arrests had risen to a total of 28. As the SLO 
wryly commented ‘until they were separated the CID lock-up reverberated with 
communist songs’.62 
 During most of 1949 therefore, the trends established in the previous year 
continued. Successful intelligence production enabled Special Branch to keep a 
lid on MCP activities. However, they still struggled to deal a more decisive, 
strategic blow to the MCP underground structure, and relied for their intelligence 
on ordinary policing methods, surveillance operations, captured documents and a 
few secret agents or informants. 
 Emphasising the MCP’s retention of the strategic initiative, towards the 
end of the year, Special Branch discovered the MCP’s intention to form a new 
‘Traitor Assassination Corps’. In British documents this was also referred to as a 
‘Special Service Corps’ or ‘Shock Troops’. The establishment of this paramilitary 
unit, actually a revival of the lapsed Workers Protection Corps which was 
misnamed and misunderstood in intelligence reports well into the mid-1950s, was 
part of a new six-month plan for violence. This was the result of instructions from 
the Central Executive Committee to create unrest in Singapore in order to divert 
British troops from the Federation. The new ‘Special Service Corps’ was led by a 
veteran of the wartime anti-Japanese resistance who was also a member of the 
Ang Bin Huay triad. This secret society originated in Qing dynasty China and 
opposed the Manchu rule of the Qing court. It later spread to Southeast Asia 
through Chinese emigration.63 Despite evidence from the Singapore Special 
Branch records suggesting that the Ang Bin Huay allied with the MCP in 
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Singapore, over the causeway in the Federation, it entered into negotiations with 
the local Guomindang movement.64 
 According to Singapore Town Committee member Guo Ren Huey, most 
of the new Workers Protection Corps were recruited from ABL members who had 
triad connections rather than fully committed communists.65 As a result, there was 
a qualitative difference between this new extremist group and the old Workers 
Protection Corps, which had been totally subservient to the MCP. The alliance 
with the Ang Bin Huay resulted from negotiations between the triad group and 
MCP in summer 1949 when the communists sought to take advantage of the 
triad’s networks in the lower strata of the Chinese community. These were 
carefully monitored by Special Branch Inspector and secret society specialist 
Khaw Kai Boh who was later promoted to Director.66 
 Hoping to forestall these developments, the police raided an MCP 
communication centre (parlance for a minor headquarters) on 11 December 1949, 
and nine days later, arrested two District Committee members as well as two 
members of the new ‘Special Service Corps’. This action had no effect on MCP 
preparations for a new phase of urban terrorism.67 
  
Coping with terrorism 
 By the start of 1950, Special Branch faced a matured MCP organisation 
which incorporated an underground party structure, clandestine terrorist elements, 
and an open united front (see figure 4.1). There were around 250-300 full MCP 
members left. These were supported by a network of front movements including 
580 GLU members, 250 Students ABL members and around 2000 ABL members 
or more informal sympathisers.68 Conversely, the Singapore government were 
confident that the two years of civil and industrial peace they had enjoyed were 
testament to the success of their intelligence and security machinery. In 1949, a 
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mere 6,612 working days were lost due to strikes in Singapore: in comparison 
with 492,708 in 1947.69 
 
Figure 4.1. Outline MCP organisation in Singapore, 1950.70 
 
 High-grade intelligence indicated that February 1950 would see the 
beginning of the MCP’s new resolutions to implement widespread sabotage and 
the assassination of ‘Running Dog’ collaborators.71 This intelligence proved 
extremely accurate, but did not enable precautionary measures. Whilst the 
dominant theme in 1948-49 was of effective tactical intelligence but little 
information about MCP strategic intentions, in early 1950, the colonial 
government had sound intelligence about MCP intentions but less information on 
how these would be carried out. By the end of the year, security intelligence 
production reached a peak in effectiveness, but the police sacrificed valuable 
sources to deal a devastating blow to the communist hierarchy. 
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 With no intelligence forewarning, in February 1950, grenades were thrown 
into the bus depot and central police yard. This began a campaign of violence 
which continued for most of the year.72 
 The first significant incident occurred on the evening of 28 April 1950. 
Governor Franklin Gimson was presiding over an amateur boxing competition at 
the Happy World leisure park. An assailant attempted to assassinate Gimson by 
throwing a grenade which bounced off his leg and landed six feet away. The 
Governor survived because the grenade was defective and exploded with a 
reduced radius. The press named the assassin ‘the man on the 13th step’ due to his 
positioning in the stadium.73 Gimson described his escape as almost miraculous. If 
the grenade had exploded properly, he would have perished alongside the 
Commissioner of Police and local RAF commander. He sincerely doubted 
whether ‘the man on the 13th step’ would ever be found.74 
 Such an audacious attack exposed the falsity of the previous two years of 
calm. Whilst Special Branch had temporarily thrown MCP plans into disarray, 
they were powerless to prevent the start of urban terrorism due to continuous 
weaknesses in producing intelligence about forthcoming communist actions. Past 
police successes, such as the Chinatown raids on propaganda centres, typified the 
strengths of intelligence production in generating information about communist 
meeting points and personalities. In response to the assassination attempt, the 
government introduced new Emergency Regulations levying a mandatory death 
penalty for manufacturing, carrying or using explosives. Having to resort to 
increased punitive and preventive measures highlights the extent to which the 
government felt vulnerable to the new terrorist threat.75  
 In 1948, MSS and Special Branch possessed good tactical intelligence 
about particular communist organisations and their immediate intentions. This 
helped to forestall trouble in the harbour dispute. However, they lacked strategic 
intelligence about the overall intentions and capabilities of the MCP. In early 
1950, this situation appeared to be reversed. Special Branch knew in advance of 
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the formation of the ‘Special Service Corps’ and their violent intentions, but 
lacked specific intelligence which would have enabled them to prevent attacks. 
Instead, they were left chasing up leads after the event.  
 The primary reason for this discrepancy became clear in subsequent 
months. Unlike the old Workers Protection Corps, the new ‘Special Service 
Corps’ was acting semi-autonomously from the MCP hierarchy and thus outside 
the knowledge of Special Branch agents. After the assassination attempt on 
Gimson, terrorist incidents became more impulsive and – according to Singapore 
MCP leader Guo Ren Huey – were outside the knowledge of the Town 
Committee. In addition, they were not always perpetrated by the actual ‘Special 
Service Corps’. In one incident, an individual Students’ ABL member attacked 
the headmistress of the Nanyang Girls’ School with acid. This was not part of the 
MCP plan of campaign but shows an escalating spiral of grassroots violence 
inspired by the high-profile attack on the Governor.76 Compounding the 
difficulties facing Special Branch, it was becoming increasingly difficult to recruit 
reliable informers as a result of the threat of retaliation against ‘running dogs’. 
Public help to the police was rarely forthcoming.77 Special Branch was forced to 
rely on surveillance operations and investigative procedures more associated with 
criminal policing. 
 Nevertheless, Special Branch quickly adapted and – although unable to 
prevent further incidents – established an impressive record of responding to 
them. Two days after the assassination attempt, they rounded up the Governor’s 
assailant, who was also implicated in a grenade attack against the Adelphi Hotel. 
The would-be assassin, identified as a man named Tan Aik Chok in intelligence 
shared through SIFE with the American CIA, was found along with eight other 
high-ranking MCP members in a raid on an underground trade union centre at 
Lorong 33 in the Geylang district (an area better known as a long-standing centre 
of vice).78 The sharing of this intelligence alludes to another connection between 
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the local and regional-national intelligence communities. The latter was able to 
share local intelligence with foreign allies and keep them abreast of developments 
in Singapore. CIA reports from 1950 suggest a lag-time of around two months for 
intelligence to be processed by Special Branch, disseminated across the British 
intelligence community, shared with, and reported upon by their American allies. 
According to Special Branch Chinese section head John Fairbairn, they were 
running at a lag time of approximately one week for translating MCP 
documentation which fell into their hands.79 
 All of those arrested were China-born rather than locally-born. Such a fact 
was of great interest to the colonial government given their attempts to classify 
the Singapore Chinese population based upon their local or foreign origins and 
draw links between birthplace, descent and loyalty.80 One of them was a young 
woman who proved to be a member of the Singapore Town Committee.81 
However, unwilling to compromise intelligence sources, the government 
struggled to find publicly disclosable evidence with which to prosecute those 
arrested.82 In addition, the Lorong 33 raid involved sacrificing important inside 
sources on the MCP. The government later reflected that this left them in the dark 
and without continuing up-to-date intelligence for the rest of the year and beyond. 
83 This would imply that one of those brought in during the Lorong 33 arrests was 
a Special Branch agent, or that the security of their agent was otherwise 
compromised through this action. 
 Although enjoying some successes against the MCP underground and 
front movements, security organisations remained powerless to prevent an 
escalating spiral of terrorist acts. Whilst the ‘Special Service Corps’ had been 
hampered by poor quality arms and explosives during their early attacks, through 
developing an aptitude for improvisation they achieved greater success. On 17 
July 1950, an arson attempt was perpetrated against the Aik Hoe rubber factory 
using an improvised incendiary device which utilised an ordinary incense stick as 
the fuse. Aik Hoe had been founded by the entrepreneur Tan Lark Sye in 1925, 
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and rose to its position as one of the biggest rubber enterprises in Singapore by 
taking advantage of the Great Depression which ruined many longer-established 
businesses. Following the ‘Korean War boom’ in rubber prices, the Aik Hoe 
Company became one of the world’s leading rubber traders in the 1950s and 
1960s.84 Over the following days, similar devices were used against the Singapore 
Improvement Trust offices, Michelin rubber factory and Louis Dreyfus rubber 
godown. Only prompt action by the fire brigade prevented all these attempts from 
being successful.85  
 Fundamentally, their inability to procure intelligence to prevent terrorist 
incidents made it look as if the British were losing control. This became apparent 
on 27 July 1950 when a second attempt succeeded in burning down the Aik Hoe 
factory, causing an estimated $12,000,000 (or £1,400,000) worth of damage. The 
following day, whilst the police regained some initiative by arresting four 
suspected arsonists, another terrorist boarded a bus in broad daylight and shot Li 
Chi Hoa, the Chinese Inspector of Schools, for his collaboration with the 
government. Li survived, but the impact on public morale was clearly felt.86 
Police protection was extended to prominent Chinese individuals who had been 
criticised by MCP propaganda.87 
 As well as undermining public morale and damaging capitalist interests, 
industrial attacks were of direct financial benefit to the MCP. The Town 
Committee helped obtain funds for the MCP campaign in Malaya through 
extortion rackets. Following the destruction of the Aik Hoe factory, other 
businessmen paid protection money to prevent attacks on their premises. 
Although this deviated from Central Executive Committee instructions to focus 
attacks on British interests rather than Singaporean Chinese businessmen, it 
proved a lucrative strategy.88 
 Special Branch had foreknowledge that Aik Ho was a major communist 
target. The Lorong 33 raid in April 1950 uncovered what Gimson termed an MCP 
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‘master plan’ of sabotage and terrorism which included Aik Hoe (albeit giving 
only a general outline without specific details due to the independence of the 
‘Special Service Corps’). Despite repeated tip-offs from the police, the factory 
owners refused to improve security. Thus even when Special Branch did produce 
intelligence forewarning of planned attacks, they struggled to enact preventive 
measures due to the intransigence of private citizens.89  Tan Lark Sye’s refusal to 
heed Special Branch warnings generated suspicions amongst the United States. A 
CIA report from September 1950 repeated rumours from local business circles 
that Tan had deliberately allowed the attack to cover potentially fraudulent 
business activities (Tan was suspected of selling rubber which was already 
consigned to export shipments at cut prices to Chinese friends).90  
 The MCP continued to possess the initiative through subsequent weeks. 
On the night of 30 August, two police constables were held up and had their 
pistols stolen. This appeared to be an attempt to rectify the MCP’s perennial 
difficulty in procuring weapons and ammunition. More worryingly, the RAF 
airbase at Seletar reported the theft of over one thousand friction tubes: a device 
which ignited the charge of three inch signal mortars. In view of the ‘Special 
Service Corps’ proficiency with improvised incendiary devices, these could easily 
be used as bomb detonators.91 Meanwhile, communists sabotaged the Rediffusion 
broadcasting company installations in support of a labour dispute, and engaged in 
widespread taxi burning in an attempt to cripple the city’s transport.92 In October, 
a traffic policeman was assassinated by three Chinese assailants and a special 
constable was shot in his home. Special Branch became convinced that the 
‘Special Service Corps’ had been granted total freedom of action by the Town 
Committee in executing the ‘master plan’ uncovered at Lorong 33 any way they 
saw fit. Such independence was probable given that the Corps drew its 
membership from criminal secret societies as well as MCP members (although 
this was not yet known by Special Branch in 1950). The semi-independence of the 
‘Special Service Corps’ was used by Special Branch as explanation for why they 
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struggled to get prior intelligence of attacks, implying that the MCP hierarchy was 
penetrated and that they would have known more if the Singapore Town 
Committee had been directly involved.93 
 The violence which erupted in 1950 casts further light on the nature and 
significance of the security intelligence machine. In contrast to previous years, 
Special Branch enjoyed more success in generating general intelligence about the 
new campaign than tactical information about specific attacks. This was largely 
because of the nature of the new organisation involved, the reformulated Workers 
Protection Corps (or ‘Special Service Corps’) which combined communist 
activists and triad members. The nature of intelligence produced by Special 
Branch in this period further supports the conclusion that they had penetrated the 
communist hierarchy at a high level. The MCP attacks, denounced as ‘terrorist’ 
incidents by the colonial government, further emphasised the dominance of the 
Emergency upon colonial rule in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As well as the 
security field, labour and education were seen as battlegrounds against communist 
subversive influence. The confrontation with communism permeated many 
aspects of Singapore politics and society during this period. Whilst Special 
Branch remained primarily responsible for confronting the MCP, the seriousness 
of the struggle meant that MI5 and SIFE were increasingly consulted, and even 
foreign intelligence partners such as the CIA took an interest in local 
developments in Singapore. 
 
Pyrrhic victory 
 Whilst struggling to control the violent terrorist campaign, Special Branch 
steadily accumulated intelligence leading to the destruction of the Singapore 
Town Committee in December 1950. Special Branch possessed at least one highly 
placed agent, possibly a member of the Town Committee itself. Given the 
importance attached to certain intelligence reports and their nature (reports on 
highly secretive Town Committee meetings) this would seem likely. However, the 
action taken in rounding up important MCP leaders in April 1950 involved the 
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sacrifice of at least some of these sources, hindering intelligence production over 
subsequent years. 
 By spring 1950, the Town Committee had only three members. Its 
secretary was Ah Kim, a man who had fought in the communist-organised 
resistance during the Second World War and had links to the Ang Bin Huay triad. 
Ah Hia was responsible for Party organisation and the united front movements. 
She was arrested in the raid on Lorong 33 on 30 April 1950 and banished to 
China. Finally, Guo Ren Huey, editor of Freedom News, held authority over 
propaganda and the Students’ ABL and had been recently promoted to Town 
Committee status. The arrest of Ah Hia left the Town Committee with only two 
members: Ah Kim and Guo Ren Huey. Because of the stringent Central Executive 
Committee rules on the length of service required for a member to be promoted to 
Town Committee level, in addition to the success of the police in picking off 
leading MCP members, they were unable to find suitable replacements.94 This is 
implicit of the deterrent effect of good intelligence. As suggested by Special 
Branch director Nigel Morris (promoted to Commissioner of Police in later 1950), 
the MCP were reluctant to send high-ranking members from Malaya to Singapore 
because of the proven effectiveness of Operation Bulldog.95 
 Further confirmation of penetration of the MCP can be found in a series of 
heated exchanges between SIFE and the Singapore government. At the end of 
April, a document was obtained by an important Special Branch agent which 
indicated that MCP internal discipline was in disarray. This was believed to be an 
internal memorandum distributed very narrowly within the Party.96 The Singapore 
government sent a translated copy direct to the Colonial Office and implied in 
their covering letter that SIFE had approved their actions. In fact, H/SIFE Jack 
Morton strongly disapproved and took serious umbrage with this violation of the 
proper lines of communication for intelligence dissemination. To safeguard such 
important sources as well as to ensure proper assessment to contextualise the raw 
information, it was SIFE’s responsibility to collate intelligence from local Special 
Branches and pass it on to MI5 Head Office, who could then provide evaluation 
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of the material to government departments in London. It was not the duty of 
Special Branch or the Singapore government to communicate intelligence directly 
to the metropole.97 Morton’s critique is reminiscent of the dispute between SIFE 
and MSS. Although seeming to acknowledge that Special Branch was producing 
security intelligence, SIFE were insistent that they were the proper authority for 
providing assessment of such intelligence. This was the same distinction between 
collection and assessment implied through the organisation of the Pan-Malayan 
Reviews. 
 The Governor promptly back-tracked and blamed Special Branch director 
Nigel Morris for the indiscretion. Somewhat patronisingly (and implausibly), the 
Governor stated that Morris didn’t realise the dangers in departing from 
procedures to protect agent’s identities. In this instance, the limited distribution of 
the document meant that, if the MCP discovered it had fallen into British hands, 
they may have been able to discover who was responsible. Gimson described that 
much of the current intelligence difficulty arose because a previously valuable 
Special Branch agent had been blown and had to evacuated from Singapore.98  
 Moreover, in September 1950, during a particularly active period of 
violent attacks, Gimson informed his superiors that Special Branch agents who 
had penetrated the ‘innermost circles’ of the Singapore communist movement had 
recently been discharged from their positions of trust. Special Branch was 
confident that this was not because their agents’ covers had been blown, but 
simply because they had been demoted for inefficiency.99 In November 1950, 
Special Branch received a handwritten document reporting the recent decision of 
the Singapore Town Committee to improve its own security measures. This 
document revealed that the MCP leaders in Singapore were in the grip of an 
espionage panic, fearing infiltration by ‘secret service men, running dogs and 
spies’. They decided to embark on a major reinvestigation of the background and 
loyalty of all Party members whilst introducing tougher vetting for new 
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recruits.100 Taken together, these incidents suggest that, during the course of 1949-
50, Special Branch had repeated success in penetrating the MCP. 
 Ultimately, the terrorist campaign of 1950 proved self-destructive for the 
MCP organisation in Singapore, as it forced Special Branch to move from long-
term surveillance operations to punitive enforcement by rounding up communist 
leaders. Moreover, by bringing Party operations into the public sphere, they 
increased the likelihood of compromising Party secrecy, making it easier for 
Special Branch to gain information on MCP activities. Assassination attempts 
were also made against Special Branch officers who were identified because the 
families of detainees in the Special Branch lock-up at Robinson Road took note of 
car registration numbers when visiting. This only increased the zeal of Special 
Branch in smashing the MCP.101 
 On 12 November 1950, the police raided an important communist 
propaganda centre on Arang Road near the Singapore waterfront. This produced 
an escalating spiral of successful raids against MCP hideouts. Intelligence accrued 
during the Arang Road raid helped Special Branch to locate and arrest the 
remaining two members of the Singapore Town Committee. On 5 December 
1950, Ah Kim asked Guo Ren Huey to rendezvous outside the Thong Chai 
Medical Institution (a long-standing philanthropic enterprise in the heart of 
Chinatown) with a courier from the District Committees. After meeting the 
courier, Guo was arrested by three Special Branch detectives. The following day, 
Ah Kim was arrested at the same location whilst waiting for a contact who did not 
show up.102 
 The exact circumstances by which Special Branch achieved this 
momentous success are unclear from the present evidence. Counterinsurgency 
expert and historian Richard Clutterbuck suggested that it was the result of an 
alert detective spotting the first suspicious exchange by chance and tailing Guo 
before arresting him.103 Singapore’s Colonial Secretary (the Governor’s chief 
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deputy) W. L. Blythe noted that the arrest of the Town Committee was brought 
about not by planned, long-term intelligence operations but an ‘unexpected 
windfall’.104 However, Guo Ren Huey himself offered a contradictory explanation 
which – if correct – would indicate greater success for Special Branch in 
maintaining consistent penetration of the MCP. 
 Guo recounted that, in early 1950, the Singapore Town Committee re-
admitted a former member – whom he named as one Sin Ah – who had been 
moved to a different position within the Party earlier in the Emergency. However, 
MCP sympathisers planted within the Special Branch headquarters discovered 
that Town Committee records had fallen into the hands of Special Branch 
detectives. Sin Ah was suspected of this treachery and suspended, but further 
action was not taken against him because the arrest of the remaining Town 
Committee occurred whilst they were still gathering evidence. The demotion of 
Sin Ah could correspond with the loss of important agents related by Gimson in 
September 1950.105 Guo’s testimony could be reliable because, following his 
arrest in December 1950, he defected to Special Branch and for the remainder of 
his career hunted down his former comrades as a British (and later Singaporean) 
intelligence officer.106 Other Special Branch reports written in December 1950 
state that the arrests were the result of tip-offs from two independent sources 
(although this is more likely to mean casual informer testimony than the result of 
agent penetration).107 
 Without more reliable or authoritative evidence, at most it can be said that 
Special Branch were able to achieve a significant breakthrough, probably through 
a combination of good intelligence and good luck. This devastating blow 
effectively severed all contact between Singapore communists and the MCP 
Southern Bureau in Johore, and left the various front organisations without any 
coordinated leadership.108 Despite the attempts of the MCP to disrupt orderly 
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government through a terrorist campaign in 1950, the year ended with Special 
Branch triumphant. The round-up of the Town Committee was testament to over 
two years of efficient tactical intelligence production, despite some mishaps along 
the way. However, as with the arrests of April 1950, it proved to be a pyrrhic 
victory. As chapter six elaborates, Special Branch actions against the Town 
Committee left them without inside sources as the MCP reorganised its 
underground networks in 1951-52.  
 However, persuading the arrested Guo Ren Huey (and possibly Ah Kim) 
to defect and continue working for Special Branch was a further achievement for 
Special Branch. As remembered by Fong Chong Pik, then an MCP propagandist 
on the run from security forces, ‘as I knew then, following the complete 
destruction of the underground Town Committee, its secretary and some members 
became turncoats, acting as enemy agents to attack the underground 
organisation’.109 As well as using inside knowledge to better direct police 
operations, Guo’s defection had a psychological impact on his former comrades 
who it appears were well aware that their organisation was repeatedly hindered by 
Special Branch penetration agents and defectors.110 
 The timing with which Special Branch struck their decisive blow was 
fortuitous. From 11-13 December, Singapore succumbed to widespread riots by 
the Malay Muslim community. These were in protest at a court case over a young 
girl named Maria Hertogh, who had been abandoned by her Dutch parents during 
the war and raised by a Malay Muslim family. The Singapore courts ruled that 
Maria should be returned to her biological parents. The riots which ensued led to 
the murder of seven Europeans and Eurasians, and the police appeared powerless 
to respond. Order was only restored by massive intervention from the British 
armed forces, laying bare the sheer vulnerability of the colonial system and its 
reliance on the use of force.111 The successes of Special Branch in keeping a lid 
on communist activities alluded to the nature of intelligence as a force multiplier 
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or ‘insurance policy’ (as termed by the regional JIC) and Singapore as something 
akin to an intelligence state. Both national security and colonial stability depended 
upon good intelligence.112 In contrast, the December 1950 riots seemed to suggest 
that Singapore was less an intelligence state and more a police state where the 
ultimate source of control remained the military. 
 The Maria Hertogh riots led to various investigations by the British 
government into decision-making and policing in Singapore. In addition to a 
number of published reports, Hong Kong Police Commissioner Duncan 
MacIntosh was seconded to Singapore to prepare a top secret, highly critical 
review of the direction of police and intelligence work. MacIntosh wrote that: 
There has been an imprudent atmosphere of complacency derived from 
absence of active Chinese communist inspired incidents. The whole 
attention of the Force has been focused upon potential Chinese terrorist 
acts to the neglect of other potentials of unrest and disorder, which are 
equally dangerous either by themselves or by communist exacerbation and 
exploitation.113 
The accuracy of some of these statements can be questioned. The year 1950 saw a 
severe escalation in MCP acts of violence, so it was natural that these dominated 
the agenda. MacIntosh entirely ignored these facts, seeking to place blame on the 
police and certain members of the colonial government rather than explore 
broader contradictions and tensions in Singapore’s complex society. 
 Although the overall police and colonial administration had failed during 
the Maria Hertogh riots and received justified criticism, MacIntosh’s review of 
police intelligence appears entirely unfair. The success enjoyed by Special Branch 
against the MCP helped prevent more serious disturbances. During the riots, the 
MCP failed to capitalise upon the disorder. A lavishly-redacted SIFE report 
postulated that this was because of the recent arrest of the remaining Town 
Committee. By the 14 December, the MCP got around to distributing some 40 
posters but that was the extent of their involvement.114 Through dislocating the 
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communist underground organisation in Singapore, Special Branch helped to 
forestall an MCP attempt to take advantage of the situation. 
 The historian Syed Aljunied suggested that, as a result of the Maria 
Hertogh riots, ‘the basic assumption that all threats emanated from foreign 
agencies whose sole object was the displacement of British colonial rule and that 
subversive activities in Singapore posed only minor threats to the security of the 
island were suddenly shattered and rendered obsolete’. He argued that this 
incident was a watershed in establishing a tighter system of colonial security and 
more effective counter-subversion methods.115 The applicability of this assertion 
is questionable. In the records of British security intelligence – most only made 
available following the release of the Migrated Archives – there does not appear 
to be any basic assumption that all security threats were essentially foreign. 
Indeed, intelligence agencies debated whether a potential foreign threat (the CCP) 
was as relevant as the currently existing local threat (the MCP). Perhaps a more 
accurate summary would be that the Maria Hertogh riots reminded policy-makers 
that communism was not the only potentially subversive force.116 Yet after the 
riots – centred upon the Malay population – died down, it was the predominantly 
Chinse MCP which remained the major security threat, even whilst Britain 
prepared to compromise with legitimate nationalists.  
 To suggest that an improvement in intelligence and police work resulted 
directly from the Hertogh riots is similarly erroneous. As demonstrated by the 
evidence accumulated in this chapter, the Singapore police operated effectively 
against the threat of gradual MCP subversion in 1948-49, and also regained 
control after the outbreak of terrorist activities in 1950. The assassination attempt 
upon Governor Franklin Gimson was a more pertinent turning point, as this 
triggered a switch from a cautious Special Branch accumulating intelligence on 
the underground MCP to a proactive Special Branch leading police raids to stamp 
out the communist hierarchy. In this regard, the greatest significance of the 
Hertogh riots was in bringing debates surrounding colonial security into the 
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limelight of the corridors of Whitehall and Singapore public sphere. In the 
clandestine world of security intelligence, Singapore already had a well-oiled 
machine in the form of the Special Branch and advice from MI5. 
 
Summary 
 Intelligence production played a significant part in Singapore’s post-war 
development. In contrast to the situation in Malaya, the Singapore Special Branch 
proved effective at producing timely and actionable tactical intelligence on the 
MCP. This enabled coordinated enforcement operations which prevented the 
colony from succumbing to communist violence. The maintenance of public order 
throughout most of the post-war years was in large part due to the effectiveness of 
the intelligence machine. 
 Special Branch success can be distilled to just a few reasons. One of the 
most important was the legacy of previous successes. Nigel Morris, Alan Blades 
and other officers had strong experience in security intelligence from the 1930s, 
when they had proven their effectiveness against both the MCP and Japanese 
espionage. The Singapore branch of MSS and later the Singapore Special Branch 
inherited this intelligence expertise which the Federation Special Branch lacked. 
They also benefitted from the cooperation of the Kempeitai in 1945-46. 
Consequently, it was not until the early 1950s that security intelligence in the 
Federation of Malaya started to catch up with Singapore.117 Another element was 
the momentum of success. Picking off MCP leaders in Operation Bulldog during 
1948 and 1949 deterred the MCP from reinforcing the Singapore Town 
Committee or District Committees during the critical year of 1950. Special 
Branch capitalised on both their intelligence legacy and momentum of success by 
achieving agent penetration of the MCP. However, this was not just a story of 
success. Special Branch struggled to produce tactical and strategic intelligence on 
the MCP threat at any one time, and their enforcement efforts were largely 
reactive. Until the arrest of the Town Committee in December 1950, the MCP set 
the tempo of the struggle. 
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 MCP mis-calculation cannot be ignored. The terrorist campaign of 1950 
was mandated by the Central Executive Committee not to achieve anything in 
Singapore but to divert British attention away from Malaya. However, it shocked 
the public, strengthened government resolve and brought the MCP’s underground 
struggle into the open arena where it was more easily targeted by Special Branch. 
In contrast, security forces acted judiciously and left the MCP dislocated during a 
crucial moment in Singapore’s history: the Maria Hertogh riots of December 
1950. 
 Intelligence organisation played some role in this success. The position of 
Special Branch within the police enabled rapid and efficient dissemination of their 
intelligence. Information was transmitted not just to policy-makers whose 
perceptions they could shape but also to other police departments which could 
help bring about action. In addition, unlike MSS, Special Branch developed a 
sound working relationship with MI5 and SIFE. The SLO for Singapore helped to 
coordinate civil-military intelligence relations and provided an alternative avenue 
for intelligence analysis with links to MI5’s global intelligence pool. As 
subsequent chapters show, this became even more important due to decolonisation 
concerns, with MI5, SIFE and Special Branch able to pool resources to better 
understand emerging local politicians.  
 On balance, there remains a useful distinction to be made between the 
local and regional-national intelligence communities. They differed in priorities, 
organisational models and working cultures. The internal situation in Singapore 
was very much the reserve of the local intelligence community. At higher levels, 
interest in local affairs was mostly prompted by dramatic events such as the Aik 
Hoe arson, Gimson assassination attempt or Maria Hertogh riots. Nevertheless, 
these two intelligence communities were not entirely separate, and shared 
activities such as security intelligence ensured that they frequently cooperated, 
with bodies such as SIFE and MI5 penetrating advisors into the local level. 
Special Branch officer Ahmad Khan later described their working relationship as 
‘hand in glove’: a stark contrast to the unhelpful bureaucratic conflict which had 
festered between MI5 and MSS.118 
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5. Cold War concerns and intelligence innovations 
 The early to mid-1950s transformed the Cold War in Asia. In Southeast 
Asia, the conflict in Indochina led to the creation of North and South Vietnam in 
1954. Escalating tensions encouraged weakening colonial powers and their 
Dominions (France, Great Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand) 
to forge a new alliance with selected Asian nations (Laos, the Philippines and 
Thailand). The Manila Pact of September 1954 created the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organisation. In the British territories, progress was finally made in the Malayan 
Emergency under General Gerald Templer who served as civil and military 
supremo from 1952-54. In 1957, Malaya became an independent nation under the 
leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Across the causeway in Singapore, a new 
constitution gave an enlarged voice to locally elected representatives in 1955. The 
first Chief Minister, David Marshall, was an inconsistent supporter of counter-
subversion initiatives. His replacement from 1956, Lim Yew Hock, was firmly 
allied to British goals. Meanwhile, in East Asia, the formal creation of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 heralded a new threat to 
British economic and strategic interests. The Korean War of 1950-53 carried the 
risk of escalation into general war with China. 
 The same period was equally transformative for British intelligence. This 
chapter evaluates how the regional-national intelligence community responded to 
the changing Cold War. Britain’s key foreign policy goal was, as Malcolm 
MacDonald had voiced in 1948-49, to promote a non-communist buffer zone 
between North Vietnam and China and the British colonies of Singapore and the 
Federation of Malaya. However, this was a period in which British power and 
prestige were in decline. Even within its strategic stronghold of Singapore, Britain 
was increasingly forced to negotiate with local politicians. It was also a period of 
continuing economic pressures. Therefore, the British government was unwilling 
to enter into major overt commitments in the Southeast Asian Cold War and were 
already questioning their existing defence commitments in Asia.1 They were 
equally worried about provoking a more aggressive stance from the PRC which 
would threaten Hong Kong. 
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 Consequently, secret services became increasingly significant to Britain’s 
Cold War in Southeast Asia. The growing complexity of Cold War problems 
required more diverse avenues for intelligence processing. Greater attention was 
paid to open source and propaganda intelligence, although more entrenched 
activities and agencies such as JIC strategic intelligence, SIS foreign intelligence 
and SIFE security intelligence retained their position of prominence. As well as 
providing assessments, the regional-national intelligence community also began to 
play a more proactive role in implementing Cold War policy. One avenue for 
achieving this was through propaganda and covert action; another was through 
intelligence diplomacy with other regional powers. This work, referred to by 
Philip Murphy as the ‘missionary’ side of intelligence, proved more effective in 
building alignments and exporting a particular intelligence culture than it did at 
channelling new information back to Singapore.2 
 This chapter explores how the regional-national intelligence community 
met these new challenges and sought to advance British goals in a manner 
appropriate to declining capabilities. It begins by examining the growing 
integration between agencies and activities within the regional-national 
intelligence community, before investigating intelligence activities linked with the 
situation in Southeast Asia and China. Nevertheless, despite some success in 
helping to advance British goals, this community struggled to resolve its 
information collection problems. 
 
Strengthening the intelligence community 
 A key factor in the regional activities of British intelligence was the 
increasing coordination between different agencies and activities in Singapore. 
The divisive turf wars of 1948 were largely resolved by 1949. However, a number 
of problems remained. Perhaps the greatest of these was the poor stream of raw 
intelligence reaching collation and assessments centres. This was greatest with 
regard to China. The solution to both lingering bureaucratic resentments and the 
collection problem was seen to be engendering greater cooperation within the 
British intelligence system.  
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 Intelligence consumers played a significant role in trying to foster better 
coordination. From 1950, the Commissioner General began hosting biannual 
conferences at his official residence, Bukit Serene, to discuss Cold War 
developments with British representatives from across the Far East. The first 
meeting, which MacDonald referred to as his ‘Cold War Committee’, was held on 
22 August 1950. MacDonald used this occasion to champion his belief in the need 
for more proactive counter-subversion and counter-communist efforts, particularly 
through propaganda.3 This period also saw growing correlation between the 
world-views of the metropolitan government and Phoenix Park. Following a 
series of ministerial exchanges in autumn 1955, the Prime Minister agreed to a 
more active ‘counter-subversion’ policy, very broadly defined as including 
propaganda and covert action, by the intelligence services.4 This is implicit of 
regional-national unity on the view that countering communist subversion was not 
just a defensive security concern but required taking the initiative. To do this, 
intelligence services needed to work together in pursuit of Britain’s foreign policy 
goals. 
 In his December 1952 Cold War conference, MacDonald theorised that a 
third phase had opened in the Far Eastern Cold War. Intelligence from London 
and Singapore indicated that communist parties were moving away from 
insurgency tactics in some areas and that the Soviet Union and China were 
exhibiting feelers towards peaceful coexistence. In Southeast Asia, he predicted 
that this third phase would be characterised by communist propaganda offensives 
and political infiltration. This was a retreat from the first phase (of constitutional 
struggle from 1945-47) and second phase (of revolutionary violence from 1948-
52). In this new phase, it was more important than ever to strengthen Britain’s 
response through intelligence and covert propaganda. Consequently, MacDonald 
was a strong voice in support of the relatively youthful RIO as well as entrenched 
services such as SIFE.5 
 However, SIFE found their direction relationships with London more 
challenging. During the tenure of Jack Morton (a former DSO Baghdad) as 
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H/SIFE from 1949-52, staffing levels peaked at 65.6 This started to become an 
issue from summer 1953, by which point Morton had been replaced by Courtenay 
Young. Young was a Cambridge Chinese graduate who joined MI5 in 1941 and 
later served as SLO to one of SIFE’s key partners, the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Young advised Australia on the creation of 
ASIO, and as SLO continued to work with his Australian colleagues in 
implementing tougher protective security and counterespionage.7 With this 
experience as well as previous service in SIFE behind him, Young was a genuine 
regional expert, unlike several previous appointees. 
 Between 1953 and 1956, pressures from user departments in London and 
Singapore forced H/SIFE to think seriously about economies. MacDonald’s new 
Foreign Office deputy argued that SIFE’s functions could mostly be done by MI5 
Head Office. Young defended his organisation by explaining that as long as there 
was a Commissioner General they would need security intelligence advice. But 
since the continued existence of Phoenix Park was thrown into doubt at the end of 
MacDonald’s much-extended appointment in 1955, this was not a stable position.8 
By the end of Young’s tenure in 1955, there were still 51 persons working for 
SIFE despite various attempts at reform.9 This was approximately one third of the 
total number of MI5 officers working across the Empire and Commonwealth.10 
 Against this backdrop, the Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary 
Ivone Kirkpatrick denounced Singapore as ‘full of intelligence officers… a slough 
of despond in South-East Asia’. Whilst there was no immediate ultimatum, 
Kirkpatrick strongly suggested to the new Director-General, Sir Dick White, that 
MI5 relate their future planning to the probable disappearance of the 
Commissioner General.  Moreover, Kirkpatrick made it clear that the British 
government favoured intelligence collation done in London.11 This linked the fate 
of SIFE not only with the Commissioner-General but also its sister organisation 
SIME. Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook and JIC(London) Chairman Patrick Dean 
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were convinced that large regional collation centres were outdated. SIME was 
slowly wound down by 1958.12 
 However, SIFE survived after it was decided to retain the position of 
Commissioner General due to the new SEATO alliance. Because of its 
adaptability and continued utility to the changing priorities of the Commissioner 
General, SIFE was spared. SIME was simply less relevant due to deteriorating 
British influence in its region. In contrast, SIFE experienced rejuvenated 
importance to the execution of Britain’s Cold War and decolonisation imperatives 
in Southeast Asia. Although departing his office as Commissioner General, 
Malcolm MacDonald remained a crucial supporter. In London, he explained that 
SIFE’s regionalist approach was vital to underpinning Britain’s overt diplomatic 
activities.13 Unlike the central Foreign Office and its mouthpieces in Singapore, 
the more maverick MacDonald – who had become very close to his intelligence 
advisors – was fully convinced of the ‘unique window’ argument. His rationale, 
based upon how intelligence could support foreign policy goals, is revealing of 
the crucial reason why this interpretation dominated despite recurring problems in 
intelligence collection. 
 In October 1955, Singapore gained a new Commissioner General. 
MacDonald’s replacement was Sir Robert Heatlie Scott, an experienced Foreign 
Office Asia hand and Whitehall mover who had briefly chaired the JIC(FE) in 
1947. Whilst MacDonald had been the personal representative of the British 
monarch and retained his Cabinet rank, Scott was only accorded the rank of 
Ambassador. This symbolised the reality that Scott’s coordinating activities were 
increasingly focused on the Foreign Office side. The Colonial Office had been 
willing to terminate the post, but the creation of SEATO and tense situation in 
Vietnam required somebody to coordinate Britain’s foreign policy.14 
 Scott quickly outlined his own vision for Phoenix Park. He envisaged a 
slimmed down but more coherent grouping of the intelligence and defence arms.15 
Regarding SIFE, Scott agreed with the Foreign Office that much of their collation 
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and analysis could be done back in London. This was a rejection of the standard 
‘unique window’ view that analysis could be improved by some sort of imperialist 
cultural immersion. However, SIFE could add value to Britain’s Cold War by 
helping to improve the local security machine ready for independence and 
building partnerships to provide for continued British influence in Southeast 
Asia.16 
 SIFE also gained a new director in 1955. This was Richard (‘Dick’) 
Thistlethwaite, who had previously served with security intelligence in Iran 
during the wartime occupation before being appointed MI5 representative in 
Palestine and later the United States.17. Thistlethwaite and Scott enjoyed a 
remarkable degree of shared priorities, and reinvigorated the crucial partnership 
between SIFE and the Commissioner General. Thistlethwaite himself questioned 
the relevance of a large assessments staff as the training and liaison functions of 
SIFE were becoming more important than its actual intelligence reporting. The 
very purpose of regional intelligence was in flux. Although foreign intelligence 
remained a significant imperative in light of the Vietnamese and Chinese 
situations, this was more the purview of SIS. The security situation was stabilising 
as communist insurgencies were on the decline. Therefore, Thistlethwaite saw a 
shift in SIFE’s focus away from reportage towards building new relationships 
with Asian nations.18 Due to the creation of SEATO, H/SIFE played an enlarged 
role as a regional expert on counter-subversion. Thus by adapting to the changing 
environment, SIFE remained on the front line of the Cold War.19 Ultimately, SIFE 
continued in existence for as long as the post of Commissioner-General until 
1963. This is testament to the indispensability of the former to the latter.  
 Despite some success in adapting to Britain’s revised priorities, the 
intelligence system retained its major flaw. Raw production was the critical 
weakness. Partly this was because of inadequacies internal to local producers, but 
it also resulted from the existence of a plethora of separate bureaucracies. The 
most striking case was the complex relationship between MI5 and SIS. 
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 Talks between MI5 and SIS resulted in the establishment of a combined 
sub-section in Singapore, the Joint Intelligence Division (JID). This remained 
administratively part of SIFE, succeeding the old counter-intelligence ‘B’ section, 
but was headed by successive SIS officers. The JID assumed responsibility for 
directing collection requirements for SIS field posts, security intelligence collation 
and training local security services.20 
 This regional change was part of shifting patterns of national intelligence 
organisation. From 1948, MI5 and SIS were locked in discussions about overseas 
representation and jurisdictional boundaries. MI5 wished to secure representation 
in foreign territories such as Thailand to direct more security intelligence towards 
SIFE. Only Burma had representation by both SIS officers and an MI5 SLO. This 
proved to be one of the more successful SIS centres in the Far East during the 
early Cold War, drawing on shared experience to penetrate of local insurgent 
movements.21 Guy Liddell reflected that this was the only non-British territory in 
Southeast Asia providing reasonably good intelligence.22 The success of this 
model was a major impetus in SIFE attempts to secure joint representation in 
other nations. These talks were paired with discussions on who should conduct 
relations with overseas security services, which threatened to drag on 
interminably throughout 1949.23  
 In the end, progress was made not in London but in Singapore where 
H/SIFE and the Far East Controller agreed upon dual representation in 
neighbouring countries. To appease SIS headquarters, MI5 also had to integrate 
their regional collation centre with the counterintelligence sections of the SIS 
regional controller, creating the JID.24 By this point, relations were becoming 
more acrimonious. One SIS officer told Liddell that ‘C’ (the Chief of SIS) was 
always sniping at MI5, accusing them of ‘trying to extend our tentacles too far’.25 
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In return, Liddell noted that SIS ‘had manifestly failed to give us any information 
of any value about communist activities in China, or in the Far East’.26  
 The JID was a solution to two problems. On the one hand, it bolstered 
SIFE’s position within the intelligence hierarchy through combining the political 
capital of MI5 and SIS. As Liddell noted one year after its creation, ‘there seems 
little doubt that SIFE is now very firmly established, and even something of a 
Power in the Land’.27 By pooling foreign and security intelligence resources, the 
status of both was significantly bolstered.  
 Secondly, the JID was intended to improve SIFE’s intake of intelligence. 
SIFE was providing analysis of Cold War developments based on a relative dearth 
of sources. In Malaya they had access to captured MCP documents, but only if the 
local Special Branch was willing to cooperate. From the outset, however, SIFE 
had conceptualised its own value in terms of combining information from British 
and foreign territories. The JID was supposed to streamline this process and 
achieve SIFE’s core aims. 
 Little information has been declassified as to the details of JID activity. 
One sparse insight is provided by H/SIFE Courtenay Young’s annual review from 
June 1953. Young described progress made by officers in ‘B’ section (SIFE 
parlance for the JID, see figure 5.1) since he assumed office a year previously. 
The B.2 China desk produced a directory of all known PRC officials in Southeast 
Asia. They also took control of the interrogation of two Chinese defectors, ‘Good 
Gamble’ and ‘Besom’. Major Stevens, whose remit as B.4 included the Soviet 
bloc intelligence services, collated information on Soviet and Czechoslovakian 
intelligence activity in the region. Information he provided enabled four defector 
operations to be launched against Soviet personnel during 1952-53, although all 
proved abortive.28  
 As figure 5.1 shows, the creation of the JID transformed SIFE 
organisation. Alex Kellar had established a functional structure in 1949 with desks 
dealing with thematic issues such as nationalism and international communism. 
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This was scrapped in favour of a more territorial division of labour. This is 
indicative of the importance of improving the intake of raw intelligence, as this 
structure was better suited to liaising with local producers and directing collection 
processes. However, metropolitan intelligence directors and user departments 
began to worry that SIFE was moving away from its collation remit and straying 
too far into raw intelligence production. The JID merger had the potential to blur 
the boundaries between foreign and security intelligence. This could be negative, 
by potentially reducing SIFE’s focus, but also positive, by bringing to light 
information of mutual interest. 
 
Figure 5.1. Territorial organisation of the JID (SIFE ‘B’ Section) in 
September 1953.29 
 
 Having overcome the bureaucratic tensions of the 1940s, the regional 
intelligence milieu was increasingly centralised. This was conducted through the 
physical relocation into the Commissioner General’s complex at Phoenix Park. It 
was also evident through less tangible improvements in relationships. Regional 
intelligence staved off economising pressures by articulating its continued 
relevance to foreign policy goals. Moreover, the strengthening of a regional-
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national intelligence community can be inferred from these interactions. As the 
Cold War escalated and changed, metropolitan and regional decision-makers were 
increasingly aligned in their priorities and policies, particularly in the belief that 
intelligence and covert activities could provide a solution to their problems. 
Whilst raw information collection remained a critical weakness, despite the 
creation of the JID, a more centralised intelligence community was better 
equipped to move beyond assessments and support the active pursuit of policy as 
mandated by both Malcolm MacDonald and Whitehall. 
 
The China quandary 
 The foundation of the PRC on 1 October 1949 posed new dilemmas to 
British intelligence in the Far East. They now faced not only communist 
insurgencies across Southeast Asia, but also a revolutionary communist state at 
the epicentre of the Far East. Communist China was not only a strategic threat. It 
was also a security challenge. Most states in Southeast Asia, but in particular the 
British colonies, had significant Chinese populations. In Singapore itself, the 
Chinese diaspora constituted over 80% of the population (see table 5.1). It was 
expected that these populations would become increasingly vulnerable to the 
spread of communism as the prestige of the PRC grew.  
Table 5.1. Chinese diaspora as percentage of total population, 1952.30 
Singapore 80% 
Malaya 45% 
Sarawak 26% 
North Borneo 20% 
Thailand 17% 
Indochina 5% 
Indonesia 3% 
Burma 1.5% 
Philippines 1.25% 
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  Consequently, the Singapore intelligence community began devoting 
increasing attention to China. However, forecasting PRC intentions and 
capabilities proved difficult. The agencies most involved in intelligence 
assessment were the JIC(FE), focused on strategic evaluations, and JIB, dedicated 
to technical appreciations. But intelligence production on communist China was 
even more problematic than attempts to increase the intake in Southeast Asia. In 
April 1952, Guy Liddell debriefed Bill Oughton, a SIFE officer posted back to 
Head Office. Oughton explained that collection remained their Achilles Heel. 
Producing intelligence assessments was ‘rather like trying to make bricks without 
straw’.31 
 As a result, policy-makers increasingly advocated the use of open source 
intelligence. Hong Kong was identified as the key site for generating this raw 
material. This sort of intelligence activity was very low-grade, reacting to the 
absence of even a basic understanding of the PRC. The historian Eric Setzekorn 
referred to this dimension of intelligence work as ‘cultural intelligence’ necessary 
for forming reliable judgements about a foreign state’s behaviour.32 It was 
impossible to predict the PRC’s intentions without having a basic understanding 
of the new state’s leadership, ideology, structure and society. Open sources 
including Chinese press and travellers’ eyewitness reports were crucial to this 
project. Ironically, this symbolised a return to the intelligence situation of the 
previous century. Following intelligence failure during the Second Opium War in 
1859-60, British army officers began the first systematic intelligence appreciation 
of China, reliant on open source information. To quote Setzekorn, ‘the 
challenging task given to a chosen cadre of British Army officers from 1861-1900 
was to build a store of knowledge about China starting from zero’.33 The creation 
of a new communist state in 1949 effectively took British intelligence back to the 
start of this process. 
 Before 1950, British intelligence analysts were relatively sanguine about 
the strategic threat emanating from China. Their anxieties were centred upon the 
vulnerable colony of Hong Kong, but the BDCC(FE) concluded that open 
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aggression was very unlikely.34 The JIC(FE) argued that China would adopt a 
non-aggressive stance for practical reasons. Not only were the internal social and 
economic problems facing the new regime so immense, but the CCP was believed 
to value a British-administered Hong Kong as a window on the world.35  
 However, following the start of the Korean War in June 1950, colonial and 
defence officials began worrying that China would embark on a more aggressive 
policy.36 Their earlier confidence in China’s inherent caution was shattered when 
Chinese forces intervened in Korea from October 1950. In November 1950, the 
JIC(FE) concluded that ‘despite the enormous administrative and economic 
problems facing the new regime… the [Chinese Communist] Party has found both 
time and resources to enable it to play a leading role in the propagation of 
communism throughout the Far East’.37 This included not only direct engagement 
with British and United States forces in Korea, but also provision of aid to the 
Viet Minh in Indochina. An alarmist JIC(FE) report the following month 
predicted that Chinese military action in Indochina was highly likely.38 The 
security threat of CCP-inspired subversion had morphed into a strategic threat of 
direct Chinese attack.  
 The crux of the problem lay at the collection stage of the intelligence 
cycle. Singapore lacked authoritative or insightful sources on the beliefs and 
intentions of the CCP leadership. Difficulties in gathering information on the new 
Chinese state included its totalitarian security-tight nature, the conspicuous 
position of any Europeans in China and lack of Chinese-speaking linguists in the 
British intelligence community. The latter remained a persistent problem 
throughout the 1950s, hampering both secret intelligence operations and attempts 
to translate open sources.39 As Guy Liddell noted following a JIC(London) 
debate, ‘nobody is at all clear about Chinese intentions’.40 
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 The most obvious source of foreign intelligence was SIS, but they 
operated very few assets in China before 1949, and even fewer after the 
communist takeover. This left them reliant on Chinese Nationalist sources, the 
reliability of which was dubious at best, or intelligence sharing with the United 
States, which left much to be desired.41 
 Once the PRC was established, encouraging defectors with inside 
knowledge was a potential source of more reliable human intelligence. But the 
JIC(London) was pessimistic over their chances of encouraging Chinese 
defectors. Their rationale was based on a racialist, imperialist world-view, arguing 
that ‘the tendency of the Chinaman was to remain in his own country and to 
conform to the majority view’. However, in an equally jingoistic assertion, they 
believed that greed could be used to persuade Chinese to become in situ agents in 
return for payment.42 Similar sentiments were expressed by the SIS station chief 
in Tientsin, who believed that ‘virtually no Chinese – one may perhaps say 
literally none – could be trusted to work honestly for us for as much as twenty-
four hours once our backs were turned unless we had some powerful hold over 
them’.43 
 The influence of racialist ideas upon intelligence presumptions was 
equally evident amongst the United States intelligence community. A CIA 
summary from the 1960s notes that the Chinese made difficult agents because of 
an innate loyalty to traditional structures of authority from the family up to the 
authoritarian state.  
The Chinese personality pattern and the legacy of traditional Chinese 
society (between which there is presumably some causal relationship) 
combine to make the Chinese as a target […] difficult to dislodge from his 
quid pro quo loyalties to regime and family. The principal wedge is a 
failure in the quid pro quo.44 
This is not dissimilar to the views held by British intelligence authorities a decade 
previous. However, in the early 1950s, there had been less chance for the PRC 
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quid pro quo (of providing stability in return for submission) to have shown itself 
a failure. From the perspective of imperialistic intelligence planners, this made it 
even harder to detach these innate Chinese loyalties. 
 Following the descent of the Korean War into stalemate by summer 1951, 
the question of defectors returned to prominence. The War Office was keen to 
promote defectors from the Chinese army to gain tactical intelligence about Korea 
and the Foreign Office supported more vigorous propaganda to encourage 
desertion. MI5’s Guy Liddell was less convinced: ‘if the Foreign Office proposals 
are to be adopted, we shall probably get a large number of dubious Chinamen who 
will be hoping to get a wad of money and a peanut store in Singapore’. It could 
easily become a racket for intelligence peddlers.45 The concern was that Chinese 
agents would invent information to feel they had earned their pay, or, if not paid 
enough, would similarly invent information out of spite.46 Again, Anglo-
American views were entirely in accord. One CIA officer recorded the anecdote 
of how a Chinese agent fabricated information to please his handler: ‘if he [the 
case officer] had not constantly pressured me to produce,’ he [the agent] said, ‘I 
would not have had to fabricate’.47 
 So-called intelligence peddlers were a major problem in Hong Kong. 
These were usually former Nationalist Chinese (Guomindang) agents who had 
fled from the mainland. Deprived of any actual intelligence sources, they took to 
fabrication. In a twelve month period from summer 1951-summer 1952, the Hong 
Kong SLO submitted the names of 102 alleged intelligence peddlers, leading to 
15 arrests and ten deportation orders. This form of refugee intelligence peddling 
was widespread due to the easiness with which the ‘gullible or unwary’ (by which 
the Hong Kong Special Branch meant the Americans) could be led up the garden 
path.48 As well as opportunist ex-Guomindang fraudsters, Britain and the United 
States were concerned about deliberate attempts by their enemies to spread 
disinformation. Around 1946, the Soviet Union set up a ‘disinformation section’ 
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in their TASS news service in Shanghai to try to infect Western and Guomindang 
intelligence cycles.49 
 To give a single example of these case histories, one Wong Chi Yung was 
deported for life in December 1951. He was a former operative of the 
Guomindang Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (BIS) selling information on 
PRC naval and air force strength in the border areas and even data on North 
Korean espionage in Hong Kong. He claimed to be running a network of sub-
agents and to have visited Canton, returning with a report on the exact location, 
strength and details of all local armed forces after only five days. The 
impossibility of this feat put the SLO onto his tracks, but previously Wong was 
successful in selling information to British and American intelligence services.50 
 These peddlers were a double-edged nuisance. Most importantly, they 
directly polluted the intelligence cycle with fabricated information. As well as 
enjoying initial success in selling information to British agencies, they continued 
to sell to the United States. Although the CIA did not approach intelligence 
sharing in a spirit of mutuality, American intelligence agencies could pass on this 
information to their British allies in a way which would disguise the dubiousness 
of its source. 
 These peddlers posed a second problem. This was the sheer amount of 
time and effort entailed in weeding out their information. It was all very well 
eliminating sources of phony intelligence, but this did not automatically generate 
more reliable sources of information. As one SLO in the SIFE area commented, 
‘virtually no information was coming out of China’.51  
 As well as rogue intelligence peddlers, information shared officially by 
Guomindang organisations was highly suspect. In late 1947, Guomindang sources 
propagated false reports of the creation of a Far Eastern Cominform to try to 
increase support for their failing regime.52 The unreliability of sources linked to 
the Guomindang continued as a motif in British, Australian and United States 
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intelligence assessment throughout the Cold War.53 Moreover, the Guomindang 
authorities in Taiwan were reluctant to indulge in sharing of reliable material.54 In 
summer 1950, a local Chinese employee of the British consulate in Taipei was 
arrested by the Guomindang counter-intelligence service as a communist spy. The 
British were left to find out about this through public press accounts and only 
received the interrogation reports after much persuasion. This was far from a 
healthy liaison relationship.55 However, as noted by one CIA analyst posted to 
Taiwan, sometimes the Guomindang were able to provide genuine intelligence on 
the PRC, and the danger for Western recipients in automatically discounting their 
information as propaganda was one of being careful ‘not to throw out the baby 
with the bath water’.56 This was not a new problem facing British intelligence 
officials. During the Second World War, the BIS had passed on agents to Britain’s 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) in India. SOE were suspicious of their 
loyalties, believing that they had been sent to cooperate on the surface whilst 
hunting for strategic intelligence about Britain’s plans for the post-war Far East.57 
 With secret sources proving problematic, intelligence planners sought to 
expand the provision of open source work about China. This was already being 
done by the JIB network. The Australian JIB(M) contributed a great deal of 
expertise on China, where its director, Harold King, had previously worked in the 
maritime customs service. The Bureau ‘acquired a reputation among overseas 
intelligence agencies of expertise in, and unusual insights into, China’s 
development of its defence infrastructure’.58 In late 1948, one year before the 
triumph of the CCP in China’s Civil War, the fledgling JIB(M) set China as its top 
intelligence priority.59 This was not alone as a case of Britain and Australia 
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pooling resources to deal with the Chinese threat. From the mid-1960s, signals 
intelligence operations in Hong Kong were jointly administered by GCHQ and the 
Australian Defence Signals Directorate.60  
 In 1953, the JIB(M) distributed a report on Sino-Soviet collaboration 
which concluded that China was highly dependent on the USSR. They predicted 
that the prolongation of the Korean War would reduce China’s latitude for 
pursuing an independent policy. In compiling this report, interviews with 
evacuees from mainland China, who drew their data from open observation, were 
the most valued source. The JIB(M) admitted that reliable information on China 
was extremely difficult to obtain and that much of their paper was speculative.61 
 Other open source methods utilised by the JIB(M) are revealed in the 
memoirs of the head of its Scientific Intelligence Branch, Major Robert Harry 
Mathams. From 1958, Mathams directed efforts to provide an order of battle of 
Chinese scientific resources in response to worries that China might make an 
unexpected leap forward in defence (particularly nuclear) technology. Mathams 
used translated Chinese scientific journals which civilian Australian consultants 
could evaluate for competence. His branch also procured Chinese domestic 
electronic components from Hong Kong to extrapolate conclusions about 
comparative scientific prowess. From these evaluations, Mathams revealed the 
hard decisions Chinese leaders would need to make to effectively deploy their 
limited scientific resources to meet proclaimed national objectives.62 Another 
open source technique was to record the serial numbers of Chinese rolling stock 
that came into Hong Kong. This enabled the JIB(M) to estimate the total stock of 
Chinese railway equipment. This technique was derived from wartime practices of 
noting down the serial numbers of destroyed German tanks to estimate total 
production.63 
 As a result of Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the demand for 
open source intelligence about the PRC increased.  In December 1950, Malcolm 
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MacDonald took up a proposal generated by his Cold War conference to set up a 
‘China Bureau’ in Singapore. This would be a new intelligence collation and 
analysis organisation which would use open sources and interviews with travellers 
crossing the China-Hong Kong border to build a better understanding of the 
ideology, domestic policies and overseas relationships of the CCP.64 The Korean 
War context was critical. As MacDonald argued, ‘there can be no doubt that we 
are faced with a power in China which bids fair to disrupt the world as we know 
it’.65 
 However, whilst agreeing with the need to exploit open source or cultural 
intelligence, Whitehall argued that it should be done in London. The Foreign 
Office envisaged the China Bureau as a guide to national policy, focused on 
understanding the ideology and strategic intentions of the PRC. This is revealing 
of a difference in priorities in responding to communist China. In London, the 
strategic threat was most important; in Singapore, the security threat of the 
Chinese diaspora was paramount. MacDonald wanted to use China Bureau 
intelligence to help with counter-subversion and counter-propaganda in Southeast 
Asia.66 
 Bureaucratic inertia between Singapore and London meant that the China 
Bureau never came to fruition. Instead, the Foreign Office Research Department 
(FORD) assumed responsibility for preparing background papers in London. 
Their first major study of the PRC, completed in June 1951, admitted that any 
conclusions were speculative and the state of open source intelligence was barely 
more adequate than secret intelligence.67 In Singapore, a much smaller China 
Section was established in Phoenix Park. This Section produced monthly reviews 
derived from press monitoring reports and was initially overseen by MacDonald’s 
Chinese Affairs advisor George Kitson (who had served with SIS in Shanghai in 
the 1930s).68 London later complained that the Singapore China Section was 
duplicating the work of FORD, but MacDonald defended its existence. His 
regional bureaucracy needed intelligence more focused on the Chinese diaspora 
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than the PRC itself, and the China Section played a valuable role in providing 
interrogation briefs for the Singapore Special Branch. It also provided briefs for 
an organisation which briefly inherited the name of China Bureau: an 
interrogation centre in Hong Kong which was set up under joint supervision of the 
Local Intelligence Committee and RIO.69  
 On 6 March 1951, this interviewing unit began operations under command 
of Colonel Valentine Rodolphe Burkhardt. Burkhardt had served in the FECB 
from 1936-39 and worked for the War Office in China during the Second World 
War, earning a reputation as a ‘latter-day Scarlet Pimpernel’ by helping Free 
French supporters leave Shanghai.70 Because the Governor, Alexander Grantham, 
was concerned about provoking the PRC, it was agreed that Burkhardt would only 
interview Westerners leaving China. It was deemed inevitable that interrogating 
Chinese travellers would be leaked to Beijing and, as well as causing antagonism, 
would carry the potential for China to plant disinformation. In addition, 
aforementioned racial prejudices about Chinese informants appear to have carried 
much weight.71 
 Burkhardt’s interviews concentrated on Christian missionaries expelled 
from the PRC. Their collective output produced commentary on political and 
social issues such as registration cards, land reform, massacres, taxation on 
religious incense, medical provision and indoctrination: all of which can be 
termed ‘cultural intelligence’.72 Most of the information in these reports could be 
dismissed as anecdotes or gossip. Nevertheless, the fact that Burkhardt’s 
operations continued to receive funding and grow in scale indicated the 
seriousness of Britain’s intelligence weakness in dealing with the PRC. Anything 
which could give even marginal insight towards a basic understanding of 
communist China was deemed worth pursuing. As one recent commentator 
described, ‘no good case officers or intercept technicians can make sense out of 
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what they learn without comprehensive knowledge of the world that surrounds 
their human or electronic sources’.73  
 Perhaps the key obstacle to providing more useful intelligence on China 
was the reluctance of the Hong Kong government to risk provoking a crisis. This 
created animosity between Grantham’s administration and the regional-national 
intelligence community, which wished to exploit Hong Kong for more 
information. As the Director of Military Intelligence summarised, ‘Hong Kong 
was about the only window into China, providing opportunities for making 
contact with the Chinese people and extracting information. At the moment there 
was a singular dearth of such information from other sources’.74 
 These tensions had implications beyond British intelligence. Shortly 
before the outbreak of the Korean War, Hong Kong’s Commissioner of Police, 
Duncan McIntosh, tried to evict the CIA from the colony. He wrote a long diatribe 
against United States intelligence officials which was wholly supported by 
Governor Grantham. They argued that the Americans were endangering the 
colony through provoking the PRC with their own covert action and support for 
anti-communist guerrilla movements inside China. The colonial authorities 
arrested a Chinese agent of the CIA in February 1951, leading the Americans to 
accuse Grantham’s government of bias towards the communists.75 Then a CIA 
officer stationed in Hong Kong, James Lilley recalled that ‘the British were our 
allies, but… they were sensitive to anything that could upset [Beijing] about the 
way Hong Kong was being run’.76 Even before the conflict began, Grantham 
refused permission for the CIA to set up a radio station for keeping in contact with 
anti-communist guerrilla forces on the mainland.77 MI5 Head Office, although 
agreeing that the Americans were a nuisance, had to talk Grantham down. Guy 
Liddell felt that the Governor was too parochial, willing to risk the global Anglo-
American intelligence partnership for the sake of just one territory.78  This is 
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implicit of the core point of disagreement. For the regional-national intelligence 
community in London and Singapore, Hong Kong was no more than a useful 
intelligence collection centre, and its survival was not an end in itself. These 
intelligence directors saw Singapore as the more vital imperial asset. 
 In response to this seemingly intransigent colonial attitude, the Director of 
Military Intelligence dismissed the Hong Kong government as ‘dead weight’: an 
opinion nurtured by a recent visit to the colony. Grantham’s administration were 
not only harming intelligence relations with the Americans, but also blocking 
British proposals to develop lines into China. London and Singapore were united 
in the hope of establishing a new interrogation centre for Chinese travellers. The 
Hong Kong colonial government repeatedly vetoed the project on account of 
defence concerns which were less important to the regional-national intelligence 
community.79 
 After months of procrastination, the deadlock was finally overcome. The 
War Office assumed sole responsibility for the new interrogation unit under the 
authority of the ranking military intelligence representative in Hong Kong, who 
was in turn responsible to GSI branch in Singapore and MI2 in London. In August 
1953, the new Chinese interrogation unit, codenamed Uplift, commenced 
operations.80 
 In the end, it does not appear that intelligence agencies or their customers 
were really satisfied with these endeavours. Little progress was made on 
establishing an agreed understanding of the basic nature of the PRC. Even in 
1956, SIS were still struggling towards a ‘proper study of [the] Chinese 
Communist administration’, implying that the national intelligence community 
was not happy with FORD’s theoretical efforts.81 Despite the efforts to expand 
open source intelligence, the PRC remained a largely unknown factor in the 
international sphere. Two decades later, CIA analysts continued to bemoan that 
the Chinese ‘penchant for secrecy’ and lack of authoritative sources meant that 
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‘China-watching’ remained ‘imprecise at best’ and far below the level of 
advanced ‘Kremlinology’.82 
 The ways in which British intelligence reacted to the China quandary in 
the early to mid-1950s are indicative of how the escalating Cold War prompted 
attempts to innovate new (or to revitalise old) intelligence activities in the Far 
East. Such efforts broadly failed, and information collection remained the critical 
weakness of the intelligence system. Just as importantly, the debates surrounding 
China and open source intelligence serve as a reminder that, although there was a 
remarkable degree of unity between the regional-national intelligence community 
in Singapore and London, there were still considerable disputes between the 
regional administration as a whole and metropolitan users of intelligence. 
Different priorities meant that the Foreign Office and Malcolm MacDonald were 
opposed in their plans for the direction of open source intelligence. Nevertheless, 
the greatest division was between a united regional-national intelligence system 
and local authorities in Hong Kong. 
 
Proactive counter-subversion 
 As well as providing intelligence assessments for their users, the regional-
national intelligence community contributed to the covert implementation of 
British Cold War policy in two principal areas: propaganda and diplomacy. In this 
regard, despite the struggles faced in providing useful intelligence for decision-
makers, the intelligence apparatus was still able to play a useful role. The 
expansion of propaganda and covert action in the 1950s reflected a consensus 
between MacDonald’s bureaucracy and the British government for more proactive 
‘counter subversion’ in Southeast Asia. As discussed in chapter one, covert action 
and secret intelligence are not the same thing. They are, however, often 
undertaken by the same organisations or same clandestine communities. In 
addition, operations in pursuance of one can sometimes lead to the other. On the 
whole, it appears that the covert action side of the secret service community in 
Singapore was dominated by SIS and RIO. Little information has been disclosed 
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about SIS operations, whereas RIO’s activities are far better documented. In these 
activities, it is apparent that RIO was using its intake of intelligence from other 
members of the Singapore intelligence communities to guide its implementation 
of covert action. 
 RIO became one of the most important exponents of this policy. Created 
in 1949 as an offshoot of the IRD, RIO owed its primary allegiance to the 
Commissioner General. Although intended by IRD to focus on the production of 
propaganda guidelines for implementation by Britain’s local Information Officers 
across the Far East, RIO also had secondary functions as a producer of 
‘propaganda intelligence’. As defined by its first director, John Rayner, this 
entailed intelligence useful for the production of British propaganda and 
intelligence about enemy (particularly Chinese or Soviet) propaganda. RIO 
therefore became a centre for open source intelligence.83  
 Rayner struggled to combine both intelligence and propaganda functions 
with the meagre resources allotted to RIO. His first registry officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jolliffe, was swamped in output work, leading Rayner to search for a 
specialist Propaganda Intelligence Officer whose sole function would be ‘the 
collection, collation and editing of intelligence, from open and secret sources, 
suitable for use in propaganda and as background information; and the study of 
the propaganda output from the countries of the Far East’.84 Rayner’s first 
Propaganda Intelligence Officer was Catherine Illingworth, who was soon joined 
by Ann Elwell, the wife of a SIFE officer who came recommended from MI5’s 
overseas trouble-shooter Sir John Shaw.85 Further intelligence expertise was 
provided by Dennis Ambler, who occupied the position of Assistant Regional 
Information Officer in charge of the covert side of RIO from 1950-59. According 
to the memoirs of a CIA official in regular contact with RIO, Ambler was an SIS 
operative seconded to RIO.86 It is worth highlighting that Illingworth and Elwell 
appear to have been two of the few women to play prominent positions in the 
British intelligence bureaucracy in Singapore. This intelligence machine was 
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dominated by men (particularly of the middle classes and above). In particular, 
Special Branch was almost exclusively a masculine organisation. Gendered roles 
may have contributed to an intelligence culture which, as subsequent chapters 
show, sometimes became associated with heavy-handed policing. This is not, 
however, unique to Singapore. The entry of Illingworth and Elwell into RIO 
reflects a broader trend in mid-twentieth century British intelligence: that the 
propaganda and covert action side of secret service bureaucracies were less closed 
to the advancement of women.87 
 As well as secret material passed on by other agencies, RIO independently 
collated a vast array of potential intelligence material from overt channels. This 
ranged from official communist publications to press cuttings from non-
communist countries and daily monitoring reports of communist broadcasts from 
Moscow and Beijing.88 The research apparatus of RIO distilled this intake into a 
number of intelligence reports. Their weekly analysis of Chinese propaganda 
broadcasts was distributed widely throughout the regional-national intelligence 
community and also to American allies.89 These analyses were primarily useful 
for RIO in understanding the themes and strategies of Chinese propaganda in 
Southeast Asia and facilitating counter-propaganda. They were also useful to 
RIO’s intelligence partners and the Foreign Office as open source information 
casting light on broader Chinese intentions.  From July 1955, open source 
intelligence production was supplemented by a new publication: Inside 
Communist North Vietnam. Reacting to the Geneva Conference and split of 
Vietnam along the 17th Parallel in 1954, this digest was based exclusively on 
official North Vietnamese media and the testimony of defectors or refugees. The 
first issue focused on themes of government corruption, economic mis-
management and Hanoi’s subservience to the Soviet Union and China. Inside 
Communist North Vietnam was distributed to RIO’s CIA contact, Joseph Smith, 
and British organisations.90 With so little intelligence available on new communist 
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states, RIO’s digests assisted more traditional intelligence agencies in building up 
a picture of background conditions in these unknown countries, supplementing the 
open source work of the small China Section. 
 However, RIO’s role as an intelligence producer was at a much lower 
level than the likes of SIFE or SIS. RIO was most useful in providing a channel to 
pursue more active counter-subversion through ‘covert action’. Within Cold War 
British practices, this was rather loosely defined. Usually, ‘covert action’ involves 
activities pursued in support of national foreign policy which are conducted in a 
deniable or unacknowledged manner. British officials have generally divided it 
into two categories: operations (such as the Iranian coup of 1953) and 
propaganda.91 
 In explaining CIA covert action during the Cold War, James Callanan 
described three basic types of clandestine operation: 
1. Defensive covert action: aimed at countering communist efforts to 
undermine United States allies, such as the paramilitary support given to 
the Philippines during the Hukbalahap revolt. 
2. Offensive covert action: focused on destabilising communist regimes, 
typified by the Bay of Pigs incident. 
3. Preventive covert action: designed to impede or neutralise the potential for 
the Soviet Union to expand its influence over non-aligned countries in the 
Third World.92 
 These definitions are equally useful in understanding how Britain sought 
to use covert action by clandestine agencies to support its foreign policy goals in 
Southeast Asia. RIO was active in pursuing defensive and preventive covert 
action in British and foreign territories respectively. Within the limitations of 
available archival evidence, it appears that RIO did not embark on offensive 
covert action with one exception: its support to the SIS-led Operation Debenture 
to encourage dissent and defection within communist China (which is discussed in 
chapter seven). This was in line with overarching British policy. 
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 During October-December 1955, the British government engaged in high 
level debates over covert policy. The Foreign Secretary wanted more proactive 
efforts, particularly in what he termed the ‘intermediate’ nations of the Middle 
East and Southeast Asia (such as Laos, Cambodia and Thailand) where Britain 
had indirect strategic interests. In 1953, Britain cooperated with the CIA in 
instigating a coup against premier Mossadegh of Iran following his nationalisation 
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company facilities. For Foreign Secretary Harold 
Macmillan, this provided a tempting example for how covert action could achieve 
foreign policy goals.93 The Colonial Secretary’s viewpoint was more cautious, 
arguing that ‘we should not I think allow the metaphorical expression “cold war” 
to blind us to the fact that what we are considering is not war-like operations at 
all, but, whatever methods may be employed, operations which are essentially 
political’.94 Nevertheless, this was entirely the point. The political nature of the 
Cold War, particularly when compounded by the anxieties of decolonisation, lent 
itself to a solution involving propaganda or covert action administered by the 
Foreign Office-controlled RIO or SIS. 
 These debates culminated in a decision by Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
to reorganise the national system for overseeing covert operations away from the 
previous committee model.95 Instead, the Foreign Office (to which both RIO and 
SIS reported) would have supremacy over covert action in non-British territories. 
This was to be part of a more assertive ‘counter-subversion’ policy. Eden 
emphasised that these operations – defined as ‘clandestine activities, whether by 
propaganda or by operations, directed against communism or, in the colonies, 
against subversive forms of nationalism’ – were to be focused on the colonial 
sphere and intermediate territories. He saw little prospect in conducting major 
campaigns against communist states.96 
 RIO supported this proactive ‘counter-subversion’ agenda by instituting 
defensive covert action in the colonies. They hoped to control the flow of 
information reaching the Chinese diaspora in response to concerns that the 
enhanced prestige of communist China would attract overseas Chinese 
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populations to communism. From Hong Kong, RIO worked with the Hungarian 
Jesuit refugee Father Laszlo Ladany. A respected ‘China watcher’, Ladany edited 
an English language newsletter, China News Analysis, which was regarded by 
CIA officer James Lilley as one of the best sources of information on communist 
China.97 Based on open source intelligence, this was very critical of the Chinese 
regime. RIO was not directly involved in this project, but worked with Ladany to 
publish a Chinese language version, News from Mainland China, for distribution 
in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.98 
 Similarly aimed at controlling the flow of information about China, RIO 
covertly funded a publishing house in Hong Kong for printing material including 
Chinese translations of American school textbooks. In Singapore, they secretly 
sponsored a bookstore to sell subtly anti-communist works with the intention of 
gradually moulding public opinion. RIO also distributed an approved guide about 
universities in mainland China to schools in Singapore and Malaya.99 The colonial 
governments were concerned about local Chinese students returning to China, 
becoming indoctrinated and returning as revolutionary cadres. Rather than prevent 
travel entirely and appear repressive, RIO hoped to ameliorate the risks more 
subtly by publishing a carefully selected guide. In undertaking these operations, 
they relied upon an intake of intelligence not only about China, but also about the 
popular mood in Singapore and Malaya. They therefore relied upon liaison with 
Special Branch and SIFE.100 These can all be classified as examples of defensive 
covert action utilising ‘grey’ propaganda methods (information which is broadly 
true but the purpose and authorship of which is carefully hidden). In none of these 
cases was RIO’s responsibility disclosed, instead acting behind the cover of the 
Hong Kong publishing house or the priest Father Ladany.  
 Outside British territories, RIO had fewer automatic opportunities to 
influence public opinion. Nevertheless, alongside more traditional publicity 
efforts, they utilised covert initiatives to target particular sections of society in the 
‘intermediate’ territories of Southeast Asia. This constituted preventive covert 
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action aimed at forestalling communist takeovers. As well as providing 
intelligence, communist defectors proved a useful tool for these RIO operations. 
In late 1955, they arranged for Kavinh Keohoun, a Pathet Lao defector, to give a 
press conference at the Laotian Embassy in Bangkok. Britain’s extensive 
international connections with SEATO and non-SEATO powers made RIO the 
ideal go-between. Following the reported success of this event, they arranged for a 
surrendered Malayan communist insurgent to address a Chinese audience in South 
Vietnam.101 
 A more controversial approach to the Vietnam quagmire was proposed by 
Assistant Regional Information Officer Geoffrey Crossley following a tour of 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in December 1954. British Information Officers 
liaised with local propaganda services, but felt hampered by the defeatism of these 
partners. The prevailing attitude in South Vietnam seemed to be that it was 
impossible to out-publicise the Viet Minh, for ‘they have propaganda organised 
down to the level of the village coffee table’.102 
 RIO’s priority was to promote stable government in South Vietnam to 
contain the spread of communism. This was an uphill struggle given the 
corruption, nepotism and religious intolerance of the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. 
To help stabilise Diem, Crossley suggested a radical way of giving ‘friendly’ help. 
RIO could place unattributable criticism in the local press and expose the 
inadequacies of the regime in the hope that this would generate public pressure to 
make Diem reform before it was too late. Crossley argued that the best solution to 
stabilising the Diem government was to destabilise it in a controlled manner. His 
proposal would have entangled RIO in reshaping the South Vietnam government 
in an image desirable to Britain.103 It is not clear whether Crossley’s ideas were 
implemented in practice, but their proposal by a senior RIO official was indicative 
of the potential of propaganda to be a tool for covert action. The difference 
between this proposal for an operation in a foreign territory and the more limited 
aims of RIO’s operations in British colonies is worth noting. In Singapore, 
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Malaya and Hong Kong, RIO used propaganda to influence mass opinion in 
limited, defensive covert action, whereas Crossley’s proposal was targeted at 
changing the policies of the South Vietnamese government. 
 Less controversially, in late 1955, RIO worked to disrupt the flow of 
communist publications from Hong Kong to Indonesia. Almost a decade earlier, 
SIFE had warned that Hong Kong was becoming ‘a communist liaison centre 
between the CCP and communist circles in Asia, Europe and America’.104 
Meanwhile, Indonesia was a persistent secondary security concern following its 
hard-won independence. At first the threat was of revolutionary nationalism, but 
SIFE tempered this by cooperating with and helping to train the Indonesian 
security services. In the early 1950s, Indonesia became one of SIFE’s closest 
foreign partners.105 By the middle of the decade, concerns arose that Indonesia’s 
President Sukarno was increasingly influenced by communism. This led to Anglo-
American support for the failed Outer Islands Rebellion in 1958.106 On the road to 
this fateful decision – which only served to increase tensions – RIO hoped to 
forestall growing communist influence by liaising with security services in Hong 
Kong to disrupt the flow of communist propaganda.107 
 These covert operations were important because of the limitations of more 
overt publicity in supporting foreign policy. In 1954, the British Information 
Officer in Djakarta provided a scathing and humorous critique of how British 
publicity failed to achieve its goals in Indonesia. RIO’s primary targets were the 
less hard-core fringe of the PKI (the Indonesian communist party) and the Chinese 
diaspora. Neither of these groups seemed to react well to overt propaganda (see 
table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2. Local reactions to RIO propaganda in Indonesia, 1954.108 
Propaganda line PKI fringe reaction Chinese diaspora 
reaction 
Communism aims at 
world domination 
Better keep on the right 
side 
Good for Mao 
Communism relies on 
force and fraud 
So do the ‘colonialists’ Why not? 
Communism tolerates no 
second allegiance 
Impressive Stronger than any other 
secret society 
Communism denies 
liberty to the individual 
Better be in on the ground 
floor to do the denying 
How much liberty did 
any Chinese peasant 
have in the old days? 
Communism has failed as 
a faith and a method 
Colonialism has failed, 
communism is in the 
ascendant 
Dien Bien Phu 
The Free World has a 
positive answer 
Please leave us alone Chiang Kai-shek? 
The Free World is able 
and prepared to defend its 
freedom 
Atom bombs for Asians Foreign devils 
  
 RIO’s involvement in covert action revealed the opportunities and 
limitations for implementing the policy envisaged by Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden. Eden emphasised that covert action was not an end in itself but a subsidiary 
instrument to support the overt policies pursued by the British government.109 
Careful control by the Foreign Office was paramount. Crossley’s Vietnam 
proposal – if pursued – would have entangled Britain in the Vietnam morass 
beyond the national agenda of supporting non-communist states without entering 
into extensive commitments. It is highly unlikely that these measures were ever 
approved and implemented in practice. Equally controversial proposals by the SIS 
Bangkok station to pay an assassin £10,000 to murder leading communists in 
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Laos were quashed by Dick White, who moved from being Director-General of 
MI5 to Chief of SIS in 1956.110 Nevertheless, their proposal demonstrated that a 
different level of deniable operation was conceivable in the foreign sphere than 
the colonies. RIO’s activities in Singapore and Malaya were more restrained 
partly because of the process of decolonisation. By 1955, Singapore had a locally-
elected government working with the British Governor. Deniability was 
increasingly difficult on the road to independence.   
 Looking through the archival records of RIO implies that Eden’s vision of 
a covert action programme closely aligned with overt policy was faithfully 
followed through. RIO operations relating to Laos and Indonesia conformed to 
broader Foreign Office goals with regard to those countries, and also supported 
other clandestine activities such as SIFE security intelligence training. In total, 
these activities show that Britain became more proactively engaged with the Cold 
War in Southeast Asia than it appeared on the overt level. Overtly, Britain seemed 
less involved in the regional Cold War than the United States, but clandestine 
operations provided an opportunity to exert influence despite Britain’s dwindling 
formal power. Therefore, the efforts of SIFE, SIS and RIO were a vital 
supplement to overall foreign policy. Whilst the value of the narrowly defined 
intelligence production functions of the regional bureaucracy may have deserved 
the label of a ‘slough of despond’, the utility of the Singapore intelligence milieu 
to policy implementation tells a different story. If Singapore appeared (to 
imperialist intelligence officials) to be a ‘unique window’ on Southeast Asia, then 
this was a window which could be opened to allow covert influence to pass 
through. 
 
Intelligence diplomacy 
 RIO’s engagement with covert action illustrates how the regional 
intelligence milieu played a proactive role in implementing national policy. As 
well as propaganda, this was achieved through intelligence diplomacy with 
foreign services throughout the region. This was partly done to improve their 
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intake of raw intelligence, but also to support British policy in building up the 
northern arc of Southeast Asian countries as a non-communist buffer zone to 
protect British interests in Malaya and Singapore. The former can be characterised 
as intelligence liaison – networking between intelligence agencies to fulfil 
bureaucratic interests – whilst the latter represented intelligence diplomacy: the 
use of intelligence actors to fulfil foreign policy goals. Such endeavours 
emphasise the potential of intelligence officers to act as non-traditional diplomats 
in pursuit of state foreign policy (as well as the more narrow goals of the 
intelligence agencies they represented). This supports the contention of New 
Diplomatic Historians that diplomacy is an activity entered into by a range of 
official, semi-official and unofficial actors. The advantage of using intelligence 
actors as diplomats was that they possessed official and authoritative standing – 
like traditional diplomatic actors – but could operate at the clandestine level. The 
quasi-diplomatic activities of intelligence agencies had the benefit of entailing 
fewer overt commitments than ordinary channels. In other words, Britain could 
use intelligence diplomacy to build relationships when official foreign policy 
adopted a more hands-off stance, such as with the former French Indochina 
colonies. 
 One recent article about SIS officers in the Hanoi embassy during the 
United States-Vietnam War noted that intelligence officers sometimes ‘operated 
in a blurred space between espionage and diplomacy’.111 If this is true for SIS, 
then MI5 global activities can equally be characterised as quasi-diplomatic 
through the role of SIFE and SLOs. Their main purpose was to ensure former 
colonies remained pro-British and anti-Soviet. Maintaining security cooperation 
within a Commonwealth framework became a critical goal for MI5’s global 
activities in the 1950s and 1960s.112  Furthermore, due to the fear of a spreading 
Cold War, security intelligence cooperation was not limited to the 
Commonwealth, but also entailed relationships with the likes of Thailand, Laos 
and Cambodia. As well as bilateral relationships with foreign powers, the SEATO 
alliance provided another important outlet for intelligence diplomacy.113 
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Nevertheless, there were serious limitations to this practice. As other scholars 
have noted, intelligence sharing is usually very cautious. Justifications for not 
being totally candid with allies can include the need to protect sources of 
intelligence, worries about distribution to third parties, and a desire to keep the 
practice of intelligence liaison secret.114 Consequently, the intelligence diplomacy 
undertaken by the regional-national intelligence community achieved far less for 
actual intelligence production that it did in cultivating alignments to support Cold 
War policy. 
 Such activities were far from being a new departure. The diplomatic 
functions of intelligence officers were apparent at least as far back as the so-called 
‘Great Game’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. British imperial agents 
working on the borderlands of Empire were tasked not only with producing 
information, but also with winning the support of local Asian leaders and ensuring 
they remained immune to Russian overtures.115 When tensions with Russia 
assumed a new guise following the 1917 Revolution, Britain responded to fears 
about Comintern influence in the colonies through stepping-up its intelligence 
cooperation with other colonial powers in Southeast Asia.116 One example of this 
was the passing of control over double agent Lai Tek from French 
counterintelligence to the Singapore Special Branch when he departed Indochina 
in the 1930s. The policy pursued after 1945 was a continuation of this tried-and-
tested strategy for dealing with the Russian threat. 
 In the 1950s, MI5 Head Office played an important role in developing 
international relationships through offering training to colonial Special Branches 
and the security services of independent nations. This was inseparable from the 
global Cold War. According to the notorious MI5 whistle-blower and conspiracy 
theorist Peter Wright, Director-General Sir Dick White ‘believed in the 
fashionable idea of “containing” the Soviet Union, and that MI5 had a vital role to 
play in neutralising Soviet assets’.117 This programme therefore supported 
Britain’s over-arching containment goals through promoting a stable non-
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communist Southeast Asia. Chikara Hashimoto’s research into MI5 and SIME 
activities in the Middle East highlighted the ambiguities and strategic failings of 
this policy, which only served to support authoritarian regimes and stoke popular 
anti-British sentiment.118 However, the comparable role of MI5 and other British 
intelligence organisations in Southeast Asia has received less attention.  
 Britain’s most significant global ally was undoubtedly the United States. 
However, despite a wide-ranging European partnership in signals and human 
intelligence, in Southeast Asia, both parties remained reluctant to engage in 
meaningful sharing.119 Relations between SIFE and potential United States 
partners including the CIA were superficially cordial. During his year in 
Singapore from 1948-49 Alex Kellar made a point of establishing ‘profitable and 
friendly’ relations with CIA Station Chief Bob Jantzen.120 Yet despite a positive 
appearance on the surface, intelligence relations with the Americans were never 
smooth. During the Korean War, SIFE complained that the United States shared 
negligible quantities of intelligence on East Asia despite their two nations being 
allies in a hot war.121 
 Trying to improve this situation, Jack Morton held a conference with the 
CIA to make progress on combined intelligence efforts. They agreed to adopt a 
joint plan of research to avoid duplication, and also to coordinate the advice and 
intelligence they were passing to common allies.122 SIS made similar overtures. 
Far East Controller Maurice Oldfield – described as a ‘hedonist who drank 
whiskey, told dirty jokes and had won a reputation as a Far East expert’ – 
negotiated the Four Square Agreement with the CIA. This separated spheres of 
influence in Southeast Asia between the CIA and British intelligence based upon 
former or current colonial possessions. They also pledged to cooperate in 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Indonesia, thereby authorising 
representatives on the ground to undertake joint operations without specific 
reference to Washington or London. Overall, these efforts were not successful in 
practice. Despite being seen by enthusiastic CIA and SIS officers as a license to 
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wage Cold War, the Four Square Agreement produced little progress.123 In 
preparation for a visit to Singapore in January 1954, MI5 Director-General Sir 
Dick White was informed that the CIA remained reluctant to share intelligence 
despite maintaining close contact with SIFE and SIS. Despite general policy 
agreements, the majority of intelligence traffic appeared to be going one-way 
from the British to the Americans. MI5 attributed this to overall Anglo-American 
policy differences over China.124 
 Reading between the lines, it becomes apparent that this reluctance was 
not as one-way as SIFE documents implied. British intelligence authorities were 
equally reluctant to share raw material with the United States. JIC(London) 
Chairman Patrick Dean noticed that SIFE seemed more willing to engage in 
meaningful collaboration with Asian powers whose intelligence services they had 
helped to train than with their American allies. In British eyes, United States 
agencies such as the CIA were seen to be susceptible to ‘wild reporting’ and 
‘unfortunate indiscretions’.125 The CIA was not unaware of these British 
prejudices. The CIA station chief in Singapore, Bob Jantzen, told his propaganda 
expert that ‘the thing is, these [British] guys are really nuts about security and 
won’t even tell each other what they’re doing, much less us’.126 
 Despite a certain guarded jealousy on the part of SIFE, other British 
agencies were keener to explore cooperation with their American allies. In 1954, 
Malcolm MacDonald proposed that the United States participate in the JIC(FE). 
Australian observers had long been present, and both Dean and the CIA Director, 
Allen Dulles, welcomed the idea. London was less supportive, worrying that 
Washington may get the wrong idea and treat the views of MacDonald’s 
bureaucracy as official national policy rather than the opinions of Singapore 
regional officialdom. Working past these objections, Dulles formally accepted the 
invitation. Michael Stewart, chairman of the JIC(FE), welcomed this development 
as a new chance to engage in meaningful intelligence sharing.127 Whether this was 
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actually achieved is far from certain. The CIA sent Russell Jack Smith to 
Singapore as their observer to the JIC(FE), but Smith’s memoirs give more 
attention to his social than professional activities.128  
 Relations with the United States were characterised by a dichotomy of 
cordial dialogues and policy agreements alongside mutual reluctance for 
intelligence sharing. Relationships with European colonial powers were 
sometimes more substantial. These examples of intelligence diplomacy were an 
important corollary to Britain’s overall foreign policy. In the late 1940s, Britain 
sought to engender greater regional cooperation between interested states in 
Southeast Asia. At first, the mechanism chosen for pursuing this was the Special 
Commissioner, who held regular liaison meetings on technical subjects (linked 
with the problem of rice shortages). These lapsed following the recall of Killearn 
in 1948. Intelligence, particularly security intelligence, became the new vanguard 
of Britain’s attempts to promote regional collaboration. This was particularly 
apparent in relations with other colonial powers. Britain did not wish to be seen to 
be openly collaborating with the French and Dutch for fear of alienating Asian 
opinion and harming their hopes of remaining a regional hegemon.129 
Consequently, intelligence diplomacy created opportunities to build covert Cold 
War alignments with other Western powers. By the 1950s, it also proved to be a 
valuable strategy in encouraging cooperation with Asian states. 
 Successive heads of SIFE strove to cultivate liaison with their colleagues 
in the French Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage 
(SDECE) and the Netherlands East Indies Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS). 
NEFIS liaised with SIFE via Van Hulst, an experienced Special Branch-style 
officer from Dutch Indonesia who utilised vice-consular cover in Singapore. It 
took longer for France to establish formal liaison relations, eradicating Kellar’s 
hopes for tripartite colonial liaison before Indonesian independence in 1949 
rendered such a plan obsolete.130 
 Crucially, this headquarters coordination was backed up by the sharing of 
processed intelligence. In Batavia, NEFIS passed selected information to the 
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British Consul-General, Sir Francis Shepherd. Shepherd was not always 
appreciative of the quality of this material, scathingly attacking two government 
publications which utilised NEFIS intelligence: 
This is however, an even more blatant than usual case of the Dutch habit 
of producing a certain number of facts in circumstances of their own 
choosing in order to ‘make their point’. Even Dutch intelligence circles 
who should have no axes to grind and should only keep to fact, continually 
jump to conclusions that they would like to think were fact […] I make my 
usual criticism as on all NEFIS material that it is too apt to jump to 
conclusions, the conclusions they may wish to draw.131 
This critique raises the question as to what was so very different between this 
‘Dutch’ approach and how Britain derived conclusions about communist trends 
with little reliable information. According to the Dutch historian Bart Luttikhuis, 
NEFIS ‘often worked with only the thinnest of information, filling in the gaps 
with guesswork and preconceived notions’. Colonial racial preconceptions 
sometimes skewed analysis; for example, NEFIS were suspicion of citizens who 
moved around a lot as this did not fit their view of Indonesian societal norms.132 
In light of such research, the British criticisms could appear justified, but are 
somewhat ironic given the situation in the British territories. As seen in chapter 
three, the JIC(FE) and user departments such as the Foreign Office were 
frequently forced to admit that they were formulating conclusions despite very 
little evidence. Meanwhile, at the local level, primary users such as the Colonial 
Secretary’s department continued to view the Chinese population through racial 
classifications.  
 Nevertheless, despite this dissatisfaction with shared intelligence product, 
at least two-way dialogues were successfully established in the Anglo-Dutch 
intelligence relationship. After 1949, although losing the majority of their imperial 
territories in Southeast Asia, the Dutch retained a presence on New Guinea. The 
former NEFIS signals intelligence section continued to operate from this base. 
Some of their intelligence was shared with Britain, and in return, the Dutch sent a 
naval intelligence officer to Singapore to obtain British information on anti-
Sukarno movements in Indonesia. In the late 1950s, Indonesia was a common 
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security threat to British Singapore and Dutch New Guinea, so there was a more 
tangible motive for sharing intelligence than in the Anglo-American case.133 
 Intelligence sharing between British and French agencies was more akin to 
the strained relationships with the United States. SIFE placed the blame on the 
French because of internal intelligence rivalries, a supposedly traditional anti-
British outlook and a focus on tactical counterinsurgency rather than the strategic 
regional picture. However, we can question whether these criticisms would be 
equally applicable to British intelligence, its deficiencies and prejudices, at the 
time. Nevertheless, by 1952, the SIFE liaison officer in Saigon (i.e. the SIS head 
of station now that the JID was in operation) had established direct contact with 
the SDECE and the new Vietnamese Security Service, who had allowed him to 
interrogate a Viet Minh defector.134 
 But as with the American case, this explanation of the reasons for poor 
intelligence sharing is unacceptable. Guy Liddell’s diaries instead demonstrate 
that British agencies were unwilling to pass security intelligence relating to the 
Malayan Emergency to the French. JIC(FE) chairman Michael Creswell may well 
have bemoaned that the SDECE were not supplying much intelligence on Viet 
Minh links with China, but if they were unwilling to share comparable 
intelligence in return, the French attitude is hardly surprising.135 MI5 remained 
reluctant to give away more information than a ‘need to know’ basis and were 
concerned for the security of their sources. Liddell was irritated that the French 
repeatedly accused SIFE of holding back on liaison, writing that ‘the idea of the 
omniscience of ourselves and the Americans in the intelligence field seems to be 
prevalent in every area where collaboration with the French is going on’. Whilst it 
was true that the British were equally in the dark regarding Chinese and Soviet 
intentions, the greater geographic breadth of their regional apparatus meant that 
Britain was – if far from omniscient – then certainly much better placed to 
evaluate trends in regional communist capabilities.136  
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 From this admittedly sparse evidence, it appears that, despite 
commitments to cooperation at the directional level, intelligence relationships 
with other Western powers were characterised by mutual suspicions of colonial 
rivalries and lax security.137 Despite possessing an imperialist world-view, British 
agencies seem to have placed greater faith in their ability to establish relations 
with newly independent Asian powers. In part this was because MI5 offered 
support in setting up their intelligence services, ensuring post-colonial states 
remained indebted to and modelled upon the British intelligence system. 
 This was not merely limited to nations emerging from British 
decolonisation, but also the former colonies of the French and Dutch empires. 
Laos and Cambodia were assisted through MI5 training programmes as well as 
advice from RIO. These were key new states in the frontline of the Cold War, and 
were therefore important allies in Britain’s non-communist front. Such states were 
viable targets for setting up close intelligence partnerships as Britain was not 
directly tainted with the legacy of the departed imperial power. Other recipients of 
training assistance included the Thai, Burmese, Indonesian and Filipino security 
services, to which MacDonald offered subsidised places at the Special Branch 
School in Kuala Lumpur.138 
 In October 1954, JIC(FE) Chairman Andrew Gilchrist visited Bangkok to 
assess the security situation. Gilchrist had served in multiple Foreign Office 
positions in Thailand, and during the Second World War organised undercover 
resistance in that country for Force 136 of the Special Operations Executive. 
Unlike previous JIC(FE) Chairmen, Gilchrist was an experienced regional 
diplomat and intelligence officer. During his 1954 visit, Gilchrist reported that 
greater overt assistance to Thailand, Laos and Cambodia was paramount. He 
predicted that South Vietnam would fall to communism within a year and was of 
no utility beyond being a case study of how not to contain communism. 
Therefore, the other three states in the upper arc would become the forward 
defence for British Malaya.139 Britain was not willing to directly commit to the 
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defence of these nations, and as Commissioner General, MacDonald directed a 
policy of supporting a non-communist, neutral South-East Asia. This was 
different from the proactively anti-communist vision of the United States.140 
Intelligence diplomacy gave Britain the opportunity to engage with the Cold War 
covertly whilst publicly maintaining a more hands-off stance than the Americans. 
On his tour of Thailand and Indochina, Gilchrist observed that RIO and SIFE 
were playing an important role in training local intelligence services.141 
 Offering assistance to Asian powers was not philanthropic but rather an 
attempt to shore up British regional influence, increase the viability of non-
communist governments which stood between China and Singapore, and also to 
generate new sources of intelligence collection.  
 In the early 1950s, one of SIFE’s closest foreign partners was Indonesia, 
showing that productive intelligence cooperation was possible before increasing 
Anglo-Indonesian confrontation in the latter half of the decade. In 1954, Indonesia 
was the only non-Western state to liaise directly with SIFE in Singapore. Djakarta 
retained one of the pre-independence Dutch liaison officers as their intermediary. 
This placed Indonesia on the same liaison footing as the United States, 
Netherlands and France.142 
 Partnerships with Asian security services were strengthened following the 
Manila Pact of September 1954. MacDonald saw SEATO as one of Britain’s three 
lines of defence against communism, along with bilateral support to local 
governments and British-led development aid through the Colombo Plan.143 The 
creation of SEATO was one of the principal factors leading to the retention of the 
office of Commissioner General under Robert Scott. 
 JIC(FE) chairman Andrew Gilchrist had less faith in the value of 
multilateral cooperation through SEATO. He preferred bilateral intelligence 
relationships such as Britain’s existing arrangements for training Southeast Asian 
security forces. Even MacDonald agreed, although he was convinced that the 
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defence and political value of SEATO outweighed its cumbersome intelligence 
existence. They worried that the creation of SEATO could alienate existing 
intelligence liaison with non-members such as Burma and Indonesia.144 As well as 
intelligence training relationships, Britain also engaged in intelligence sharing 
with some Southeast Asian actors. The current evidence in the British archives 
gives little insight into what information Britain gave away, and only scant clues 
as to what they received in return. In June 1950, the Philippines Department of 
National Defence passed on a precis of documents surrendered by two defectors 
from the Hukbalahap communist insurgency. Like the MCP, the Hukbalahap 
movement had originated as an anti-Japanese resistance but continued their 
struggle against government forces after the end of the Second World War. 
However, this precis did not contain the original documents and was focused on 
Hukbalahap propaganda.145 It is unlikely that such information would be of much 
use to SIFE or the JIC(FE). However, without more evidence, it is impossible to 
generalise about whether such documents are typical of the intelligence Britain 
was receiving from Southeast Asian partners. 
 The major intelligence problem constituted by SEATO was the fact that 
British intelligence authorities did not have much faith in the protective security 
capabilities of the three Asian members (Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand). 
Training their security officers and accepting intelligence material in return was 
one matter, but sharing secret material gathered by British agencies was another. 
Patrick Dean argued that ‘we and the Americans (and to some extent the 
Australians and Indonesia) are the only people in the area who really run effective 
intelligence/security organisations’. He therefore proposed a two-tier approach to 
SEATO intelligence cooperation. Outwardly, a small amount of material would be 
shared without reservation. The real work would be done by an informal grouping 
of the Western members exchanging intelligence more frankly under the 
counter.146 
 This cynical approach became a broad guideline to Britain’s engagement 
with SEATO. In May 1955, the JIC(FE) prepared a report for the meeting of the 
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SEATO Ad Hoc Intelligence Sub-Committee which would be held in Singapore 
(possibly as recognition of the city’s status as an intelligence centre) on 19 July 
1955. They carefully expurgated sensitive details and left in ‘just enough secret 
information to make it realistic’.147 Similar reservations were made even within 
the Commonwealth. In the late 1940s, Britain created ‘dummy’ intelligence 
estimates to circulate to states such as India.148 The JIC differentiated between the 
trusting intelligence relationships of the ‘old’ Commonwealth, such as Australia 
and New Zealand, and its relations with newer Asian members who were seen as 
less adept at protective security.149 It is somewhat suspicious that the JIC(London) 
was voicing these opinions in 1949, shortly after Anglo-American concerns over 
security in Australia had prompted a rupture in intelligence sharing and the 
despatch of MI5 specialists to help create a new security service. This would seem 
to imply that concerns about security were as much influenced by imperialist 
prejudices as reality. 
 The SEATO Ad Hoc Intelligence Sub-Committee quickly became known 
as the Committee to Counter Communist Subversion. In 1956, at British 
suggestion, it was renamed the Committee of Security Experts. Its two primary 
functions were to ensure continuing exchange of intelligence between members 
and to offer mutual advice on security matters. H/SIFE served as British 
representative until SIFE was wound down in 1963, after which his seat was filled 
by the SIS Head of Station in Bangkok.150 But the Committee of Security Experts 
proved a problematic organisation hampered by reluctance for intelligence sharing 
on an equal basis. Britain and the United States had access to intelligence sources 
which, although far from perfect, gave a fuller picture than the Asian powers. Yet 
they were unwilling to share valuable intelligence.151 
 Britain was arguably the worst offender at intelligence sharing 
chauvinism. H/SIFE Dick Thistlethwaite regarded SEATO as ‘one of the biggest 
time-consumers and paper-producers of all time’.152 During the fourth security 
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meeting in June 1956, the Americans tabled a proposal for sharing information 
obtained in the debriefing of nationals leaving communist areas. Thistlethwaite 
dismissed this as ‘almost indiscriminate’ distribution of valuable interrogation 
intelligence. Supported by the Australian delegate, ASIO Director-General Sir 
Charles Spry, he opposed the motion on grounds that informants would be 
deterred from full disclosure if they were worried about leakages brought about by 
over-zealous intelligence sharing with less security-conscious partners. 
Thistlethwaite and Spry persuaded the Americans to modify the proposal on a 
more selective basis.153 This raises questions surrounding the commitment of 
SIFE to genuine intelligence partnerships.  
 Because of the high-handed approach of SIFE and the JIC(FE), RIO 
became one of the main participants in intelligence exchange with SEATO. After 
succeeding Rayner as director in 1956, Desmond Pakenham noted that the 
SEATO Research Service Centre benefitted greatly from the supply of RIO’s 
open source intelligence about the communist threat in Southeast Asia. Whilst 
SIFE was unwilling to exchange top secret information, RIO’s lower-level 
intelligence could be safely disseminated through SEATO without equivalent 
security fears.154 
 As well as using SEATO as a mechanism for intelligence liaison, SIFE 
constructed multilateral partnerships on a broader basis. In October 1958, Scott 
and Thistlethwaite took the lead in a security problem common to many states in 
the region: reintegrating surrendered communist insurgents back into society 
without prejudicing national security. They hosted a small conference of SEATO 
(the Philippines, United States, Australia and New Zealand) and non-SEATO 
(Laos, South Vietnam, Malaya and Singapore) countries. This was doubly useful. 
As well as helping define solutions to the shared problem, the conference 
encouraged future regional collaborations with broader participation than 
SEATO.155 To this end, SIFE allowed its Asian partners to direct discussions. The 
newly independent Federation of Malaya led a session on interrogation 
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techniques, whilst on the final two days, the Filipino delegation led discussion of 
resettlement problems.156 
 Britain’s effectiveness in developing international intelligence 
relationships was a mixed record. On the one hand, agencies such as SIFE were 
successful in arranging for top-level liaison with some coordination of direction 
with Western allies. They were yet more proactive in developing intelligence 
diplomacy through offering training assistance to newly independent Asian 
nations. However, beneath this veneer of cooperation there was little substantive 
information exchange. Britain and its Western partners were equally reluctant to 
engage in meaningful intelligence sharing because of conflicting national policies, 
mutual distrust and a chauvinistic attitude towards the safeguarding prowess of 
Asian security services. Ironically, these same services were at least partially 
trained by MI5. 
 These barriers to more fruitful multilateral liaison were not exclusive to 
SEATO. As shown by Chikara Hashimoto’s research, the Baghdad Pact in the 
Middle East suffered from similar problems. British agencies, particularly MI5, 
saw information security and effective vetting procedures as a fundamental 
prerequisite to intelligence cooperation. But in both the Baghdad Pact and 
SEATO, British experts did not rate the aptitude of local members at all highly. 
Any intelligence shared took the form of finished assessments carefully 
concealing the actual sources of intelligence. This security concern was 
compounded by differing perceptions of the threat. Whilst the Baghdad Pact was 
split over attitudes to non-communist subversive movements, SEATO was 
divided over how to respond to the Cold War. Political obstacles were also 
apparent between Britain and the United States, who had very different 
approaches to containing communism in Asia. Their divergence was typified by 
Britain’s diplomatic recognition of the PRC and Washington’s refusal to do so. As 
a result, most meaningful intelligence sharing was either on a bilateral basis or 
through lower-level channels such as the SEATO Research Service Centre.157 
This is indicative of a particular British attitude to multilateral intelligence liaison 
outside Europe: supportive of liaison in principle as a means of fostering anti-
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communist unity, but suspicious of liaison in practice for political and security 
reasons (the latter often being a mask for cultural prejudices). 
 
Summary 
 By August 1950, when Malcolm MacDonald held his first ‘Cold War 
Committee’ at Bukit Serene, the Cold War in Southeast Asia was beginning to 
evolve. The establishment of the PRC in 1949 and outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950 – although occurring in East Asia – had a noticeable impact on intelligence 
practices in Southeast Asia. As well as generating an urgent need for intelligence 
about China itself, the possibility of Chinese communist expansion gave added 
impetus to Britain’s policy of supporting a non-communist buffer zone in the 
upper arc of Southeast Asia. However, Britain lacked the capacity or the political 
will to follow through with major defence commitments. 
 Regional intelligence became more closely integrated under the auspices 
of the Commissioner General. It also became more intertwined with national 
foreign policy objectives. The growing complexity of the Cold War in Asia 
required the intelligence community to grow in scope and activity, although 
ventures into open source intelligence did little to upset the hierarchy of status 
which typified the existence of a regional-national intelligence community linking 
Singapore to London. Moreover, service intelligence departments increasingly 
took their lead from SIFE and SIS. At a conference of Far Eastern military 
intelligence representatives in March 1950, SIFE experts were called in to outline 
the situation and provide direction to guide military attachés’ intake of 
information.158 
 The alignment of regional and national actors is also apparent in how 
Singapore-based intelligence agencies provided an opportunity to aid in the 
implementation of foreign policy. Through proactive counter-subversion and 
intelligence diplomacy, agencies including SIFE and RIO supported British policy 
to encourage resistance to communism in the upper arc. They also aided local 
British regimes such as the Singapore colonial government by helping to disrupt 
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the flow of ideas from China. Providing assistance to Asian nations and working 
with Western allies in the clandestine sphere enabled Britain to engage with the 
Cold War whilst avoiding major commitments. Consequently, although 
intelligence diplomacy largely failed to improve intelligence collection due to the 
multiple obstacles to intelligence sharing, it was more successful as an avenue for 
supporting foreign policy.  
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
209 
 
6. Singapore security and communist subversion 
 The year 1950 ended with a pyrrhic victory for the Singapore Special 
Branch but a public failure for the police as a whole. This discrepancy speaks to 
an important issue in understanding the methods, culture and effectiveness of 
Special Branch during the 1950s: the primacy of their intelligence or policing 
functions. The arrest of the MCP Town Committee severely dislocated the 
communist underground but did not obliterate it. Like the hydra, the MCP regrew 
new structures and adapted. To prevent a return to the violent campaign of spring-
summer 1950, Special Branch needed to gather intelligence on this evolving threat 
and take action to enforce the rule of law. Their success does not necessarily 
imply that Special Branch had an effective security intelligence culture. As this 
chapter examines, many of their achievements were less the result of directed 
intelligence operations than mundane policing procedures complemented by good 
fortune. Moving against the Town Committee sacrificed important sources of 
intelligence. Further compounded by the shifting patterns of MCP organisation, 
the British administration remained in the dark about the communist underground 
for at least two years. 
 In fulfilling its functions, Special Branch was assisted by other security 
intelligence actors: SIFE and MI5. The mid 1950s saw major changes to how 
these agencies gave assistance to the colonies. In Singapore itself, SIFE removed 
the position of SLO. Instead they embedded officers within Special Branch to 
improve the intelligence culture of the police. Meanwhile, in the metropole, a 
landmark report on colonial security by General Sir Gerald Templer prompted the 
creation of an Intelligence and Security Department to make the Colonial Office 
more intelligence-minded. MI5 Head Office assisted through expanding its 
provision of training and advice, both of which benefitted Singapore directly. This 
increasing involvement by the regional-national community in local intelligence 
affairs was symptomatic of an appreciation of the differing intelligence culture 
between MI5 and Special Branch, as well as growing concern for their future 
access to intelligence. Decolonisation became as important an imperative as the 
Emergency in driving Singapore policy (and national policy towards Singapore) 
during this period. However, security was one area upon which the British were 
unwilling to compromise. The willingness of Lim Yew Hock to work with the 
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colonial government and share their security agenda was vital in facilitating the 
road to 1959. 
 These developments in intelligence occurred during a period of 
fundamental transition for Singapore. The first elections for an Executive and 
Legislative Council to assist the Governor were held in March 1948. Gimson’s 
administration was hindered in implementing political development by the 
Emergency, but under Governor John Fearns Nicoll (1952-55), Singapore 
embarked on more substantial progress towards self-government. In July 1953, 
Nicoll appointed a commission under Sir George Rendel to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the colony’s constitution. The commission’s report led 
to the inauguration of the Rendel Constitution in 1955 which replaced the 
Executive Council with a Cabinet-style Council of Ministers. A 32-person 
Legislative Assembly was formed, with 25 seats up for election. The largest party 
in the Assembly would take the six seats for elected representatives on the 
Council of Ministers (the rest being appointed by the Governor), and its party 
leader would serve under the Governor as Chief Minister. According to the 
Singapore historian C. M. Turnbull, the Rendel Constitution ‘was designed to 
stimulate an appetite for self-government among seemingly reluctant 
Singaporeans’. However, it had the effect of awakening and accelerating these 
desires at a greater pace than Britain anticipated.1 
 The election of April 1955 was won by the Labour Front, ensuring its 
leader David Marshall became the first Chief Minister. In April 1956, Marshall 
led a delegation to London for negotiations over Singapore’s next steps towards 
independence. However, unwilling to compromise on issues including the control 
of intelligence and security, Marshall’s mission failed and led to his resignation. 
The new Chief Minister, Lim Yew Hock, was more closely aligned with Britain 
over security, and reached a compromise agreement with London in March 1957. 
In August 1958 Britain passed the State of Singapore Act to transform the colony 
into a self-governing state with a high degree of domestic autonomy. Self-
government became a practical reality following the general election of May 
1959. 
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Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
211 
 
 During this transition, security intelligence attained even greater 
important. In 1956, MI5 described Singapore as ‘the colonial territory of vital 
importance to the United Kingdom in the Far East’.2 This importance was derived 
not only from Singapore’s position as a strategic base and administrative centre. 
Equally important were the rapid changes within Singapore’s borders which had 
implications for the broader conduct of British intelligence. The next two chapters 
examine how local, regional and national intelligence networks worked to combat 
the communist threat and bring about a peaceful decolonisation which would 
continue to meet Britain’s defence and intelligence requirements. This chapter 
focuses on the subversive threat of the MCP underground organisation from 1951-
55, as well as local manifestations of Cold War threats from around the region. 
Chapter seven looks more directly at the constitutional process, the communist 
united front and the party which emerged triumphant in 1959: the People’s Action 
Party. 
  
Patterns of intelligence organisation 
 During the first few years of the Emergency, the regional-national 
intelligence community had little direct involvement or interest in day-to-day 
developments in Singapore. The local intelligence machine operated with only 
minor interference, although it could – and did – liaise with MI5 representatives to 
draw upon their advice and expertise. The local intelligence community was 
distinct from the regional and national levels because of its hierarchical 
separation, the different working culture of Special Branch as part of the process 
of enforcing law and order, and its inwards-looking priorities. At the regional-
national level, security intelligence was less engaged with purely local issues, had 
to compete for influence with other intelligence activities, and was non-executive, 
focused on collating, assessing and disseminating intelligence. 
 However, the evolving situation in the early to mid-1950s required the 
regional-national intelligence community to keep pace. Intelligence actors became 
increasingly involved in the clandestine implementation of policy. The spectre of 
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decolonisation, and the continuing weakness of information collection, meant they 
became increasingly interested in local intelligence processes. Meanwhile, the 
local intelligence machine amended its focus and showed growing interest in 
external developments which had the potential to impact upon their remit. By the 
mid-1950s, therefore, there were signs of greater unity across the British 
intelligence system in Singapore. 
 Special Branch remained the main producer of local security intelligence. 
The principal sections dealing with the communist threat were the Chinese 
Internal and Chinese External sections. The former was primarily concerned with 
the MCP and was commanded by European officers in the early 1950s. In 
contrast, the Chinese External section was led by a locally-recruited officer, Khaw 
Kai Boh, from 1950-53. This section studied movements which had ties with 
communist China. Khaw was a Singapore-born Chinese who joined Field Security 
as an intelligence officer during the British Military Administration. During the 
MSS years he had specialised in investigating criminal secret societies such as the 
Ang Bin Huay triad. Khaw was the highest-ranking locally-recruited officer in 
Special Branch and was promoted to Director in August 1957.3 
 Other Special Branch sub-divisions included an English-Speaking 
Intelligentsia section, a Travel Control section and an Indian section led by the 
long-serving officer Ahmad Khan. Born in modern-day Pakistan, Khan started 
work as a part-time Arabic translator for the Singapore Special Branch in 1934 
until he was recruited by Alan Blades to help counter Japanese espionage. Unlike 
many European officers who escaped to India, Khan was captured during the 
Second World War. Following the restoration of British authority he joined MSS 
and then Special Branch.4 A broader base of recruitment than the rest of the 
(predominantly Malay and European) police contributed to Special Branch’s early 
successes in dealing with the MCP. In the 1930s, Special Branch recruited 
Chinese detectives who had previously been members of the MCP and could draw 
upon their unique knowledge of the communities which they needed to gather 
intelligence upon.5 Special Branch proved committed to training Asian officers to 
                                                            
3 FCO 141/14950, Khaw Kai Boh to Black, 5 October 1957. 
4 NAS 000150, Interview with Ahmad Khan, reel 1. 
5 NAS 001745, Interview with Nigel Morris, reel 2. 
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prepare them for leadership roles. Both Khaw Kai Boh and Ahmad Khan 
benefitted from intensive training in London with MI5 and the Metropolitan 
Police.6  
 Charting the activities of Special Branch during this period is possible 
because of the release of large volumes of their reports in the Migrated Archives. 
It is worth noting that these are mostly what may be termed ‘basic descriptive’ 
reports: Special Branch’s weekly, fortnightly or monthly summaries of events for 
dissemination to the services, SLO, police authorities or colonial government. 
This type of report commented on the current state of information known about 
the MCP and describe noteworthy events such as police raids. They rarely gave 
more analytical or speculative assessment of what this intelligence means. This is 
a key distinction between the reports disseminated by Special Branch and those 
distributed by SIFE and the JIC(FE). Arguably, Special Branch had less need to 
interpret their intelligence for their users. Because of their dual operational culture 
as an intelligence collector and police enforcement actor, they were themselves 
the primary authority for acting on their own intelligence. One could say that 
Special Branch had less need to convince its users of their interpretations: merely 
to keep them informed of their activities. 
 From November 1950 until August 1957, Special Branch was directed by 
Alan Blades. Blades had been responsible for counter-espionage in the pre-war 
Special Branch. Escaping to Ceylon during the war, he joined the Far Eastern 
Bureau of the Ministry of Information, and in 1946 was promoted to Assistant 
Director of MSS. Following the creation of the new Special Branch in 1948, he 
became its operational chief under the overall leadership of Nigel Morris. Blades 
became the longest-serving Director of the Singapore Special Branch during the 
Malayan Emergency period of 1948-60. He was described by his own deputy, 
Richard Corridon, as a man of great ability and integrity who believed 
communism to be inherently evil.7 A similar appreciation was held by Lee Kuan 
Yew, who recalled Blades as being ‘a tall, taciturn man with a white goatee and 
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glasses […] he was well aware of the dangers the communists posed, and 
probably thought I was too close to them for my own good’.8 
 Whilst Blades was a highly capable and experienced intelligence officer, 
well-suited to the leadership of Special Branch, his leadership was not without 
problems. During a major review of colonial security in 1955, General Templer 
criticised the Singapore Special Branch for being a ‘one-man show’ which lacked 
a full complement of senior officers.9  
 This was further complicated by the political context of ‘Malayanisation’, 
as the longest-serving officers were expatriates. In 1956 a Malayanisation 
Commission suggested that the police force could be ‘Malayanised’ within three 
years without loss of efficiency. Commissioner of Police Nigel Morris regarded 
this as absurd. As an average, the most senior local officers (such as Khaw Kai 
Boh) had nine years less experience than senior expatriates such as Blades or 
Khan.10 Political pressures to promote locally-recruited officers had to be 
balanced against the need for experience and efficiency.  
 Whilst the nature of Special Branch changed, the system for liaison 
between MI5 and the local security machinery also adapted to the evolving 
political situation. The established model of the Security Liaison Officer (SLO) 
was temporarily abandoned in Singapore and the Federation from 1954-56. 
H/SIFE Courtenay Young believed that the two primary functions of the SLO – 
providing advice to colonial governments and collating locally produced 
intelligence – were incompatible. SLOs were supposed to advise their attached 
Governments about the efficiency of the local intelligence machine upon which 
the SLOs were dependent for providing intelligence back to SIFE. The advisory 
and collation roles were therefore at odds, with SLOs deprived from unrestricted 
access to Special Branch files due to suspicions of MI5 interference.11 This 
emphasised the lack of organisational integration between the local and regional 
levels of intelligence. It also indicated a cultural distinction, as both levels were 
inherently suspicious of the other. This is unsurprising given the role of MI5 and 
                                                            
8 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story, p. 329. 
9 FCO 141/14867, Black to Lennox-Boyd, 6 August 1955. 
10 FCO 141/15295, Undated memorandum by Director of Personnel, ‘Malayanisation’, c. 1956. 
11 KV 4/425, Memorandum by Young, ‘The Basic Problems of SIFE Area Posts’, 25 September 
1953. 
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SIFE in canvassing support for the removal of MSS, in which many senior Special 
Branch officers had served. Meanwhile, local intelligence collection remained one 
of SIFE’s greatest hindrances. In response, Young removed the SLOs from 
Malaya and Singapore. Instead, SIFE officers were seconded directly to Special 
Branch from 1954 to create a more effective conduit of information and provide 
more productive assistance.12 
 This was underpinned by high-handed logic about the perceived 
distinction between security and political intelligence. Young argued that ‘it is 
idle to expect that any Special Branches out here, or indeed I should have thought 
anywhere, could reach the high standard of organisation and method achieved by 
the Security Service’. SIFE advice was seen as invaluable in persuading Special 
Branch officers to think ‘more like intelligence officers and less like policemen’.13 
Young’s comments showed that earlier MI5 attitudes about colonial intelligence 
still carried capital. From SIFE’s perspective, the intelligence culture of their 
organisation was fundamentally different from that of Special Branch. Ironically, 
it could be argued that the Singapore Special Branch was Britain’s most effective 
(if highly imperfect) security intelligence producer in the Far East. However, 
action taken to preserve government authority – rounding up the Town Committee 
– proved detrimental to the intelligence process. This alludes to an important point 
about the character of Special Branch. Its integral position within the police and 
colonial structure meant that its long-term intelligence functions were sometimes 
sacrificed for the sake of effective enforcement. SIFE and MI5 did not face this 
problem of conflicting priorities. Special Branch was a security intelligence 
agency, but one of different character to SIFE or MI5. 
 Young’s reorganisation achieved mixed results. The first SIFE officer 
implanted into Special Branch, Christopher Crace, struggled to achieve anything 
meaningful. First appointed to the Research section, after mismanagement and a 
lack of direction he was moved to the Chinese External section. Crace was tasked 
with producing a chart showing CCP contacts in Singapore. However, this was far 
from what Young had in mind, and Crace felt that ‘I cannot believe that I have 
                                                            
12 KV 4/425, Memorandum by Young, ‘The Basic Problems of SIFE Area Posts’, 25 September 
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13 KV 4/427, Memorandum by Young, ‘Intelligence Organisation’, 22 August 1955. 
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been of any use to SIFE and only of doubtful value to Special Branch’.14 This 
problem appears to have arisen from the use of SIFE liaison officers as another 
pair of hands doing ordinary Special Branch work. When SIFE advisors were 
allowed to fulfil their intended functions, their impact was more positive. 
Following the Templer report on colonial security in April 1955, the SIFE advisor 
helped Special Branch respond to Templer’s recommendations by helping to 
oversee rapid internal reorganisations.15 
 Young’s successor as H/SIFE, Dick Thistlethwaite, dispensed with this 
experiment and reinstated the SLOs.16 He thereby responded to growing 
metropolitan pressure to create a system whereby Britain would continue to have 
access to locally-produced security intelligence after self-government was 
inevitably conceded. The SLO designate for Singapore, R. C. Symonds, agreed 
that Malayanisation of the police was inevitable. Therefore it was advantageous to 
cement the position of the new SLOs, creating a form of liaison to which less 
objection could be raised than the previous system of embedding British 
intelligence officers in what would soon become a genuinely Singaporean Special 
Branch.17 Bill Magan, head of MI5’s counter-subversion E Branch, added the 
suggestion that SLOs be encouraged to duplicate Special Branch records in a 
separate card index to guard against a future rupture of liaison following 
decolonisation.18 Thistlethwaite hoped the restored SLOs would provide analysis 
of security intelligence which affected only their territory and thereby leave SIFE 
to concentrate on information of broader regional significance.19 This was a 
fundamental rejection of Young’s logic which tried to bridge the gap between the 
local and regional levels of assessment.  
 Back in the metropole, imperial security intelligence was scrutinised by 
the Templer report, published on 23 April 1955. As well as offering suggestions 
for individual colonies, Templer supported measures to instil more ‘intelligence-
mindedness’ within the Colonial Office. In Templer’s words, ‘security 
                                                            
14 KV 4/425, Memorandum by Crace, ‘Research Section of Singapore Special Branch’, 10 
September 1953. 
15 FCO 141/14867, Black to Lennox-Boyd, 6 August 1955. 
16 KV 4/427, Memorandum by Thistlethwaite, ‘SIFE’s Future’, 30 September 1955. 
17 KV 4/428, Memorandum by R. C. Symonds (SLO Designate, Singapore), ‘Note on the Proposed 
Reopening of a Security Liaison Office, Singapore’, 15 May 1956. 
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19 KV 4/428, Thistlethwaite to Magan, 10 May 1956. 
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intelligence has I think come to be regarded as a kind of spicy condiment added to 
the Secretariat hot-pot by a supernumerary and possibly superfluous cook, instead 
of being a carefully planned and expertly served dish of its own’.20 These 
criticisms were not too dissimilar to those levied by Courtenay Young against the 
Singapore Special Branch for behaving too much like policeman and not enough 
like intelligence officers. Templer extended this critique to the entire colonial 
establishment. As a result of Templer’s landmark report, a new Colonial Office 
Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) was created in London and measures 
were taken to better integrate the Colonial Office with the JIC. In addition, 
deputies were appointed to the Security Intelligence Advisor. This was an MI5 
officer appointed to the Colonial Office to fulfil similar functions to SLOs in 
individual colonies. Since 1954, the first incumbent was former SIFE counter-
espionage specialist Alec MacDonald. 
 However, the creation of ISD and strengthening of the MI5 presence 
within the Colonial Office did not have an immediate effect upon national 
intelligence. The Colonial Office remained reluctant to change, and bureaucratic 
tensions ensued. Colonial planners feared the reduction of complex and locally 
distinct problems to the JIC’s Cold War world-view.21  
 Nevertheless, ISD created more opportunities for metropolitan 
intervention in local intelligence organisation. In December 1955, Duncan Watson 
of ISD visited Singapore. He concluded that the counter-subversion organisation 
as a whole was too clandestine. He worried that there was a tendency to view 
counter-subversion as purely a security matter rather than something to which all 
branches of government could contribute in their everyday business.22 Singapore 
government saw counter-subversion as involving three areas: counter-propaganda, 
positive efforts to improve living conditions, and unattributable clandestine 
activities (including security intelligence gathering). However, the organisation 
                                                            
20 CAB 21/2925, Report on colonial security by General Sir Gerald Templer, 23 April 1955. 
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was mainly sub rosa and geared around the latter. Local officials did not believe 
that positive overt measures would have sufficient effect in time to be useful. In 
contrast, ISD placed greater emphasis on long-term education and counter-
measures which would gradually contain communist influence.23 This highlights 
the tension between the national view, where the Colonial Office could afford to 
take a long-term approach, and the pressure felt by local officials to provide 
security in the present. 
 The JIC(London) chairman, Patrick Dean, also visited Singapore in 
February 1956. In contrast to Duncan Watson, Dean emphasised the increasing 
importance of clandestine measures. His view embodied how the regional-
national intelligence community became increasingly involved in policy through 
propaganda, covert action and intelligence diplomacy. The Singapore Governor, 
by this point Robert Brown Black, was more worried about the implications of 
such measures for the constitutional process. Dean and the JIC(FE) chairman, 
Andrew Gilchrist, tried to mollify the Governor through explaining that Britain 
preferred grey to black forms of propaganda and covert action.24 Standing apart 
from Dean and Gilchrist, ISD endorsed the Governor’s view on the need for 
extremely delicate handling of clandestine activities.25 This disagreement was not 
an issue between the three levels of administration, but between intelligence 
actors across the three levels and their colonial consumers in Singapore and 
London. Intelligence officials remained more concerned with communism and its 
threat to both Cold War strategic concerns and imperial security, whilst colonial 
managers were more concerned with the uncertainty of political developments. 
 In April 1956, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, 
sent out instructions to Governors to review their intelligence machines. Lennox-
Boyd emphasised that the British government attached great importance to 
retaining influence after independence, and expected colonial administrations to 
help their SLOs build towards a stable future position.26 
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 In response, Governor Black reviewed the intelligence machinery in 
Singapore. He agreed that they needed to reform the assessments machinery to 
reflect the advanced constitutional state of Singapore and be more suitable for 
retention in a self-governing territory. To that end, the old Local Intelligence 
Committee was replaced with a new Singapore Intelligence Committee chaired by 
the Chief Secretary. This made twice monthly reports to the Governor and the 
elected Chief Minister, but – as agreed by Lim Yew Hock after he replaced the 
less amenable David Marshall – these would not be circulated to other elected 
ministers. Moreover, arrangements were made for other intelligence to be 
submitted privately to the Governor’s Secretary for when certain subjects were 
deemed unsuitable for the knowledge of the Chief Minister.27 Although Lim Yew 
Hock’s agenda was more closely aligned with the anti-communist goals of the 
British security regime, he was not completely trusted. 
 In addition to providing training and continuous liaison, MI5 Head Office 
also helped to coordinate metropolitan security initiatives. For example, in early 
1954, the JIC(London) voiced concern over the vulnerability of key buildings 
across the Empire to eavesdropping devices. MI5 acted on these concerns by 
instructing SLOs to conduct investigations in their respective colonies.28 
Following these investigations, the SLO in Singapore reported no signs of any 
Soviet or satellite intelligence activity of any sort, including eavesdropping. Little 
was known to MI5 or SIFE about the Chinese intelligence service, so they could 
not generalise about its organisation, methods or technical competence. So far, no 
local activities had come to light which could be directly attributed to a 
centralised intelligence organisation, despite long-term counter-intelligence 
investigations against the Bank of China (the natural cover for any PRC 
intelligence activity and only 400 yards from the government offices at Empress 
Place). The risk was assessed as slight.29 
 However, protective security remained an under-valued aspect of security 
intelligence until further prodding from MI5. In 1957, MI5 sent counter-sabotage 
expert Mr. Fenton to Singapore. Fenton was seconded to SIFE to provide advice 
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in this field to British dependencies and the newly independent Federation of 
Malaya.30 Special Branch agreed to appoint a serving officer as part-time counter-
sabotage officer for the Singapore government: something that the SLOs had been 
fruitlessly encouraging since the re-establishment of the post three years before. 
To carry out this decision, an Inspector T. T. Nathan was attached to Mr Fenton 
for training.31 In this regard, metropolitan intervention from MI5 helped SIFE and 
its SLOs introduce greater standardisation in security intelligence practices across 
the Empire. 
 The 1950s were a period of experimentation and change in security 
intelligence organisation. Whilst the Cold War threat remained constant, 
Singapore’s constitutional progress provided new political considerations. As the 
local intelligence machine came under pressure for ‘Malayanisation’, the regional-
national intelligence community became increasingly concerned with ensuring a 
continued flow of intelligence and promoting the development of a security 
intelligence culture more akin to their own patterns. As a result of these 
sometimes competing political and intelligence imperatives, Special Branch was 
gradually ‘Malayanised’, the SLO was removed and then reinstated, and the 
Singapore intelligence machine came under increasing national scrutiny. 
 
A war of attrition 
 Against this backdrop of shifting organisational patterns, local security 
operations continued to focus on the MCP. Special Branch struggled to recover 
from difficulties in intelligence production and remained largely in the dark as to 
the state of the communist underground. The successes they achieved against the 
MCP underground from 1951 are implicit of a working culture influenced as 
much by their status as a police division as by their composition as a security 
intelligence producer. Although Special Branch was creating security intelligence 
(contrary to what some high-handed MI5 officials believed), the way it was 
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generating and using that intelligence was different to regional-national security 
intelligence agencies. 
 Following the detention of the two remaining members of the Singapore 
Town Committee in December 1950, Special Branch continued their record of 
successful action against the MCP underground. On 4 January 1951, they arrested 
25 suspects connected with an English-speaking group of the ABL. This came to 
be known as the ‘university case’, and involved high-profile detainees including 
Devan Nair and James Puthucheary, who later became important figures in the 
communist open united front. Their arrest was the result of long-term Special 
Branch investigations into the production of MCP English language propaganda 
within the University of Malaya.32 
 This action was a timely reminder that the decentralised cell structure of 
the MCP was not easily crippled. Despite the arrest of the Town Committee, the 
threat of continued sabotage and violence, as well as the flow of propaganda, was 
undiminished. On 26 January 1951, the police raided an MCP communications 
centre on Queen Street in downtown Singapore. This was the result of a month-
long surveillance operation and tip-offs from secret sources. Diaries recovered 
from the scene proved this to be the hideout of a gang involved in acts of arson 
and identification card thefts. The Workers Protection Corps (also known by the 
Special Branch misnomer of ‘Special Service Corps’) evidently remained at 
large.33 
 Nevertheless, although the potential threat of terrorism remained unabated 
in the perceptions of the British administration, 1951 marked a lull in MCP-
inspired violence. The Secretary for Internal Affairs, J. C. Barry, attributed this to 
‘good information and firm action’: an effective intelligence processing machine 
and the efficient translation of this into enforcement operations.34 However, these 
two imperatives could sometimes be conflictual. Barry was under no illusions that 
this was anything but a ‘war of attrition’.35 Successful police action relied upon 
good intelligence, but taking action could mean the loss of future intelligence. 
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Detaining one of the members of the Singapore Town Committee in April 1950 
necessitated the sacrifice of valuable sources of information. The detention of the 
remaining members in December exacerbated this intelligence problem. Even 
though the Town Committee secretary, Ah Kim, began divulging information in 
April 1951, events had moved on since his arrest. The value of any intelligence he 
could give was limited.36 To some extent this was counteracted by the recruitment 
of the other Town Committee member, Guo Ren Huey, as a Special Branch asset, 
having a demoralising impact on the MCP underground. MCP propagandist Fong 
Chong Pik recalled how Party security became one of the most serious problems 
faced by the MCP in the 1950s and that treachery and leakages occurred 
frequently.37 Ironically, Fong probably over-estimated the capabilities of Special 
Branch at the time. Although they continued to secure useful tactical intelligence 
which enabled specific raids, they struggled to gather information about the 
overall make-up of the communist underground. In this regard, continuity with the 
earlier years of the Emergency is apparent. The year 1950 was the anomaly which 
saw Special Branch generating useful strategic intelligence about MCP intentions 
and capabilities. Both before and afterwards, they remained essentially reactive 
and reliant upon very confined tactical intelligence to maintain pressure on the 
communist organisation. As Colonial Secretary W. L. Blythe noted, ‘successful 
action, however, always tends to reduce, or destroy altogether, important and 
intimate sources of information and the course of the next resurgence of organised 
communist activity cannot necessarily be foretold and forestalled’.38 
 During this becalmed period, Special Branch enjoyed further success 
against the propaganda wing of the MCP. On 11 July 1951, they captured the 
Freedom Press in an isolated rural area. Alan Blades noted that this was no easy 
operation, involving difficult terrain for maintaining observation, and thus 
operations were necessarily hurried. As a result, only two people were arrested 
and the head of the Freedom Press unit, Eu Chooi Yip, was able to escape.39 Eu’s 
assistant, Fong Chong Pik, suspected that this raid was brought about through an 
MCP traitor tipping off Special Branch. However, he had no evidence to support 
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this judgement, and admitted it could equally have been the result of regular 
police surveillance noticing suspicious comings and goings.40 Recovering the 
physical printing templates and machines enabled Special Branch to produce their 
own issue of Freedom News with articles by MCP defectors as a form of counter-
propaganda.41 
 The figure of Eu Chooi Yip sheds light on the intelligence gaps faced in 
this period. Examination of documents seized in the Freedom Press raid led 
Special Branch to believe that he was a more important figure than previously 
suspected. They wondered whether Eu might be a new leader of the Town 
Committee.42 However, there was, in reality, no Town Committee, as the MCP 
never resurrected that system. The fact that Special Branch did not know this, and 
were still speculating as to whom could be Town Committee members into 1951 
and 1952, highlights the poor state of intelligence about the organisation of the 
MCP. 
 Indeed, an element of luck pervaded some of the notable Special Branch 
successes. Others were the result not of security intelligence operations but 
general preventative policing. On 11 June, an ordinary police radio patrol arrested 
a suspicious man who turned out to be Wong Fook Kwong, an MCP district 
leader who went by various aliases including Tit Fung or the ‘Iron Spearhead’.43 
 Whilst Special Branch appeared to know very little about the MCP, the 
MCP seemed to greatly improve its intelligence capabilities against Special 
Branch. In April 1952, a long-standing Special Branch informant was 
assassinated. The police blamed poor security in places of detention, from where 
they struggled to prevent detainees smuggling messages back to their comrades. 
Although the informant had out-lived his usefulness, his shocking murder was a 
signal that the British did not have a monopoly on security intelligence.44 In 
contrast to the situation in 1950, when MCP attacks were concentrated on high-
profile government figures or capitalist establishments, the police became the 
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major target for the Workers Protection Corps. This showed on the one hand the 
success of Special Branch in instilling fear of their intelligence potential within 
the MCP, but also the poor state of current intelligence as they were unable to 
prevent these attacks or round up those responsible. On 11 September 1952, a 
young communist sympathiser dropped a grenade into the car of Special Branch 
Chief Inspector Lau Siew Foo. Lau and two others were seriously injured 
although managed to recover. However, despite a $25,000 reward for information, 
the assailant escaped justice. Special Branch believed he had stowed away on a 
ship bound for Hong Kong, but this proved to be a false lead.45 
 This prevailing state of attrition began to change in autumn 1952. A 
random police spot-check of bus passengers on 12 November found a Chinese 
man acting nervously. On investigation, he was found to possess several MCP 
documents which led to the discovery of a major headquarters near Jurong Road 
in rural western Singapore.46 Raiding this address provided Special Branch with a 
vast array of documents, allowing them to piece together a picture of the MCP 
organisation for the first time since December 1950. At the same time, analysis of 
documents seized from a communist courier killed in Johore (Malaya) and bound 
for Singapore cast light on MCP intentions.47 
 The intelligence from these actions proved that, contrary to Special Branch 
suspicions, the Singapore Town Committee had never been reformed. Instead, the 
MCP operated its underground presence in Singapore through lower-level 
structures under the supervision of its Southern Bureau in Johore. The largest of 
these new organisations seemed to be a Singapore Town and Rural Directing 
Committee, a successor to the old District Committees which previously were 
subordinate to the Town Committee. The man arrested on the bus was one of the 
leaders of this organisation. Documents seized and translated by Special Branch 
showed that, since its inception in early 1952, the new committee had made little 
progress with its allotted tasks and suffered from poor morale. All this new 
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information was used to rebuild Special Branch’s personality charts and registry 
to prepare for future operations against the communist underground.48  
 In addition, the documentation seized in Johore in October 1952 showed 
that the MCP had considerably changed strategy since 1950. This decision was 
taken in a directive of October 1951, but British intelligence had previously been 
uncertain whether these ‘October directives’ had been transmitted to Singapore.49 
The courier documents confirmed that the Singapore branches of the Party were 
aware of and following central policy. This new communist campaign entailed 
greater awareness of the political nature of insurgency. In Singapore, this meant a 
turn away from mass violence in favour of a political struggle with only sporadic 
violent operations against the security forces. This central policy change 
explained the increased targeting of police officers and informers in 1952. 
Moreover, the Central Executive Committee advised separating the Workers 
Protection Corps, concentrated in the rural areas, from the political organisation in 
the city. Greater emphasis was placed upon the security of Party personnel and not 
attracting undue attention to long-term penetration efforts through short-term acts 
of violence.50 
 Throughout 1953, Special Branch continued to accumulate more 
intelligence about the MCP underground in Singapore. This enabled ever more 
effective action to be taken against these remnants of the pre-1950 organisation. 
However, there also remained inherent dangers in taking action against the 
communist underground. As the police became more successful in acting against 
the MCP, the Party moved further and further towards a decentralised and 
fragmented organisation, more resistant to police action. 
 Following the shooting of a police informant in January 1953, Special 
Branch rounded up eight members of a previously unknown MCP organisation 
known as ‘O’ District.51 Continuing analysis of incoming intelligence (mostly 
from captured documents or casual informants) showed that Tit Fung – the MCP 
leader arrested in June 1952 – was the commander of this ‘O’ District. Whilst this 
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should have been an important coup for Special Branch, the realisation of the 
importance of this detainee was marred by his sudden escape. Recovering from a 
bout of chronic tuberculosis in the hospital lock-up, the young Tit Fung was 
sprung from custody by a party led by a woman believed to be his mother.52 
 The breakthroughs of October-November 1952 relied largely upon luck 
and general policing. A year later, Special Branch achieved a more significant 
coup against the MCP by processing intelligence gathered from informants and 
surveillance operations. Assisted by their Federation counterparts, they carried out 
a week-long operation which netted four key arrests. Those arrested were the head 
of the Workers Protection Corps in Singapore, two female couriers linking 
Singapore to the MCP Southern Bureau, and a woman named Lam Wei Ling 
(alias Ah Shu), who was the current leader of the Town and Rural Directing 
Committee.53 
 From an extensive mass of documents uncovered in the course of these 
arrests, often tiny rolls of paper concealed in domestic items, Special Branch 
accumulated a more accurate appreciation of the communist underground. The 
underground then consisted of four main structures. The Town and Rural 
Directing Committee was best known to Special Branch. In addition, there was 
the ‘O’ District which used a structure of sub-branches instead of the standard 
communist cell structure. Thirdly, an ‘A’ District appeared to be an offshoot of 
‘O’ District about which little was discovered at this time. Finally, a revived 
Freedom Press unit was the smallest element of the communist underground. The 
total strength of this network was estimated at around 2000 persons, but only 30 
were full Party members. The majority were either ABL members, active 
sympathisers (who helped to collect subscriptions and distribute propaganda) or 
passive sympathisers (who just paid subscriptions).54  
 Following this new information, on 28 January 1954, the police detained a 
man named Wan Fung who had replaced Ah Shu as the overall leader of the MCP 
underground. His arrest was possible because of the methodical card index which 
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Special Branch had created using the intelligence gathered in 1952-53, providing 
a registry of all suspected communists and everything known about them.55 This 
was demonstrative of a sound intelligence process. Systematic interrogation of 
Wan Fung confirmed previous intelligence as well as revealing some of its 
deficiencies. Crucially, the MCP was left disorganised, with the Town and Rural 
Committee having collapsed following the arrests of October 1953. ‘O’ District 
had also been severely dislocated and reformed as a lower-grade ‘E’ Branch. 
Because of the fragmentation of the MCP, less was known about ‘A’ District, 
which was thought be focused on the penetration of education and the 
intelligentsia. The education field proved crucial to the MCP’s survival despite 
increasing police pressure.56  
 From 1954, the MCP underground network declined in importance, both 
for the communist movement itself and in the anxieties of British intelligence. 
Greater attention was devoted to CCP influences, as well as the growing 
‘communist front’ of penetrated trade unions, students’ organisations and political 
parties. This front movement was separate from the underground remnants of the 
MCP. As Singapore moved closer to self-governance following the inauguration 
of the Rendel Constitution in 1955, the open front held more potential than the 
beleaguered hard-core underground for achieving the MCP’s goals. 
 Moreover, Special Branch continued to pick off underground leaders as 
they gained the tactical intelligence to identify and locate them. On 9 July 1954, 
Tit Fung was re-arrested. Now in charge of Party communications with the 
Federation (and a drug addict), his detention and eventual deportation to China 
left the Singapore underground out-of-touch with the central organisation.57 A few 
days earlier, Sam Kung, the ‘E’ Branch secretary, had been arrested. Intelligence 
gained from his interrogation identified a mysterious ‘Comrade D’ as the latest 
Party leader in Singapore, and led to police raids upon three farms which Sam 
Kung had purchased as rural bases for the Party. In total, 30 pigs, 79 ducks and 33 
chickens were seized: not an inconsequential detail in the laborious Special 
Branch intelligence files, but a vital source of food to underground MCP 
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members.58 The identity of ‘Comrade D’ was finally established in December 
1954. He was a 24 year old student, expelled from the Chinese High School, 
named Ng Men Chiang (alias Chow Kong).59 The final decisive blow to the MCP 
underground was the arrest of the new secretary of ‘E’ Branch in March 1955. 
Neither ‘E’ Branch nor the remnants of the Workers Protection Corps recovered 
from this succession of leadership eliminations.60 Consequently, by the time of the 
inauguration of the Rendel Constitution, the MCP underground had been 
decisively dealt with. This enabled Special Branch and its partners to shift their 
focus to the communist front movement and its links to new nationalist parties. 
 As a footnote to this struggle against the communist underground, the 
leader of ‘A’ Branch (formerly ‘A’ District) was arrested on 1 February 1959. 
This leader was a 33 year old flower-seller named Woo Chong Poh. Under 
interrogation, Woo admitted to controlling an organisation of around 60 student 
and worker sympathisers, and his involvement in planning grenade attacks on 
police establishments in June 1956. Worryingly, 153 serviceable hand grenades 
were recovered following his arrest, even though the violent arm of the MCP had 
been inactive for some time. If the information Woo gave up in his interrogation 
can be relied upon, he had been in charge of ‘A’ District since its inception. 
Previously he had served in ‘O’ District under Tit Fung, but around 1952-53 
formed his own district after a personal quarrel.61 If nothing else, this is an 
interesting reminder that the ‘communist terrorists’ pursued relentlessly by an 
expansive British intelligence machine were mainly young men and women who 
were fuelled as much by personal passions and beliefs as by systematic 
indoctrination or foreign inspiration. Age was an important factor in policing 
Singapore, where approximately half the population were classified by the 
colonial authorities as ‘youths’.62 
 During the period of 1951-55, Special Branch struggled to move past the 
problems which plagued it from 1948-50. The arrest of the Town Committee and 
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loss of inside sources on the MCP was not counterbalanced by the increasingly 
out-of-date intelligence provided by its captured and defecting ringleaders. From 
1951 until autumn 1952, the local intelligence machine lost the initiative. Their 
intake of intelligence enabled a number of significant tactical successes, but often 
this was the result of chance or ordinary policing and not always testament to an 
excellent security intelligence culture. Only from 1953 did they produce 
consistently good intelligence about MCP organisation and intentions. Once this 
information began to be produced, Special Branch was well-placed to act upon it. 
However, in explaining the decline of MCP underground activity in favour of a 
united front strategy, Special Branch successes are just one factor. From October 
1951, the central Party authorities began enforcing a more cautious, politicised 
approach. The changing political and constitutional environment in Singapore 
seemed to hold greater opportunities for such an approach than for the previous 
violent methods adopted by the MCP. 
 
Special Branch methods and culture 
 The mixed record of Special Branch in producing security intelligence 
raises questions relating to their methods and culture. From 1951-53, very little 
was known about the MCP organisation in Singapore. Information was gained 
more from translating and examining captured documents than from recruiting 
agents within the MCP. In contrast, during the period before 1951, Special Branch 
had access to more secret and long-term sources of information. These documents 
were captured during raids which in many cases relied upon more quotidian police 
procedures or sheer good luck. Therefore, the extent to which Special Branch was 
an effective security intelligence instrument as well as being a mechanism for 
policing needs to be considered. 
 Special Branch attested that two of its greatest successes against the 
communist underground – the arrest of the Town Committee in December 1950 
and the discovery of the Jurong Road headquarters in November 1952 – were the 
result of preventive policing. Following the arrest of one Town Committee 
member in April 1950, Special Branch lost important active sources. An 
unexpected lead in December enabled the prompt arrest of the surviving 
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committee members (although there remains much uncertainty regarding the 
precise circumstances entailed). Likewise, in November 1952, a regular police 
spot-check uncovered the vital evidence which led to the MCP communications 
centre.63 Although this speaks of an efficient, quick-acting police force, it could 
also imply that H/SIFE Courtenay Young was justified in regarding the working 
culture of Special Branch to be less like an intelligence agency and more like a 
police force. 
 Even after Special Branch succeeded in piecing together a picture of the 
MCP underground by the end of 1953, this did not mean that all subsequent 
successes flowed from intelligence production. The major enforcement operation 
which netted the arrests of Tit Fung and Sam Kung in June-July 1954 resulted 
from MCP over-reach and responsive policing. On 25 June 1954, five Workers 
Protection Corps activists attempted to extort $10,000 from a local businessman. 
This was not dissimilar to MCP policy in 1950, extorting funds under threat of 
sabotage or assassination. Immediate police action secured the arrest of two of the 
extortionists on the spot. Follow-up operations snared the remaining three 
conspirators as well as sixteen other suspects. Subsequent operations led police to 
Sam Kung and Tit Fung.64 
 In this instance, Special Branch benefited from a sound system of policing 
which enabled the first two members of the extortion gang to be immediately 
detained. From the evidence available, it would seem that follow-up operations 
relied upon clues found on their persons or information revealed under 
interrogation. Whilst interrogations are an important source of security 
intelligence, they are equally part of the ordinary criminal investigation procedure. 
The extent to which Special Branch, in this operation, acted any different from the 
CID appears limited. Security intelligence, as understood by its main British 
practitioners, MI5 and SIFE, involved a specific process or intelligence cycle. 
Because Special Branch was also part of the police enforcement procedure, an 
intelligence cycle involving separate stages of collection, analysis and 
dissemination does not seem appropriate for their activities. It is understandable 
that organisations such as MI5 frequently implied that colonial or political 
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intelligence were not the same as security intelligence. However, these definitions 
were also inherently linked to power relations and must be approached with 
caution. The processed information which Special Branch was producing was 
unequivocally security intelligence vital to the national security of Singapore. 
Admittedly it was at the same time political intelligence integral to colonial 
supremacy. The ways in which this intelligence was produced, however, form the 
greatest distinction between their operational culture and that of MI5 or SIFE. It is 
therefore not helpful to draw a rigid distinction between security and political or 
police intelligence, but rather to interrogate the relationships between different 
activities within the overall security intelligence sphere. 
 Although the distinction between policing and intelligence in Special 
Branch activities is somewhat unclear, other factors explaining their increasing 
success from 1953 are more transparent. One of the most important factors was 
the improving cooperation between the Singapore Special Branch and their 
counterparts in the Federation of Malaya. When Sir John Fearns Nicoll arrived as 
Governor of Singapore in April 1952, he faced criticism from the Federation for 
not doing more to prevent the sending of food supplies to insurgents in Johore. 
Nicoll strengthened the Special Branch presence on the Johore Straits and 
reorganised police launch patrols. In August 1952 he agreed to loan five Special 
Branch officers to the Federation at the request of General Templer, even though 
this considerably weakened the Singapore police.65  
 This was a significant period in the development of an effective 
intelligence system over the causeway in the Federation. Following the 
dissolution of MSS in 1948, the Federation Special Branch faced greater 
difficulties than its Singapore counterpart in becoming operationally effective. 
This was partly a result of the very different operating conditions they faced. 
Equally, the development of the Federation Special Branch was hindered by 
confused lines of authority: they reported to the Commissioner of Police, but were 
also subject to oversight from the High Commissioner’s Director of Intelligence. 
When Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner and Director of 
Operations in 1952, he enacted reforms to separate Special Branch from ordinary 
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CID investigations and to engender greater coordination between Special Branch 
and service intelligence. As previous historians have argued, the Federation 
Special Branch only started becoming really effective as a result of Templer’s 
reforms from 1952.66 
 Consequently, Singapore’s decision to support Templer by seconding 
experienced Special Branch officers was a significant show of support. Whilst the 
Federation Special Branch had been floundering for some time, its Singapore 
equivalent had enjoyed a great deal of tactical success. Although the available 
records do not reveal how this assistance was received in Kuala Lumpur, it can be 
presumed that sharing this experience during an important period of 
transformation was a welcome gesture of goodwill. Concurrently, Templer’s 
newly appointed Director of Intelligence, Jack Morton, worked from Kuala 
Lumpur to engender greater cooperation. Morton had served as H/SIFE until 
1952, and consequently was keen to promote solutions which crossed territorial 
boundaries. Morton proposed that the two Special Branches formulate a joint plan 
for penetration of the MCP. This was deemed impractical due to the two different 
situations (communist insurgency and communist subversion). However, other 
initiatives proved more successful. These included the posting of liaison officers 
between the Singapore Local Intelligence Committee and its Federation 
equivalent.67 
 With reference to this increasing cooperation between Kuala Lumpur and 
Singapore, the Governor of Singapore praised the cooperation between police 
headquarters. Nevertheless, he argued that it did not go deep enough. He wrote of 
a need for officers to know each other personally, to meet frequently, and to know 
what each side is doing in the field. Nicoll deprecated ‘the deeply ingrained habit 
in Malaya of everyone working in his own watertight compartment’, exacerbated 
by ‘antagonism at official as well as unofficial levels between Singapore and the 
Federation’.68 
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 The immediate results of improving cooperation were twofold. Firstly, 
police cooperation helped to disrupt the MCP underground in Singapore by 
cutting off their lines of communication with the Federation. Documents seized 
from the Jurong Road interrogation centre showed that seaborne communications 
between the Town and Rural Directing Committee and Johore had been cut off for 
several months.69 This left the Singapore communist underground reliant on land 
communications across the Johore-Singapore causeway. These were easier to 
police due to a system of identity card checks. Such communications routes were 
coordinated by Tit Fung; the re-arrest of whom in July 1954 effectively severed 
communications between the MCP remnants in Singapore and Malaya for at least 
six months.70 
 In addition, improving cooperation between the two Special Branches 
enabled more timely exchange of intelligence of mutual interest as well as the 
implementation of joint operations. This included sharing intelligence seized from 
the courier killed in Johore on 17 October 1952, which enabled the Singapore 
Special Branch to better understand MCP motives in curbing their violent 
activities. These had previously been attributed to local necessity whereas they 
were also a response to centrally-mandated policy.71 In October 1953, the 
operation which removed MCP Singapore leader Ah Shu was a joint endeavour 
between the Singapore and Federation Special Branches. In a previous incident of 
summer 1952, the Federation Special Branch seconded an officer to Singapore to 
continue the hunt for an important MCP leader, Lee Meng, who had evaded them 
in Johor Baru (the Federation-Singapore border town). Cooperation between the 
two Special Branches resulted in Lee Meng’s arrest in Singapore, and helped the 
Singapore Special Branch progress its investigations against Ah Shu, the 
Singapore communist leader who was later arrested in 1953.72 Improving liaison 
was therefore a significant ingredient in the increasing success of both the 
Federation and Singapore Special Branches. 
 Another factor which helps to explain the success of Special Branch in 
keeping a lid on underground activities is that of the extensive powers available to 
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them. William Cheng, a Deputy Superintendent in Special Branch, recalled that 
Special Branch had significant power and influence in the colony. They had direct 
access to the Governor (the highest authority), who would invariable heed their 
advice and authorise whatever operations were deemed necessary. To some 
extent, the tremendous powers of search and detention which were granted under 
Emergency Regulations were a source of fear and deterrence amongst their 
enemies. However, after 1959, Special Branch had to report to both a locally-
elected cabinet and an Anglo-Malayan-Singaporean Internal Security Council, 
which was less automatically receptive of their views.73 
 Whilst some aspects of Special Branch work closely resembled their 
police functions, in other ways, they developed an effective and recognisable 
security intelligence process. Richard Corridon was one of its highest-ranking 
officers under the directorships of Alan Blades and Khaw Kai Boh. In an oral 
history testimony, Corridon recalled the methods used by Special Branch to 
combat the MCP. Their typical modus operandi involved long-term surveillance 
operations supplemented by attempts to recruit agents or informants. Once a 
suspect was arrested, they would be rigorously interrogated, commonly using 
psychological methods including sleep deprivation. This would provide further 
information to be fed into the Special Branch intelligence registry to guide future 
operations.74 
 The interception of correspondence provided an additional method of 
intelligence-gathering. Since the start of the Emergency, telephone tapping against 
political parties was widespread. Special Branch also had detectives within the 
Post Office to conduct postal scanning and interception. Corridon remembered 
one Indian detective who was exceptionally gifted at re-sealing letters, but was 
later found to be using his talents to steal money from envelopes. In Corridon’s 
view, postal and telephone interception was more reliable than agent testimony at 
providing evidence to justify enforcement action.75 
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 Interrogations were a vital part of the intelligence process.76 However, as 
Singapore moved towards self-government, these activities came under increasing 
political scrutiny. As Chief Minister, David Marshall had curtailed the more 
excessive powers of the police by repealing some of the Emergency Regulations, 
such as those giving wide powers to impose curfew. However, following an 
upsurge in what Special Branch depicted as communist-directed subversion in 
1955, Marshall was forced to introduce a new Preservation of Public Security 
Ordinance. This restored many of the powers previously held by Special Branch 
and the police, with one noteworthy caveat. Previously Special Branch powers of 
detention were subject only to the oversight of the executive branch of the 
colonial government. A panel of inquiry consisting of three judges was created to 
provide judicial review. This panel had the power to overturn detention orders and 
compel the immediate release of those detained if they felt that releasing them 
would not prejudice the defence or internal security of Singapore.77 However, 
from the incomplete archival evidence relating to the operation of this mechanism, 
it does not appear that the judicial committee exercised their powers at all 
frequently. 
 Following a visit to its headquarters on Robinson Road in 1957, the Chief 
Justice praised Special Branch for their work, but questioned the conditions of 
cells they used in the Central Police Station. These seemed very hot and dark, and 
prisoners were only given 15 minutes exercise a day. The Chief Justice was told 
that uncooperative detainees could be kept in these conditions for three to six 
months, and were sometimes awakened for night interrogations. He denounced 
these as the least agreeable prison cells he had seen in his experience in many 
colonies, but appreciated that ‘the kid glove is not an adequate weapon to employ 
when fighting the menace of Communism’. Overall, the Chief Justice was 
satisfied that:  
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I do not believe that brutality takes place in these cells and if, as I am told 
is the case, the knowledge of the Special Branch is materially increased as 
a result of vigorous interrogation of detainees, whose resistance, no doubt, 
is lowered by Spartan living conditions, the end achieved is worth the 
somewhat unpleasant methods employed in getting it.78  
This ruling is symptomatic of the very limited oversight exerted by the colonial 
judiciary over the powers of Special Branch, even during the period of the Rendel 
Constitution. However, as the next chapter shows, once this scrutiny of Special 
Branch interrogation methods entered the public sphere, the police had to deal 
with potentially greater ramifications.  
 Overall, a number of factors contributed to Special Branch successes 
against the communist underground in Singapore. On the one hand, they 
benefitted from good fortune and the fruits of a sound system of preventive 
policing. Conversely, they demonstrated increasing prowess at security 
intelligence methods such as agent recruitment, interrogation and both human and 
technical surveillance. Special Branch was both a police and an intelligence 
agency, and its working culture reflected a hybrid of these two influences. 
Moreover, the operational environment in which they worked was broadly in their 
favour. The particular geography of Singapore, consisting of rural outskirts and a 
densely populated urban centre could be both a hindrance and a help. On the one 
hand, it was harder to conduct long-term surveillance in the rural areas, to which 
the communist underground increasingly fled as the city was left to the united 
front movement. But conversely, this left the communists increasingly isolated. 
The political environment of the Emergency Regulations gave the police, 
including Special Branch, extensive powers. Perhaps most importantly, Singapore 
was an island, and there were only two ways the Singapore MCP could 
communicate with the Party hierarchy in the Federation: over the causeway or by 
boat. Improving coordination between the Singapore and Federation helped to 
sever these communications, leaving the Singapore MCP ever more vulnerable as 
Special Branch kept picking off its leaders. Special Branch were still primarily 
reactive, but succeeding in keeping a lid on the level of MCP activity using the 
same methods they had used in Operation Bulldog in 1948-49.  
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Local ramifications of regional problems 
 In addition to countering MCP underground activity, security intelligence 
agencies also had to monitor local manifestations of bigger regional and global 
problems. Singapore experienced a minor spy scare in October 1951 when the 
SLO realised that one Ivan Krotov, due to arrive for a meeting of the UN 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, was implicated in the Gouzenko 
affair in Canada. Krotov had been a Commercial Counsellor in Ottawa, but was 
revealed by Igor Gouzenko, who defected in September 1945, to be an 
intelligence officer known as ‘the Economist’. MI5 did not feel this was of any 
special significance, but officials in Singapore disagreed.79 
 The Secretary for Internal Affairs, J. C. Barry, argued that if the press 
found out Krotov’s identity, it could be very embarrassing for Britain. He noted 
that: 
Whilst it is probably true to say that all Iron Curtain representatives are 
spies, we could be accused of being unreal in our anti-communist efforts if 
we admitted a man who has been proved to have been actively engaged in 
subverting Commonwealth nations in the course of his espionage activities 
in a Commonwealth country.80 
This comment is interesting on a number of levels. Firstly, Gouzenko’s indictment 
hardly amounted to proof that Krotov was a spy. Coupled with Barry’s assertion 
that all Soviet bloc representatives were spies, this represents Cold War paranoia 
rather than foreign policy realism. Overall, it is suggestive of an overblown spy 
scare fuelled by fantastical perceptions of ubiquitous Soviet espionage and fear of 
a public scandal. Singapore does not appear to have been a major target for Soviet 
intelligence operations. The records brought to Britain by the Soviet defector 
Vasili Mitrokhin in 1992 showed that, in 1973, the KGB budget for its Singapore 
residency was only 22,600 roubles. In comparison, Japan was budgeted 203,100; 
India 204,600; and Indonesia 72,800.81 Of course, these figures represent a period 
when Britain had withdrawn most of its intelligence and defence interests (the 
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JIC(FE) was wound down in 1971) and Singapore was no longer such an 
important intelligence centre as in the 1950s. 
 In 1951, Krotov was allowed to enter Singapore. In fact, he made a most 
favourable impression upon the local press, which noted the debonair appearance, 
good humour and generous tipping of the spy-turned-grain-expert.82  As The 
Straits Times recounted, the closest thing to a spy scandal during Krotov’s three-
week sojourn was when one reporter ambushed ‘the master spy’ in his hotel 
dining room to ask a leading question about his past in Ottawa. This high-stakes 
drama culminated in another Soviet representative having a quiet word with the 
British reporter, complaining that he had spoiled Mr Krotov’s breakfast.83  
 More seriously, the Singapore Special Branch treated the CCP as a greater 
potential threat than the MCP. This was because of the ideological pull factor of 
China and greater resources available to the PRC if they should decide to embark 
on state-sponsored subversion or espionage. 
 Under the leadership of Alan Blades, Special Branch remained in close 
contact with SIFE headquarters regarding investigations into suspected agents of 
the Chinese government. These were not necessarily intelligence assets, but 
usually trade representatives whose motivations required investigation. In the 
early 1950s, Special Branch also liaised directly with the Secretary for Special 
Duties at the Indonesian Consulate-General. They shared intelligence about the 
traffic through Singapore of Chinese representatives journeying to Indonesia. It 
has already been shown that Indonesia was one of SIFE’s closest foreign partners 
in this period, but it is interesting that Special Branch maintained independent 
liaison relations with the Consulate-General. After all, similar activity had 
contributed to earning MSS a reputation for meddling in SIFE affairs.84 
 As the principal window on the PRC, Hong Kong also played an important 
role in monitoring manifestations of communist Chinese influence in Singapore. 
Furthermore, given the problems encountered in Hong Kong of Guomindang 
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intelligence operations, Taiwan was also a target of interest. On 9 April 1951, the 
Singapore Special Branch acted upon information received from the Hong Kong 
SLO to detain a man named Kong Jie Siong. Kong was a former Guomindang 
intelligence officer who – according to the SLO’s report – had defected to the 
PRC and was being sent as their station chief in Singapore. However, upon his 
arrest and interrogation, Kong admitted nothing beyond his former membership of 
Guomindang intelligence. The only compromising evidence found upon him was 
the name of a PRC intelligence agent in Djakarta (the identity of whom was 
known to Special Branch through their exchange of information with Indonesia). 
Whilst local Guomindang sources corroborated the Hong Kong reports about 
Kong’s defection, Special Branch believed it more likely that he was simply an 
ex-Nationalist agent who had incurred their animosity by refusing to continue 
working for them. They attributed the episode to the Guomindang’s expertise at 
disinformation and desire for revenge against the retired spy.85 
 Locally, the Singapore administration tried to understand and classify 
different groups within the ethnic Chinese population. This form of administrative 
information can be truly termed ‘political’ rather than ‘security’ intelligence. 
Unlike Special Branch information, its purpose was not to understand specific 
security threats but to enable better understanding of the governed population, 
thereby contributing to the efficiency of colonial rule. Such intelligence 
procedures rested upon a racialist ideology endemic to the imperial system. 
 In 1954, 69% of the ethnic Chinese population of Singapore were of 
British nationality, and 31% were aliens. However, the LIC did not find this 
classification helpful. They found it more useful to think beyond nationality and 
divide the Chinese based on a cultural definition. This was a split between those 
Chinese who identified culturally and politically as Singaporean or Malayan 
versus those who remained culturally Chinese and showed no signs of integration 
into the nation. It was the latter who constituted what the British called the 
‘overseas Chinese’, and they greatly outnumbered the ‘Malayanised Chinese’ who 
were mainly confined to the professional and educated classes. This was seen to 
be a matter of Chinese racial pride, which the colonial administration did not 
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regard as entirely equivalent with Western understandings of nationalism or 
patriotism.86 
 This non-Malayanised ‘overseas Chinese’ population was further 
classified into four main groups. The Guomindang group remained loyal to the 
Taiwanese regime and was most virulently anti-communist. A commercial group 
remained culturally Chinese to the core but had less political ties with China, and 
was prepared to be ‘Malayan’ in an economic sense. An intellectual group was 
described as the most left-wing and least Chinese-minded, since their leftist ideas 
originated from the West (a very questionable assertion). Finally, the artisan 
classes were seen as largely apolitical. According to the LIC, probably the biggest 
influence on the silent majority of local Chinese was the commercial group. These 
business leaders identified with the colony of Singapore in an economic sense and 
were supportive of the British administration for commercial reasons, but did not 
identify with the Commonwealth as a whole or Malaya more broadly. They were 
motivated primarily by self-interest.87 These classifications can be compared with 
the views espoused by intelligence practitioners from the likes of the JIC and CIA 
about the psychology of Chinese agents. It would appear that an imperialist 
world-view was endemic which depicted the Chinese as avaricious, selfish and 
untrustworthy. The Far Eastern intelligence efforts of the Western powers in the 
Cold War cannot be divorced from the legacies of imperialism and prevalent 
attitudes to race. 
 Whilst such ‘political’ intelligence sought to better understand the identity 
of the Singapore Chinese population (albeit through applying sweeping 
prejudices), ‘security’ intelligence focused on the influence of the CCP and 
official PRC institutions. During the 1950s, it did not appear that the CCP had any 
local structure in Singapore. Nevertheless, as Special Branch noted, ‘it is difficult 
not to exaggerate the potential threat of a political party which has no organisation 
in Singapore. Objectivity is almost impossible where so much depends on 
speculation’.88 Neither MI5 nor local intelligence services had any firm 
                                                            
86 FCO 141/14579, LIC paper, ‘The position and attitude of the overseas Chinese in Singapore’, 12 
April 1954. 
87 Ibid. 
88 FCO 141/14578, Supplement no. 2 to Singapore Police Intelligence Journal February 1954, 
‘Influence of Communist China in Singapore’. 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
241 
 
information about the organisation, targets or methods of the communist Chinese 
intelligence agency. Although a number of so-called CCP ‘agents’ had been 
deported from Singapore, there was little evidence to suggest these were any more 
than trade representatives. The Bank of China had a section collecting economic 
intelligence about Southeast Asia from its Singapore headquarters, and it was 
believed probable that this was used as a cover for other intelligence activities.89 
 Consequently, further investigations were initiated against the Bank of 
China. As aforementioned, MI5 and Foreign Office anti-bugging experts found no 
evidence that the Bank was being used to tap into the nearby government offices. 
Overall, there was little evidence that the Bank constituted a present security 
threat. However, due to its semi-official status, large supply of funds and control 
over all local trade with China, the Bank was regarded as a serious potential threat 
due to the disruption it could cause if doing so would serve PRC policy. Secret 
sources indicated that Bank staff had been subjected to political indoctrination 
since December 1950. Present sources of information were deemed to be 
inadequate, making the Bank of China a high priority intelligence target.90 
 All these investigations into PRC officials and institutions appeared to 
show that communist China was not directly undertaking activities which posed a 
security threat. However, the pull factor of ‘Red China’ was regarded as a 
dangerous ideological influence upon young ‘overseas Chinese’ in the colony. 
Special Branch was perennially worried about students departing for further study 
in China and returning as indoctrinated revolutionaries.  
 The problem of students returning to China necessitated rapid Special 
Branch intervention when the daughter of a Johore Councillor absconded to Hong 
Kong in June 1951 along with a group of five other girls. The head of the Chinese 
External section, Khaw Kai Boh, was sent to Hong Kong to conduct a thorough 
investigation.91 After Khaw returned with the six girls, it was decided to detain 
and interrogate the four eldest (not the Councillor’s daughter). As an aside, the 
Hong Kong police ran afoul of the Singapore administration by booking 
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expensive air travel back to Singapore. The parents of the children only offered to 
pay for their return fares if they were willing to return; since the girls were all 
unwilling, Singapore Special Branch had to foot the bill.92 
 In their statements, all the girls denied any CCP or MCP sympathies or 
any knowledge of these organisations. They all claimed that nobody had incited 
them to go to China, and denied knowledge of any body encouraging students to 
return. They corroborated each other’s statements and all claimed to have been 
attracted by a better standard of education, making their decision of their own 
volition. One 19 year old girl, Chen Pui Yeng, stated that ‘I am not interested in 
politics. My sole purpose for going back to China was to continue my studies. I 
hope you can see my point. What future is there for me in Malaya?’93 
 Evaluating these interrogation reports, Khaw Kai Boh was convinced that 
the girls were telling the truth. He was inclined to believe their testimonies, which 
were not broken down by thorough cross-examination, and did not believe the 
girls to be the ‘indoctrinated type’. They seemed to be more childish and 
misguided. Khaw attributed their reckless decision to the general situation 
whereby admiration for China as a spiritual homeland was widespread in 
Singapore, rather than any feelings for the communist regime. This would 
correspond with the administration’s ideas about the majority of the ‘overseas 
Chinese’ identifying with China in the cultural sphere. As such, Khaw 
recommended releasing the girls, and argued for better counter-propaganda to 
eradicate this prevailing state of mind amongst Chinese students.94 
 China was not the only regional security threat with ramifications for local 
intelligence operations. Although at the start of the decade Indonesia was an 
important intelligence partner for SIFE and Special Branch, within a few years it 
was a growing intelligence threat. In November 1953, the JIC(FE) reviewed 
Indonesian policy towards Malaya. This was agreed to be driven by anti-
colonialist ideology, geographic proximity, racial and religious ties, and economic 
interests. However, the JIC(FE) concluded there was no evidence of any 
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coordinated policy in support of a ‘Greater Indonesia’, and did not expect this to 
become an issue for the foreseeable future.95 
 Anglo-Indonesian relations deteriorated rapidly. From 1958, Britain and 
the United States were involved in giving covert aid to a rebel movement in 
Indonesia’s Outer Islands. Against this dangerous background, on 5 February 
1959, a Malacca-born Malay named Mustafa bin Derawi was arrested on 
suspicion of conducting espionage for the Indonesian Consulate-General. Mustafa 
was found with a miniature camera and tape recorder, wrist-watch microphone 
and other espionage equipment. He claimed to be acting on instructions from the 
Indonesian Military Attaché, Captain Soetopo, and spying on E. S. Pohan, the 
rebel government’s ‘Ambassador at Large’. Two days before, Mustafa had 
informed Special Branch that Pohan planned to kidnap the Consul-General with 
the aid of Chinese secret societies; he then proceeded to tell the same story the 
other way round to Pohan. He claimed to have recruited sub-agents comprising of 
two taxi drivers, two reporters and a Malay Police Constable.  Special Branch 
surmised that Mustafa was a pathological liar but there was some basis to believe 
his claims of being recruited as a spy. He was in possession of an Indonesian 
passport made out on 30 October, and a diary containing the names of various 
officials of the Consulate-General. Previously he had been a ‘mischievous’ 
journalist.96 Most likely, Mustafa had indeed been recruited by Indonesian 
intelligence but proceeded to invent agents and activities in a manner reminiscent 
of Graham Greene’s Our Man in Havana.  
 Mustafa’s story was given credence by recent reports from the SLO. In 
late 1958, intelligence reached the British that the Indonesian Consulate-General 
was increasing its intelligence activities and was attempting to recruit more agents 
to cover rebel activities in Singapore. Members of Indonesian intelligence were 
reported to be feeding information to Special Branch to try to discover how far 
they were interested in Indonesian affairs.97 
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 Consequently, in understanding the development of local security 
intelligence operations in the 1950s, it is necessary to move beyond the inwards-
facing dimension. Regional problems such as the threats from China and 
Indonesia also had internal manifestations within Singapore, and these required a 
high degree of cooperation between local, regional and national intelligence 
agencies. In contrast to the situation of 1948-49, this cooperation appears to have 
functioned well throughout the 1950s. Therefore, as well as providing advice (or 
interference) designed to improve the ‘intelligence culture’ of Special Branch, 
MI5 and SIFE played a valuable role in assisting in the process of intelligence 
collection, analysis and direction by helping to identify targets of interest and 
collating pertinent information from across their networks. Just as the expanding 
Cold War in the 1950s had major implications for the activities of the regional-
national intelligence community, it also diluted the inwards-oriented, MCP-
focused priorities of the local intelligence community. Due to increasing 
cooperation and even organisational penetration (when Young planted SIFE 
officers directly into Special Branch), as well as an increasing level of shared 
targets and priorities, the local and regional-national intelligence communities 
became more unified during this period. Perhaps the most marked difference 
between them remained their differing intelligence cultures, and the implications 
this had (or perhaps more accurately, the implications which MI5 and SIFE 
wanted it to have) for their status. 
  
Summary 
 During the 1950s, British security intelligence faced a number of problems 
in Singapore. By far the largest was the threat of subversion and violence by the 
MCP underground organisation. Counteracting this threat was primarily the 
responsibility of Special Branch. In carrying out its duties, Special Branch 
enjoyed a mixed record of success. From 1951-53, only sporadic intelligence was 
gathered about the MCP underground, making targeted and sustained operations 
very difficult. However, from October 1953, a more complete picture of the 
communist network was established. This enabled Special Branch to more 
effectively target communist leaders and ensure the permanent dislocation of the 
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MCP underground by 1955. As a result, the Party never recovered, and 
henceforward the threat from united front movements became a greater concern 
for Special Branch. This new challenge, and the problems it caused for the 
peaceful decolonisation of Singapore, is examined in the next chapter. 
 Special Branch evolved a particular operational culture during this period. 
Their methods were primarily those of surveillance, interrogation and – less 
frequently – the recruitment of agents or informers. These enabled Special Branch 
to establish a registry of suspected communist sympathisers to guide future 
operations. Earlier in the decade, they were dependent on luck or ordinary 
policing for vital leads that unearthed communist cells or communications centres. 
However, once its intelligence archive was better established, Special Branch 
came increasingly to resemble a mature security intelligence organisation, adept at 
both the intelligence production cycle and in implementing intelligence-led 
policing. Nevertheless, the core collection problem which had plagued Special 
Branch in the late 1940s remained equally pertinent. They continued to be on the 
defensive, able to deliver useful tactical intelligence to enable operations which 
kept a lid on more violent communist activities, but struggled to achieve sustained 
strategic intelligence which would have enabled more decisive action against the 
MCP. 
 The regional and national levels of intelligence also played a significant 
role in the security intelligence machine in Singapore. SIFE and MI5 tried to 
improve the intelligence culture in Special Branch, and also provided access to 
alternative sources of intelligence which could aid in understanding key targets 
such as communist China, international communism, or, as will be seen in the 
next chapter, Lee Kuan Yew. This was particularly pertinent in light of the local 
repercussions of regional problems. These problems showed the value of the 
three-tier system of intelligence organisation, and this period saw increasing unity 
across a broader British intelligence community due to a shared awareness of the 
interaction between internal and external security threats. In contrast, the purely 
local nature of the MCP underground meant SIFE and MI5 could be of less 
assistance in producing or evaluating intelligence, leaving Special Branch 
struggling on alone into the mid-1950s.  
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Part 3 
Roads to decolonisation, 1955-1959 
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7. British influence, intelligence and Singapore politics 
 By the mid-1950s, British security intelligence in Singapore was 
increasingly forced to deal with the prospect of decolonisation. This affected all 
three levels. Members of the regional-national intelligence community prepared 
for the withdrawal of British colonial regimes and made new arrangements to 
ensure that they continued to receive indigenously-produced intelligence. Given 
the intention to retain the Singapore base, ensuring post-colonial access to 
intelligence produced in Singapore was an important contributor to the goal of 
retaining British influence. Locally, the method adopted for achieving this was 
through the retention of SLOs. Meanwhile, at the regional level, the future of the 
vast intelligence bureaucracy at Phoenix Park was increasingly uncertain. 
Although the office of the Commissioner General had survived economising 
pressures in the mid-1950s, progress towards self-government also generated 
uncertainty. There was no guarantee that an independent successor government 
would continue to tolerate a ‘slough of despond’ of British spies.  
 This chapter explores the relationship between security intelligence and 
decolonisation in Singapore. It considers how decolonisation came to dominate 
policy and affected the ways in which intelligence responded to both the internal 
and external Cold Wars. Local political concerns became important to all three 
levels of intelligence, as regional and national agendas were curtailed and the 
nature of Special Branch work changed. Nevertheless, security remained the 
utmost imperative upon which Britain was reluctant to compromise. The key 
goals for the regional-national intelligence community were to ensure an orderly 
transfer of power and to leave a legacy of a British intelligence culture. Both of 
these policies would help ensure the retention of British influence in Singapore 
and across Southeast Asia more broadly. All three levels of intelligence were 
united in working to ensure policy-makers felt safe about decolonisation. 
Intelligence ensured that the British knew that Lee Kuan Yew was not a 
communist, but still worried that he may prove unable to maintain control of 
leftist elements.  
 The Rendel Constitution of 1955 was only the first step towards 
Singapore’s independence. The second significant moment came with the fall of 
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David Marshall and his replacement as Chief Minister by Lim Yew Hock in June 
1956. During negotiations in London in April 1956, Marshall found Britain 
unwilling to give up their veto on defence and security.  Having staked his 
reputation on achieving results, Marshall had little option but to resign. The new 
Chief Minister, Lim Yew Hock, proved more amenable to Britain’s security 
agenda. In September-October 1956, Lim dissolved several major communist 
front organisations in the student and labour fields. This provoked a clash which 
the government easily won. Under Lim’s direction, Special Branch arrested the 
key leaders of what was perceived as a communist united front in Operation 
Liberation.  
 Meanwhile, a new political force gained momentum in Singapore. This 
was the People’s Action Party (PAP) founded in 1954 under the leadership of the 
young Singaporean Chinese lawyer Lee Kuan Yew. Lee watched on the sidelines 
as Marshall – who terminated some of the most stringent Emergency Regulations 
– failed to control the security situation, and Lim Yew Hock sacrificed public 
support by taking credit for colonial security operations. Lim was too close to the 
British to be acceptable to the Singapore electorate. Nevertheless, he succeeded 
where Marshall had failed and reached agreement with London in March 1957 
that paved the way for the August 1958 State of Singapore Act. In May 1959, 
when this thesis ends, Singapore achieved self-government and Lee Kuan Yew’s 
PAP triumphed in the general election. Lee himself wrote that ‘Marshall had 
taught me how not to be soft and weak when dealing with the communists. Lim 
Yew Hock taught me how not to be tough and flat-footed’.1 From 1954-59, Lee 
succeeded in manipulating pro-communist and leftist support without becoming a 
fellow traveller. In the words of Richard Clutterbuck, Lee Kuan Yew was ‘one of 
the few democratic leaders who has risen to power astride the communist tiger 
without ever losing control of it’.2 Lee deftly used Special Branch to purge the 
PAP of leftist influences which opposed his moderate faction. In February 1963 – 
a few months before Singapore joined the new Federation of Malaysia – Lee 
approved Operation Cold Store which saw the detention of over 100 left-wing 
figures. This effectively removed the opposition in the form of Barisan Sosialis (a 
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new party founded by PAP rebels in 1961) and paved the way for unbroken PAP 
rule in Singapore.3 Security intelligence is therefore an important aspect of 
Singapore’s history which demonstrates continuity between the colonial and post-
colonial periods. In this regard, the British intelligence apparatus was broadly 
successful. They helped to establish a stable, non-communist state which 
continued to operate intelligence services modelled upon a British intelligence 
culture. British intelligence and police officers remained very influential in the 
early years of Lee Kuan Yew’s government.4 
 
The future of British intelligence in Singapore 
 From the mid-1950s, decolonisation was a major impetus in British policy 
towards Singapore As well as dominating local politics, it affected how the 
regional-national intelligence community operated. Political changes acted as a 
restraining influence on some practices, but also provided new impetus to expand 
intelligence activities designed to maintain British influence. Following the loss of 
India in 1947, Singapore became Britain’s centre of strategic gravity in Asia. 
Hong Kong was not regarded as sufficiently defendable in the event of war, and 
Malaya and Borneo were underdeveloped as military strongholds. As 
decolonisation seemed increasingly inevitable, Britain’s key goal was to appease 
nationalist demands without compromising the security and continued ownership 
of its bases.5 
 In spring 1955, the future of the Commissioner General came under 
review. Malcolm MacDonald’s tenure had already been extended six times, 
allowing him to establish a unique position and reputation. However, the Colonial 
Office felt the time was right for a change. MacDonald was described as flagging 
in his energies, ‘not surprising after eight years in so enervating a climate’ and too 
‘Asian-minded’ to be the best interpreter of British policies. In addition, the 
Colonial Office questioned the need for a Commissioner General and the 
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continuance of the office could not be taken for granted.6 Preoccupied with 
internal constitutional changes, the Colonial Office felt that MacDonald was too 
sanguine about the prospects for closer unity between Singapore, Malaya and 
Borneo. The metropole saw this as a ‘long, difficult and quite likely fruitless 
task’.7 In the Federation, Gerald Templer thought MacDonald’s plans for a 
Greater Malaysia were ‘plain nonsense’.8 Ultimately, MacDonald’s faith in 
merger was justified. The eventual creation of Malaysia in September 1963 was a 
security construct intended to neutralise Singapore’s Chinese population by 
placing them within a federal, majority-Malay and trusted anti-communist state.9 
 On 6 August 1955, the Prime Minister issued a formal directive to the new 
Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, Sir Robert Heatlie Scott. From the 
beginning of Scott’s appointment, the future position of regional intelligence was 
intimately connected with that of the broader Commissioner General’s 
bureaucracy. Regional intelligence appeared increasingly to resemble an outdated 
‘slough of despond’ as British territories moved towards independence. 
Nevertheless, as examined in chapter five, by adapting to the changing 
environment, the likes of SIFE and the JIC(FE) survived threatened metropolitan 
cuts and played an active role in the implementation of Cold War policy. The 
atmosphere of political uncertainty brought about some changes to their functions. 
SIFE was increasingly influential as an instrument of intelligence diplomacy and a 
link with SEATO, rather than purely being a body for intelligence assessments. 
Although the extent to which Singapore represented a ‘unique window’ for 
intelligence production was questioned by the metropole, it instead came to 
represent unique opportunities for exerting influence. 
 Whilst the practical ability of Britain to maintain a regional intelligence 
centre was under doubt, its desirability was not. In Cabinet discussions on 
Britain’s counter-subversion policy, Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan 
advocated for greater involvement by SIS and MI5 in territories experiencing 
constitutional transition. He worried that the speed of decolonisation was 
increasingly swift, and that it would not always be possible to build up adequate 
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indigenous intelligence services ready for independence. Britain must therefore 
find unilateral ways of maintaining essential intelligence and security interests. 
Moreover, as elected officials (such as Singapore’s Chief Minister) gained more 
influence over local security matters, local intelligence mechanisms could not be 
fully relied upon by the imperial government. Macmillan argued that Britain 
needed to retain officers who would act solely in the interests of Britain.10 This 
view from the Foreign Secretary (who would shortly become Prime Minister) 
corroborated MI5’s plans to retain SLOs to guarantee future access to intelligence 
and represent British interests. 
 However, the future constitutional position of Singapore created questions 
over the tenability of certain intelligence activities. When the JIC(London) and 
JIC(FE) chairmen met with Governor Black in February 1956, Black voiced 
concern about the increasing attention being given to clandestine measures. He 
was concerned that, now Singapore had a partially-elected cabinet, constitutional 
progress could be derailed or embarrassed by intelligence and propaganda 
operations.11 
 This was demonstrated by the decision to terminate an SIS operation in 
1956. Operation Debenture was described by one senior defence official as the 
first British operation of any magnitude for the penetration of communist China. It 
was a collaboration between SIS, RIO and the services. Through radio broadcasts 
from British defence establishments in Singapore, its goal was to stimulate dissent 
and possibly defections. From the intelligence angle alone, this was justified as a 
worthwhile attempt to increase their negligible lines into China. It was also a 
covert action operation designed to weaken Chinese morale in the Cold War. The 
broadcasting station was located on service land in order to reduce the risk of 
local political complications in the context of the Rendel Constitution. British 
officials feared an outcry if it was discovered they were conducting operations 
against China from Singapore.12 
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 Operation Debenture became active in May 1955. However, after just six 
months, the operation came under scrutiny due to the lack of any observable 
results. SIS proposed terminating the operation. This was supported by the 
Commissioner General for reasons pertinent to decolonisation.  
 The operation was first conceived in March 1954. SIS envisaged 
broadcasting original news and commentary prepared in Singapore under cover of 
a local Chinese radio enthusiast anxious to spread the ‘truth’ about the outside 
world to his countrymen. However, because of the estimated cost, it was agreed 
instead that they would re-transmit the previous day’s BBC broadcasts in 
Mandarin.13 
 In October 1955, SIS informed the Foreign Office of their intention to 
abort the operation. The Foreign Office demurred at first, but on the 
Commissioner General’s advice, dropped their objection to termination. Scott 
believed that the continuation of the operation could soon become embarrassing if 
they were forced to disclose it to an elected Singaporean Chinese official.14 
However, the Chiefs of Staff disagreed. They felt it would be a retrograde step to 
abandon their only operation against the Chinese mainland.15 
 In response to these discussions, Sir John Sinclair, the Chief of SIS, 
suggested that Debenture could relocate outside of Singapore provided funds 
could be generated for more aggressive broadcasting given the lack of results on 
the present scale. However, during his visit to Singapore in February 1956, the 
JIC(London) chairman was convinced by Scott that there was insufficient 
evidence of the impact of the operation to justify continuing it, even in a less 
politically sensitive area.16 Debenture was therefore terminated. The 
Commissioner General’s reluctance to conduct covert action from Singapore was 
a major factor in this decision. Decolonisation therefore acted as a restraining 
influence on certain intelligence activities, as Britain could no longer count on 
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being able to conduct clandestine work from Singapore without considering the 
implications.  
 Progress towards decolonisation had an equally significant impact upon 
the local intelligence machine. As well as requiring good security intelligence to 
guide this process and prevent interference from subversive elements, intelligence 
and security became an object of political debate during constitutional 
negotiations. 
 In 1956, talks between the Chief Minister and British government about 
the future of Singapore required agreement on future responsibilities for internal 
security. The Colonial Office was increasingly certain that Britain could not 
sacrifice control over internal security, as this was a necessary corollary to 
safeguarding British military, naval and air force bases. Furthermore, Britain 
would not countenance transferring responsibility when Singapore was in no 
position to guarantee law and order without assistance from metropolitan troops.17 
Perhaps this observation was a reaction to the Maria Hertogh riots of December 
1950, in which the police relied upon military support to restore order. 
 During talks in summer 1956, Lim Yew Hock proposed a Defence and 
Security Council which would consist of three Singaporean, two British and one 
Federation members, with the British High Commissioner in the chair and having 
a casting, but no original, vote.18 Following the failure of talks with Marshall, the 
British side was willing to drop their power of intervention in internal security 
affairs as long as satisfactory machinery was created which would continue to 
meet British intelligence requirements of full access to local intelligence product. 
They also insisted that efficiency must take precedence over ‘Malayanisation’ in 
the Special Branch, as it had done in the Federation, and that the position of SLO 
must be maintained. It was hoped that Lim would be more amenable than 
Marshall because he seemed to share Britain’s anti-communist agenda.19 Britain 
prioritised access to intelligence over control of intelligence, implying that 
collection remained the biggest problem and was of greater concern than 
direction. 
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 Lim Yew Hock met with MI5 Director-General Roger Hollis on 21 
December 1956. Lim was keen to send high-grade Singaporean police officers to 
London for MI5 training.20 Following this talk and others with the Colonial 
Office, Lim made it clear that Britain would continue to have the fullest access to 
security intelligence from Singapore sources.21 
 With such assurances, Britain felt able to reach agreement with Lim over 
the control of security. They agreed that, under the new constitution which would 
take effect in 1959, an Internal Security Council would be formed. With three 
British, three Singaporean and one Federation member, a British-Malayan 
coalition would always be able to outvote the Singaporean government. This 
would ensure an anti-communist agenda would prevail even if more leftist forces 
swept to power in Singapore. Such a composition satisfied Britain’s security 
imperative of decolonising without jeopardising Cold War interests. The 
agreement can also be seen as Britain’s acceptance of the need to compromise and 
negotiate in the direction of security efforts so long as the intelligence product 
remained flowing. Lim agreed that all security intelligence produced by the 
Special Branch would remain directly available to the British government, and 
that the new Singapore government would not interfere in the police. This reflects 
the strong British belief in the independence of the police from politics. External 
defence continued to be the remit of the British during the period of 1959-63, in 
which Singapore attained self-government but remained a formal colony.22 
Further, more informal safeguards for British interests were provided through the 
retention of expatriate officers in senior positions. Former Special Branch chief 
Alan Blades remained Commissioner of Police from 1957 until 1963. Following a 
brief and largely disastrous attempt to make a senior local Special Branch officer 
its chief from 1957-59, another expatriate, Eric John Linsell, served as Director of 
Special Branch from 1959-61. Linsell had no prior intelligence experience and 
was more of a uniform and CID man, so Lee Kuan Yew came to rely increasingly 
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on senior officers like Richard Corridon and Ahmad Khan for providing analysis 
of the communist threat.23 
 
Decolonising intelligence and retaining influence 
 As well as high-level negotiations, providing practical aid was another 
means of ensuring continued influence over intelligence production. This enabled 
metropolitan intelligence actors and their regional offshoots to build the 
foundations of continued influence in Southeast Asia. 
 From 1950, MI5 Head Office ran training courses for British colonial 
Special Branches. These were overhauled in 1955 following the Templer Report 
on colonial security, and MI5 began offering three or four courses per year. Far 
Eastern colonies provided much of the student intake. Moreover, in 1954, SIFE 
officer Alec MacDonald was appointed as MI5’s new Security Intelligence 
Advisor to the Colonial Office. His work entailed advising the colonial 
bureaucracy in London and conducting on-site visits to individual territories. The 
Templer Report led to the appointment of two deputies to enable greater coverage 
of on-the-spot advice.24 
 Alec MacDonald envisaged his role as being about more than just 
providing short-term colonial security. Conforming to MI5’s broader goal of 
ensuring lasting intelligence liaison, he saw the position of Security Intelligence 
Adviser as a way of building professional indigenous intelligence services able to 
contribute to Commonwealth intelligence sharing. This would be a valuable 
bequest to newly independent states, albeit a selfish one. MI5 saw intelligence 
decolonisation as the best long-term guarantee of maintaining British intelligence 
interests in Southeast Asia.25 As in other decolonising regions, security 
intelligence actors played a ‘missionary’ role in helping to spread a 
Commonwealth intelligence culture which would preserve their influence and 
promote continued liaison. In the ‘old’ Commonwealth nations (such as 
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Australia), MI5 helped build analogous organisations to itself. In new states 
nearing independence, the focus was on developing the capacity of police Special 
Branches and encouraging new political leaders to see intelligence as serving the 
cause of national security, not political interests.26 In carrying out this task, 
intelligence agencies supported overall government policy expressed through the 
Commonwealth Security Conferences began by Prime Minister Clement Attlee in 
1948.27 Perhaps ironically given earlier MI5 views about Special Branches as 
lesser intelligence organisations, they now seemed to acknowledge that these 
agencies were the best avenues for national security intelligence in the colonies. It 
was feared that organisations independent from the police (like MI5 itself) would 
more easily fall prey to political interests. 
 After the Templer Report in spring 1955, MI5 involvement in training 
colonial Special Branches expanded massively (see table 7.1). Topics covered in 
the 1955 syllabus related to intelligence organisation (e.g. the position of Special 
Branches in the overall security intelligence picture and MI5 imperial 
responsibilities) or methods (the conduct of surveillance operations and 
interrogation practices). Instructors included Bill Magan (head of MI5’s overseas 
E Branch) former H/SIFE Hugh Winterborn, Security Intelligence Advisor Alec 
MacDonald and Soviet expert Millicent Bagot.28 
 
Table 7.1. Colonial Police Officers attending MI5 Training Courses, 1954-
1957.29 
MI5 Training Courses 1954 1955 1956 1957 
In-Situ Courses 35 296 180 126 
London Courses 15 15 135 118 
Total 50 311 315 244 
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 SIFE supported these central MI5 initiatives at the regional level. In July 
1951, they hosted a conference of British Special Branches to give guidance on 
directing intelligence requirements. Around this time, SIFE also began giving 
specialised training to the Hong Kong Special Branch to try to improve the 
production of raw intelligence on the PRC as a counterbalance to SIS 
deficiencies.30 A similar conference was held in September 1952, which SIFE 
used to reprimand certain Special Branches over perceived intelligence ‘black 
spots’. As in 1948, the blame for collection problems was placed at the local level. 
Courtenay Young admonished the Singapore Special Branch for a ‘defeatist’ 
attitude to long-term agent penetration, and its Hong Kong counterpart for not 
doing enough to encourage Chinese defectors.31  
 In the early 1950s, SIFE’s main goal in providing assistance to Special 
Branches was to improve intelligence collection. MI5 Director-General Sir Dick 
White argued that SIFE should put its best people inside Special Branches to 
improve the flow of intelligence, because otherwise SIFE collation was a waste of 
time.32 Without an intake of raw information, the regional intelligence 
bureaucracy could very well appear ‘a slough of despond’. Even in territories 
where SIFE was directly represented through SLOs, intelligence collection and 
collation were not automatically improved. Whilst serving as H/SIFE, Young 
worried that the Special Branches were not allowing SLOs unrestricted access to 
files due to suspicions of MI5 interference upon their prerogative. This was little 
better than the situation in 1948 when MSS was reportedly denying the DSO 
access to intelligence needed for interpreting the Malayan Emergency. In 
response, Young closed down the SLO appointments in Malaya and Singapore, 
instead seconding officers inside the two Special Branches. This entailed a 
perceptive change from the SLO as an aide to the Governor to the SLO as a 
corollary of the intelligence producers.33 
 However, during the partnership of Robert Scott as Commissioner General 
and Dick Thistlethwaite as H/SIFE from 1956 to 1959, these relationships were 
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fundamentally reoriented. The focus shifted to providing post-colonial 
intelligence liaison instead of improving intelligence production in the present. 
Following the repeal of some of the Emergency Regulations in Singapore, 
Thistlethwaite commented that: 
It is clear to everybody, I should think, from the Secretary-of-State who 
has just been out here, to the meanest shop-keeper that a new era has 
begun in Singapore and the Federation. There are the beginnings of self-
government in both and there will be a snowball demand for complete 
autonomy which it may be possible to guide, but not to resist.34 
SIFE could help guide this transfer of power by improving local Special Branches 
ready for ‘Malayanisation’. This corresponded with Christopher Andrew’s 
depiction of the SLO as a means of maintaining British influence to keep former 
colonies out of the Soviet orbit.35 This was distinct from the earlier function of 
SLOs in providing colonial governments with access to MI5’s global intelligence 
pool, demonstrating how intelligence priorities were forced to adapt to the 
changing environment.  
 Despite reservations about the future of British intelligence activities, 
SIFE, SIS(FE) and the JIC(FE) all remained in Singapore after 1959. SIFE played 
a reduced role in guiding regional collation activities, and was withdrawn in 1963. 
The final H/SIFE, Christopher Herbert, shed responsibility for foreign collation to 
focus solely on the current and former British territories in the region.36 During 
the Brunei Revolt of December 1962-May 1963, SIFE provided practical support 
by organising interrogation teams from independent Malaya to debrief captured 
insurgents, then processed the resulting material at SIFE headquarters. Moreover, 
H/SIFE helped supervise improvements to local intelligence processes in the 
emerging confrontation with Indonesia.37 
 In addition, Herbert cooperated with the Malayan Commissioner of Police, 
Claude Fenner, to divide security responsibilities between the federal and 
territorial governments of the new Malaysia. The central government would be 
responsible for internal security and the police, with the creation of an Inspector 
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General of Police to whom all the territorial Special Branches would be 
responsible. This plan was a reaction to concerns regarding the security of 
Singapore, by ensuring that the chain of command avoided Singapore politicians 
in favour of centralising authority in Kuala Lumpur. In Singapore specifically, a 
British military intelligence officer would continue to work inside Special Branch. 
MI5 would continue to station separate SLOs in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo 
following the dissolution of SIFE.38 Due to the role of intelligence diplomacy, this 
would appear to be a successful transition for MI5 which safeguarded access to 
locally-produced intelligence even after disbanding SIFE. 
 Consequently, the process of decolonisation in Singapore appears to have 
been at least a short-term success for British intelligence in achieving national 
objectives. The goal expressed by Harold Macmillan of ensuring continued access 
to intelligence, and maintaining British influence over intelligence, security and 
defence matters, was achieved through the willingness of national and regional 
intelligence agencies to engage with local partners. In so doing, the regional-
national intelligence community expressed a clear bias in favour of the Malayan 
government of Tunku Abdul Rahman, which had already proven its anti-
communist credentials. The future political course of Singapore was less certain. 
Lee Kuan Yew was seen more as a potential ally than a threat, but Britain could 
not be sure that he would retain a grip on power until the massive arrest of 
communist supporters during Operation Cold Store in 1963. To this end, British 
objectives were best met by exporting a shared intelligence culture through the 
Special Branch, leaving behind experienced expatriate officers, and negotiating 
continued access to locally-produced intelligence. 
 
‘Malayanisation’ problems 
 The process of decolonisation had equally far-reaching effects for the 
character of the local intelligence machine. However, these were not always so 
successful for Britain. The Singapore police was increasingly subjected to 
‘Malayanisation’. As well as incurring staffing changes and attempts to promote 
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locally-recruited officers, this also involved growing political and popular scrutiny 
of Special Branch methods. 
 Public concerns over the nature of Special Branch policing followed from 
allegations levied by lawyer T. T. Rajah on behalf of four communist detainees in 
1957. These accused Special Branch of inflicting bodily torture including 
electroshock, beatings, and dousing prisoners with freezing water. However, these 
very serious allegations did not appear to match the (admittedly limited and 
potentially unreliable) evidence. The doctor engaged by Mr Rajah found no 
persuasive evidence to suggest that torture had occurred, and the examination of 
the prisoners by Dr Chee, the Special Branch Medical Officer who conducted 
daily visits and thorough weekly examinations of all detainees, directly 
contradicted the accusations. The government strongly suspected these allegations 
were fabricated by the prisoners in collusion, as three of them had shared a cell 
before making these claims.39 Nevertheless, such serious accusations had to be 
investigated thoroughly. An internal investigation further discredited the claims 
by finding clear discrepancies between the accusations levied by Mr Rajah and the 
statements supplied from the detainees he represented.40 
 Nevertheless, on 24 April 1958, a motion was moved by an independent 
Member of the Legislative Assembly to condemn Special Branch and demand 
further investigation. This was defeated by 19 votes to four. Lee Kuan Yew 
revealed that he had previously been a solicitor for one of the detainees and had 
advised against making charges against Special Branch; he had terminated his 
relationship with the prisoner as he refused to be a party to something he fully 
believed to be untrue. Showing support for Special Branch, Lee denounced the 
Assembly motion as ‘unwise’ and ‘dishonest’.41 The Governor despaired that they 
could not sue Rajah and his clients for libel because it would be impossible to 
prove their dishonesty in open court. Nevertheless, he noted that: 
All the people who made these allegations are among those who are 
prepared to go to any lengths including the use of violence to embarrass 
and overthrow the elected Government of Singapore. It is therefore not 
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surprising that they will endeavour to use any means to try to discredit the 
Police Force in the discharge of its lawful functions.42  
Clearly the British government was sensitive to its appearance and anything that 
could stand in the way of an orderly and controlled ‘Malayanisation’. Moreover, 
the spectre of communist violence remained a useful rhetorical device in 
justifying the continuance of a strict security regime. 
 In evaluating this incident, it is worth noting that we are reliant upon 
records created by the accused party: Special Branch. It is perhaps unsurprising 
that the records retained in the ‘Migrated Archives’ exonerate Special Branch 
from these allegations of torture. However, two points could be argued to stand in 
favour of this interpretation. Firstly, Lee Kuan Yew (who, although privately 
enjoying good contacts with the police, was publicly committed to denouncing 
colonialism) supported Special Branch against these accusations. It is possible 
that Lee did so out of self-interest, as by this time he was more concerned with 
suppressing communist or ‘leftist’ influences within his own party than with 
opposing the police. Perhaps more convincingly, this incident could be compared 
with incidents of torture in colonial territories such as Cyprus or Kenya, where 
evidence from the Migrated Archives has proven that this brutality took place.43 If 
similar instances occurred in Singapore, it would seem unusual that the records 
relating to them were destroyed entirely whilst damning records from other 
colonies were retained in secret. However, based on the limited evidence relating 
to this case – and the subject of torture more broadly – it is impossible to discern 
the truth with any certainty. At most, it could be said that it is unlikely in this 
incident that physical torture took place, but that this does not mean that Special 
Branch never engaged in physical abuses of their power. Psychological 
interrogation methods with physical manifestations such as sleep deprivation were 
utilised.44 Based on the information contained within colonial archives, it is 
impossible to deduce anything further. 
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 Although the growth of political oversight of the police could be abused 
by subversive forces, there were also benefits to ‘Malayanisation’. Nigel Morris 
(Commissioner of Police from 1952-57) recalled that when he first joined the 
Singapore police in the 1930s, it felt like a force, akin to the army. When he 
departed as Commissioner in October 1957, he believed it had become more of a 
public service.45 In the mid-1930s, they didn’t have any locals at the rank of 
Assistant Superintendent or above. Although a few officers started coming in 
from elsewhere in Asia, the city colony was predominantly policed by the British. 
By 1957, around 80% of officers were locally recruited (even though there 
remained an imbalance between Malay and Chinese recruitment).46   
 However, the move towards self-government prompted some expatriate 
Special Branch officers to view their future with trepidation. They believed that, 
due to their actions in policing certain political parties, their careers would suffer 
after the 1959 elections. As early as April 1956, MI5’s Alec MacDonald predicted 
an exodus of expatriate officers once control of the police lay in the hands of 
elected ministers. He warned that MI5 could not fill the resulting intelligence 
gap.47 The British authorities therefore needed to balance ‘Malayanisation’ with 
safeguards to ensure continuity. 
 One of these officers was Ahmad Khan, who was in charge of the Indian 
Section from October 1950 and had served in Special Branch for 18 of his 20 
years in the Singapore Police. Khan, born in India and by this time a Pakistani 
national and not a British citizen, applied to retire as an ‘entitled officer’ with 
compensation.48 Khan – an extremely capable officer – had antagonised local 
politicians on a number of occasions. Khan’s apprehension was no doubt 
heightened by his experience during the Japanese occupation, when his pre-war 
surveillance of Japanese espionage meant he was treated strictly. Since the war, 
Khan had been chiefly responsible for the destruction of the MCP Indian section 
in 1948-50 and was well known to left-wing PAP leaders such as Devan Nair and 
James Puthucheary. He was in charge of the case against the leftist student 
newspaper Fajar in 1954, when he was accused of being a ‘Quisling’ by the 
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British communist lawyer D. N. Pritt. As a result, Khan’s superiors, viewing his 
case sympathetically, noted that ‘Ahmad Khan’s name is an anathema to left-wing 
political leaders’.49 Khan’s application was approved, but in the end he chose to 
continue serving until 1963 and earned the trust and respect of Lee Kuan Yew.50 
 The new Special Branch Director, Khaw Kai Boh, also applied to retire 
with compensation. Locally-recruited, Khaw had served continuously in Special 
Branch and its predecessors since 1945 except for when he attended Scotland 
Yard and MI5 training in 1953-54, and when he undertook a Law Fellowship in 
Britain from 1955-57. Upon his return to Singapore, Khaw was made Acting 
Director of Special Branch in August 1957 and approved in November. He was a 
British subject and the son of a Singapore-born Chinese family. From October 
1945-April 1946, Khaw served as an intelligence officer with Field Security, and 
investigated war collaborators, many of whom had since become prominent 
citizens. From 1946-47 he was loaned from MSS to the Penang CID where he 
conducted underground work against the Ang Bin Huey Triad. From August 1950 
until June 1953 he commanded the Special Branch Chinese External section. He 
had received what he regarded as considerable undesirable publicity in more 
recent actions against communist front organisations with links to left-wing PAP 
members.51 
 Khaw’s application was more divisive than that of Khan because he had 
only recently assumed the directorship and had his law fellowship funded by the 
government. However, on a pragmatic basis, Alan Blades (now Commissioner of 
Police) worried that rejecting Khaw’s application may lead him to press for a 
transfer or resign before the 1959 elections. If this happened, Special Branch 
would be in disarray and they would lose a valuable officer currently in line to be 
the first non-European Commissioner of Police. It was hoped that approving 
Khaw’s application would persuade him to stay on for longer. Blades felt it 
important to maintain continuity during his efforts to remould the police to be 
more locally-officered.52 
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 Khaw’s application was accepted, but in defiance of Blades’ hopes, he 
gave notice of his intention to retire with effect on 20 April 1959. The government 
had no choice but to accept. The Governor was frustrated, feeling that Khaw was 
spurning the opportunities given to him. Blades had by now lost confidence in 
Khaw, who had gone on leave and was reading in a local law firm (as well as 
harbouring political ambitions). It was thought best that he remain on leave and 
not resume duties in Special Branch.53 This particular attempt at ‘Malayanisation’ 
proved an embarrassing failure for the outgoing British regime. The next Special 
Branch Director, Eric Linsell, was a British officer who had served in Palestine, 
the Straits Settlements and Singapore (specialising in anti-narcotics investigations 
since 1953). Although not a veteran Special Branch officer, Linsell was an 
experienced colonial police officer: hardly an endorsement for the successes of 
‘Malayanisation’ initiatives. 
 As the Malayanisation of the police shows, the road to decolonisation had 
a significant impact upon local intelligence organisation and the culture of Special 
Branch. Security intelligence was forced to operate in a more politically sensitive 
environment. The same dictates applied equally to the regional-national 
intelligence community. SIFE and SIS saw some of their activities curtailed as 
their Cold War goals conflicted with the evolving realities of decolonisation. 
Singapore historians have suggested that in conflicts between decolonisation and 
security, the Cold War security imperative governed decisions.54 Although this is 
broadly true, the nuance can be added that decolonisation also affected the way 
Britain approached Cold War intelligence and security operations. It forced the 
British to rethink their priorities, ultimately leading to a preference to maintain 
access to intelligence even if diluting their control over it (so long as they could 
trust the successor government). Ironically, the decision to appoint a Singaporean 
as Director of Special Branch only delayed this process. 
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Safe for decolonisation? 
 Security intelligence was an object of decolonisation negotiations. It was 
also a vital tool in ensuring this process went smoothly. Principally, intelligence 
gathered by Special Branch ensured that the growing threat from a communist 
front movement (centred upon the personality of Lim Chin Siong) did not 
interfere with British plans for an orderly transfer of power to a pro-British and 
non-communist successor government. 
 By 1955, the MCP underground was no longer a serious threat to the 
governance of the colony. However, as Singapore prepared for increasing local 
autonomy, the threat from ‘front’ organisations controlled by individual 
communists or penetrated by underground members came to dominate Special 
Branch efforts. This was similar to the tactics adopted by the MCP before 1948, 
when front parties such as the Malayan Democratic Union were used to expand 
communist influence. 
 Three aspects of the communist front movement required monitoring. 
Initially the strongest strand was the student movement. Following successful 
police action against communist underground networks in 1953-55, communist-
sympathising students represented the best organised remnant of the old MCP and 
ABL system. The student threat rose to prominence as a result of the 
government’s National Service Ordinance, which required all young people to 
register for national service by 22 May 1954. This led to demonstrations and sit-
ins which, although failing to achieve concessions, awakened an anti-colonial 
consciousness amongst Chinese students which communist activists could exploit. 
In 1954, the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students Unions (SCMSSU) was 
formed, which rapidly recruited 10,000 members. This union was controlled by 
MCP-affiliated elements and appeared to be a front organisation.55 
 The intentions and capabilities of the student front movement were the 
subject of research by one of the SIFE officers implanted in Special Branch from 
1954-56. This research concluded that the principal objective of their leaders did 
not appear to be the attainment of any specific concessions but to cause unrest. 
However, SIFE and Special Branch were unsure how far the MCP retained 
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control of front organisations such as the SCMSSU. The students appeared to be 
in defiance of the official MCP line on peaceful penetration: ‘the students’ 
behaviour suggests therefore that they are prepared to defy the MCP no less than 
they do the authority of their parents, teachers and the law’. Alternative influences 
could include the CCP or international communist organisations such as the 
International Union of Students.56 Security intelligence experts did not know 
entirely who – if anyone – was directing student activities, and could only guess at 
their motivations. This made the perceived communist front a more serious threat 
than a specific communist party such as the MCP. 
 In addition to students, unionised labour proved a fertile breeding ground 
for communist fronts. These proved easier intelligence targets than the student 
movements, and were more reliably traced back to MCP inspiration and probable 
direction. 
 Communist-inspired labour activities attained significance in May 1955 
when a strike at the Hock Lee Bus Company led to rioting. This was partly due to 
hostility between CCP and Guomindang affiliated Chinese, as the Singapore Bus 
Workers Union was influenced by the former, whilst the Hock Lee owners were 
known Guomindang sympathisers. The SCMSSU came out on strike in support, 
forcing the government to rescind certain demands. After a peaceful resolution to 
the dispute, the SCMSSU was officially registered on condition that it no longer 
participate in political activities: a pledge which the students soon broke.57 
 Special Branch quickly identified the Singapore Factory and Shop 
Workers Union (SF&SWU) as the core of the communist labour front. Although 
formed in 1953, once an ex-detainee named Lim Chin Siong assumed the position 
of Secretary-General in March 1955, membership soared from 1,354 to nearly 
23,000 in just five months. In addition, the SF&SWU led a so-called ‘Middle 
Road’ coalition (named after the location of their main offices in downtown 
Singapore). This coalition of unions accounted for a further 7,000 workers. 
Control was exercised through SF&SWU officials, including ex-‘university case’ 
ABL detainees Devan Nair and James Puthucheary, holding additional offices in 
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these other unions. In total, the SF&SWU accounted for around 34% of organised 
labour in Singapore.58  
 During May-June 1955, the Middle Road group threatened sympathy 
strikes over a harbour dispute, leading Chief Minister David Marshall to agree to 
negotiate with Lim Chin Siong over the release of detainees. This was against the 
advice of the British administration, which would have preferred a more coercive 
solution. Ultimately, Marshall did not give any concessions, and the new 
Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (passed in October 1955) strengthened 
the powers of the police. Previously Marshall has rescinded some of the 
Emergency Regulations, and his reaction to the events of 1955 was to backtrack in 
favour of Britain’s security agenda.59 What this episode demonstrated to Special 
Branch, however, was that the SF&SWU was willing to foment labour unrest for 
political ends. Whilst there was no evidence of direct control by the MCP, such 
direction was unnecessary with suspected or known communists such as Lim 
Chin Siong and Devan Nair in control.60 Information from a top secret source in 
March 1955 indicated that Lim Chin Siong was directly connected with the MCP, 
and also that he had a strong following in the Malayan Textile Mills where several 
workers were MCP ‘E’ Branch affiliates.61 
 As well as students and labour, the third field penetrated by the communist 
front was that of politics. On 21 November 1954, a new People’s Action Party 
was formed: the party which would win the 1959 elections and form the 
government to which Britain transferred power. However, in 1954-55, the rise of 
the PAP to dominance was not predicted by British intelligence. They were more 
concerned with the extent to which this fringe party was a communist front 
organisation. The seeming collaboration of the PAP with known front members 
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blurred the divisions between communism, socialism and nationalism, creating 
new problems for the security intelligence machine.62 
 In the Legislative Assembly election of 1955, three out of four competing 
PAP candidates were successful: Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chew Chua and Lim Chin 
Siong. The fourth, Devan Nair, failed to be elected. At this early stage, Special 
Branch was unsure how far the party constituted a subversive threat. Certainly it 
was formed of anti-colonial, socialist-leaning dissidents. Lim Chin Siong, also the 
SF&SWU leader, appeared to be ‘a typical young communist’ who was briefly 
detained on suspicion of ABL membership after he organised a school 
examinations boycott in 1951. Although information about the PAP leadership 
was scanty, they appeared to be cultivating a united front of youths, workers and 
peasants in conformity with communist tradition. One Special Branch informant 
suggested that the MCP had instructed some of its members to join and infiltrate 
the PAP.63 
 Special Branch was more sanguine about the PAP’s leader, Lee Kuan 
Yew, who appeared to be personally opposed to communism. Their concern was 
whether Lee would be able to control the extremist elements in the party. The 
PAP leadership was summarised as being ‘fellow travellers playing with 
uncontrollable forces’. Evidence in Lee’s favour included his early cooperation 
with the police. In January 1955, Lee received an overture from the MCP which 
indicated they would support any anti-colonial party, which he passed on to 
Special Branch. This seemed to be an attempt to woo the PAP to the side of the 
MCP. He handed over further documents the following month.64  
 Lee Kuan Yew had been under watch since he left to study law in England 
with his fiancée Kwa Geok Choo. Upon their return to Singapore in 1950, SIFE 
passed on reports from the Cambridge Police to Singapore Special Branch about 
their activities. Special Branch director Nigel Morris requested further 
information be obtained through MI5 channels.65 The information received was 
becalming. The Singapore Commissioner of Police, R. E. Foulger, had been 
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staying at his home in Devonshire whilst Lee (then using the anglicised name of 
Harry Lee) and Kwa were at Cambridge and hosted them for a weekend in 
November 1949. Foulger formed a good impression of Lee, with whom he played 
golf, surmising that ‘treated properly, Harry Lee will be an asset to this country; 
treated wrongly, he might become a red hot opponent’.66 Upon Lee’s return, 
Morris had recommended he be detained for questioning, but Foulger overruled 
him, arguing that there was more to gain by befriending and winning over the 
talented young Lee.67 
 Even before his involvement in politics, Lee Kuan Yew was therefore 
treated as a person of interest by British intelligence. When Lee was about to enter 
politics with the founding of the PAP, two Special Branch officers invited Lee and 
his wife for an informal dinner in order to better assess his leanings. Whilst Kwa 
spent the evening trying to keep her husband away from alcohol in case he spoke 
too candidly, the Special Branch officers – Cheng and Finch – tried to provoke 
Lee into revealing his inner feelings. They reminded him of the proverb that it is 
easy to ride a tiger, but then you cannot get off without being eaten. Lee replied 
that he would ride the communist tiger, get off it and beat it. They subsequently 
filed an assessment concluding that Lee was definitely not a communist and was 
just opportunistically aligning with leftists until the power base of his moderate 
faction was secure. This prediction proved correct.68 Meanwhile, SIS inserted its 
own man into Lee’s circle: the journalist, propagandist and ex-SOE officer Alex 
Josey. Josey’s leftist activities caused the CIA some worry until they were 
reassured that he was, in fact, ‘working on’ Lee for British intelligence.69 
 Conversely, Special Branch investigations confirmed that Lim Chin Siong, 
previously only suspected of communist leanings, was indeed a communist.70 In 
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one operation, Chinese Special Branch officer William Cheng, recruited because 
his father (a Guomindang diplomat) was an old acquaintance of the JIC(FE) 
Chairman, was raiding a pineapple canning factory looking for an MCP 
underground official. Instead, he found a biscuit tin containing minute MCP 
documents written on rice paper. Chief Inspector Lau Siew Foo, who, as well as 
having survived an assassination attempt, was a handwriting expert, proved that 
these documents were written by Lim Chin Siong.71 Further evidence 
accumulated from December 1955, when an arrested suspect named Set Chay 
Tuan identified Lim as the person who cultivated him into joining the ABL, 
organising him into a cell and giving him MCP publications to study. The arrest 
of further members of Seet’s cell corroborated these charges.72 
  These Special Branch appreciations of the various elements of what was 
referred to as the communist front movement helped direct government action 
during the crisis which arose in autumn 1956. By this time, David Marshall had 
been replaced as Chief Minister by Lim Yew Hock, who was more willing to use 
coercive action to curtail front activities. On 24 September 1956, the government 
ordered the dissolution of the SCMSSU and expulsion of 142 students for 
subversive activities. In reaction, students organised sit-ins and Lim Chin Siong 
began preparations for a general strike. After a government deadline to the 
students and their parents expired, force was used to clear the schools on the 
morning of 26 October 1956. Within a few hours, Singapore succumbed to 
widespread rioting.73 
 The government’s response was two-fold. Firstly, they implemented 
Operation Photo: a joint police and armed service plan for riot control drawn up 
because such a situation was foreseen following the failure of Marshall’s talks. 
Anti-riot tactics included road blocks, rigid curfews and using helicopters to drop 
tear, smoke and dye grenades to break up crowds. These operations were deemed 
an unequivocal success in restoring order by 30 October. The government 
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attributed this to learning the lessons of the Maria Hertogh riots in 1950 and 
embarking on regular planning and joint civil-military exercises to hone their 
techniques.74 
 Secondly, to forestall a general strike, Special Branch simultaneously 
raided the SF&SWU Middle Road headquarters and branch offices at 2:00 AM on 
27 October. They arrested 219 suspects, including Lim Chin Siong, and recovered 
a large amount of documents for processing. These documents justified the action 
taken, proving that the SF&SWU was guilty of inciting an unlawful, politically-
motivated strike. In turn this justified the legal dissolution of the SF&SWU. The 
intelligence gained in the Middle Road raid gave Special Branch further insight 
into the communist front.75  
 Good security intelligence was a vital factor in explaining the major blow 
dealt to the communist front in autumn 1956. Special Branch study of 
organisations such as the SF&SWU and personalities including Lim Chin Siong 
meant that they were prepared to take rapid action to forestall an escalation of 
unrest. The knowledge was already in place to enable the arrest of the most 
troublesome communist activists. This was justified by the discovery – after the 
raid on Middle Road – of how close the SF&SWU was to launching a general 
strike. Other factors explaining government success included an effective joint 
plan for riot control, the close cooperation of Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock, and 
miscalculation by Lim Chin Siong in provoking such decisive retaliation.76 As 
with the incidents of April 1948, communists and their sympathisers overreached 
themselves and provided justification for their own censure. 
 In the aftermath of the disturbances, the effective production of security 
intelligence and its dissemination to an audience prepared to take action continued 
to be of paramount importance. By summer 1957, Special Branch were concerned 
that a new united front was forming. Whilst the focus previously had been on 
workers and students, in 1957, this front was oriented around particular cultural 
groups within the PAP. The chief methods of mass mobilisation employed by this 
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new united front were celebration functions or picnics where cultural 
performances or ‘typical communist behaviour’ (such as study groups or 
regimentation) were observed. As a result of consistent surveillance of these 
events, Special Branch drew up a plan for 50 arrests.77 
 The Special Branch plan was in response to fears that the PAP Central 
Executive Committee was on the brink of succumbing to communist control. At a 
party conference on 4 August 1957, six leftist members were elected to the 
twelve-person committee. Lee Kuan Yew refused to take office as he was not 
willing to be a puppet of the communists.78 
 The result was Operation Apple: a move against the communist united 
front with the full support of Lim Yew Hock on 22 August 1957. A total of 39 
people were arrested, although one was a case of mistaken identity. The 38 
detained comprised 19 leaders of the PAP Cultural and Education Committee 
(including five members of the Central Executive Committee), 15 union leaders 
affiliated with the dissolved Middle Road group, and four members of the Sin Pao 
newspaper: a mouthpiece of leftist activity. The goal was to disrupt the 
penetration and subversion of legitimate political and labour processes.79 One of 
those arrested, the secretary of the PAP Bukit Panjong branch, admitted being 
instructed by the MCP to join the PAP and stand as a candidate at the next 
Assembly elections.80 Captured MCP documents translated by Special Branch 
were disclosed as part of a government command paper to justify this bold move 
to the public. These were selected to show how the MCP intended to infiltrate the 
PAP to change its policies from within.81 
 In September 1957, Special Branch followed up on this success with 
action against the student front in Operation Banana. This was the culmination of 
long-term investigations into cell meetings and picnics where communist cultural 
performances were exhibited. 48 students were arrested on 25 September, 
followed by the Principal of Chung Cheng School the following day. Intelligence 
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gained from documents and interrogations more than confirmed police suspicions 
that the ‘indoctrination and subversion of students has never been known to have 
been conducted so brazenly on such a scale before’. From the home of one 
arrested student, 525 copies of 22 different seditious songs were seized. The lyrics 
of one song included: 
Don’t be afraid of wolves and jackals that are in front of us,   
Don’t be afraid of tigers and leopards that are behind us, 
Heighten our spirit and be brave! Load our guns and shoot them dead.82 
 These two operations – Apple and Banana – dealt a devastating blow to 
the communist front. The extent to which Lee Kuan Yew was complicit in these 
actions is uncertain. Lim Yew Hock certainly implied that he had been tidying up 
Lee’s house for him.  Lee found himself having to steadfastly deny any 
involvement.83 It is perhaps worth recalling that Lee was not averse to passing 
communist material onto Special Branch and tipping them off about MCP 
overtures to the PAP. Certainly his moderate faction benefited enormously from 
Operation Apple. In spring 1958, Lee met secretly with the latest MCP leader in 
Singapore: Fong Chong Pik (also known as Fang Chuang-Pi or ‘The Plen’). ‘The 
Plen’ agreed to cut ties with all political movements other than the PAP, 
sacrificing the shattered remnants of the united front and leaving the MCP at the 
mercy of Lee’s good faith. Organised communism was all but dead. Moreover, as 
the British were increasingly aware, Lee had no intention of working with 
communists.84 
 Nevertheless, following the conclusion of a constitutional agreement with 
Lim Yew Hock which set a date for self-government, the British administration 
could not afford to be complacent. There remained the potential threat of power in 
the PAP being usurped by the leftist faction. A Special Branch report of 
September 1957 continued to refer to the PAP as a ‘crypto-communist’ party.85 
 In conversation with a member of the United States Consulate-General, 
Lee Kuan Yew stated that there were ten times more pro-communist than 
moderate cadres in the PAP. This conversation, reported to the British via the 
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SLO, was actually more comforting than disturbing. Lee implied that he would 
rather go into coalition than attempt to run a government on his own if there 
seemed to be a risk of a communist takeover of the PAP. He believed that, so long 
as British troops remained, the constitution would be able to work. Lee admitted 
that prior to the British offer of self-government, he would have regarded 
communism as a lesser evil than colonialism, but he was now willing to work 
with Britain to achieve full independence through the interim period of self-
government.86 
 However, a more pessimistic view of Lee’s chances of controlling the PAP 
was forwarded by the Special Branch Research Unit in May 1958. The Research 
Unit compared statements from PAP City Council members with recent 
statements from Beijing Radio. They argued that the PAP was deliberately 
imitating China, thus conforming to international communist policy, and adopting 
PRC lines as their own policy within a couple of weeks of their broadcast.87 Khaw 
Kai Boh noted that PAP success in the City Council elections was ‘a textbook 
example of how the party with communist association and training could take 
over the country through the polls’. The Special Branch Director worried that 
Lee’s opportunistic appropriation of communist tactics may ‘have created a 
monster of such magnitude which they will find incapable to control’, and feared 
a repeat of August 1957.88 These views appear to have been only a minority 
reaction within Special Branch and British intelligence more broadly. 
 The assessments produced by the likes of Special Branch were influential 
on the way that metropolitan actors saw the PAP. A Colonial Office memorandum 
of February 1958 noted that ‘the PAP is virile, energetic, well-organised, devoutly 
socialist, nationalist and anti-colonial’ but that under its present leaders it was not 
communist. Because of the need to appeal to youths, forming around 50% of 
Singapore’s population (and certainly the most vocal element), the PAP 
sometimes engaged in knowingly irresponsible actions. Lee Kuan Yew defended 
this strategy as an ‘invidious necessity’ to attract mass support away from the 
communist camp. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office was confident that a 
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government headed by Lee Kuan Yew would satisfy the British requirements of 
being responsible, willing to work within the new constitution, and resolved to 
frustrate any communist conspiracy. In private, Lee appeared frightened by the 
dangers presented by communism and had praised Lim Yew Hock’s strong action 
against subversion. Following government action in Operation Apple, when the 
PAP extremists overplayed their hand, Lee was able to reconstitute the party on 
more moderate lines and publicly adopt a more anti-communist stance.89 
 At a special conference of the PAP in November 1958, the Party approved 
a resolution to hold their conference every two years rather than annually. Special 
Branch interpreted this as a tactical move by Lee to keep the moderate leaders in 
power for longer and remove chances of the party machine falling into the hands 
of extremists. The moderates were increasingly open in defining themselves as 
non-communists.90  
 As a result, by the time of the landmark elections in May 1959, the British 
administration was confident that, whatever the outcome, Singapore was safe for 
decolonisation. Because of decisive police action, informed by good intelligence 
and a comprehensive Special Branch registry of subversive personalities, only 15 
out of a total of 194 electoral candidates were deemed of any security interest.91 
Continual reporting by Special Branch and contacts between intelligence officers 
and Lee Kuan Yew from as early as 1950 ensured that British policy-makers 
accepted that Lee was not a communist. Although worried that he may not be able 
to maintain control over leftist influences within his party, these concerns abated 
following the detention of Lim Chin Siong in October 1956 and Operations Apple 
and Banana in 1957. 
 This alludes to an important continuity in Singapore’s history. Special 
Branch was at the forefront of an internalised Cold War centred upon Singaporean 
politics in the 1950s. It remained as such after 1959. Lee Kuan Yew had 
maintained contact with the intelligence and security machine of the colonial state 
during his years of opposition. He benefitted (whether intentionally or tacitly) 
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from the security actions undertaken by the colonial authorities and Lim Yew 
Hock in 1957. Once in power, Lee continued to work closely with the security 
apparatus. By 1959, organised communism in Singapore was practically dead. 
However, Lee continued to maintain its spectre in order to publicly denounce his 
opponents. This culminated in Operation Cold Store: the mass arrest of supposed 
pro-communist activists in February 1963. Lee’s willingness to use Cold War 
narratives and the anti-communist security machine sometimes dismayed even 
British diplomatic observers.92 The irony, of course, was that this legacy was their 
own bequest to Lee.  
 
Summary 
 The implementation of self-government for Singapore in 1959 was an 
intelligence success story. By the late 1950s, Britain’s policy towards Singapore 
was driven by a desire to make the colony ‘safe for decolonisation’.93 Such 
‘safety’ meant transferring power to a non-communist (and preferably anti-
communist) regime which would allow the retention of bases, continued security 
influence, and maintain a British-imposed intelligence culture. In the short term, 
efforts by MI5, SIFE and Special Branch achieved these goals, even if their 
success was overtaken by events as Britain increasingly sought to divest its 
commitments in Southeast Asia by the end of the 1960s. Security intelligence was 
at the heart of Singapore’s decolonisation, both as an object of negotiations and as 
a mechanism for ensuring a safe transfer of power. Although Special Branch 
struggled to marshal information on the communist underground in the early 
1950s, by the second half of the decade, they had amassed sufficient information 
about the open communist front to enable targeted counter-action. This was a 
success for security intelligence production, but even more so for its 
dissemination. The intelligence produced by Special Branch was decisive for 
guiding action at the local level. It was equally important for guiding metropolitan 
opinions, persuading the British government that Lee Kuan Yew was a safe pair 
of hands.  
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 Lacking the level of information available to Britain, the United States was 
less sanguine after the 1959 elections. The CIA tried (unsuccessfully) to recruit a 
Special Branch officer as an agent to report on the PAP government. When 
Richard Corridon informed Lee Kuan Yew, the latter instructed him to ‘remember 
all the time that we are not dealing with an enemy, but the bloody stupidity of a 
friend’. Special Branch picked up the CIA case officer who was quietly sent back 
to America.94 According the recollections of one CIA officer, the United States 
government had tried to buy off Lee Kuan Yew’s government with two million 
dollars to quickly release all their arrested and disgraced staff involved in the case, 
but Lee refused to be bribed.95 This unfortunate incident in Anglo-American 
relations reinforced the importance of security intelligence to the Singapore 
decolonisation process. Britain had reliable intelligence and therefore trusted Lee 
Kuan Yew; America did not trust Lee Kuan Yew and thus tried to gather more 
intelligence. This incident would also seem to imply that Anglo-American 
intelligence sharing in Southeast Asia had not improved since the earlier 1950s. 
 Also at the national and regional levels, agencies such as MI5 and SIFE 
contributed to the general withdrawal from Empire by making preparations for 
future liaison with independent nations. This complimented their existing 
intelligence diplomacy, such as the training and support given to SEATO 
members. MI5 policy in this period was successful in ensuring continued access 
to locally-produced intelligence in Malaya and Singapore. In return, they 
continued to offer guidance on intelligence organisation as preparations were 
made for the creation of a unified Malaysia in 1963. 
 This is not to say that the decolonisation process was entirely plain-sailing 
for the intelligence community. The ‘Malayanisation’ of Special Branch had its 
complexities, not in the least the embarrassment caused by Khaw Kai Boh’s 
decision to resign before the PAP came into power. But these setbacks were only 
minor deviations in the general march of progress, which was facilitated to a 
significant extent by a highly effective system of intelligence and policing. 
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8. Conclusion: A ‘slough of despond’? 
Conditioned by grade-B movies and Joseph Conrad’s novels, I had 
envisioned Singapore as a murky, slatternly place, peopled by sinister 
Chinese who lived in corrugated-roof shacks looking over a harbour 
crowded with rusty coastal freighters and decrepit junks. The contrast, the 
reality, could not have been greater. The harbour, for example, as seen 
from the US naval attaché’s launch, was very large and orderly […] Even 
the legendary Raffles Hotel turned out to be a pleasant stone structure, not 
bamboo and attap fronds, and the air conditioning at the Elizabethan Grill 
was so aggressive it froze us stiff at lunch […] The other guests expanded 
at length about the delightful living in Singapore, ‘the finest residential 
city in the Far East’. I made a mental note.1 
 As this observation shows, CIA officer Russell Jack Smith found 
Singapore to be something of a surprise. On a personal level, he had expected an 
old-world, jingoistic version of an ‘Oriental’ city, and discovered a modern and 
efficient hub of commerce, high society and modernity. On the professional level, 
having toured round Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland Southeast 
Asia, he was equally surprised to discover in Singapore an intelligence goldmine. 
Singapore was not just the centre of gravity for the British Empire in the Far East. 
Intelligence officers such as Smith and his British counterparts also saw 
Singapore as a unique meeting point of cultures. Singapore was almost part of 
Malaya, with a young and vibrant Chinese population divided in loyalty between 
various shades of nationalists, communists and those who were pragmatically 
tolerant of colonial rule. It was close enough to mainland Southeast Asia to be 
useful as a base for covert action and sufficiently juxtaposed to Indonesia to 
attract the attention of government agents, rebels and Dutch spies. As a result, 
Singapore became a Cold War spy city. It even had the occasional (largely 
uneventful) visit from high-profile Soviet spies.2 This view, shared by British 
intelligence officers and their allies, depicted Singapore as a ‘unique window’ on 
Southeast Asia: the ideal place for conducting intelligence operations. However, 
this was an interpretation which rested upon imperialist prejudices. As implicit in 
Smith’s observations, Singapore was also seen as uniquely comfortable. It was 
part of Asia but with all the conveniences of the Western model of modernity. 
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This made Singapore an attractive place of work for a plethora of international 
spies. 
 This intelligence melting pot comprised American, Australian, Chinese, 
Dutch, French, Indonesian, Soviet and many other intelligence officers. At its 
heart was the British intelligence community (or, to be more accurate, 
communities). British intelligence was organised across three levels: the local, the 
regional and the national. Singapore was not only a physical home for the many 
agencies which compromised this system. It was also a conceptual focal point. 
From the late 1940s, Singapore was regarded as Britain’s critical defence interest 
in the Far East. Even before the Second World War, with the opening of the 
Singapore naval base and realisation of the strategic vulnerability of Hong Kong, 
Singapore had assumed its status as the nerve centre of British defence and 
intelligence in 1939. 
 However, not everybody in the British government was satisfied with this 
state of affairs. The Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office seemed to 
think of the Singapore intelligence system as ‘a slough of despond in South East 
Asia’.3 Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick voiced this opinion at a time when the British 
government was thinking about cutting back on its commitments to Southeast 
Asia. The question was one of cost versus value. Ultimately, although the overall 
size of the Commissioner General’s establishment was reduced, intelligence 
activities continued largely unhindered. SIFE, SIS, RIO and the joint and service 
intelligence organisations retained their organisations in Singapore, and adapted 
their activities to the evolving environment of the Cold War and decolonisation. 
The ‘unique window’ view appeared to prevail.  
 This thesis has revolved around three important themes. Firstly, it has 
evaluated the relationship between the three levels of intelligence, interrogating 
their organisation, working culture and impact, to ascertain the nature of the 
British intelligence community in Singapore. Overall, it is clear that there were 
two closely associated but nevertheless distinct British intelligence communities 
in Singapore: a local one and a regional-national one. Secondly, this discussion 
has shown that intelligence (particularly security intelligence) played a very 
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significant role in Singapore’s post-war evolution. This has shed new light on the 
urban counterpart to the Malayan Emergency, British priorities in the 
decolonisation of Singapore, and the continuity between colonial and post-
colonial regimes. Finally, this thesis considers two contradictory views proposed 
by intelligence practitioners and their consumers: the ‘unique window’ and 
‘slough of despond’ interpretations. It is evident that the former was dominant, but 
the reasons for this are worth delineating. 
 
Understanding an intelligence community 
 The three-tier model of intelligence was not unique to Singapore. Britain 
created similar intelligence architectures for the post-war Middle East and, to a 
lesser extent, in Central Africa. Understanding how these systems worked in 
practice reveals how Britain conceptualised and sought to enact its intelligence 
empire in the age of decolonisation and the Cold War. When considering 
Singapore and the Far East, it appears more accurate to talk of two intelligence 
communities: a regional-national community, and a local intelligence community. 
The distinction between the two can be seen across the three main areas of 
analysis used by this thesis: intelligence organisation, intelligence culture and 
intelligence impact. 
 The organisation of intelligence is critical to understanding its hierarchies, 
the status of different agencies and activities, and its relationship with users. In the 
early post-war years, the regional intelligence architecture was most influenced by 
concerns relating to perceived ‘lessons’ of the Second World War and the 
emerging Cold War national intelligence agenda. Highest status was accorded to 
service and joint intelligence organisations, and, through the authority of the JIC, 
strategic intelligence was invested with highest priority. This community was 
already very close to its parent organisations in the metropole. Concurrently, the 
local intelligence machine, although resurrected quite easily by experienced 
officers like Alan Blades, was shaped into an anachronistic structure more suitable 
to the pre-war colonial architecture than post-1945 realities. The outbreak of the 
Malayan Emergency catalysed the revision and expansion of these intelligence 
networks in response to the developing Cold War in Southeast Asia. Unlike in 
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Europe, this conflict was as much about combatting insurgencies and other threats 
to imperial security as it was a strategic stand-off with communist great powers. 
This entailed a greater focus on counter-subversion and regional security, 
benefitting the status of agencies such as SIFE and SIS(FE) which could 
contribute to these priorities. The creation of the JID in 1950, by pooling the 
political capital of these two agencies, further enhanced their centrality to regional 
intelligence. From 1949, regional intelligence agencies were housed alongside 
their principal consumers in Phoenix Park, resolving some of the tensions which 
previously existed between producers and their users. 
 Following the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency and the changes it 
provoked, consistent organisational trends began to develop. Within the regional-
national intelligence community, security intelligence continued to increase in 
importance and status. This created greater synergy with local intelligence, in 
which security was by far the major priority, but organisational practices 
continued to divide the two communities. At the regional-national level, security 
intelligence was essentially non-executive and advisory. Locally, the Singapore 
Special Branch was an integral part of the police and part of the enforcement 
machinery. This proved very effective in enabling intelligence to be disseminated 
to influence timely action. During the Harbour Board unrest of April 1948, as well 
as the more protracted campaign against the underground MCP from 1948-55, 
Special Branch responded to tactical intelligence in an effective manner. The 
police operations they led, although essentially reactive, prevented a more 
successful MCP campaign and kept a lid on communist activities. These local 
intelligence efforts were largely self-supporting and separate from the regional-
national levels, although the dramatic events of 1950 led to slightly more interest 
– and intrusion – from higher up the hierarchy. 
 As the 1950s wore on, the evolving complexity of Cold War problems 
prompted further changes to regional intelligence. Nevertheless, the status 
relationships which emerged in the wake of the Malayan Emergency remained 
unaltered. The JIC remained central to the overall intelligence cycle, and SIFE 
and SIS(FE) were the most pertinent instruments of these changes. Although the 
rise of communist China proved to be an intractable intelligence target, changes in 
Southeast Asia prompted more positive developments. The birth of a new 
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communist state in North Vietnam, and the countervailing creation of a non-
communist alliance through SEATO, prompted a growth in scope for regional 
intelligence. Throughout the 1950s, the regional and national levels continued to 
grow closer. The former began implementing policies devised by the latter, 
moving beyond narrow reporting functions.  
 As well as organisation, this thesis has examined the workings and 
operational culture of British intelligence in Singapore. Naturally this was heavily 
influenced by patterns of organisation. The specific organisation of Special 
Branch, as well as the more confined scope of problems it faced, ensured that the 
local intelligence culture was more exclusively focused upon counter-subversion 
and security than that of the regional-national community. Special Branch became 
reasonably effective at intelligence production due to the experience of its officers 
and the working culture inherited from its predecessors. It was even more 
effective at instrumentalising that intelligence for operational purposes. However, 
its production saw a discrepancy between excellent tactical and poor strategic 
intelligence. Such a discrepancy prevented the colonial government from 
wrestling greater initiative away from the MCP. Similarly, intelligence collection 
remained the crucial weakness of the regional-national intelligence cycle. As a 
result, it was sometimes difficult for intelligence assessors to provide a reliable 
understanding of events as they unfolded. Cold War interpretations dominated, 
although these were not always implicit of a monolithic or Soviet-dominated view 
of communism. Instead, intelligence analysis was reasonably receptive to local 
variations. 
 Throughout the 1950s, Special Branch enjoyed continued tactical success 
due to a combination of factors including luck, preventative policing, sound 
intelligence methods and a favourable operational environment. Their working 
culture was influenced by both their status as a police department and their task as 
an intelligence organisation. They consistently struggled to recover from the loss 
of important sources in 1950 and mainly produced tactical, reactive intelligence in 
dealing with the communist underground. In countering the activities of a 
communist united front, their long-term intelligence potential began to improve, 
enabling more pre-emptive operations such as Operations Apple and Banana in 
1957. This period saw increasing interaction between the local and regional-
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national intelligence communities due to concerns about maintaining access to 
intelligence after decolonisation. These interactions were shaped by power 
relationships, as SIFE and MI5 sought to ‘improve’ the intelligence culture of 
Special Branch and ensure that their own post-colonial intelligence needs were 
safeguarded. Decolonisation became an additional imperative and affected the 
way that intelligence actors responded to both the internal and external Cold Wars 
in Singapore. Security remained paramount, and Britain was not prepared to 
compromise without adequate guarantees that its access to intelligence would 
remain undiluted. 
 This alludes to an important observation. Contrary to the views espoused 
by some intelligence actors at the time and some more recent historians, in the 
context of the 1950s British Empire, a distinction between security intelligence 
and political (or colonial) intelligence makes little sense. Although these two 
aspects of intelligence were not entirely the same, they need to be understood 
together as part of a dynamic relationship. Special Branch was not just an agent of 
colonial political intelligence. It was a mechanism for national security 
intelligence, albeit working in a different way to MI5. This appreciation is 
significant for understanding what was meant by security intelligence and who 
produced it. In the specific context of the end of empires and early Cold War, 
security intelligence was as much the jurisdiction of police structures as of MI5 
and its proxies. Outside of Britain, MI5 was reliant upon these local security 
machines for providing intelligence and ensuring its own efficiency. Nevertheless, 
defining boundaries was all about power, and MI5 sought to establish hegemony 
over security intelligence assessment, even if accepting that it was dependent 
upon Special Branches for security intelligence collection. 
 Evaluating the impact and influence of intelligence is more problematic. It 
could be argued that agencies such as SIFE were very successful in persuading 
Malcolm MacDonald of their particular world-view (in turn disseminated to the 
metropole). However, it is difficult to establish whether this was due to SIFE’s 
influence or a coincidence of views. Nevertheless, intelligence was useful in 
shaping how policy-makers approached the developing Cold War, even by 
confirming their pre-assumptions, and not necessarily guiding specific policies. 
From the mid-1950s, the intelligence communities also became influential as a 
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means of executing foreign policy through clandestine means. This provided 
perhaps the greatest justification for maintaining this ‘slough of despond’. They 
provided an avenue for policy implementation which matched British goals and 
capabilities. Specifically, intelligence diplomacy proved effective at building 
influence and alignments, even if it did little to improve information collection. 
Comparably, within Singapore’s borders, the Emergency was the dominant theme 
in colonial governance from 1948-55. Special Branch was the front line in this 
struggle, and therefore enjoyed the full support of the administration. Special 
Branch was not just an intelligence producer but also a key organ in shaping 
Singapore’s history during this turbulent period. The qualified effectiveness of 
Special Branch played a crucial role in determining the failure of the MCP and the 
confidence felt by British administrators in devolving power. The Emergency was 
the dominant problem for Singapore in the early 1950s, and Special Branch 
provided the primary means of engagement with it. 
 From 1955, decolonisation became an equally important dictate. The key 
goals of the regional-national intelligence community were to ensure an orderly 
transfer of power which would retain pro-British, anti-communist influence and to 
leave behind a British intelligence culture. The local intelligence machine proved 
adept at fulfilling these goals. Special Branch monitored the emergence of new 
political parties and ensured that policy-makers felt safe about decolonisation. 
They were certain that Lee Kuan Yew was not a communist, and from 1957 were 
increasingly optimistic about his prospects of maintain control against leftist 
influences within the PAP. Meanwhile, with attempts to ‘Malayanise’ the police 
proving a mixed record of success, the retention of experienced expatriate 
personnel, in addition to the training provided by SIFE and MI5, ensured that the 
local security apparatus retained a British intelligence culture during the period 
between the beginning of self-government in 1959 and Singapore’s ultimate 
independence in 1965. 
 From analysis of these three areas, it becomes clear that there were two 
British intelligence communities operating in Singapore during the early Cold 
War: a local intelligence community, and a regional-national one. Although they 
were frequently interpenetrated and consulted at various stages, these 
communities were divided by their organisation, working practices and priorities. 
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For the local intelligence community, security intelligence was the dominant (and 
arguably the only) concern. Moreover, responsibility for security intelligence was 
vested in the Special Branch: an integral part of the police and in contrast to the 
non-executive standards of the regional-national community. At the regional-
national level, security intelligence was one of the most prominent activities but 
had to compete for influence with other concerns. The local intelligence 
community demonstrated a successful capacity for tactical intelligence 
production. Conversely, the major recurring weakness of the regional-national 
community was an inability to improve the collection of raw intelligence outside 
Singapore. Nonetheless, both these intelligence communities had a significant 
impact upon Britain’s pursuit of its foreign policy objectives during the Cold War 
and withdrawal from empire. In the first instance, intelligence communities 
reinforced a Cold War awareness within their consumer departments and guided 
perceptions of the threat. Secondly, intelligence communities were more than just 
passive, reporting bodies. The regional-national community offered opportunities 
to covertly implement Cold War policies through providing a mechanism for 
building up a buffer zone in the ‘northern tier’ of Southeast Asia, and facilitating 
the continuation of British influence despite dwindling overt resources. 
Meanwhile, the local intelligence community guided police action and shaped 
opinions to make sure that Singapore was safe for decolonisation. 
 
Understanding Singapore 
 This thesis is not just a study of a particular intelligence model adopted by 
Britain in response to post-war ‘lessons’ and adapted to cope with Cold War 
demands. It also represents a new approach to Singapore’s post-war history. Most 
existing histories have focused on Singapore’s road to independence through 
exploring the rise of the PAP, the societal changes which facilitated it, and the 
negotiations between the colonisers and the colonised. A smaller body of 
scholarship has engaged with Singapore’s place in international history; 
particularly how the global Cold War contributed to the form and pace of 
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Singapore’s decolonisation.4 These international studies have downplayed the role 
of the major challenger to Singapore’s national security: the MCP. On the other 
hand, studies of the Emergency have focused not upon British reactions but upon 
the actions of the communists themselves and the different strategies they used.5 
 This thesis has brought into focus another aspect of Singaporean history: 
the role of British intelligence – particularly Special Branch – in determining 
Singapore’s course. By highlighting the significance of this forgotten actor, two 
core themes become clear. Firstly, the Emergency which began in 1948 was a 
significant and previously undervalued aspect of the Singapore story. Although 
less consistently violent than in the Federation, this struggle affected all strata of 
society, from ordinary citizens forced to live within the confines of Emergency 
Regulations to local businessmen working with the fear of extortion by the 
communists or their criminal allies; from nationalist politicians seeking to position 
themselves as acceptable to the British security regime to the colonialists 
themselves. This was the fundamental national security concern, and intelligence 
was the key to its resolution. Special Branch did not just ensure the political 
survival of the colonial regime by weeding out communist dissidents. It was also 
providing for long-term security for a future independent Singapore, and 
supporting the police in maintaining law and order. As Carl Trocki has shown, the 
idea of a culture of control is an important aspect in explaining continuity in 
Singapore’s history.6 Security intelligence contributed to this continuity. 
 Although the Emergency in the Federation, and the role of intelligence 
services in responding to it, is a well-trodden story, concurrent events in 
Singapore remain less well-known. The communist campaign in Singapore was 
not constant, but shifted between four broad phases: political penetration and 
labour subversion (1946-49), overt violence against colonial and local elites 
(1950), underground-directed resistance and subversion of the masses (1951-55) 
and the development of united fronts in labour, education and politics (1955-59). 
This is not to say that all these strategies were not used at any one time; rather, the 
primary focus of MCP efforts switched from one approach to the next in a 
                                                            
4 Long, Safe for Decolonisation; Heng and Aljunied (eds.), Singapore in Global History; Lau, 
‘Decolonisation and the Cold War in Singapore’. 
5 Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution; Lee, The Open United Front; Singh, Quest for Political Power. 
6 Trocki, Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control. 
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chronology broadly consistent with this periodisation. As a result, the security 
machine had to evolve its responses, from longer-term intelligence efforts to more 
decisive action through riot control, picking off leaders and vetting potential front 
members. Although consistently reactive against MCP initiatives, Special Branch 
was successful in meeting the challenges entailed by each phase. Ultimately, their 
intelligence production played an important role in developing perceptions of Lee 
Kuan Yew as a trustworthy heir to the anti-communist colonial state. 
 This alludes to a second theme in the relationship between intelligence and 
Singapore’s history. The development of an effective police and intelligence 
machine was a major part of the process of decolonisation. On the one hand, 
Special Branch removed a principal obstacle to constitutional progress by 
neutralising the threat from the MCP underground by 1955. Moreover, by 
reassuring colonial administrators and the national government in London about 
the reliability of Lee Kuan Yew, they created an atmosphere in which Britain felt 
safe to decolonise Singapore in a manner which would preserve their vital 
intelligence, strategic and Cold War interests. Studying the intelligence machine 
which developed in Singapore, consisting of both the local and regional-national 
intelligence communities, provides a unique window on the fascinating history of 
post-war Singapore in its transition from Britain’s paramount interest in the Far 
East to an independent nation. 
 As this thesis has shown, Lee Kuan Yew was heavily vetted by Special 
Branch and MI5 in the early to mid-1950s. Moreover, he showed a willingness to 
inform them about MCP overtures to the PAP. Following Special Branch action 
against leftist elements within the PAP in 1957, Lee became more outspoken 
against communism. It is therefore unsurprising that, once in office from 1959, he 
worked effectively with Special Branch and the Internal Security Council in 
moving against communist influences. Operation Cold Store in 1963 fulfilled 
Britain’s security concerns by rounding up great numbers of suspected 
communists. It also shows how Lee used security actors to help solidify his 
power. Viewed from the perspective of intelligence, the Singapore story would 
therefore appear one of continuity rather than new departures. 
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‘Slough of despond’ or ‘unique window’? 
 The regional level of intelligence was consistently problematic for policy-
makers. Two interpretations were apparent: the ‘unique window’ and the ‘slough 
of despond’. The ‘unique window’ view was widely held by British intelligence 
practitioners and their foreign allies. This was a self-perpetuating view. By 
treating Singapore as a ‘unique window’, regional intelligence agencies 
encouraged other nations to do the same in order to benefit from closeness to 
Britain’s centre of gravity. Meanwhile, in doing so, they also provided an 
argument to justify their own existence. In contrast, some consumers of 
intelligence regarded Singapore (specifically regional intelligence) as a ‘slough of 
despond’: a waste of effort and money. However, this was a minority view. The 
‘unique window’ interpretation prevailed, but we can question how far it was 
objectively correct and why it held such traction. From available records, it 
appears that regional intelligence, although popular with its immediate users in 
Phoenix Park, struggled to improve intelligence collection and sometimes pursued 
conflicting priorities to the metropole (as seen in the debates over the China 
Bureau).  
 However, regional intelligence was valuable in other ways which moved 
beyond the narrow functions of the typical intelligence cycle. It supported the 
illusion that Britain could deal with the Southeast Asian region as a whole; it 
provided an avenue for coordinated Cold War activities; it served as a useful 
exchange point; and it supported Britain’s ambitions to remain an influential great 
power. For these reasons, the ‘slough of despond’ view failed to gather traction. 
The British intelligence communities in Singapore were as much about 
implementing policy as helping to guide it. In doing so, they made themselves 
invaluable. 
 The CIA’s Russell Smith encapsulated this view when he described 
Singapore as ‘a unique window on the swirling post-World War II scene of 
Southeast Asia where every country from Burma to Indonesia was struggling to 
reach a new accommodation with changed realities’. Smith fully believed in the 
value of an intelligence apparatus in Singapore which could provide ‘an 
understanding of the interplay of economic, political, and strategic forces as seen 
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from within the region, not from distant and paperbound Washington’.7 This was 
the logic shared by Malcolm MacDonald and other supporters of the three-tier 
approach to British intelligence. They believed that a regional collation machinery 
based in Singapore could provide rapid assessments of locally-produced 
information informed by the nuances of immersion in Southeast Asia as a whole 
and Singapore itself. This could complement the longer-term evaluations of the 
national intelligence hierarchy in London.  
 This view rested in part upon imperialist prejudices and a preference for 
the comforts of Singapore over dispersion in the field.  The idea of Singapore as a 
‘unique window’ was based upon perceptions of its status as a racial, cultural and 
intellectual melting pot which reflected the imperialist paradigm by which the 
colonial government saw its subject populations. One could argue that the very 
concept of a ‘unique intelligence window’ was dependent upon an imperialist 
approach to knowledge-building and cultural understanding. It also reflected a 
preference for imposing order and generalisations upon the dynamic and very 
diverse post-war situation in Southeast Asia. Moreover, by choosing to create a 
regional administrative bureaucracy for Southeast Asia, Britain created a situation 
with its own unique intelligence requirements. 
 The particular intelligence structure which evolved from 1946 therefore 
constituted a ‘unique window’ upon how Britain saw the evolving Cold War and 
its own priorities. This was informed by a strong focus on imperial security. The 
imperative of imperial security interacted with perceptions of the Cold War to 
produce a British Singaporean approach to intelligence assessment. Cold War 
suspicions abounded, even when there was a distinct lack of available 
information, but regional intelligence bodies seemed never to lose sight of the 
principal problem: the threat of local communist movements to imperial security. 
This was linked with the broader Cold War through the prism of Soviet 
ideological inspiration and the pull factor of ‘Red China’. As decolonisation 
became increasingly inevitable, intelligence assessors were faced with the 
problem of how to understand the relationship between nationalists and 
communists. On the whole, the latter remained the greater problem. 
                                                            
7 Smith, The Unknown CIA, p. 90. 
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 The Singapore intelligence system perhaps attained its greatest 
significance through its ability to contribute to the implementation of policy. From 
the available declassified records, it is more difficult to comment upon the content 
and influence of intelligence assessments from the 1950s than the late 1940s. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that, in response to the evolving external environment, 
intelligence agencies – particularly at the regional level – were increasingly called 
upon to play a more active role in furthering British goals. In the first place, MI5 
and SIFE conducted intelligence diplomacy to strengthen British influence 
amongst foreign partners, particularly SEATO and individual Asian powers. 
Although reluctant to share intelligence material due to political, cultural and 
security impediments, these British agencies were keen to develop relationships 
through training and advice. Similarly, these same techniques were used to instil a 
British (or Commonwealth) intelligence culture within British territories preparing 
for independence. This intelligence diplomacy had two primary purposes: to 
ensure continued access to local intelligence after decolonisation, and to support 
Southeast Asian states in resisting communism. In both regards, Britain appears to 
have been broadly successful in the short-term; at least until the withdrawal from 
East of Suez by the late 1960s rendered these interests largely obsolete. 
Meanwhile, agencies such as RIO and SIS(FE) contributed to Cold War goals 
through propaganda and covert action. As with intelligence diplomacy, these 
activities enabled Britain to engage with the Cold War discreetly and without 
entailing major (costly) commitments. In other words, intelligence was a way of 
fighting the Cold War on the quiet and on the cheap. This helped ensure the 
survival of regional intelligence despite certain metropolitan pressures in the mid-
1950s. 
 It is therefore possible to understand why an intelligence system of 
doubtful efficacy at its core function (generating and processing intelligence) was 
treated as an invaluable instrument or a ‘unique window’. This was an imperialist 
approach to Cold War intelligence, and as such, imperialist perceptions and 
imperial priorities dominated. Singapore was the centre of Britain’s defence 
interests in the Far East and a key imperial stronghold. It was also perceived to be 
a safe and comfortable place from which to survey Southeast Asia. More tangibly, 
the intelligence system which evolved from 1946 did not do so in a vacuum. It 
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constantly adapted to meet the immediate interests of its principal consumers: the 
local and regional governments in Singapore. Nobody doubted that as long as 
there was a Commissioner General there would need to be a mid-level of 
intelligence between the local and national. Although the operational details of 
intelligence agencies remain shrouded in secrecy, it is evident that they had a 
noteworthy bureaucratic impact. This is measurable both in the evolution and 
expansion of the Phoenix Park intelligence system, and also in the perceptions of 
users who saw value in this system despite criticising its actual intelligence 
collection.  
 Finally, there was one way in which this system can be regarded as a 
genuinely ‘unique window’, notwithstanding the imperialist connotations of this 
concept. Windows, of course, can be opened, and things can pass through them. 
Singapore provided the ideal location to coordinate clandestine activities which 
moved beyond passive reporting and into the active implementation of policy. 
Understanding the nature of the British intelligence apparatus in Singapore 
therefore highlights the proactivity of Britain’s approach to the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia in the covert realm. British spies didn’t just look through the 
window. They opened the window, and tried to pass their influence through it. 
 Singapore was a ‘unique window’ on intelligence insofar as British 
imperialist intelligence organisers chose to make it so. They deliberately made 
Singapore the centre of the clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia and used it to 
exert influence across the region. Studying British intelligence in Singapore is 
therefore revealing of how British intelligence approached the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia. It is equally revealing of how British policy-makers 
conceptualised Singapore during the latter stages of empire. 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
292 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
Archival Sources: State Papers 
Kew, The National Archives 
Air Ministry Series 
AIR 20: Papers Accumulated by the Air Historical Branch: 1874-1986 
AIR 40: Directorate of Intelligence, 1926-1984 
Cabinet Office Series 
CAB 21: Registered Files, 1916-1965 
CAB 158: JIC Memoranda, 1946-1968 
CAB 159: JIC Minutes, 1947-1968 
Colonial Office Series 
CO 537: Confidential General Correspondence, 1759-1955 
CO 953: Singapore Original Correspondence, 1936-1951 
CO 968: Defence Department, 1941-1967 
CO 1022: South-East Asia Department, 1950-1956 
CO 1030: Far East Department, 1941-1967 
CO 1035: Intelligence and Security Department, 1954-1965 
Ministry of Defence Series 
DEFE 4: Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes, 1947-1981 
DEFE 5: Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda, 1947-1981 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Series 
FCO 141: Migrated Archives, 1835-2012 
Foreign Office Series 
FO 371: Political Departments, General Correspondence, 1906-1966 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
293 
 
FO 810: Consulate, Batavia and Embassy, Jakarta, Dutch East Indies, 
1846-1976 
FO 953: Information Policy Department and Regional Information 
Departments, 1947-1965 
FO 959: Consulates, French Indo-China, 1945-1959 
FO 1091: Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, 1950-1963 
FO 1110: Information Research Department, General Correspondence, 
1948-1967 
Prime Minister’s Office Series 
PREM 8: Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951 
PREM 11: Correspondence and Papers, 1951-1964 
Security Service (MI5) Series 
KV 4: Policy Files, 1909-1963 
War Office Series 
WO 208: Directorate of Military Intelligence, 1917-1974 
London, The British Library 
India Office Series 
IOR/L/WS: War Staff Files 
 
Archival Sources: Private Papers 
Durham, Durham University Library 
Malcolm MacDonald Papers (GB 033 MAC) 
Oxford, Bodleian Library 
Manuscripts Indian Ocean Series 
S. 116: Papers of Wilfred Lawson Blythe   
S. 251: Malayan Security Service Political Intelligence Journals 
S. 254: Papers of John Dalley  
S. 262: Papers of Harold Fairburn 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
294 
 
S. 271: Papers of H. Ralph Hone 
S. 325: Interview with Clifford B. B. Heathcote-Smith 
S. 344: Interview with David Mercer MacDougall 
London, School of Oriental and African Studies Library 
PP MS 31: Papers of Wilfred Lawson Blythe 
 
Online Sources 
Central Intelligence Agency CREST programme 
CIA-RDP82-00457R005800680012-5 
CIA-RDP82-00457R005000630002-9 
National Archives of Australia, Department of External Affairs 
A1209, 1958/5716: JIB(Melbourne) Report on Sino-Soviet Collaboration, 
1953 
A1838, 2464/1-2464/4: SEATO Committee of Security Experts 
National Archives and Records Administration (United States), Central 
Intelligence Agency Records (RG 263) 
Box 14/39/3, Robert M. Leviness, ‘The Chinese as Agent’, Studies in 
Intelligence 10, summer 1966 
Box 18/40/4, Gail Solin, ‘The Art of China-Watching’, Studies in 
Intelligence 19, spring 1975 
National Archives of Singapore Oral History Programme 
000039: Guo Ren Huey  
000044: Richard Corridon 
000150: Ahmad Khan 
000156: David Saul Marshall 
001745: Nigel Morris 
001458: William Cheng 
 
 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
295 
 
Memoirs and other published primary sources 
Chin Peng, My Side of History (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003) 
Fong Chong Pik, Memoirs of a Malayan Communist Revolutionary (Singapore: 
SIRD, 2008) 
Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger, 2nd edn (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 
2014) 
Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story (Singapore: Times Editions, 1998) 
Lilley, James and Jeffrey Lilley, China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, 
Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) 
MacDonald, Malcolm, People and Places (London: Collins, 1969) 
MacDonald, Malcolm and Alexander Nicholas Shaw (ed.), The Pleasures and 
Pains of Collecting (Durham: Friends of the Oriental Museum, 2018) 
Mathams, R. H., Sub Rosa: Memoirs of an Australian Intelligence Analyst 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1982) 
Onraet, René, Singapore: A Police Background (London: Dorothy Crisp, 1946) 
Shinozaki, Mamoru, Syonan: My Story (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2011) 
Smith, Joseph B., Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Putnam’s, 1976) 
Smith, Russell Jack, The Unknown Central Intelligence Agency: My Three 
Decades with the Agency (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989) 
 
Newspapers 
The Daily Telegraph (London) 
The Singapore Free Press (Singapore) 
The Singapore Standard (Singapore) 
The Straits Budget (Singapore) 
The Straits Times (Singapore) 
The Times (London) 
 
 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
296 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Books 
Aid, Mathew M. and Cees Wiebes (eds.), Secrets of Signals Intelligence during 
the Cold War and Beyond (London: Frank Cass, 2001) 
Akita, Shigeru, Gerold Korzewski and Shoichi Watanabe (eds.), The 
Transformation of the International Order of Asia: Decolonization, the Cold War 
and the Colombo Plan (London: Routledge, 2014) 
Aldrich, Richard J., The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret 
Intelligence (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2002) 
Aldrich, Richard J. (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 
(London: Routledge, 1992) 
Aldrich, Richard J., GCHQ (London: Harper Press, 2010) 
Aldrich, Richard J., Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and 
the Politics of Secret Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
Aldrich, Richard J. and Rory Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence 
and British Prime Ministers (London: William Collins, 2016) 
Aldrich, Richard J. and Michael F. Hopkins, Intelligence, Defence and 
Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994) 
Aldrich, Richard J., Gary Rawnsley and Ming-yeh Rawnsley (eds.), The 
Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-1965: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and 
Special Operations (London: Frank Cass, 1999) 
Aljunied, Syed Muhd Khairudin, Colonialism, Violence and Muslims in Southeast 
Asia: The Maria Hertogh Controversy and its Aftermath (London: Routledge, 
2009) 
Anderson, David M. and David Killingray (eds.), Policing and Decolonisation: 
Politics, Nationalism and the Police (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992) 
Andrew, Christopher and Simona Tobia (eds.), Interrogation in War and Conflict: 
A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Analysis (London: Routledge, 2014) 
Andrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin, The KGB and the World: The 
Mitrokhin Archive II (London: Penguin, 2006) 
Andrew, Christopher, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 
(London: Allen Lane, 2009) 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
297 
 
Barr, Michael D., Singapore: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2019) 
Barr, Michael D. and Carl A. Trocki (eds.), Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism 
in Post-War Singapore (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008) 
Ban Kah Choon, Absent History: The Untold Story of Special Branch Operations 
in Singapore, 1915-1942 (Singapore: Horizon Books, 2001) 
Bayly, C. A., Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social 
Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) 
Bayly, Christopher and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: Freedom and Revolution in 
Southeast Asia (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010) 
Best, Antony (ed.), Britain’s Retreat from Empire in East Asia, 1905-1980 
(London: Routledge, 2017) 
Best, Antony, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 
Bloodworth, Dennis, The Tiger and the Trojan Horse (Singapore: Times Editions, 
1986) 
Bonner, David, Executive Measures, Terrorism and National Security: Have the 
Rules of the Game Changed? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 
Bower, Tom, The Perfect English Spy: Sir Dick White and the Secret War, 1935-
90 (London: Heinemann, 1995) 
Callanan, James, Covert Action in the Cold War: US Policy, Intelligence and CIA 
Operations (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010) 
Clague, Peter, Iron Spearhead (Singapore: Heinemann, 1980) 
Clutterbuck, Richard, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1973) 
Comber, Leon, Malaya’s Secret Police, 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch 
in the Malayan Emergency (Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2008) 
Corera, Gordon, MI6: Life and Death in the British Secret Service (London: 
Phoenix, 2012) 
Cormac, Rory, Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and 
Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst, 2013) 
Cormac, Rory, Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces and the Secret Pursuit of 
British Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
298 
 
Cradock, Percy, Know your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee saw 
the World (London: John Murray, 2002) 
Cumings, Bruce, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume I: Liberation and the 
Emergence of Separate Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) 
Davies, Peter, The Authorised History of British Defence Economic Intelligence: 
A Cold War in Whitehall, 1929-90 (London: Routledge, 2018) 
Davies, Phillip H. J., Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United 
States, Volume 2: Evolution of the UK Intelligence Community (Santa Barbara: 
Praeger, 2012) 
Davies, Phillip H. J., MI6 and the Machinery of Spying: Structure and Process in 
Britain’s Secret Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 2004) 
Defty, Andrew, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53: The 
Information Research Department (London: Routledge, 2004) 
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis, The Secret War for China: Espionage, Revolution and the 
Rise of Mao (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017) 
Dorril, Stephen, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (London: Fourth Estate, 
2001) 
Dylan, Huw, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain’s Joint Intelligence 
Bureau, 1945-1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
Elphick, Peter, Far Eastern File: Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930-1945 
(London: Coronet, 1998) 
Goodman, Michael S., The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 
Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis 
(London: Routledge, 2014) 
Goscha, Christopher E. and Christian F. Ostermann (eds.), Connecting Histories: 
Decolonisation and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009) 
Grant, Matthew (ed.), The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy 
and the Bomb (2009) 
Hack, Karl, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and 
Singapore 1941-1968 (Richmond: Curzon, 2001)  
Hashimoto, Chikara, The Twilight of the British Empire: British Intelligence and 
Counter-Subversion in the Middle East, 1945-63 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2017) 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
299 
 
Heng, Derek and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied (eds.), Singapore in Global 
History (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011) 
Herman, Michael, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 
Hevia, James, The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and 
Empire-Building in Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
Hong Liu and Sin-Kiong Wong, Singapore Chinese Society in Transition: 
Business, Politics and Socio-Economic Change, 1945-1965 (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2004) 
Horner, David, The Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 1949-1963 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2014) 
Jeffery, Keith, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2010) 
Johnson, Robert, Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 
1757-1947 (London: Greenhill Books, 2008) 
Kent, Sherman, Strategic Intelligence Assessment for American World Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015) 
Lau, Albert (ed.), Southeast Asia and the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2012) 
Lee Ting Hui, The Open United Front: The Communist Struggle in Singapore, 
1954-1966 (Singapore: South Seas Society, 1996) 
Lomas, Daniel W. B., Intelligence, Security and the Attlee Governments, 1945-51 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017) 
Long, S. R. Joey, Safe for Decolonisation: The Eisenhower Administration, 
Britain and Singapore (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2011) 
Low, Donald and Thomas Vadaketh (eds.), Hard Choices: Challenging the 
Singapore Consensus (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2014) 
Lowe, Peter, Contending with Nationalism and Communism: British Policy 
towards Southeast Asia, 1945-65 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 
Major, Patrick and Christopher R. Moran (eds.), Spooked: Britain, Empire and 
Intelligence since 1945 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010) 
Mark, Chi-Kwan, Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations 
1949-1957 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004) 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
300 
 
McCoy, Alfred J., Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, 
and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2009) 
Murfett, Malcolm H. (ed.), Cold War Southeast Asia (Singapore: Marshall 
Cavendish, 2012) 
Phythian, Mark (ed.), Understanding the Intelligence Cycle (London: Routledge, 
2013) 
Poh, Soo Kai (ed.), Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History, 2nd edn 
(Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2015) 
Popplewell, Richard J., Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence 
and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904-1924 (London: Frank Cass, 1995) 
Ramakrishna, Kumar, Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts 
and Minds 1948-1958 (Richmond: Curzon, 2002) 
Ramakrishna, Kumar, Freedom News: The Untold Story of the Communist 
Underground Publication (Singapore: RSIS, 2008) 
Remme, Tilman, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945-
1949 (London: Routledge, 1995)  
Sanger, Clyde, Malcolm MacDonald: Bringing an End to Empire (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1995) 
Sinclair, Georgina, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial 
Endgame, 1945-80 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006) 
Singh, Bilveer, Quest for Political Power: Communist Subversion and Militancy 
in Singapore (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2015) 
Tarling, Nicholas, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Impact of the Korean War 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005) 
Tarling, Nicholas, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-
1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
Tarling, Nicholas (ed.), Studying Singapore’s Past: C. M. Turnbull and the 
History of Modern Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013) 
Thomas, Martin, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial 
Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) 
Trocki, Carl A., Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control (London: 
Routledge, 2006) 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
301 
 
Turnbull, C. M., A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005, 2nd edn (Singapore: 
National University of Singapore Press, 2009) 
Walton, Calder, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the 
Twilight of Empire (London: William Collins, 2013) 
Yong, C. F. and R. B. McKenna, The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 
1912-1949 (Singapore: NUS Press, 1990), p. 214. 
 
Articles and Chapters 
Aljunied, S. M. K., ‘Rethinking Riots in Colonial South-East Asia: The Case of 
the Maria Hertogh Controversy in Singapore, 1950-54’, South East Asia 
Research, 18(1) (2010), 105-131 
Anderson, David, ‘British Abuse and Torture in Kenya’s Counter-Insurgency, 
1952-60’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23(4) (2012), 700-719 
Andrew, Christopher, ‘The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and 
the Anglo-American Connection’, Intelligence and National Security, 4(2) (1989), 
213-256 
Arditti, Roger and Philip H. J. Davies, ‘Rethinking the Rise and Fall of the 
Malayan Security Service, 1946-48’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 43(2) (2015), 292-316 
Arditti, Roger, ‘Security Intelligence in the Middle East (SIME): Joint Security 
Intelligence Operations in the Middle East, c. 1939-58’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 31(3) (2016), 369-396 
Arditti, Roger, ‘The View from Above: How the Royal Air Force Provided a 
Strategic Vision for Operational Intelligence in the Malayan Emergency’, Small 
Wars & Insurgencies, 26(5) (2015), 764-789 
Badger, Anthony, ‘Historians, A Legacy of Suspicion and the “Migrated 
Archives”’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23(4-5) (2012), 799-807 
Ball, Desmond, ‘Over and Out: Signals Intelligence (Sigint) in Hong Kong’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 11(3) (1996), 474-496 
Ball, Simon J., ‘Selkirk in Singapore’, Twentieth Century British History, 10(2) 
(1999), 162-191 
Baxter, Christopher, ‘A Closed Book? British Intelligence and East Asia, 1945-
1950’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 22(1) (2011), 4-27 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
302 
 
Bennett, Huw, ‘“A Very Salutary Effect”: The Counter-Terror Strategy in the 
Early Malayan Emergency, June 1948 to December 1949’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 32(3) (2009), 415-444 
Best, Antony, ‘“We Are Virtually at War with Russia”: Britain and the Cold War 
in East Asia, 1923-40’, Cold War History, 12(2) (2003), 205-225 
Clipson, Edmund, ‘“For Purposes of Political Camouflage”: Intelligence 
Gathering in Colonial Burma, 1933-35’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 40(4) (2012), 643-667 
Comber, Leon, ‘“Traitor of All Traitors” – Secret Agent Extraordinaire: Lai Teck, 
Secretary-General, Communist Party of Malaya (1939-1947)’, Journal of the 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 83(2) (2010), 1-25 
Cormac, Rory, ‘A Whitehall ‘Showdown’? Colonial Office-Joint Intelligence 
Committee Relations in the Mid-1950s’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 39(2) (2011), 249-267 
Cormac, Rory, ‘The Pinprick Approach: Whitehall’s Top Secret Anti-Communist 
Committee and the Evolution of British Covert Action Strategy’, Journal of Cold 
War Studies, 16(3) (2014), 5-28 
Cormac, Rory, ‘Organising Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on 
Colonial Security’, Intelligence and National Security, 25(6) (2010), 800-822 
Craig, Tony, ‘From Counter-Subversion to Counter-Insurgency – Comparing 
MI5’s Role in British Guiana, Aden and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Crisis’, 
Journal of Intelligence History, 14(1) (2015), 38-53 
Dartford, Gerald P., ‘The Communist Threat to Malaya and Singapore’, Current 
History, 38(222) (1960), 82-87 
Davies, Philip H. J., ‘The SIS Singapore Station and the Role of the Far East 
Controller: Secret Intelligence Structure and Process in Post-War Colonial 
Administration’, Intelligence and National Security, 14(4) (1999), 105-129 
Deery, Phillip, ‘Malaya, 1948: Britain’s Asian Cold War?’, Journal of Cold War 
Studies, 9(1) (2007), 29-54 
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis, ‘US Intelligence and Chinese Spies in the Civil War’, 
Journal of Intelligence History, 13(1) (2014), 62-75 
Efimova, Larisa, ‘Did the Soviet Union Instruct Southeast Asian Communists to 
Revolt? New Russian Evidence on the Calcutta Youth Conference of February 
1948’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 40(3) (2009), 449-469 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
303 
 
Goscha, Christopher, ‘Intelligence in a Time of Decolonisation: The Case of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam at War (1945-1950)’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 22(1) (2007), 100-138 
Greenwood, Sean, ‘Frank Roberts and the ‘Other’ Long Telegram: The View 
from the British Embassy in Moscow, March 1946’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 25(1) (1990), 103-122 
Hack, Karl, ‘British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in the Era of 
Decolonisation: The Example of Malaya’, Intelligence and National Security, 
14(2) (1999), 124-155 
Hack, Karl, ‘“Iron Claws on Malaya”: The Historiography of the Malayan 
Emergency’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 30(1) (1999), 99-125 
Hack, Karl, ‘The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm’, Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 32(2) (2009), 383-414 
Hack, Karl, ‘The Origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya 1948’, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 40(3) (2009), 471-496 
Hampshire, Edward, ‘“Apply the Flame More Searingly”: The Destruction and 
Migration of the Archives of British Colonial Administration: A Southeast Asian 
Case Study’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 41(2) (2013), 334-
352 
Hashimoto, Chikara, ‘Fighting the Cold War or Post-Colonialism? Britain in the 
Middle East from 1945 to 1958: Looking through the Records of the British 
Security Service’, International History Review, 36(1) (2014), 19-44 
Hashimoto, Chikara, ‘The Training of Secret Police in Conflictual Intelligence 
Cultures: British Failure in the Middle East during the Cold War’, International 
History Review, 39(3) (2017), 450-469 
Hulnick, Arthur S., ‘The Downside of Open Source Intelligence’, International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 15(4) (2002), 565-579 
Hyam, Ronald, ‘The Primacy of Geopolitics: The Dynamics of British Imperial 
Policy, 1763-1963’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 27(2) 
(1999), 27-52 
Jones, Matthew, ‘Creating Malaysia: Singapore Security, the Borneo Territories, 
and the Contours of British Policy, 1961-63’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 28(2) (2000), 85-109 
Jones, Matthew, ‘Maximum Disavowable Aid: Britain, the United States and the 
Indonesian Rebellion, 1957-1958’, English Historical Review, 114(459) (1999), 
1179-1216 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
304 
 
Long, S. R. J., ‘Mixed Up in Power Politics and the Cold War: the Americans, the 
ICFTU and Singapore’s Labour Movement, 1955-1960’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 40(2) (2009), 323-352 
Luttikhuis, Bart, ‘Creating Distrust through Intelligence Work: Psychological 
Terror and the Dutch Security Services in Indonesia, 1945-1949’, War in History, 
25(2) (2018), 151-171 
Matejova, Miriam and Don Munton, ‘Western Intelligence Cooperation on 
Vietnam in the Early Cold War Era’, Journal of Intelligence History, 15(2) 
(2016), 139-155 
Mawby, Spencer, ‘Mr. Smith Goes to Vienna: Britain’s Cold War in the 
Caribbean 1951-1954’, Cold War History, 13(4) (2013), 541-561 
McKnight, David, ‘Western Intelligence and SEATO’s War on Subversion, 1956-
63’, Intelligence and National Security, 20(2) (2005), 288-303 
Murphy, Christopher J., ‘“Constituting a Problem in Themselves”: Countering 
Covert Chinese Activity in India: The Life and Death of the Chinese Intelligence 
Section, 1944-46’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 44(6) (2016), 
928-951 
Murphy, Philip, ‘A Police State? The Nyasaland Emergency and Colonial 
Intelligence’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 36(4) (2010), 765-780 
Murphy, Philip, ‘Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The View from 
Central Africa’, Intelligence and National Security, 17(3) (2002), 131-162 
Murphy, Philip, ‘Intelligence and Decolonisation: The Life and Death of the 
Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau, 1954-63’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 29(2) (2001), 101-130 
Neville, Warwick, ‘Singapore: Ethnic Diversity and its Implications’, Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers, 56(2) (1966), 236-253 (pp. 237-238) 
Ngoei, Wen-Qing, ‘World War II, Race and the Southeast Asian Origins of the 
Domino Theory’, Sources and Methods (Wilson Centre, 2017) 
<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/world-war-ii-race-and-the-southeast-
asian-origins-the-domino-theory> [accessed 8 March 2019]. 
Phillips, David, ‘The “Migrated Archives” and a Forgotten Corner of Empire: The 
Borneo Territories’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 44(6) 
(2016), 1001-1019 
Poeze, Harry E., ‘The Cold War in Indonesia, 1948’, Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 40(3) (2009), 497-517 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
305 
 
Ruane, Kevin, “Containing America’: Aspects of British Foreign Policy and the 
Cold War in South-East Asia, 1951-54’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 7(1) (1996), 
141-174 
Setzekorn, Eric, ‘The First China Watchers: British Intelligence Officers in China, 
1878-1900’, Intelligence and National Security, 28(2) (2013), 181-201 
Shaw, Alexander Nicholas, ‘British Counterinsurgency in Brunei and Sarawak, 
1962-63: Developing Best Practices in the Shadow of Malaya’, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 27(4) (2016), 702-725  
Shaw, Alexander Nicholas, ‘A Diplomat and Collector: Malcolm MacDonald’s 
Pursuit of Beauty during the Cold War and End of Empire’, Journal of the History 
of Collections, 30(3) (2018), 511-527 
Shaw, Alexander Nicholas, ‘MI5 and the Cold War in South-East Asia: 
Examining the Performance of Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE), 1946-1963’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 32(6) (2017), 797-816 
Shaw, Alexander Nicholas, ‘Sir Reader Bullard, Frank Roberts and the Azerbaijan 
Crisis of 1945-46: Bevin’s Officials, Perceptions and the Adoption of a Cold War 
Mentality in British Soviet Policy’, Cold War History, 17(3) (2017), 279-297 
Silvestri, Michael, ‘The Thrill of ‘Simply Dressing Up’: The Indian Police, 
Disguise, and Intelligence Work in Colonial India’, Journal of Colonialism and 
Colonial History, 2(2) (2001) 
Sinclair, Georgina, ‘“The Sharp End of the Intelligence Machine”: The Rise of the 
Malayan Police Special Branch 1948-1955’, Intelligence and National Security, 
26(4) (2011), 460-477 
Smith, Simon, ‘General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya: Hearts and 
Minds, Intelligence and Propaganda’, Intelligence and National Security, 16(3) 
(2001), 60-78 
Stewart, Brian, ‘Winning in Malaya: An Intelligence Success Story’, Intelligence 
and National Security, 14(4) (1999), 267-283 
Stockwell, A. J., ‘Imperial Security and Moslem Militancy, with Special 
Reference to the Hertogh Riots in Singapore (December 1950)’, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 17(2) (1986), 322-335 
Stockwell, A. J., ‘“A Widespread and Long Concocted Plot to Overthrow 
Government in Malaya”? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency’, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21(3) (1993), 66-88 
Alexander Nicholas Shaw 
306 
 
Sutton, Christopher, ‘Britain, the Cold War and “The Importance of Influencing 
the Young”: A Comparison of Cyprus and Hong Kong’, Britain and the World, 
7(1) (2014), 85-108 
Tarling, Nicholas, ‘Some Rather Nebulous Capacity: Lord Killearn’s 
Appointment in Southeast Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, 20(3) (1986), 559-600 
Troy, Thomas F., ‘The “Correct” Definition of Intelligence’, International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 5(4) (1991), 433-454 
Wade, Geoff, ‘The Beginnings of a ‘Cold War’ in Southeast Asia: British and 
Australian Perceptions’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 40(3) (2009), 543-
565 
Watkins, John, ‘Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early 
Modern Europe’, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 38(1) (2014), 1-
14. 
Wolf, Nikita, ‘“This Secret Town”: British Intelligence, the Special Relationship 
and the Vietnam War’, International History Review, 39(2) (2017), 338-367 
Yew, Leung, ‘Managing Plurality: The Politics of the Periphery in Early Cold 
War Singapore’, International Journal of Asian Studies, 7(2) (2010), 159-177 
 
Theses 
Arditti, Roger, ‘“Our Achilles’ Heel”: Interagency Intelligence during the 
Malayan Emergency’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Brunel University, 2015) 
Clipson, Edmund Beade, ‘Constructing an Intelligence State: The Colonial 
Security Services in Burma, 1930-1942’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University 
of Exeter, 2010) 
Lombardo, Johannes Richard, ‘United States Foreign Policy towards the British 
Crown Colony of Hong Kong during the Early Cold War Period, 1945-1964’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1997) 
Maguire, Thomas, ‘British and American Intelligence and Anti-Communist 
Propaganda in Early Cold War Southeast Asia, 1948-1961’ (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University of Cambridge, 2015) 
 
